乔治·巴塔耶：神圣的亲密关系

https://socialecologies.wordpress.com/2016/07/15/georges-bataille-the-intimacy-of-the-sacred/

Georges Bataille: The Intimacy of theSacred 乔治·巴塔耶：神圣的亲密关系

Posted on July 15, 2016 发表于七月 15, 2016

TodayI kept thinking back to those lectures by Alexandre Kojève on Hegel’s Master/Slave Dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spiritthat he presented to the world from 1930 to 1939. Most of the major intellectuals of the era would attend these lectures: Jean-Paul Sartre, Jaques Lacan, Georges Bataille, Simone Weil, etc.. Below I discuss Bataille’s relation to and against Hegel’s dialectic, and his own preference for a non-dialectical and formless thoughtbased on immanence over transcendence, sacred over profane thought: and, the return of the intimate order of immediacy. 今天，我不断回想起亚历山大·科耶夫在 1930 年至 1939 年间向世界发表的关于黑格尔《精神现象学中的主奴辩证法》的讲座。那个时代的大多数主要知识分子都会参加这些讲座：让·保罗·萨特、雅克·拉康、乔治·巴塔耶、西蒙娜·韦尔等。下面我讨论一下巴塔耶与黑格尔的关系和反对辩证法，以及他自己对非辩证和无形思想的偏好，这种思想基于内在性而非超越性，神圣性而非世俗性思想：以及直接性的亲密秩序的回归。

Warning: Up front… this post is more specialist. If you’re not versant with Hegel or Bataille you might want to pass. It would take me a great deal of time to set the stage for the conflicts between the two thinkers approaches. This one deals with a specific reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spiritas seen through Alexandre Kojève’s lectures. So if you’re not well read in these areas I’d just pass by on this one…

I make no qualms about it. I’m jumping into the midst of the argument rather than setting it up with a lengthy explanatory opening… 警告：前面……这篇文章更加专业。如果您不熟悉黑格尔或巴塔耶，您可能想跳过。我花了很多时间来为这两位思想家方法之间的冲突做好准备。这一篇涉及从亚历山大·科耶夫的讲座中看到的对黑格尔《精神现象学》的具体解读。因此，如果您对这些领域没有很好的了解，我会略过这一点……

我对此没有任何疑虑。我是直接介入争论，而不是用冗长的解释性开场白……

We know that the slave, having passed through slavish consciousness in the dialectical reversal engendered by self-negation forms himself as something distinct and durable. He enters, by virtue of his labour, the world of objective reality – he recognizes himself in the world he has transformed by his work; in doing so, he achieves “his authentic freedom,” his ‘true autonomy” (27). 我们知道，奴隶在自我否定所产生的辩证逆转中度过了奴隶意识，使自己成为一种独特而持久的东西。他凭借自己的劳动进入了客观现实的世界——他在自己通过劳动改变的世界中认识到了自己；通过这样做，他实现了“他真正的自由”，他的“真正的自治”（27）。

The point being that as the slave transforms the world of objective things he creates the conditions that spawn within him the revolutionary need for recognition, etc.. Having once been a slave to the terror of death (from the Master and the Natural World), this slave, through work, creates a world that is the reflection of his own most value, and by which he seeks to impose this value on others in the renewed struggle for recognition. The creation of the technical world of work thus engenders and reveals the autonomous self-consciousness of the slave. 关键在于，当奴隶改变客观事物的世界时，他创造了条件，在他体内产生了对承认等的革命性需求。曾经是死亡恐惧（来自主人和自然世界）的奴隶，这个奴隶通过工作创造了一个反映他自己最大价值的世界，并通过这个世界，他试图在新的争取承认的斗争中将这种价值强加给他人。因此，技术工作世界的创造产生并揭示了奴隶的自主意识。

