巴菲特2003

翻译作者：Barrons，本文仅转发推广该历史雄文，分享投资经验，知识无价，感恩Barrons翻译

日益沉重的贸易赤字

America's Growing Trade Deficit Is Selling the Nation

导读：以下或许是解决此问题的办法，而且最好能够马上行动

Out From Under Us. Here's a Way to Fix the Problem? And We Need to Do It Now.

财富杂志2003.10.26

FORTUNE Sunday, October 26, 2003

关于美国日益沉重的贸易赤字，我要发出警讯，同时提出相对应的解决方案，不过在此之前，我必须提醒各位，有两点可能会使各位怀疑我个人的说法，第一，我个人过去预测未来，特别是有关于总体经济的纪录一向是乏善可陈，比如说，过去二十多年来，我个人就过于高估通货膨涨所可能带来的威胁，除了这点之外，早在1987年我就曾公开表达对于日益沉重贸易赤字所产生的忧虑，但是事后大家都知道，我们不但存活下来，甚至更加繁荣，我至少已经喊过一次”狼来了”，不过尽管如此，我还是必须再次高喊”狼来了”，而且这次更以Berkshire的资金做担保，从我出生到2002年春天，72年来，我从来就没有买过任何外币，不过在那之后，Berkshire开始投入大量的资金买进数种外币，我不会点明是那些币别，事实上，这并不重要，重要的是，其背后所代表的意义，我之所以会持有这些外币，完全是因为认为美元长期终将贬值。

I'm about to deliver a warning regarding the U.S. trade deficit and also suggest a remedy for the problem. But first I need to mention two reasons you might want to be skeptical about what I say. To begin, my forecasting record with respect to macroeconomics is far from inspiring. For example, over the past two decades I was excessively fearful of inflation. More to the point at hand, I started way back in 1987 to publicly worry about our mounting trade deficits? and, as you know, we've not only survived but also thrived. So on the trade front, score at least one "wolf" for me. Nevertheless, I am crying wolf again and this time backing it with Berkshire Hathaway's money. Through the spring of 2002, I had lived nearly 72 years without purchasing a foreign currency. Since then Berkshire has made significant investments in? and today holds? several currencies. I won't give you particulars; in fact, it is largely irrelevant which currencies they are. What does matter is the underlying point: To hold other currencies is to believe that the dollar will decline.

身为美国人以及一位专业投资人，我宁愿这样的看法，事后被证明是个错误，因为相较于公司以及乃至于其股东，因为美元下跌在其它日常生活的层面当中所承受的损失，任何Berkshire经由投资外币所获得的利益都将相形逊色。

Both as an American and as an investor, I actually hope these commitments prove to be a mistake. Any profits Berkshire might make from currency trading would pale against the losses the company and our shareholders, in other aspects of their lives, would incur from a plunging dollar.

但身为Berkshire的领导人，我身负有效运用公司资金的重责大任，而就在我一向秉持说到做到原则的过程中，我国贸易赤字的问题也日益严重，甚至使得我国的资产以相当惊人的速度流到海外。

But as head of Berkshire Hathaway, I am in charge of investing its money in ways that make sense. And my reason for finally putting my money where my mouth has been so long is that our trade deficit has greatly worsened, to the point that our country's" net worth," so to speak, is now being transferred abroad at an alarming rate.

这个问题如果不解决的话，迟早会出大乱子，为了让大家明了其中道理，我举一个比较夸张的例子，假设有两个面积相同且相媲邻的独立小岛-浪费村以及勤俭村，在这两座岛上，土地是惟一的资本财，且由于其社会还相当原始，所以食物是岛上惟一的消费品与生产品，事实上，岛上的居民每天平均只要工作八小时，就可以生产出足够的食物，长久以来两个岛便个自维持着自给自足的景况。

A perpetuation of this transfer will lead to major trouble. To understand why, take a wildly fanciful trip with me to two isolated, side-by-side islands of equal size, Squanderville and Thriftville. Land is the only capital asset on these islands, and their communities are primitive, needing only food and producing only food. Working eight hours a day, in fact, each inhabitant can produce enough food to sustain himself or herself. And for a long time that's how things go along. On each island everybody works the prescribed eight hours a day, which means that each society is self-sufficient.

