Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals（First Section）评注
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals
by Emmanuel Kant
Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
FIRST SECTION
第一章
TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL
从普通的道德理性知识过渡到哲学的道德理性知识
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness. There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will itself and may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good.
Moderation in the affections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be called good without qualification, although they have been so unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles of a good will, they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it. A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations.
Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value. There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will. Therefore we will examine this idea from this point of view. In the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being adapted suitably to the purposes of life, we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now in a being which has reason and a will, if the proper object of nature were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, and the whole rule of its conduct, would be far more surely prescribed to it by instinct, and that end would have been attained thereby much more certainly than it ever can be by reason.
Should reason have been communicated to this favoured creature over and above, it must only have served it to contemplate the happy constitution of its nature, to admire it, to congratulate itself thereon, and to feel thankful for it to the beneficent cause, but not that it should subject its desires to that weak and delusive guidance and meddle bunglingly with the purpose of nature. In a word, nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into practical exercise, nor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself the plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature would not only have taken on herself the choice of the ends, but also of the means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both to instinct. And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction.
And from this circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of the understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their shoulders. rather than gained in happiness; and they end by envying, rather than despising, the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we must admit, that the judgement of those who would very much lower the lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard to the happiness and satisfaction of life, or who would even reduce them below zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with which the world is governed, but that there lies at the root of these judgements the idea that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must, for the most part, be postponed.
For as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and since, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i. e., as one which is to have influence on the will, 理性这种实践能力意指理性对意志有影响力，therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary. 理性的正当功能必定是产生在其本身即是善的意志，而不仅仅作为手段的善，就其产生自身即是善的意志来说，理性是绝对必要的。This will then, though not indeed the sole and complete good, must be the supreme good and the condition of every other, even of the desire of happiness.
Under these circumstances, there is nothing inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the cultivation of the reason, which is requisite for the first and unconditional purpose, does in many ways interfere, at least in this life, with the attainment of the second, which is always conditional, namely, happiness. Nay, it may even reduce it to nothing, without nature thereby failing of her purpose. For reason recognizes the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination, and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its own proper kind, namely that from the attainment of an end, which end again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination. We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to do this, we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and hindrances.
【理解】康德指出，普通人类理性都会承认，一件事情的道德价值在于行为者的“善良意志”，而不在于它的实用性。因而善良意志是我们在撇开一切感性的东西时单凭理性来设想的一种意志，而理性（作为实践理性）则是一种“应当给意志以影响的能力”，“所以它的真正的使命决不是作为另外意图的手段，而是产生出自在地本身就是善良的意志来”。大自然给人配备了理性不是为了满足人的感性欲求，因为在这种满足上人的本能比理性要更有用，人的理性是为了更高的理想，也就是实现“义务”这一包含着善良意志的概念。对于这一点，每个普通人单凭自己自然的健全知性即可领会，所以“不须教导，只要解释就行”。但之所以需要解释，是因为义务和“爱好”经常混杂在一起，因而一个行为是道德的还是仅仅是明智的，仅凭普通的道德理性知识还不足以区分，而必须提升到哲学的道德理性知识，即从日常混杂的行为中把“出于义务”（而不仅仅是“合乎义务”）的成分区别出来。
These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the brighter. I omit here all actions which are already recognized as inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful for this or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all, since they even conflict with it. I also set aside those actions which really conform to duty, but to which men have no direct inclination, performing them because they are impelled thereto by some other inclination. For in this case we can readily distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from duty, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this distinction when the action accords with duty and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it. 但是当行为与责任一致，行为的主体对其又有一种直接的偏好时，要分辨出他们就相当困难了。
康德接下来就举了四个例子来对什么是真正的道德行为加以解释。这四个例子并不是随便举的，而是按照严格的逻辑关系排列的。这四个例子就是：1）做买卖童叟无欺（对他人的消极义务）；2）不放弃自己的生命（对自己的消极义务）；3）帮助他人（对他人的积极义务）；4）增进自己的幸福（对自己的积极义务）。康德指出，在这四个例子中，人们很容易看出这些行为要能够具有道德涵义必须是“出于义务”，而不仅仅是“合乎义务”。合乎义务的事从普通的道德理性来看是值得嘉奖和鼓励的，因而属于“普通的道德理性的知识”；但从哲学的道德理性来看却还不一定值得高度推崇，还要看它是否真是“出于义务”而做的。
第一个例子：做买卖童叟无欺（对他人的消极义务）
For example, it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not over charge an inexperienced purchaser; and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone, so that a child buys of him as well as any other. Men are thus honestly served; but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it; it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might besides have a direct inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one over another.Accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view.