It’s in this notion of formalism, of self-reflecting objectification through work of a substantial formalism, and the objectifying self-reflection of spirit in the objects of its labours that will of course intrigue Marx later on to reverse this into his own modes… that is another story. 正是在这种形式主义的概念中，通过实质形式主义的工作进行自我反思的客观化，以及精神在其劳动对象中的客观化自我反思，当然会激发马克思后来将其扭转为他自己的模式……又是另一个故事了。

The story I want to relate – more as a spur to thought, than a thought itself is Georges Bataille’s acceptance of aspects of this and rejection of others. Bataille, along with a whole generation of other thinkers from 1930 onward would attend these lectures by Kojeve. But unlike many of the others Bataille would argue against the dialectic in favor of a non-dialectical approach which would exclude both the notion of Hegel’s “recognition,” and his notion of “sublatiion” or synthesis. 我想讲述的故事——与其说是思想本身，不如说是对思想的刺激，是乔治·巴塔耶对其中某些方面的接受和对其他方面的拒绝。巴塔耶以及 1930 年以来的整整一代思想家都参加了科耶夫的这些讲座。但与其他许多人不同的是，巴塔耶反对辩证法，支持非辩证法，这种方法将排除黑格尔的“承认”概念和他的“扬弃”或综合概念。

Bataille in his Theory of Religion will see in Death, neither a Master nor the driving force of terror shaping human productivity, rather he will speak of “death’s definitive impotence and absence”. (40) Doing so Bataille refuses Hegel’s movement of recognition and its drive toward a telos of final satisfaction or synthesis, replacing it with the “logic of identification and unsatisfied desire”.1 Instead of following Hegel, Bataille just at the point where Hegel’s self-negation kicks in and the path toward recognition would be forged, truncates this and enacts a contrary movement, a movement opposed to this self-perfecting elaboration of objective spirit into absolute knowledge. Rather, Bataille will see in the moment of wavering between the state of being a slave but not yet a master is the liminal zone of the sacred monstrum. 巴塔耶在他的《宗教理论》中认为，死亡既不是大师，也不是塑造人类生产力的恐怖驱动力，相反，他会谈到“死亡绝对的无能和缺席”。 (40) 这样做巴塔耶拒绝了黑格尔的承认运动及其对最终满足或综合的目的的驱动，代之以“认同和未满足的欲望的逻辑”。1 巴塔耶没有追随黑格尔，而是站在了黑格尔自我的点上。 -否定开始，通往承认的道路将被锻造，截断这一点并发起相反的运动，反对这种客观精神的自我完善的阐述的运动进入绝对知识。相反，巴塔耶会看到，在奴隶与主人之间摇摆不定的时刻，是神圣怪物的临界区。

Whereas for Kojèvethere is liberation into self-recognition, autonomy, and satisfaction; for Bataille self-negation entails no ultimate telos, no goal, no satisfaction – and, rather than the Hegelian logic of recognition there is the logic of identification and the agonistic war of desire interminable. (24) As Biles relates it the Kojèvean master/slave dialectic (his reading of Hegel) is replaces by Bataille with the dualistic opposition or agon of the sacred and profane, the “world of animal immanence and the human world of technology and transcendence” (25). As Biles suggests Bataille will undo the “Hegelian synthesis through a maintenance of antinomies” (25). 而对于科耶夫来说，则是获得自我认知、自主和满足的解放；因为巴塔耶的自我否定并不意味着最终的目的，没有目标，没有满足——而且，不是黑格尔的承认逻辑，而是认同逻辑和无休止的欲望争夺战。 (24) 正如拜尔斯所说，科耶文的主人/奴隶辩证法（他对黑格尔的解读）被巴塔耶用神圣与世俗的二元对立或对抗、“动物内在性的世界和技术与超越性的人类世界”所取代。 (25)。正如拜尔斯所说，巴塔耶将通过维护二律背反来消除黑格尔式的综合（25）。