只是到了后来，一向勤劳的勤俭村居民想多存一点钱来投资，所以决定开始一天工作16小时，如此他们除了依靠原先工作八小时所生产的食物过活，还可以把多出八小时的工作所得，外销给其惟一的邻居-也就是浪费村。

Eventually, though, the industrious citizens of Thriftville decide to do some serious saving and investing, and they start to work 16 hours a day. In this mode they continue to live off the food they produce in eight hours of work but begin exporting an equal amount to their one and only trading outlet, Squanderville.

浪费村对于这样的转变感到相当欢喜，因为从此以后他们不必工作，就可以取得相同的食物，但天下绝对没有白吃的午餐，勤俭村要求浪费村以发行浪费村债券的方式做为交换(当然该债券系以浪费村的货币计价)，只是浪费村的居民似乎不以为意。

The citizens of Squanderville are ecstatic about this turn of events, since they can now live their lives free from toil but eat as well as ever. Oh, yes, there's a quid pro quo? but to the Squanders, it seems harmless: All that the Thrifts want in exchange for their food is Squanderbonds(which are denominated, naturally, in Squanderbucks).

多年下来，勤俭村累积了大量的浪费村债券，这些债券意味浪费村在未来的年度必须兑现其当初的承诺，为此部份浪费村的学者意识到即将有麻烦上门，他们预视到如果浪费村一方面想要吃饭，一方面又要偿还以前堆积如山的债务，肯定要比以前加倍努力工作才行，不幸的是，浪费村村民对于这样的警告根本就没有心情去理会。

Over time Thriftville accumulates an enormous amount of these bonds, which at their core represent claim checks on the future output of Squanderville. A few pundits in Squanderville smell trouble coming. They foresee that for the Squanders both to eat and to pay off? or simply service? the debt they're piling up will eventually require them to work more than eight hours a day. But the residents of Squanderville are in no mood to listen to such doomsaying.

另一方面，勤俭村的村民也开始紧张起来，他们慢慢开始怀疑这些不成材的浪费村所开出的借据到底有没有效，于是勤俭村逐渐改变策略，虽然他们仍旧持有部份债券，但却把大部份的债券卖回给浪费村的居民以换取浪费村的货币，然后再利用这些资金买下浪费村的土地，直到勤俭村人完全拥有浪费村为止。

Meanwhile, the citizens of Thriftville begin to get nervous. Just how good, they ask, are the IOUs of a shiftless island? So the Thrifts change strategy: Though they continue to hold some bonds, they sell most of them to Squanderville residents for Squanderbucks and use the proceeds to buy Squanderville land. And eventually the Thrifts own all of Squanderville.

至此，浪费村人被迫面临一个难堪的结局，由于已经没有东西可以交易，为了养家糊口，他们现在不但必须回覆以往工作八小时，同时还要承担比以前更多的工作时间来偿还债务，外加支付以往轻率出售土地所需缴交的租金，到最后浪费村等于是不费吹灰之力就被整个买下来，成为勤俭村的殖民地。

At that point, the Squanders are forced to deal with an ugly equation: They must now not only return to working eight hours a day in order to eat? they have nothing left to trade? but must also work additional hours to service their debt and pay Thriftville rent on the land so imprudently sold. In effect, Squanderville has been colonized by purchase rather than conquest.

当然有人或许会说，浪费村未来藉由生产力提升，自然有办法满足过去勤俭村为浪费村所做的牺牲付出，谁也不会欠谁，但这种前人消费，再由后人来买单的做法，其实正是某些经济学者口中所谓的”隔代不公平”现象。

It can be argued, of course, that the present value of the future production that Squanderville must forever ship to Thriftville only equates to the production Thriftville initially gave up and that therefore both have received a fair deal. But since one generation of Squanders gets the free ride and future generations pay in perpetuity for it, there are? in economist talk? some pretty dramatic "intergenerational inequities."

