SEP: Metaethics. （5：Non-cognitivism and Cognitivism）
接上；
1，Two features of non-cog: expressing and doing when making a moral assessment.
A，the non-cognitive attitudes that are expressed （*****）in making a moral claim.
Moral terms get their meaning not by their link to beliefs that represent （*****）the world as being a certain way, but by their connection to non-cognitive attitudes — e.g., reactions to the way the world is, or desires for how the world might be.
The meaning of moral terms：is on those terms' conventionally-established connection to certain attitudes.
B，what people are doing （*****）in making such claims.
Non-cognitivists emphasize moral language's role as tool for influencing （*****）the others.
In claiming that sth is wrong, people are consistently not just expressing their opposition to it but telling others not to do it.
2，Non-cog's solution to the Open Question：
One can admit that something is pleasant and nonetheless not take a stand （*****）regarding it, or not have any particular emotion （*****）concerning it, or not have any interest in prescribing（*****）anything relating to it.
The Open Question is open, they hold, precisely because the attitudes expressed by a moral judgment all involve something other than （******）merely believing of something that it has certain features (whether natural or not).
3，Solution to IS/OUGHT：
The non-cognitivists’ proposals fit well with granting Hume's claim concerning the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’.
Whatever facts one grants, whatever ‘is’ claims one endorses, there is no logical inconsistency involved in failing （*****）to take a relevant stand, or to express a emotion towards it, or to prescribe something related to it.
4（*****），Non-cognitivists, of course, need to explain why it seems so plausible to see moral judgment as an expression of belief and as a matter of attributing properties to actions, institutions and characters.
5，Taking the challenge head-on, recent versions of expressivism, “quasi-realism,” have taken as a central project explaining, on non-cognitivist foundations, how and why moral language has all the trappings （*****）of being cognitivist and realist.
These views start with a picture of the world as having neither moral properties nor people believing in moral properties (though they have other beliefs), and then explain how a practice of thinking and talking about moral properties, moral beliefs, moral truth, and moral facts, might naturally and properly emerge（*****）.
The central idea is that we can see our thought and talk as fundamentally a matter of our expressing our affective attitudes or commitments which gives rise to （*****）legitimate thought and talk about corresponding properties, beliefs, truths and facts.
Two moves of this idea:
A, Talk of properties, beliefs, truths and facts comes cheap: they are just alternative ways of expressing an attitude or a commitment.
B, the question of whether the cognitivist and realist sounding discourse is legitimate is, itself, an evaluative question judged in light of one's attitudes and commitments. （不太懂。）
6，Versions of quasi-realist expressivism, remain among the most attractive ways of resisting the non-naturalist implications of Moore's Open Question Argument.
7，Other options：
Many argue that, while Moore's argument shows that thinking（*****）something is good is different than thinking it is pleasant, it does not show that being（*****）good is different from being pleasant.
A difference between the thoughts does not establish a difference in the properties.
Thus, for all the Open Question Argument shows, it might turn out that a naturalist account of the nature of moral properties is correct. The naturalist account cannot be defended simply as a conceptual truth but it also cannot be rejected, as Moore thought it could be, as obviously confusing one property (the natural property) for another one (the moral property).
This sort of cognitivism faces the difficulty of explaining the apparently distinctive nature of moral thinking.
8，Cognitivists and non-cognitivists face a common challenge:
To account for the nature of moral thought and talk that simultaneously does justice to its distinctive （*****）nature without failing to appreciate the significant ways in which it is continuous （*****）with non-moral thought and talk.
A，Cognitivism has a relatively easy time accommodating the continuity between moral and non-moral thought and talk, but, especially when combined with naturalism, it faces a real challenge in marking the distinctive nature of moral thought and talk.
B，Non-cognitivism has no trouble making room for the distinctive nature of moral thought and talk, but it has trouble accommodating the continuity.
9，Moorean non-naturalism（Intuitionism）：
attractive because its capacity to combine the continuity and the difference into a coherent picture.
（为什么？自己想。）
10，Problems of Moore's view（Which Moore and his followers try to address）:
A，seems to presuppose the existence of metaphysically dubious properties that fall outside the causal nexus.
B，it would be a complete mystery how we could every reliably learn （*****）anything about them, if they were to exist.
11，Error Theorists:
Although the coherent picture painted by Moore is, at least roughly, the right account of what moral thought and talk involves. But is undermined by its troubling metaphysical and epistemological implications (10AB).
They argue that we have compelling reasons to reject （*****）the presuppositions of moral thought.
Moral thoughts involve a mistake or a failed presupposition, and that, because of this, they cannot be true.