Bataille seeks to erase the goal of transcendence and return us to the animalistic immanence of the monstrous sacred where we reenter the world like “water in water” (TOR, 19), a realm of “pure immanence” and continuity.2 For Bataille self-consciousness was neither a mistake as some assume, nor an error but rather a product of thought and distinction. Self-consciousness arose out of utilitarian production of tools for use in hunting and gathering, and the very construction of tools and the knowledge of their use would in turn rearrange the ways we defined our modes of being in the world. As Bataille would say it “the day we see our selves from the outside asanother.Moreover, this will depend on our first having distinguished the other on the plane where manufactured things have appeared to usdistinctly.”(TOR, 31). 巴塔耶试图消除超越的目标，让我们回到兽性的内在性的可怕神圣，在那里我们像“水中的水”一样重新进入世界（TOR，19），一个“纯粹的内在性”和连续性的境界。2对于巴塔耶自我——意识既不像某些人所认为的那样是一个错误，也不是一个错误，而是思想和区别的产物。自我意识产生于用于狩猎和采集的工具的功利性生产，而工具的构造及其使用知识反过来又会重新安排我们定义我们在世界上的存在模式的方式。正如巴塔耶所说：“有一天我们从外面看到自己是另一个人。此外，这将取决于我们首先在制造的事物在我们看来清晰可见的平面上区分了对方。”（TOR，31）。

Yet, unlike Kojève’s Hegel who would impart self-consciousness as the great liberator that shaped the course of history, time, and self-negating mastery over nature and civilization, Bataille would remark that this “bringing of elements of the same nature as the 然而，与科耶夫笔下的黑格尔不同，巴塔耶会指出，这种“带来了与自然和文明具有相同性质的元素”。 s ubject, or the subject itself, onto the plane of objects isalways precarious, uncertain, and unevenly realized”.(TOR, 31). Bataille would hold forth that rather than overcoming our ancient animal heritage in some liberation of self-negation and self-relating consciousness and mastery that we are rather situated in the gap between continuity and discontinuity, bound to neither a world of pure mastery and self-overcoming nor to the escape back into the natural oblivion of pure immanence. Instead we are in the negation of negation, caught between two antagonistic worlds, two powers to which we suffer in pure terror and ecstasy. 主体，或主体本身，在客体平面上总是不稳定的、不确定的和不均匀的实现”。（TOR，31）。巴塔耶认为，我们并没有通过自我否定、自我关联意识和主宰的某种解放来克服我们古老的动物遗产，而是处于连续性与不连续性之间的鸿沟中，既不受纯粹主宰和自我控制的世界的束缚。克服或逃避回到纯粹内在性的自然遗忘中。相反，我们处于否定的否定之中，夹在两个对立的世界、两种力量之间，我们在纯粹的恐惧和狂喜中遭受痛苦。

One remembers Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus where they ask, 人们记得德勒兹和加塔里在《千高原》中问道：

(What if one became animal or plant through literature, which certainly does not mean literarily? Is it not first through the voice that one becomes animal?) （如果一个人通过文学变成了动物或植物呢？这当然不是文学意义上的？一个人不是首先通过声音变成了动物吗？）

Their point being that Literature is an assemblage. It has nothing to do with ideology. There is no ideology and never has been. All we talk about are multiplicities, lines, strata and segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machinic assemblages and their various types, bodies without organs and their construction and selection, the plane of consistency, and in each case the units of measure. (TP, KL 295) It would take me too far afield to tease out the meanings in this passage, let us only mark the notion of a “plane of consistency”: 他们的观点是文学是一个集合。这与意识形态无关。不存在意识形态，从来没有。我们谈论的只是多重性、线条、层次和分段、飞行线和强度、机械组合及其各种类型、没有器官的身体及其构造和选择、一致性平面以及每种情况下的测量单位。 (TP, KL 295) 如果我要弄清楚这段话的含义，那就太离谱了，让我们只标记“一致性平面”的概念：

The plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities. The line of flight marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions that the multiplicity effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary dimension, unless the multiplicity is transformed by the line of flight; the possibility and necessity of flattening all of the multiplicities on a single plane of consistency or exteriority, regardless of their number of dimensions. (TP, KL 389-392) 一致性平面（网格）是所有多重性的外部。飞行标记线：多重性有效填充的有限维数的现实；补充维度是不可能的，除非飞行线改变了多重性；将所有多重性扁平化在一个一致性或外在性平面上的可能性和必要性，无论其维度数量如何。 (TP, 吉隆坡 389-392)