让我们以一般家庭为背景做说明，假设我-华伦巴菲特本人，有办法让供应我一生所需的所有店家接受我开出连本带利的借据，并约定由我的后代来偿还，这样的安排可能会被看作巴菲特家族与其债主间一项公平合理的有效合约，不过巴菲特家族的下一代肯定不会乐见这样的交易来发生，(搞不好有可能会赖帐不还)。

Let's think of it in terms of a family: Imagine that I, Warren Buffett, can get the suppliers of all that I consume in my lifetime to take Buffett family IOUs that are payable, in goods and services and with interest added, by my descendants. This scenario may be viewed as effecting an even trade between the Buffett family unit and its creditors. But the generations of Buffetts following me are not likely to applaud the deal(and, heaven forbid, may even attempt to welsh on it).

再回到岛上，浪费村政府在面对日益沉重的债务负担时，迟早会采取高通膨的策略，也就是发行更多的浪费村货币，间接稀释原有货币的价值，同时浪费村政府还会理直气壮的声称，关于这些烦人的浪费村债券，我们只保证负责偿还特定数量的货币，而非等值的货币，简言之，稀释原有货币的价值，将有助于殊解岛上的财政痛苦。

Think again about those islands: Sooner or later the Squanderville government, facing ever greater payments to service debt, would decide to embrace highly inflationary policies? that is, issue more Squanderbucks to dilute the value of each. After all, the government would reason, those irritating Squanderbonds are simply claims on specific numbers of Squanderbucks, not on bucks of specific value. In short, making Squanderbucks less valuable would ease the island's fiscal pain.

而这也是为什么，如果我是勤俭村的居民，会选择直接持有浪费村的土地所有权，而非其政府发行的债券，因为一般政府对于外国人持有债券，通常比较不会负道义上的责任，俗话说的好，‘与其强抢还不如用暗偷’

That prospect is why I, were I a resident of Thriftville, would opt for direct ownership of Squanderville land rather than bonds of the island's government. Most governments find it much harder morally to power of claim checks foreigners hold. Theft by stealth is preferred to theft by force.

那么这岛所打的算盘又与美国何干? ? 简单地说，从二次世界大战至1970年代初期为止，我们基本上系处于类似勤俭村的勤勉状态，销到国外的东西比买进来多得多，同时还将结余投资到海外，这使得我们的净投资额，也就是持有的海外资产扣除外国人持有我们国内资产后的净额，持续增加，从1950年的370亿美元一路成长到1970年的680亿美元，总的来说，这些日子以来，我国的净财富，除了美国境内所有的财富外，还加上一部份财富系位于世界上其他地方。

So what does all this island hopping have to do with the U.S.? Simply put, after World War II and up until the early 1970s we operated in the industrious Thriftville style, regularly selling more abroad than we purchased. We concurrently invested our surplus abroad, with the result that our net investment? that is, our holdings of foreign assets less foreign holdings of U.S. assets? increased(under methodology, since revised, that the government was then using) from$37 billion in 1950 to$68 billion in 1970. In those days, to sum up, our country's "net worth," viewed in totality, consisted of all the wealth within our borders plus a modest portion of the wealth in the rest of the world.

此外，总的来说，由于美国持有其它国家部份所有权，除了原本的贸易结余外，我们还可享有额外的投资收益，这又是可投资资金的另一个来源，这种景况就好像是一个有薪阶级，一方面可以把薪水存下来投资，一方面又可以将投资所收到的股利再进行转投资。

Additionally, because the U.S. was in a net ownership position with respect to the rest of the world, we realized net investment income that, piled on top of our trade surplus, became a second source of investable funds. Our fiscal situation was thus similar to that of an individual who was both saving some of his salary and reinvesting the dividends from his existing nest egg.