1，Two features of non-cog: expressing and doing when making a moral assessment.
A，the non-cognitive attitudes that are expressed （*****）in making a moral claim.
Moral terms get their meaning not by their link to beliefs that represent （*****）the world as being a certain way, but by their connection to non-cognitive attitudes — e.g., reactions to the way the world is, or desires for how the world might be.
The meaning of moral terms：is on those terms' conventionally-established connection to certain attitudes.
B，what people are doing （*****）in making such claims.
Non-cognitivists emphasize moral language's role as tool for influencing （*****）the others.
In claiming that sth is wrong, people are consistently not just expressing their opposition to it but telling others not to do it.
2，Non-cog's solution to the Open Question：
One can admit that something is pleasant and nonetheless not take a stand （*****）regarding it, or not have any particular emotion （*****）concerning it, or not have any interest in prescribing（*****）anything relating to it.
The Open Question is open, they hold, precisely because the attitudes expressed by a moral judgment all involve something other than （******）merely believing of something that it has certain features (whether natural or not).
3，Solution to IS/OUGHT：
The non-cognitivists’ proposals fit well with granting Hume's claim concerning the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’.
Whatever facts one grants, whatever ‘is’ claims one endorses, there is no logical inconsistency involved in failing （*****）to take a relevant stand, or to express a emotion towards it, or to prescribe something related to it.
4（*****），Non-cognitivists, of course, need to explain why it seems so plausible to see moral judgment as an expression of belief and as a matter of attributing properties to actions, institutions and characters.
5，Taking the challenge head-on, recent versions of expressivism, “quasi-realism,” have taken as a central project explaining, on non-cognitivist foundations, how and why moral language has all the trappings （*****）of being cognitivist and realist.
These views start with a picture of the world as having neither moral properties nor people believing in moral properties (though they have other beliefs), and then explain how a practice of thinking and talking about moral properties, moral beliefs, moral truth, and moral facts, might naturally and properly emerge（*****）.
The central idea is that we can see our thought and talk as fundamentally a matter of our expressing our affective attitudes or commitments which gives rise to （*****）legitimate thought and talk about corresponding properties, beliefs, truths and facts.
Two moves of this idea:
A, Talk of properties, beliefs, truths and facts comes cheap: they are just alternative ways of expressing an attitude or a commitment.
B, the question of whether the cognitivist and realist sounding discourse is legitimate is, itself, an evaluative question judged in light of one's attitudes and commitments. （不太懂。）
6，Versions of quasi-realist expressivism, remain among the most attractive ways of resisting the non-naturalist implications of Moore's Open Question Argument.
7，Other options：
Many argue that, while Moore's argument shows that thinking（*****）something is good is different than thinking it is pleasant, it does not show that being（*****）good is different from being pleasant.
A difference between the thoughts does not establish a difference in the properties.
Thus, for all the Open Question Argument shows, it might turn out that a naturalist account of the nature of moral properties is correct. The naturalist account cannot be defended simply as a conceptual truth but it also cannot be rejected, as Moore thought it could be, as obviously confusing one property (the natural property) for another one (the moral property).
This sort of cognitivism faces the difficulty of explaining the apparently distinctive nature of moral thinking.
8，Cognitivists and non-cognitivists face a common challenge:
To account for the nature of moral thought and talk that simultaneously does justice to its distinctive （*****）nature without failing to appreciate the significant ways in which it is continuous （*****）with non-moral thought and talk.
A，Cognitivism has a relatively easy time accommodating the continuity between moral and non-moral thought and talk, but, especially when combined with naturalism, it faces a real challenge in marking the distinctive nature of moral thought and talk.
B，Non-cognitivism has no trouble making room for the distinctive nature of moral thought and talk, but it has trouble accommodating the continuity.
9，Moorean non-naturalism（Intuitionism）：
attractive because its capacity to combine the continuity and the difference into a coherent picture.
（为什么？自己想。）
10，Problems of Moore's view（Which Moore and his followers try to address）:
A，seems to presuppose the existence of metaphysically dubious properties that fall outside the causal nexus.
B，it would be a complete mystery how we could every reliably learn （*****）anything about them, if they were to exist.
11，Error Theorists:
Although the coherent picture painted by Moore is, at least roughly, the right account of what moral thought and talk involves. But is undermined by its troubling metaphysical and epistemological implications (10AB).
They argue that we have compelling reasons to reject （*****）the presuppositions of moral thought.
Moral thoughts involve a mistake or a failed presupposition, and that, because of this, they cannot be true.