This flattening into the plane of consistencyis Bataille’s pure immanence: “In a sense, the world is still, in a fundamental way, immanence without a clear limit (an indistinct flow of being into being – one thinks of the unstable presence of water in water).” (TOR, 33). For Bataille it is this movement or tendency from the pure plane of immanence toward the profane world of work and utility in which the logic of recognition and satisfaction are the outcome, and the counter-operation of a tendency or disposition toward an undoing and logic of identification and antagonistic desire seeks the path of immanence in the sacred rather than transcendence in the secular order of culture and civilization that is precarious and uncertain, a wavering between ecstasy and horror. 这种扁平化到一致性平面就是巴塔耶的纯粹内在性：“从某种意义上说，从根本上来说，世界仍然是内在性，没有明确的限制（存在到存在的模糊流动——人们会想到水在水中不稳定的存在）。水）。” （任务框架，33）。对于巴塔耶来说，正是这种从纯粹的内在性平面走向世俗的工作和功利世界的运动或趋势，其中承认和满足的逻辑是结果，而倾向或倾向的反作用是走向毁灭和逻辑。认同和敌对欲望寻求神圣的内在性道路，而不是在文化和文明的世俗秩序中寻求超越，这种秩序是不稳定和不确定的，在狂喜和恐怖之间摇摆不定。

Yet, as Biles maintains the return to immanence is not an exact reduplication of animality, not a return of the Same, but rather to a world that coexists with the profane world rather than obliterating it or erasing it in an eliminative gesture. Instead of Kojève’s path of mastering animality and one’s transition to “autonomy,” Bataille seeks to undo and cut the ties to the telos logic of the slave/master dialectic altogether through an evasion of goals and final mastery by entering the sacred realm of immanence. Yet, to attain this is for Bataille to understand what Sacrifice entails: 然而，正如拜尔斯所坚持的那样，回归内在性并不是动物性的精确复制，也不是同一性的回归，而是回归到一个与世俗世界共存的世界，而不是以消除的姿态抹杀或抹去它。巴塔耶没有走科耶夫掌握动物性和向“自主性”过渡的道路，而是寻求通过进入神圣的内在领域来逃避目标和最终的掌握，从而完全消除和切断奴隶/主人辩证法的目的逻辑的联系。然而，要实现这一点，巴塔耶必须理解牺牲意味着什么：

The principle of sacrifice is destruction, but though it sometimes goes so far as to destroy comp1etely (as in a holocaust), the destruction that sacrifice is intended tobring about is not annihilation.(TOR, 43). 牺牲的原则是破坏，但虽然有时甚至会完全破坏（如大屠杀），但牺牲所要带来的破坏并不是毁灭。（TOR，43）。

Instead of annihilation, “Sacrifice destroys an object’s real ties of subordination; it “牺牲不是毁灭，而是破坏了物体真正的从属关系；它 draws the victim out of the world of utility and restores it to that of unintelligible caprice.” (TOR, 43) In this way we can tie this notion of Bataille with the recent work of Andrew Culp’s whose rehabilitationofthe destructive force of negativity by cultivating a “hatred for this world,” offers us a parallel to the ongoing malaise we find ourselves in within our current social, cultural, political dissatisfaction with neoliberal globalism.4 The world Culp is speaking of is not the literal planetary or natural continuum but rather the artificial Human Security Regimes of our global neoliberal order within which we are all enslaved in the master/slave dialectic. As Culp argues, 将受害者从功利的世界中拉出来，并将其恢复到难以理解的任性世界。” （TOR，43）通过这种方式，我们可以将巴塔耶的这一概念与安德鲁·卡尔普最近的工作联系起来，他通过培养“对这个世界的仇恨”来恢复消极破坏性的力量，为我们提供了与我们发现的持续不适的相似之处。 4 卡尔普所说的世界并不是字面上的行星或自然连续体，而是人为的人类安全在我们的全球新自由主义秩序政权中，我们都被主奴辩证法所奴役。正如卡尔普所说，

