【海牙演讲集 翻译】M. BOGDAN：我们是否有适用他国法的国际义务？——Is There an International Obligation to Apply Foreign Law ?

前注：海牙国际法学院宗旨为培养国际法学高级人才，促进审查涉及国际司法关系问题。学院每年邀请当今国际法学领域的著名专家、学者来校讲授国际公法、国际私法和司法关系相关课程，并将相关的课程结集并以《海牙国际法学院演讲集》（The Hague Academy Collected Courses Online）的形式出版。《海牙国际法演讲集》因此在国际法学界享有很高声誉，已成为国际法学研究领域的权威资源。

收录于HACCO： http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/the-hague-academy-collected-courses

Michael Bogdan，from Lund University

国际私法基本上是法院国内法律制度的一部分，但这并不一定意味着，在没有相关条约或其他类似承担的国际义务（如欧盟法律的要求）的情况下，法院国完全可以自由地按照自己喜欢的方式制定冲突规则。在国际私法的历史进程中，有时有人争辩说，国家法院必须适用外国法律，因为即使没有公约或其他国际文书，它们也不得不按照习惯（一般）国际公法这样做。【65】

一种柔和的说法是，尽管国际公法没有规定任何义务，要求法院在家庭事务中适用特定的外国法律制度，如在家事纠纷中适用国籍法或住所地法，但在被审查的情况与法院国没有任何重大联系时，禁止适用该法院地法中的实质性规则。【66】例如，F. Vischer声称，将法院地法适用于与法院国没有任何相关联系的情况将构成违反国际法的罪行【67】，尽管他承认，没有既定的公法规则来澄清哪些联系是"相关的"。一个更谨慎的作者断言，绝对拒绝关注或考虑外国法律的适用被全世界视为"接近违反国家法律"【68】，美国最高法院1895年的一项判决表明，国际私法"一方面不是绝对义务的问题，也不是单纯的礼貌和善意的问题“。

然而，今天普遍的看法似乎是，在没有规定相反情况的国际文书的情况下，每个国家原则上可以自由制定其冲突规则，因为它符合其国家对司法和地方利益的看法，包括有权将某些问题完全服从其自己的实体法，即拒绝让某些问题受法院地法以外的法律制度管辖。因此，国际法施加的限制（如果有的话）是非常温和的。一些作者对冲突规则国际根源的激烈寻找，可能在某种程度上是出于心理原因。正如特雷弗·哈特利所说，"有人以某种方式认为，一套决定一个国家的法律制度能够在国际上延伸多远的规则必须从法律制度本身更崇高的东西中获得其权威。

以我国为例，瑞典认为，在没有条约或欧盟法律规定的相关国际义务的情况下，瑞典单方面决定结婚、离婚申请或收养的权利原则上应由适用瑞典家庭法来决定，从而不违反任何习惯国际法规则。所涉人员居住国或其公民的国家或国家不能根据习惯国际法要求瑞典法院适用其法律（另一方面，这些国家可以自由拒绝承认由此产生的瑞典决定，除非有一些国际文书要求他们承认这一决定）。在法院管辖权方面，情况有些不同，因为拒绝外国人诉诸司法，就像在其他程序方面虐待外国人一样，在某些情况下可能构成违反习惯国际法的行为。的确，对世界上所有国际私法制度的调查或许可以得出这样的结论：大多数国家的大多数冲突规则，都制定了与它应该管理的法律关系有相当密切联系的法律制度。

甚至一些更具体的冲突规则也得到广泛承认和使用，几乎具有普遍性，例如，关于场所支配行为原则（ locus regit actum）的适用，以及承认国际商业合同缔约方就适用法律（自治主义）达成协议的自由。然而，这种做法并不意味着存在具有约束力的、一般国际公法习惯规则的确凿证据，因为不能表明各国认为这种做法具有约束力（不存在这种具有约束力的习惯规则所需的任何法律和必要性）【76】。具有法律约束力的国际习俗必须与不反映法律义务的国家做法区分开来。据我所知，没有任何国际法院或法庭作出任何裁决，认定一个国家不适用外国私法违反了国家习惯法，而且实际上没有报告一个国家提出正式外交抗议，声称另一国不适用违反习惯的国际公法。在私人纠纷中，投诉国的法律或过度适用法院所在地法律。与之相反，有人支持这样一种观点，即国际法允许法院国以公共政策为由拒绝适用外国法律，即使该外国法律的适用是由一项没有明确或公开保留的国际条约规定的。