只是好景不常，1970年代后期，整个局势开始逆转，生产与消费开始出现差距，一开始短差约占国民生产毛额1%左右，当时的情况还不算太严重，因为那时还有净的投资收益做为弥补，事实上，拜投资复利的魔力所赐，我们的净资产甚至在1980年代创下3,600亿美元的历史新高。

In the late 1970s the trade situation reversed, producing deficits that initially ran about 1% of GDP. That was hardly serious, particularly because net investment income remained positive. Indeed, with the power of compound interest working for us, our net ownership balance hit its high in 1980 at$360 billion.

不过从那以后就开始走下坡，而过去五年下滑的速度尤其惊人，现在我国每年贸易赤字占国民生产毛额已超过4%，更惨的是，外国人拥有我国的资产已比我们拥有其他国家的资产多出惊人的2.5兆美元，其中除了部份资金投资在美国债券(包含政府公债以及私人公司债)之外，其它则遍布在不动产及股票证券之上。

Since then, however, it's been all downhill, with the pace of decline rapidly accelerating in the past five years. Our annual trade deficit now exceeds 4% of GDP. Equally ominous, the rest of the world owns a staggering$2.5 trillion more of the U.S. than we own of other countries. Some of this$2.5 trillion is invested in claim checks? U.S. bonds, both governmental and private? and some in such assets as property and equity securities.

实际上，我们国家现在的情况就好像是一个拥有大笔田产的富家子弟，为了消化每年多出来4%的贸易赤字，我们逼不得已靠变卖祖产渡日，同时不断将拥有的财产拿去抵押。

In effect, our country has been behaving like an extraordinarily rich family that possesses an immense farm. In order to consume 4% more than we produce? that's the trade deficit? we have, day by day, been both selling pieces of the farm and increasing the mortgage on what we still own.

至于2.5兆美元到底是多少? ? 目前美国上市公司股票的总市值约12兆美元，全国不动产的总值也约当12兆美元，至于美国举国的总资产，按照我个人估计总共约值50兆美元，这些数字在在显示我们绝对不能再低估资产流向海外的严重性，毕竟5%的总财产实在不是一笔小数目。

To put the$2.5 trillion of net foreign ownership in perspective, contrast it with the$12 trillion value of publicly owned U.S. stocks or the equal amount of U.S. residential real estate or what I would estimate as a grand total of$50 trillion in national wealth. Those comparisons show that what's already been transferred abroad is meaningful? in the area, for example, of 5% of our national wealth.

更重要的是，若贸易赤字的问题迟迟不改善，外国人拥有我国资产每年将以5,000亿美元的速度继续成长，也就是说外国人拥有我国的净资产，每年将自动递增一个百分点，且随着金额的累积，每年流到海外的投资收益也会跟着增加，这又将使得我们每年必须负担的股利以及利息支出更形沉重，这跟过去身为净收入的景况实在是有天壤之别，如今我们已深陷复利的深渊当中，在告别过去的欢愉之后，迎接我们的却是无止尽的痛苦。

More important, however, is that foreign ownership of our assets will grow at about$500 billion per year at the present trade-deficit level, which means that the deficit will be adding about one percentage point annually to foreigners' net ownership of our national wealth. As that ownership grows, so will the annual net investment income flowing out of this country. That will leave us paying ever-increasing dividends and interest to the world rather than being a net receiver of them, as in the past. We have entered the world of negative compounding? goodbye pleasure, hello pain.

