fichte

The primary task of Fichte’s system of philosophy (the Wissenschaftslehre

reconcile freedom with necessity, or, more specifically, to explain how freely willing, morally responsible agents can at the same time be considered part of a world of causally conditioned material objects in space and time.

begin simply with the ungrounded assertion of the subjective spontaneity and freedom (infinity) of the I and then to proceed to a transcendental derivation of objective necessity and limitation (finitude) as a condition necessary for the possibility of the former. 从简单的开始对我的主观自发性和自由（无限）的无根据的断言，然后进行客观必然性和限制（有限性）的先验推导，

“展示经验的基础”或“解释伴随着必然感的表征系统的基础” “displaying the foundation of experience” or “explaining the basis of the system of representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity.”

to discover a single, self-evident starting point or first principle from which one could then somehow “derive” both theoretical and practical philosophy, which is to say, our experience of ourselves as finite cognizers and as finite agents.

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Fichte insisted upon the sharp distinction between the “standpoint” of natural consciousness (which it is the task of philosophy to “derive,” and hence to “explain”) and that of transcendental reflection, which is the standpoint required of the philosopher.

1 物自体概念的矛盾 2 康德否认“理智直觉”的可能性 就是否认对？？？ In addition, he maintained that Kant's denial of the possibility of “intellectual intuition,” though certainly justified as a denial of the possibility of any non-sensory awareness of external objects,

费希特坚持认为，“解释”经验的哲学计划有两个而且只有两个可能的起点：即纯粹自我的概念（费希特与纯粹自由相关联）和纯粹事物性的概念（费希特与完全自由相关联）必然性）——作为哲学出发点，直接诉诸经验都不能保证，而每一个都只能通过哲学抽象的自觉行为来 实现 来自普通的经验（自由与必然、主体与客体在其中总是结合和区分的）。 the concept of pure selfhood (which Fichte associated with pure freedom) and that of pure thinghood (which Fichte associated with utter necessity

与纯粹的我的“理想主义”开始，并且其开始事物本身就是“教条主义”。 he characterizes the sort of philosophy that begins with the pure I as “idealism” and that which begins with the thing in itself as “dogmatism.” 因为，根据费希特早先在《关于科学知识的概念》中的论点，一个统一的哲学体系可以有一个而且只有一个第一原理，并且由于有两个而且只有两个可能的第一原理，因此不可能有理想主义/教条主义的“混合”系统。此外，由于费希特所理解的教条主义不可避免地暗示了一种严格形式的决定论或“可理解的宿命论”，而理想主义从一开始就致力于人类自由的现实，实际上也无法达到任何“可理解的宿命论”。两种完全对立的系统之间的妥协”。 a strict form of determinism or “intelligible fatalism,” whereas idealism is, from the start, committed to the reality of human freedom, it is also practically impossible to reach any sort of “compromise” between two such radically opposed systems.

one already has to be convinced, on wholly extra-philosophical grounds, of the reality of one's own freedom before one can enter into the chain of deductions and arguments that constitute the Wissenschaftslehre —一个人必须在完全超哲学的基础上确信自己自由的现实，

“我自由地设定自身”的命题的唯一令人信服的理由不是因为他无法在这个问题上接受理论上的怀疑，也不是因为他只是无法继续反思抽象的过程。相反，他诉诸费希特在他的文章“基于我们对世界道德治理的信念”中雄辩地表达的原则，即：“我不能超越这个立场，因为我不被允许这样做。Wissenschaftslehre 是唯一“符合职责”的哲学体系。 the proposition that “the I freely posits itself” is therefore not because he is unable to entertain theoretical doubts on this score nor because he is simply unable to continue the process of reflective abstraction. Instead, he appeals to a principle eloquently expressed by Fichte in his essay “On the Basis of Our Belief in a Moral Governance of the World,” namely: “I cannot go beyond this standpoint because I am not permitted to do so. Wissenschaftslehre is the only system of philosophy that “accords with duty.”