[the] politics of destruction, which has too long been mistaken for deliberation but is instead exemplified by the war machines of popular insurrection whose success is registered by the streets themselves— consider the words of the Invisible Committee in To Our Friends: “Like any specific strike, it is a politics of the accomplished fact. It is the reign of the initiative, of practical complicity, of gesture. As to decision, it accomplishes that in the streets, reminding those who’ve forgotten, that ‘popular’ comes from the Latin populor, ‘to ravage, devastate.’ It is a fullness of expression . . . and a nullity of deliberation”. By showing the nondurability of what is taken as real, so-called reality itself, communist politics is a conspiracy that writes the destruction of the world. (DD, KL 502-508) 破坏性的政治长期以来被误认为是深思熟虑的，但却以民众起义的战争机器为例证，其成功是由街道本身记录的——想想隐形委员会在《致我们的朋友》中的话： “像任何具体打击，是既成事实的政治。这是主动性、实际共谋和姿态的统治。至于决策，它在街头完成了这一任务，提醒那些忘记的人，“流行”来自拉丁语“populor”，“蹂躏、毁灭”。这是一种丰满的表达。 。 。和深思熟虑的无效” 。通过展示被视为真实的东西，即所谓的现实本身的不持久性，共产主义政治是一场阴谋，它书写了世界的毁灭。 (DD, 吉隆坡 502-508)

Yet, unlike Culp who seeks a popular insurrection against the Master’s, Bataille offers another path of evasion that seeks to destroy our ties to the Master/Slave dialectic altogether and cut our subordination to the logics of work and utilitarian modes of being; instead, for Bataille we must separate ourselves out, escape the very termsthe Master’shave imposed on us, seekto destroy the ties that have bound us to their logicbefore we can return to the “intimacy” of the sacred. 然而，与卡尔普寻求针对主人的民众起义不同，巴塔耶提供了另一条逃避之路，旨在完全摧毁我们与主/奴隶辩证法的联系，并切断我们对工作逻辑和功利主义存在模式的服从；相反，对于巴塔耶来说，我们必须将自己分离出来，逃离大师强加给我们的条件，寻求摧毁将我们束缚在他们的逻辑中的纽带，然后我们才能回到神圣的“亲密”之中。

I quote below an extended passage on this intimate return to the sacred: 我在下面引用一段关于这种亲密回归神圣的长文：

The major weakness of dualism is that it offers no legitimate place for violence except in the moment of pure transcendence, of rational exclusion of the sensuous 二元论的主要弱点在于，它没有为暴力提供合法的场所，除非是在纯粹超越的时刻，理性地排除感性的时刻。 world. But the divinity of the good cannot be maintained at that degree of purity; indeed, it falls back into the sensuous world. It isthe object, on the part of the believer, of a search for intimate communication, but this thirst for intimacy will never be quenched. The good isanexclusion of violence and there can be no breaking of the order of separate things, no intimacy, without violence; the god of goodness is limited by right to the violence with whichhe excludes violence, and he is divine, open to intimacy, only insofar as he in fact preserves the old violence within him, which he does not have the rigor to exclude, and to this extent he is not the god of reason, which is the truth of goodness. Intheorythis involves a weakening of the moral divine in favorofevil. (TOR, 80-81). 世界。但善的神性无法维持在那种纯粹程度；事实上，它又回到了感性的世界。对于信徒来说，这是寻求亲密交流的目标，但这种对亲密的渴望永远不会被熄灭。善就是排除暴力，没有暴力就不可能打破独立事物的秩序，就没有亲密关系；善良之神受到暴力的限制，他用暴力来排除暴力，他是神圣的，对亲密关系持开放态度，只有在他实际上保留了他内心的旧有暴力的情况下，他没有严格的能力去排除这种暴力，并且从这个意义上来说，他并不是理性之神，理性是善良的真理。从理论上讲，这涉及到道德神圣性的削弱，而有利于邪恶。 （TOR，80-81）。