经济学教科书告诉我们任何一个国家绝对无法长期背负不断成长的贸易赤字，因为总有一天，这些消费过度的国家会面临本国货币在汇率上的调整，而这又会促使其债权国不再接受这位大债主所开出一张又一张的欠据，这本来就是目前国际上习以为常的现象，看看近几十年来，多少挥霍无度的国家在面临信用额度紧缩后，所得到的悲惨下场即可知。

We were taught in Economics 101 that countries could not for long sustain large, ever-growing trade deficits. At a point, so it was claimed, the spree of the consumption-happy nation would be braked by currency-rate adjustments and by the unwillingness of creditor countries to accept an endless flow of IOUs from the big spenders. And that's the way it has indeed worked for the rest of the world, as we can see by the abrupt shutoffs of credit that many profligate nations have suffered in recent decades.

当然美国在某些方面，享有特殊待遇，事实上，也因为过去我们拥有堪称模范的财务记录，再加上我们实在是太有钱了，使得我们几乎可以为所欲为，没有人会怀疑我们还钱的能力以及意愿，因为我们有堆积如山的宝贵的资产可以用来交换消费品，换言之，我们国家拥有一张超级信用卡，可以让我们大刷特刷，只可惜这张信用卡额度并非完全没有上限。

The U.S., however, enjoys special status. In effect, we can behave today as we wish because our past financial behavior was so exemplary? and because we are so rich. Neither our capacity nor our intention to pay is questioned, and we continue to have a mountain of desirable assets to trade for consumables. In other words, our national credit card allows us to charge truly breathtaking amounts. But that card's credit line is not limitless.

我认为现在是马上停止这类疯狂消费行为的时候，而且我个人也准备了一套计画，这套解决方案看起来或许有点取巧，事实上它只不过是另一种形式的关税，但这种关税仍将保留自由经济市场的本质，既不保护特定产业，也不对特定国家实施惩罚，同时也不会引发贸易战争，这套计画将有助于提升我国的出口，同时还可能增进全球的贸易，更重要的是它将能够自动平衡我们的贸易赤字，避免美元币值下滑，而我认为这也是能够解决这项问题的唯一办法。

The time to halt this trading of assets for consumables is now, and I have a plan to suggest for getting it done. My remedy may sound gimmicky, and in truth it is a tariff called by another name. But this is a tariff that retains most free-market virtues, neither protecting specific industries nor punishing specific countries nor encouraging trade wars. This plan would increase our exports and might well lead to increased overall world trade. And it would balance our books without there being a significant decline in the value of the dollar, which I believe is otherwise almost certain to occur. We would achieve this balance by issuing what I will call Import Certificates(ICs) to all U.S. exporters in an amount equal to the dollar value of their exports. Each exporter would, in turn, sell the ICs to parties? either exporters abroad or importers here? wanting to get goods into the U.S. To import$1 million of goods, for example, an importer would need ICs that were the byproduct of$1 million of exports. The inevitable result: trade balance.

想要弥补贸易赤字，我们可以发行一种名叫‘进口凭证’，简称‘IC’的东西，给所有外销货物到海外的美国本地出口商，其数量按照其出口金额计算，而这些出口商可以将这张凭证再转卖给想要出口货物到美国的国外贸易商或是想要进口货物到美国的本地进口商，举例来说，假设有厂商想要进口价值100万美元的货物到美国，则他必须先找到有人出口等值货物到海外所获得的‘进口凭证’，在这样的机制之下，我们终将得到最后的结果-贸易赤字平衡。

Because our exports total about$80 billion a month, ICs would be issued in huge, equivalent quantities? that is, 80 billion certificates a month? and would surely trade in an exceptionally liquid market. Competition would then determine who among those parties wanting to sell to us would buy the certificates and how much they would pay.(I visualize that the certificates would be issued with a short life, possibly of six months, so that speculators would be discouraged from accumulating them.)