第二个例子：不放弃自己的生命（对自己的消极义务）
On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in addition, everyone has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this account the of anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral import. They preserve their life as duty requires, no doubt, but not because duty requires. On the other band, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it- not from inclination or fear, but from duty- then his maxim has a moral worth.
第三个例子：帮助他人（对他人的积极义务）
To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find a pleasure in spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however proper, however amiable it may be, bas nevertheless no true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations, e. g., the inclination to honour, which, if it is happily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and accordant with duty and consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem.
For the maxim lacks the moral import, namely, that such actions be done from duty, not from inclination. Put the case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that, while he still has the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead insensibility, and performs the action without any inclination to it, but simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine moral worth. Further still; if nature bas put little sympathy in the heart of this or that man; if he, supposed to be an upright man, is by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, perhaps because in respect of his own he is provided with the special gift of patience and fortitude and supposes, or even requires, that others should have the same- and such a man would certainly not be the meanest product of nature- but if nature had not specially framed him for a philanthropist, would he not still find in himself a source from whence to give himself a far higher worth than that of a good-natured temperament could be? Unquestionably. It is just in this that the moral worth of the character is brought out which is incomparably the highest of all, namely, that he is beneficent, not from inclination, but from duty.
第四个例子：增进自己的幸福（对自己的积极义务）。
To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly; for discontent with one's condition, under a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation to transgression of duty. But here again, without looking to duty, all men have already the strongest and most intimate inclination to happiness, because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are combined in one total. But the precept of happiness is often of such a sort that it greatly interferes with some inclinations, and yet a man cannot form any definite and certain conception of the sum of satisfaction of all of them which is called happiness. It is not then to be wondered at that a single inclination, definite both as to what it promises and as to the time within which it can be gratified, is often able to overcome such a fluctuating idea, and that a gouty痛风 patient, for instance, can choose to enjoy what he likes, and to suffer what he may, since, according to his calculation, on this occasion at least, be has not sacrificed the enjoyment of the present moment to a possibly mistaken expectation of a happiness which is supposed to be found in health.
有人做好事是出于长远利益的考虑，或是出于自己乐善好施的性格，有人维持生命只是出于本能或爱好，追求幸福只是为了享受，在康德看来这些都不能算作道德的。只有为义务而做好事，只有即使在生不如死的艰难处境中仍然不自杀，这才上升到了哲学的道德理性的层次，其“知识”可归结为三条命题：1）只有意志的出于义务的行为才具有道德价值；2）这种行为的道德价值不在于其结果（目的），而只在于其意志的准则（动机），因而这准则只能是意志的先天形式原则；3）“义务就是一个出自对法则的敬重的行动的必然性”，这敬重所针对的法则是一种普遍的立法原则。在这里所提出的三条命题中，已经显示出了该书总体结构的三个层次了，即：哲学的道德理性能够从普通的道德理性中把意志的“出于义务的行为”作为真正道德的行为分辨出来；道德的形而上学则能够在哲学的道德理性或通俗的道德哲学中把出于义务的动机归结为意志的先天形式法则，即绝对命令；这种绝对命令作为意志的先天的普遍立法原则（“自律”）如何可能、即它的必然性根据则是实践理性批判的课题，后者将这种可能性归结为人的自由，这就在更高的层次上回到了全部论证的起点即自由意志。
But even in this case, if the general desire for happiness did not influence his will, and supposing that in his particular case health was not a necessary element in this calculation, there yet remains in this, as in all other cases, this law, namely, that he should promote his happiness not from inclination but from duty, and by this would his conduct first acquire true moral worth. It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those passages of Scripture also in which we are commanded to love our neighbour, even our enemy. For love, as an affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake may; even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination- nay, are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practical love and not pathological- a love which is seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense- in principles of action and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded.
