Beijing’s Bismarckian Ghosts: How Great Powers Compete Economically

比较一战前的德-英竞争与当前中美竞争的文章。列举了四个方面的相像性：standard-setting, technology acquisition, financial power, and infrastructure investment，写的很详细，对于比较这两段历史而言，很有参考意义。但是这种分类吧，可能两个有经贸摩擦的国家都会使用，可能并不是守成国与上升国之间特有的。

文章提到中美竞争和英德竞争很相似，比如都通过挥舞关税大棒进行贸易战。Similar fears are at the core of Sino-American strategic competition, with Washington accusing Beijing of cheating,and Beijing accusing Washington of seeking to halt its rise through trade tariffs. Indeed, just as British politicians levied blunt and sometimes counterproductive tariffs on their German competitors(p.164)

比较有意思的是，提到了两段历史中emotion方面共有的点： differences in economic system amplified the salience of the narrowing economic gap, leading the established power to feel cheated and the rising power to feel unsatisfied and threatened（p.162）。这个路子沿袭了战略欺骗的研究路径，以及政治制度竞争不可调和的路径。在一定程度上，这种判断是武断的、阴谋论的，只能造成自我实现的预言的力量上升。

有意思的是，文章建议Trump对与中国加强进行竞争，但不建议使用关税的形式，因为这种形式可能让其他国家导向中国：.Strategically, tariffs can lead diplomatic partners to turn toward a competitor, and Great Britain’s protectionism indeed led some European states to grow reliant on the German market.（p. 172）.尤其认为特朗普不分对象的关税战造成了灾难性后果（和张伯伦的政策很像，不过我不了解这一段历史）：. Indeed, like Chamberlain’s, Trump’s trade approach is emotionally satisfying but diplomatically disastrous. By raising tariffs not only on China but also on American allies, partners, and neighbors— not to mention Asia’s smaller states—Trump risks actually driving them toward China. （p.174）.

顺理成章，文章的建议是让特朗普联合其他国家制衡中国： The right approach, in contrast to tariffs, would be to work with allies to strengthen rules, set standards, punish Chinese industrial policy and technology theft, invest in research, welcome the world’s best and brightest, and create alternatives to its geo-economic statecraft. （p.174）.

总体上，简单的将这两段历史进行比较，然后仅仅通过寻找相似性，进而从这种相似性中推导出霸权国的战略手段，这种研究科学性有待商榷。特朗普难道是个傻子，不知道拉拢盟友制衡中国这一套？

这种文章在美国学界不断增多，可能不是好事。看看近期中美关系的变动，未来还是令人担心的。