1 foundation

For Fichte, therefore, “the primacy of the practical” means not simply that philosophy must recognize a certain autonomous sphere within which practical reason is efficacious and practical considerations are appropriate; instead, it implies something much stronger: namely, the recognition that, as Fichte puts it, “the practical power is the innermost root of the I” and thus that “our freedom itself is a theoretical determining principle of our world.” The Wissenschaftslehre as a whole can therefore be described as a massive effort to demonstrate that reason could not be theoretical if it were not also practical—at the same time, to be sure, that also demonstrates that reason could not be practical if were not also theoretical. “实践力量是我的最内在根源”，因此“我们的自由本身是我们世界的理论决定原则”。该Wissenschaftslehre因此，作为一个整体，可以被描述为一项巨大的努力，以证明如果理性不具有实践性，它就不可能是理论性的——同时，可以肯定的是，这也表明，如果理性不具有理论性，那么它就不可能是实践性的。

On the other hand, just as surely as a free subject must posit its freedom “absolutely”—that is to say, 'purely and simply' ( schlechthin ) and “for no reason” whatsoever—so must it never identify itself with any determinate or limited state of its own being. 一个自由的主体必须“绝对地”——即“纯粹而简单地”（schlechthin）和“无缘无故”地设定它的自由一样肯定——所以它绝不能将自己与任何确定的或自身存在的有限状态。相反，有限的自由自我必须根据其自由设定的目标不断努力改造自然世界和人类世界。 On the contrary, a finite free self must constantly strive to transform both the natural and the human worlds in accordance with its own freely-posited goals.

自我的纯粹统一性被假定为基础的起点，从而转化为一种 康德意义上的idea of reason ：现实的我总是有限的，并且与自身发生分裂，因此它总是在争取一种它永远无法实现的纯粹的自我决定。在纯粹的自我作为纯粹的Tathandlung的原始抽象和最终的（必要的）自我观念之间，自我只是它决定自己成为的样子，其中“是”和“应该”完全重合，存在着整个现实意识领域和真实的人类体验。 The sheer unity of the self, which was posited as the starting point of the Foundations, is thereby transformed into an idea of reason in the Kantian sense: the actual I is always finite and divided against itself, and hence it is always striving for a sheer self-determinacy that it never achieves. Between the original abstraction of pure selfhood as sheer Tathandlung and the concluding (necessary) idea of a self that is only what it determines itself to be, in which “is” and “ought” wholly coincide, lies the entire realm of actual consciousness and real human experience.

2 philosophy of nature

the Entire Wissenschaftslehre is to consisting of four, systematically interrelated parts:: (1) first philosophy, which corresponds to the “foundational” portion of the system, as presented in the Foundation of the entire Wissenschaftslehre and revised in the lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo; (2) “theoretical philosophy” or “philosophy of nature,” (3) “practical philosophy” or ethics (corresponding to the content of the System of Ethics); and (4) “philosophy of the postulates,” which includes the subdisciplines of “natural law” or “theory of right” (as expounded in the Foundation of Natural Right) and philosophy of religion.

3 moral

Fichte deduces what he calls “the principle of all practical philosophy,” viz., that something objective (a being) follows from something subjective (a concept), and hence that the I must ascribe to itself a power of free purposiveness 合目的性 or causality 因果性 in the sensible world. 实践哲学的原则"，也就是说，一个客观的东西(一个存在)是从一个主观的东西(一个概念)发展而来的，因此"我"必须把它自己归于一种在感性世界里自由的合目的性或因果性的力量。

我必须认为我的自由处于某种必然的法则或绝对的命令之下，费希特称之为“自给自足的法则”或“自治的法则”，我应该始终根据这个法则来决定我的自由。 principle of morality: namely, that I must think of my freedom as standing under a certain necessary law or categorical imperative , which Fichte calls “the law of self-sufficiency” or “autonomy,” and that I ought always to determine my freedom in accordance with this law.