而由于美国单月的出口额约为800亿美元，所以我们也将发行等额的‘进口凭证’，也就是800亿美元的IC，并让它们可以在自由市场上流通，自由竞争将会决定到底是哪些人想要把东西卖给我们，同时要付多少代价，(而我个人也预视到‘进口凭证’的有效期限不能太长，最好不要超过六个月，以避免有不肖商人蓄意囤积居奇)

进一步说明，假设每张IC的交易价格为10美分，也就是每出口一美元的东西，将附赠价值10美分的凭证，则在其他条件不变的原则之下，这意味着任何一位美国厂商若能把货物外销到国外，则单靠领取10美分的IC，就可多赚得10%的利润。

For illustrative purposes, let's postulate that each IC would sell for 10 cents? that is, 10 cents per dollar of exports behind them. Other things being equal, this amount would mean a U.S. producer could realize 10% more by selling his goods in the export market than by selling them domestically, with the extra 10% coming from his sales of ICs.

我个人认为，大部分的出口商会将这种优惠视为成本的下降，这将有利他们在国际市场上削价竞争，尤其是一般消费型商品更是如此，比如说，国内现在铝金属每磅的报价约为66美分，则国内铝金属生产厂家将可以以每磅60美元(外加运输成本)的价格把货品销到国外市场，同时还能保有原有利润，在这种状况下，美国产品在国际市场上的竞争力将因此大增，出口金额也将大幅成长，接着国内的就业机会也很会跟着增加，同时在另一方面，外国人想要把东西卖给我们就变得很不容易，不过这是他们自己的问题，必须由他们自己想办法，不论如何船到桥头自然直，(就像Herb Stein说过的，如果某件事情无法持久，就一定会停止)，此外，IC方式将可以让出口东西到美国的国家更多弹性，因为这个方案并不打算对特定产业或是产品给予惩罚，因此到最后，自由市场将会自行决定谁以及何种东西可以被卖到美国来，IC制度只做总量管制。

In my opinion, many exporters would view this as a reduction in cost, one that would let them cut the prices of their products in international markets. Commodity-type products would particularly encourage this kind of behavior. If aluminum, for example, was selling for 66 cents per pound domestically and ICs were worth 10%, domestic aluminum producers could sell for about 60 cents per pound(plus transportation costs) in foreign markets and still earn normal margins. In this scenario, the output of the U.S. would become significantly more competitive and exports would expand. Along the way, the number of jobs would grow. Foreigners selling to us, of course, would face tougher economics. But that's a problem they're up against no matter what trade "solution" is adopted? and make no mistake, a solution must come.(As Herb Stein said, "If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.") In one way the IC approach would give countries selling to us great flexibility, since the plan does not penalize any specific industry or product. In the end, the free market would determine what would be sold in the U.S. and who would sell it. The ICs would determine only the aggregate dollar volume of what was sold.

接下来看看进口面，会发生什么状况，假设进口一部车到美国的成本原本为2万美元，则在新制度下，(假设IC的市场价格同样为10美分)，则进口商的成本将增加为2万2千美元，而假若市场对进口车的需求特别强烈，则进口商一定有办法将多出来的成本转嫁给消费者，但在通常的情况之下，供需的竞争关系将促使外国厂商吸收部份多出来的成本负担。

To see what would happen to imports, let's look at a car now entering the U.S. at a cost to the importer of$20,000. Under the new plan and the assumption that ICs sell for 10%, the importer's cost would rise to$22,000. If demand for the car was exceptionally strong, the importer might manage to pass all of this on to the American consumer. In the usual case, however, competitive forces would take hold, requiring the foreign manufacturer to absorb some, if not all, of the $2,000 IC cost.

当然天下没有白吃的午餐，对于美国人来说，IC制度不免也会有一些负面的效应，首先大部分进口商品的价格肯定会增加，而国内制造厂商进口原料的成本也会上涨，IC的成本或多或少都会变成对消费者实施的一种税负，这是一大缺点，但不论是坐视美元逐步下跌或是对特定产品实施关税惩罚或配额管制，都会引发更大的麻烦，何况我认为这些方法成功达到目的的机率可以说是微乎其微，总的来说，我认为相较之下，进口物价的上涨所引发的痛苦比起我们可能面临举国资产渐渐流失的后果要轻微许多。

There is no free lunch in the IC plan: It would have certain serious negative consequences for U.S. citizens. Prices of most imported products would increase, and so would the prices of certain competitive products manufactured domestically. The cost of the ICs, either in whole or in part, would therefore typically act as a tax on consumers. That is a serious drawback. But there would be drawbacks also to the dollar continuing to lose value or to our increasing tariffs on specific products or instituting quotas on them? courses of action that in my opinion offer a smaller chance of success. Above all, the pain of higher prices on goods imported today dims beside the pain we will eventually suffer if we drift along and trade away ever larger portions of our country's net worth.