习惯国际法对个别国家的冲突规则规定了不或只是非常薄弱的要求这一结论也得到了支持，因为国家冲突规则远非相同，而且各国之间差别很大【79】。事实上，瑞典法院确实适用外国法律，即使有关外国的国际私法不认为其法律制度适用，而且倾向于适用另一项法律，例如瑞典法律。【80】在这种情况下，断言瑞典冲突规则命令适用外国法律，因为瑞典对外国负有某些义务，这显然是错误的。

如上所述，一些较旧的理论认为，外国法律的适用是必要的，如果不是国际法，那么至少是对外国的某种既定礼节，以及不可以不尊重的行为冒犯他们的愿望。因此，以胡伯（1635-1694年）等人为代表的所谓荷兰学派制定了一个理论（礼让原则），根据该理论，国际礼让要求适用外国法律，这不仅是对其他国家仁慈态度的表达，而且是基于互惠和无私。

礼让原则在许多国家，特别是在美国早期具有极大影响，Joseph Story于1834年出版的著名的《关于法律、外交和国内冲突的评论》就证明了这一点。在现代作者中，Frank Vischer认为，礼让的概念似乎比国际公法更准确地表达了各国在选择法律问题上相互应尽的责任，因为它"突出了国家在国际上合作的义务，并适当考虑到其他国家及其主体的正当利益"。

礼让原则的支持者似乎发现很难在国际公法规定的义务和纯粹的礼貌之间划清界限。无论如何，不能断言其法律被宣布适用的外国有理由认为这是它在法律上有权享受的利益，或者法律未适用的外国有理由感到被冒犯。正如后来显示的那样，国际私法规则原则上符合法院所在国家的利益，而不是其他国家的利益。

【附注】

65. See, for example, F. A. Mann, Foreign Affairs, p. 135, who writes that the true explanation of why courts apply foreign law or recognize foreign acts is that a refusal to do so would be contrary to public international law. For instance, a strongly Catholic country considering all marriages in the world not celebrated pursuant to the rituals of the Catholic church to be invalid would in his view act ultra vires and commit an international wrong, see F. A. Mann, Recueil des cours, Vol. 186 (1984), p. 21. See also G. S. Maridakis, Recueil des cours, Vol. 105 (1962), p. 390. It is, of course, possible that today the conclusion given by Mann in his example is correct due to the forum country’s other international commitments, such as those regarding human rights.

66. See F. A. Mann, Recueil des cours, Vol. 186 (1984), p. 31 ; G. van Hecke, Recueil des cours, Vol. 126 (1969), p. 418.

67. See F. Vischer, Recueil des cours, Vol. 232 (1992), p. 26.

68. See H. Eek, Recueil des cours, Vol. 139 (1973), p. 39.

69. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 US 113 (1895) at 163-164.

70. See, for example, K. Lipstein, Recueil des cours, Vol. 135 (1972), pp. 167-173 and 192 ; A. Philip, Recueil des cours, Vol. 160 (1978), p. 10 ; A. V. M. Struycken, Recueil des cours, Vol. 311 (2004), p. 180.

71. In the words of Hans Kelsen, as formulated in a letter published in Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international, Vol. 47 II, 1957, pp. 115-125 (on p. 119), “[p]uisque le droit international général n’impose aux Etats aucune obligation concernant les normes du droit national que l’on appelle le droit international privé, et lorsqu’il n’y a pas de droit international particulier, c’està-dire conventionnel, qui oblige les Etats dans ce domaine, les organes législateurs des Etats sont complètement libres de donner aux normes du droit international privé n’importe quel contenu. Il n’y a même pas de nécessité juridique d’établir dans le cadre d’un droit national des normes de droit international privé . . .”

72. See, for example, D. J. L. Davies, Recueil des cours, Vol. 62 (1937), pp. 450- 452 ; G. Kegel and K. Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht, pp. 15-17 ; A. Philip, Recueil des cours, Vol. 160 (1978), p. 10 ; E. F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws, p. 2.