It is the violence against subordination to the profane power of the Master’s authority and world of the profane that opens us to the relations of intimacy: 正是对主人权威和世俗世界的世俗力量的暴力反抗，使我们能够建立亲密的关系：

In the divine disorder of crime, I call forthe violence that willrestorethe destroyed order. But in reality itisnot violence but crimethat has opened divine intimacy to me. And, insofar as the vengeance does not become an extensionoftheirrational violence of the crime, it will quickly close that which crime opened. For only vengeance that is commanded by passion and a taste for untrammeled violence is divine. The restoration of the lawful order is essentially subordinated to profane reality.(TOR, 81). 在犯罪的神圣混乱中，我呼吁使用暴力来恢复被破坏的秩序。但事实上，不是暴力而是犯罪向我开启了神圣的亲密关系。而且，只要复仇不成为犯罪的非理性暴力的延伸，它就会迅速关闭犯罪所造成的后果。因为只有由激情和对不受约束的暴力的爱好所指挥的复仇才是神圣的。合法秩序的恢复本质上是服从于世俗现实的。 （TOR，81）。

The destroyed order is that of the order of intimacy itself. “Through mediation the real order is subordinatedtothesearch forlost intimacy, but the profound separation between intimacy and things is succeeded by a multiplicity of confusions.” (TOR, 84-85) Yet, it is this maintaining of the “disorder of things”that is Bataille’s strategy: 被破坏的秩序就是亲密关系本身的秩序。 “通过调解，真正的秩序服从于寻找失去的亲密关系，但亲密关系和事物之间的深刻分离却被多重混乱所取代。” （TOR，84-85）然而，巴塔耶的策略正是维持“事物的无序”：

Under the sovereignty of morality, all the operations that claim to ensure the return of the intimate order are those that the real world requires: the extensive prohibitions that are given asthe precondition for the return are aimed primarily at preserving the disorder of the world of things. (TOR, 85) 在道德主权下，所有声称确保亲密秩序回归的行动都是现实世界所需要的：作为回归前提的广泛禁令，其主要目的是维持现实世界的混乱。事物。 （任务范围，85）

Ultimately not only are the violences that morality condemns set free on all sides, but a tacitdebate is initiated between the worksof salvation, which serve the real order, and those works that escape or evade it… 最终，不仅道德所谴责的暴力在各方都得到了释放，而且在服务于真实秩序的救赎作品和那些逃避或逃避现实秩序的作品之间也引发了一场心照不宣的辩论……

I’ll need to return to this in a new post to describe the notions of Death, Sacrifice, Intimacy, and Evasion in more depth, but that is for another day. 我需要在一篇新文章中再次讨论这一点，以更深入地描述死亡、牺牲、亲密和逃避的概念，但那是另一天的事了。

1. Biles, Jeremy. Ecce Monstrum: Georges Bataille and the Sacrifice of Form (Fordham University, 2007) 拜尔斯，杰里米。 Ecce Monstrum：乔治·巴塔耶和形式的牺牲（福特汉姆大学，2007）
2. Bataille, Georges, Theory of Religion. (Zone Books, 1989) 乔治·巴塔耶，《宗教理论》。 （区域图书，1989）
3. Gilles Deleuze; Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus (Kindle Locations 294-295). A&C Black. Kindle Edition. 吉尔·德勒兹；菲利克斯·瓜塔里.千高原（Kindle 地点 294-295）。 A&C 黑色。点燃版。
4. Culp, Andrew. Dark Deleuze (Forerunners: Ideas First) (Kindle Locations 73-74). University of Minnesota Press. Kindle Edition. 卡尔普、安德鲁.黑暗德勒兹（先驱者：思想第一）（Kindle位置73-74）。明尼苏达大学出版社。点燃版。