而我相信一旦IC制度开始实施，不用多久的时间，就可以让美国达到贸易平衡的境界，其均衡点将介于现在出口总额与进口总额之间，IC凭证将有助于美国产品在国际市场上的竞争力，虽然最后还是要由自由市场来决定何者具有相对的竞争优势。

I believe that ICs would produce, rather promptly, a U.S. trade equilibrium well above present export levels but below present import levels. The certificates would moderately aid all our industries in world competition, even as the free market determined which of them ultimately met the test of "comparative advantage."

另外，一般净出口国很难复制IC制度，因为他们的IC根本就一文不值，那么出口国会不会采取什么报复措施呢? 会不会引发另一次的慕德? 哈利关税大战呢? ? 我想很难，在慕德? 哈利法案推出的当头，我们正尽力想要维持贸易出超，至于现在，全世界都知道我们应该立刻修正严重的贸易赤字。

This plan would not be copied by nations that are net exporters, because their ICs would be valueless. Would major exporting countries retaliate in other ways? Would this start another Smoot-Hawley tariff war? Hardly. At the time of Smoot-Hawley we ran an unreasonable trade surplus that we wished to maintain. We now run a damaging deficit that the whole world knows we must correct.

数十年来，全球贸易盛行，种种贸易手段，诸如惩罚性关税、出口补助、配额、锁定美元汇率等纷纷出炉，许多主要出口国运用这些鼓励出口、避免进口的贸易措施来累积大量的外汇盈余，但即便如此也没有真的发生什么世界贸易大战，当然不会有人会因为一个单纯为了促进当今全世界贸易最大债务国的帐面平衡而引发危机，主要出口国过去的表现一向相当理性，我想他们仍将继续维持此一态势，虽然基于本身的利益，他们一定会设法说服我们相信他们会改进原有的做法。

For decades the world has struggled with a shifting maze of punitive tariffs, export subsidies, quotas, dollar-locked currencies, and the like. Many of these import-inhibiting and export-encouraging devices have long been employed by major exporting countries trying to amass ever larger surpluses? yet significant trade wars have not erupted. Surely one will not be precipitated by a proposal that simply aims at balancing the books of the world's largest trade debtor. Major exporting countries have behaved quite rationally in the past and they will continue to do so? though, as always, it may be in their interest to attempt to convince us that they will behave otherwise.

IC制度实施后，最有可能的结果是出口国在初期作出几个的反应动作之后，会回复到其本能，鼓励进口美国的产品，以中国来说，他们一年出口1,400亿美元的产品与服务到美国，但却只进口250亿美元的物品回中国，如果IC制度一旦实施，中国可能会采取直接购买1,150亿美元的进口凭证以填补差额，但他们也有可能直接减少对美的出口或是增加对我们的采购，而后者可能是最符合中国利益的做法，而这也是我们希望他们能够做的。

The likely outcome of an IC plan is that the exporting nations? after some initial posturing? will turn their ingenuity to encouraging imports from us. Take the position of China, which today sells us about$140 billion of goods and services annually while purchasing only$25 billion. Were ICs to exist, one course for China would be simply to fill the gap by buying 115 billion certificates annually. But it could alternatively reduce its need for ICs by cutting its exports to the U.S. or by increasing its purchases from us. This last choice would probably be the most palatable for China, and we should wish it to be so.