73. See T. C. Hartley, Recueil des cours, Vol. 319 (2006), pp. 25-26.

74. See the present wording of Chapter 1, Section 1, para. 1, and Chapter 3, Section 4, para. 1, of the Swedish Act (1904 : 26) on Some International Marriage and Guardianship Relationships, and Section 2, para. 1, of the Swedish Act (1971 : 796) on International Adoption Relationships.

75. See E. Hambro, Recueil des cours, Vol. 105 (1962), pp. 46-63 ; G. S. Maridakis, Recueil des cours, Vol. 105 (1962), p. 393.

76. See, for example, R. Ago, Recueil des cours, Vol. 58 (1936), p. 289 ; E. Hambro, Recueil des cours, Vol. 105 (1962), p. 47 ; J. Maury, 57 Recueil des cours, Vol. 57 (1936), pp. 354-357 ; M. F. Yasseen, Recueil des cours, Vol. 116 (1965), pp. 395-396. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, listing the sources of international law, includes international custom, as evidence of a general practice “accepted as law”.

77. See R. Ago, Recueil des cours, Vol. 58 (1936), pp. 288-289 ; O. Kahn- Freund, Recueil des cours, Vol. 143 (1974), p. 176, with a few references. Similarly, there seem to have been no official protests against the exorbitant jurisdictional rules of some countries, such as Article 14 of the French Civil Code giving French courts jurisdiction on the mere ground of the French citizenship of the plaintiff, or Chapter 10, Section 3, of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure giving Swedish courts jurisdiction on the mere ground of the presence of the defendant’s assets, see G. van Hecke, Recueil des cours, Vol. 126 (1969), p. 425. J. Maury, Recueil des cours, Vol. 57 (1936), pp. 355 and 428-431, who believed that there is an obligation under public international law to apply foreign law (even though not specified in detail), explained the lack of diplomatic complaints etc. partly by the fact that the States in general respected that obligation and partly by the small importance attached by them to private international law questions which from their point of view are mere “bagatelles”.

78. See Chapter X.2, infra.

79. See, for example, O. Kahn-Freund, Recueil des cours, Vol. 143 (1974), pp. 170-171.

80. See the discussion about renvoi in Chapter IX, infra.

81. See, for example, D. J. L. Davies, Recueil des cours, Vol. 62 (1937), pp. 453-460 ; M. Jänterä-Jareborg, Recueil des cours, Vol. 304 (2003), pp. 203-206 ;G. Kegel and K. Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht, pp. 175-176 ; E. F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws, pp. 14-15.

82. See, for example, G. Kegel and K. Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht, p. 180 ; E. F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws, pp. 18-19.

83. See F. Vischer, Recueil des cours, Vol. 232 (1992), p. 27.

84. See Chapter III.4, infra.

【附】英文原文

The fact that private international law is basically a part of the legal system of the forum country does not, per se, necessarily mean that in the absence of relevant treaties or other similarly assumed international obligations (such as the requirements of EU law), the forum country has completely free hands to form its conflict rules as it pleases. In the course of the history of private international law it has sometimes been argued that national courts have to apply foreign law because even in the absence of conventions or other international instruments, they are obliged to do so by customary (general) public international law 65. A somewhat “softer” claim is that even though public international law does not impose any duty to apply a particular foreign legal system, such as the lex patriae or the lex domicilii in family matters, it forbids the application of the substantive rules of the lex fori when the situation under scrutiny has no significant connection at all with the forum country 66. For example, F. Vischer asserts that applying the lex fori to situations which lack any relevant connection to the forum State would be an offence against international law 67, even though he concedes that there is no established rule of public international law clarifying which connections are “relevant”. A more prudent author has asserted that an

absolute refusal to pay attention to or to consider the application of foreign law is all over the world looked upon as “close to a breach of the law of nations” 68, and a US Supreme Court judgment from 1895 indicates that private international law was considered “neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor a mere courtesy and good will, upon the other” 69. However, today the prevailing opinion seems to be that in the absence of international instruments stipulating the contrary, each State is in principle free to formulate its conflict rules as it fits its national views of justice and local interests 70, including the right to subject certain issues exclusively to its own substantive law, i.e., to refuse to let certain issues to be governed by a legal system other than the lex fori 71. Restraints imposed by international law, if any, are thus very mild 72. It is possible that the intense search by some authors for international roots of conflict rules has to some extent psychological reasons. As it was put by Trevor Hartley, “[i]t was somehow felt that a set of rules that determine how far the legal system of a State can extend internationally must

derive its authority from something more elevated that that legal system itself” 73.

