D.Henrich <Between Kant and Hegel>
11｜The Aenesidemus Review
“Kant announces that moral awareness is a “fact of reason,” and that, as such, it is the keystone of the architecture of the system of the human mind and of the system of philosophy.5 To say that this fact is “of reason” is to imply that it is the subject of an insight that might also originally incorporate a structure of the world in which the morally good could be the source of a real and consistent system of acting.” (Henrich, 2003, page 160)
亨利希通过道德和主体将康德和费希特的继承关系展现出来，从康德的绝对命令/理性事实就可以推论出一个洞见到世界结构的道德主体，这个主体认可至善是一切的本原。
“But to invoke the term “fact” is at once to conjure up the notion of something we first state and subsequently interpret. Moreover, our interpretation must both acknowledge the primacy of the fact and give rise to moral faith. So we state first that there is the law (that constitutes the moral awareness), and then we interpret the being-there of the law (and that gives rise to the moral faith).” (Henrich, 2003, p. 217)
亨利希是这样理解康德的理性事实/绝对命令的：首先，我们承认理性事实的先验存在，这一存在构成了道德意识，然后我们解释这一存在，这种解释产生了道德信仰。
“essence on which we can found the entire system of philosophy” (Henrich, 2003, p. 220)
亨里希认可知识学是自由的体系：“自由是一个不容置疑的本质，我们可以根据这个本质建立整个哲学体系。”（268）
“The notion that thesis and antithesis are antecedent to any synthesis is one of the most important conceptual devices of the idealistic system. It derives not so much from Fichte’s analysis of Reinhold’s proposition on consciousness as from Fichte’s insight into the structural constitution of consciousness that Reinhold’s proposition never even reached.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 223)
亨利希指出费希特的洞见之一是：心灵的基本结构是对立（opposition）而不是联结（combination），换句话说就是，正题与反题先于任何综合。
“In Fichte’s opinion, relating and distinguishing is the equivalent of synthesis, but a synthesis that presupposes something.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 223)
关联+区别=综合，综合预设something。这个sth下文也提到，所谓实在的经验的某物，其实还是关联+区别的形式，但是具备了内容，意识经验赋予的内容。
“Fichte appears to be saying that the basic structure of consciousness comes closer to logical structures when he analyzes it in terms of opposition, rather than of synthesis.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 223)
“费希特似乎是说当他根据对立而不是综合来分析意识的基本结构时，意识的基本结构更接近于逻辑结构。”（272）
“What we need, in Fichte’s view, is not a formal proposition about the ultimate principle of philosophy, but instead, a real one, meaning by this a proposition that is about something. In this real sense, the proposition on consciousness could still be ultimate.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 223)
如何理解这里的real实在，这一实在命题最终还是在意识的层面，是关于意识的经验（something），那么与实在主义（pragmatism）的区别是什么？
“Fichte only hints cautiously at these similarities in his review; by the time that Hegel came to develop his own philosophy of mind, however, these similarities give way to claims of identity, which is crucial. Once looked at in the correct way, Hegel will say, the structure of the mind and basic logical structures are simply identical. Neither Kant nor the post-Kantian philosophies before Fichte entertained this perspective. Its faint outlines first appear in Fichte’s Aenesidemus Review.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 224)
意识结构与逻辑结构的相似（费希特）或同一（黑格尔）？
“He reasons that if we were just making reference to facts of consciousness, it would follow that the proposition on consciousness would itself be empirical. In consequence, all investigation into the origin of consciousness could amount to nothing more than empirical research. In consonance with Schulze, Fichte adopts the view that the proposition on consciousness becomes empirical as soon as we talk about generating processes.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 224)
亨利希指出，费希特赞同舒尔茨将意识命题看作经验的看法，但又不止于此，费希特同时认为意识命题并不单纯只有经验有效性。
“anyone who understands this principle well will feel an inner reluctance to ascribe to it merely empirical validity.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 224)
“the Principle of Consciousness is a theorem which is based upon another first principle, from which, however, the Principle of Consciousness can be strictly derived, a priori and independently of all experience” (Henrich, 2003, p. 224)
意识命题的基础是先验的。
“What constitutes facts, in part, is their determination in empirical propositions. Beyond their logical structure, however, there is a dimension to facts that eludes empirical determination. This dimension is action.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 225)
费希特通过“行动action”的概念来说明意识命题还有一个躲避经验规定的维度。
“We would, instead, have to call it a performance, or some such, by my body that thereafter we could interpret empirically. But action, per se, is not separable from knowledge. This gives us reason to believe that there is some feature of consciousness that is subject neither to empirical reports nor merely to logical truths. Whatever this feature of consciousness is, it is presumably accessible in a way that differs from that of empirical reports or logical truths.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 225)
“Reflection is a performance. A performance is, at least partially, at the disposition of the mind itself. As far as self-consciousness is concerned, the mind is a closed system, related only to itself, and it has this internal activity that is at its own disposition.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 293)“one posits something determinate. So we have both the performance of positing and the determinateness of the posited.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 294)
在描述行动时，费希特称之为performance，其实是反思。意识的行动使我们相信“意识既不受制于经验报告也不仅仅受制于逻辑真理”（274）。
By using the same word (Tat), Fichte implies a smooth transition from fact to action.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 225)
从事实过渡到行动，表示从经验过渡到先验
“Therefore, we have to bring into view the correlate of Tatsache (fact), which is Tathandlung (action), in order to see the original unity of some factual element and some cognitive state.” (Henrich, 2003, p. 225)
这里提到原初统一性，the original unity，也就是经验和先验的统一性，统一于原初的先验。
“Since “immediate” intuition does not have the properties of intuition that Kant described, Fichte sees no alternative to calling it “intellectual.” So, despite Kant’s exclusion of this term from philosophy, Fichte adopts Reinhold’s epistemological usage of the nomenclature of “intellectual intuition” and links it to the internal awareness of an activity.16” (Henrich, 2003, p. 227)
immmediate intuition=awareness of an action=intellectual intuition≠Kant’s intuition
“The very essence of the mind is its self-referential character. ‘This is the necessary circle in which all finite reason is enclosed,’ Fichte says. This is a key formula in the entire Science of Knowledge: the faculty of representation exists only for the faculty of representation.18” (Henrich, 2003, p. 228)
“心灵的真正本质是它的自我指称的特征。”（278）知识学的关键命题“我是我”就体现了这种必然的循环性，这种循环也可以表述为，我只为我而存在，我作为我而存在，“表象能力是为了并且通过表象能力而存在的”（文集一，423）