而如果我方的出口额增加，IC的供给也会增加，进一步压低IC的市价，一旦我国出口额足够，IC也将变得一文不值，整个计画也就功成身退，有了这项法宝压阵，主要的出口国也可能很快地就取消各种禁止进口美国货品的措施。

If our exports were to increase and the supply of ICs were therefore to be enlarged, their market price would be driven down. Indeed, if our exports expanded sufficiently, ICs would be rendered valueless and the entire plan made moot. Presented with the power to make this happen, important exporting countries might quickly eliminate the mechanisms they now use to inhibit exports from us.

当然一旦决定采用IC计画，我们也会采取渐进式的做法，来逐渐缩小贸易赤字，好让世界上其他国家可以配合调整，直到达到最终的目标，另一方面，政府也可考虑利用拍卖或直接增予的方式给开发中国家进口凭证，以促进其出口，而后者也等同于达到国际援助的效果。

Were we to install an IC plan, we might opt for some transition years in which we deliberately ran a relatively small deficit, a step that would enable the world to adjust as we gradually got where we need to be. Carrying this plan out, our government could either auction "bonus" ICs every month or simply give them, say, to less-developed countries needing to increase their exports. The latter course would deliver a form of foreign aid likely to be particularly effective and appreciated.

最后我还是必须提醒各位，我曾经喊过一次狼来了，一般来说，在美国，关于世界末日说法的灵验机率通常相当的低，过去的经验显示，我们的经济表现往往让一些对美国经济前景没有信心的人自打嘴巴，许多悲观论者往往低估了美国社会蕴藏的经济活力，它足以克服任何看似无解的困境，毫无疑问，我们依然是一个杰出的国家与经济体。

I will close by reminding you again that I cried wolf once before. In general, the batting average of doomsayers in the U.S. is terrible. Our country has consistently made fools of those who were skeptical about either our economic potential or our resiliency. Many pessimistic seers simply underestimated the dynamism that has allowed us to overcome problems that once seemed ominous. We still have a truly remarkable country and economy.

不过，我也相信面对贸易赤字将考验着我们处理危机的能力，我认为缓慢下滑的美元绝对不是解决问题的答案，确实某种程度，它可以减低贸易赤字的幅度，但却无法阻止国家资产以及投资利益外流的根本问题。

But I believe that in the trade deficit we also have a problem that is going to test all of our abilities to find a solution. A gently declining dollar will not provide the answer. True, it would reduce our trade deficit to a degree, but not by enough to halt the outflow of our country's net worth and the resulting growth in our investment-income deficit.

或许还有其他方法比我所提的更可行，但一厢情愿以及双手一摊绝对不是好办法，在我看来，我们绝对必须立即对资产外流的现象有所作为，IC制度看起来是问题最少，同时最可行的方案，大家要知道，关于这个问题，我们绝对不能等闲视之，因为如果照现在这样的态势下去，全世界其他国家每年将会吃掉美国4%以上的上市公司股票。

Perhaps there are other solutions that make more sense than mine. However, wishful thinking? and its usual companion, thumb sucking? is not among them. From what I now see, action to halt the rapid outflow of our national wealth is called for, and ICs seem the least painful and most certain way to get the job done. Just keep remembering that this is not a small problem: For example, at the rate at which the rest of the world is now making net investments in the U.S., it could annually buy and sock away nearly 4% of our publicly traded stocks.

本身在进行内部的商业决策时，我的合作伙伴-查理曼格时常建议我们可以多花一点时间注意一下他个人半开玩笑的期望，‘我现在只想知道我会死在哪里，然后打死我也不会到那里去’，我们政策的规划者一定要谨记这句话，千万不要重蹈浪费村的覆辙。

In evaluating business options at Berkshire, my partner, Charles Munger, suggests that we pay close attention to his jocular wish: "All I want to know is where I'm going to die, so I'll never go there." Framers of our trade policy should heed this caution? and steer clear of Squanderville.

沃伦.巴菲特

By Warren E. Buffett