The second proposition is: That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, 1）只有意志的出于义务的行为才具有道德价值。but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire. 2）这种行为的道德价值不在于其结果（目的），而只在于其意志的准则（动机），因而这准则只能是意志的先天形式原则。It is clear from what precedes that the purposes which we may have in view in our actions, or their effects regarded as ends and springs of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditional or moral worth. In what, then, can their worth lie, if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to its expected effect? It cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of the will without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action. For the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori spring, which is material, as between two roads, and as it must be determined by something, it that it must be determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, in which case every material principle has been withdrawn from it.既然意志必须被某种东西所规定，如果一个行动是出于责任而做，那么他就必须被意欲本身的形式原则所规定，因为一切质料的原则在这里都已经被抛弃。
The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding, I would express thus Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law. 3）“义务就是一个出自对法则的敬重的行动的必然性”，这敬重所针对的法则是一种普遍的立法原则。I may have inclination for an object as the effect of my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it, just for this reason, that it is an effect and not an energy of will. 我可以对我所设定的行为后果的对象有所偏好，但是我不会尊重它，这恰恰是因为它仅仅是意志的一个后果，而不是意志的一个活动。
Similarly I cannot have respect for inclination, whether my own or another's; I can at most, if my own, approve it; if another's, sometimes even love it; i. e., look on it as favourable to my own interest. It is only what is connected with my will as a principle, by no means as an effect- what does not subserve my inclination, but overpowers it, or at least in case of choice excludes it from its calculation- in other words, simply the law of itself, which can be an object of respect, and hence a command. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim* that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations.
*A maxim is the subjective principle of volition. The objective principle (i. e., that which would also serve subjectively as a practical principle to all rational beings if reason had full power over the faculty of desire) is the practical law.
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it,行为的道德价值并不在于这个行为所期望的结果 nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from this expected effect. 也不在于从这种预期的效果中借得动机的那种行为的任何原则。For all these effects- agreeableness of one's condition and even the promotion of the happiness of others- could have been also brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no need of the will of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the supreme and unconditional good can be found. 卓越的善仅仅存在于规律自身的概念中The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will. This is a good which is already present in the person who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to appear first in the result.*这个卓越的善出现在根据这一概念而行动的人中，而不必首先在结果中找到它。
*It might be here objected to me that I take refuge behind the word respect in an obscure feeling, instead of giving a distinct solution of the question by a concept of the reason. But although respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through influence, but is self-wrought by a rational concept, and, therefore, is specifically distinct from all feelings of the former kind, which may be referred either to inclination or fear, What I recognise immediately as a law for me, I recognise with respect. This merely signifies the consciousness that my will is subordinate to a law, without the intervention of other influences on my sense. The immediate determination of the will by the law, and the consciousness of this, is called respect, so that this is regarded as an effect of the law on the subject, and not as the cause of it. Respect is properly the conception of a worth which thwarts my self-love. 尊重是一种抑制自我眷恋的价值概念。Accordingly it is something which is considered neither as an object of inclination nor of fear,因此它既不被看做偏好的对象，也不被看做恐惧的对象 although it has something analogous to both. 虽然它与偏好和恐惧有某些类似。