To use my own country as an example, it is submitted that in the absence of pertinent international obligations imposed by treaties or EU law, Sweden does not violate any rules of customary international law by deciding unilaterally that the capacity to marry, an application for a divorce or an adoption shall in Swedish courts in principle always be decided by applying Swedish family law 74. The country or countries where the persons involved are domiciled or of which they are citizens cannot, relying on customary international law, demand that Swedish courts apply their laws (these countries are, on the other hand, free to deny recognition of the resulting Swedish decision, unless of course there is some international instrument obliging them to recognize it). The situation is somewhat different with regard to jurisdiction of courts, because denying access to justice to foreigners, just like the maltreatment of foreigners in other procedural respects, may under certain circumstances amount to a violation of customary international law (déni de justice). It is true that a survey of all systems of private international law in the world probably would allow the conclusion that most conflict rules of most countries designate a legal system having a reasonably close connection with the relationship it is supposed to govern. Even some of the more specific conflict rules are so widely recognized and used that they are almost universal, for example the principle of locus regit actum, the application of the lex rei sitae with regard to

rights in rem in immovable property and recognition of the freedom of the parties to an international commercial contract to agree on the applicable law (party autonomy) 75. This practice is, however, not a conclusive evidence of the existence of a binding customary rule of general public international law, as it cannot be shown that the States perceive the practice as binding (there is no opinio juris et necessitatis required for the existence of such binding customary rules) 76. Legally binding international custom must be distinguished from State practices not reflecting a legal obligation. To my knowledge, there is no decision of any international court or tribunal where a State was found guilty of violating the customary law of nations by not applying foreign private law and there are practically no reported cases where an official diplomatic protest has been lodged by a State alleging that another country has violated customary public international law by not applying, in a private dispute, the law of the complaining State or by an excessive application of the lex fori 77. On the contrary, there is some support for the view that international law

permits the forum country to refuse to apply foreign law on the grounds of public policy even in those cases where the application of that foreign law is stipulated by an international treaty comprising no explicit ordre public reservation 78.

The conclusion that customary international law imposes no or only very weak requirements on the conflict rules of individual countries is supported also by the fact that the national conflict rules are far from identical and vary substantially from country to country 79.In fact, it happens that a Swedish court applies the law of a foreign country even in a situation where the private international law of the foreign country in question does not consider its own legal system applicable and prefers to apply another — for example Swedish —law 80. Under such circumstances it would be manifestly incorrect to assert that the Swedish conflict rule orders the application of the foreign law because of some duty that Sweden owes to the foreign State in question.

As mentioned above, according to some older theories the application of foreign law is required, if not by international law, then at least by some kind of established comity or courtesy vis-à-vis foreign countries and the desire not to offend them by showing disrespect. Thus, the so-called Dutch School, as represented by Ulrich Huber (1635-1694) and others, formulated a theory pursuant to which the application of foreign law was required by comity of nations, which was not merely an expression of a benevolent attitude towards other States but was rather based on reciprocity and selfinterest 81. The Dutch School exercised substantial influence in many countries, in particular in the early United States, as is demonstrated by Joseph Story’s famous Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, published in 1834 82. Among modern authors, Frank Vischer suggested that the notion of comity seems to express, more accurately than public international law, the duties which States owe each other in the question of the choice of law, as it “underlines the obligation of the State to co-operate internationally and to give due regard to the justified interests of other States and their subjects” 83. It seems that the proponents of comity find it difficult to draw the line between an obligation under public international law and pure courtesy. It cannot, in any case, be asserted that the foreign country whose law is declared applicable has reasons to perceive this to be a benefit to which it is legally entitled or that a foreign country whose law is not applied has reasons to feel offended. As will be shown later 84, rules of private international law serve in principle the interests of the forum country rather than the interests of other countries.