The object of respect is the law only, 尊重的唯一对象是规律and that the law which we impose on ourselves and yet recognise as necessary in itself. 这个规律实际上是我们自己施加在我们身上的，却仍把它看作是本身必然的东西。As a law, we are subjected too it without consulting self-love; 由于它是规律，所以我们服从它而不需咨询自我眷恋之心。as imposed by us on ourselves, it is a result of our will. 由于它是由我们自己施加于我们身上的，所以它是我们的意志的结果。In the former aspect it has an analogy to fear, in the latter to inclination. 在前一方面，尊重与恐惧类似，在后一方面，尊重与偏好类似。Respect for a person is properly only respect for the law (of honesty, etc.) of which he gives us an example. Since we also look on the improvement of our talents as a duty, we consider that we see in a person of talents, as it were, the example of a law (viz., to become like him in this by exercise), and this constitutes our respect. All so-called moral interest consists simply in respect for the law.所谓的道德关切仅仅存在于对规律的尊重中。
But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification? 但是，究竟会是哪种规律，它的概念必定决定意志，而不必考虑预期的结果？单是在这种条件下，意志才能被称作绝对而无条件的善。As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, 既然我已经从意志所服从的任何规律中剔除了那可能发生在意志身上的所有冲动，那么，除了行为对此类规律本身的普遍符合外，就没有任何能够充当意志的原则的东西留存下来。i. e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion. 这即是说，我从来也不应该以我自己也不意愿的方式去行动，这样方能使我自己的准则成为一个普遍有效的规律。如果责任不想成为一个徒然虚构和空幻的概念，那么，单纯对规律自身的符合（不须假定任何应用于某些行为的特殊规律为前提），就作为意志的原则，而且它必须作为这样一个意志的原则。 The common reason of men in its practical judgements perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the principle here suggested. 人们的通常理性，在其实践判断中，完全与此一致，而且通常都把这一原则放在心中。
Let the question be, for example: May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it?当我身处困境，我是否可以许下诺言而有意不去遵守？ I readily distinguish here between the two significations which the question may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to make a false promise? 两个意思，许下一个虚假的诺言是否明智，或者许下一个虚假的诺言是否符合我的责任。The former may undoubtedly of be the case. I see clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from a present difficulty by means of this subterfuge欺骗, but it must be well considered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much greater inconvenience than that from which I now free myself, and as, with all my supposed cunning, the consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me than any mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be considered whether it would not be more prudent to act herein according to a universal maxim and to make it a habit to promise nothing except with the intention of keeping it. But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still only be based on the fear of consequences. 毫无疑问，前一个意思可能常常是这样一种情况，虽然我很清楚仅仅以这种权宜之计来逃脱眼前的困境不足够成分，但是我还是必须考虑，是否会有比眼前更大的困难会因为这个谎言在随后的生活中涌现出来。即使用尽了我所能设想的一切狡计，这后果仍然不能被轻易预见。一旦失去信任而可能给我带来的不利，会比我现在所企求摆脱的不幸更为大些，而且依照普遍规则行动并养成习惯不去许诺任何无意实现的承诺，这是否更为明智还很难讲清楚。但是我很快就看清楚了，这样一个规则只是基于对后果的一个忧虑。
Now it is a wholly different thing to be truthful from duty and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. 出于责任的真诚与出自对不利后果的恐惧的真诚完全是两回事In the first case, the very notion of the action already implies a law for me; 因为在前一种情形中，行为自身的概念已包含着为我的规律in the second case, I must first look about elsewhere to see what results may be combined with it which would affect myself. 而在后一种情形中，我还必须首先四处寻找什么样为我的结果可能与行动相联系。For to deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; 所以要是偏离了责任原则就肯定是恶but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very advantageous to me, 而对我的明智准则的不忠却可能时常对我有利although to abide by it is certainly safer. 虽然遵守这个准则会更加安全The shortest way, however, and an unerring one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, "Should I be content that my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others? 要对一个欺骗性的诺言是否与责任一致这个问题求个答案，最敏捷最可靠的途径就是问我自己：我会愿意把我的准则当成一个既对我自己普遍有效也对别人普遍有效的规律吗？and should I be able to say to myself, "Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate himself?" Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law.我能对我自己这样说，当身处困境而别无它法逃离时，人人都可以许下假诺言吗？我就会立即明白，我可能愿意撒谎，但却不愿意让撒谎成为一个普遍的规律。 For with such a law there would be no promises at all, 因为按照这个规律，就不会有任何诺言了。since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or if they over hastily did so would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself.我的准则一旦成为规律，它必会自戕 I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. 因此，要弄明白我必须做什么才能使我的意欲成为道德上的善，就不需要任何的精明睿智了。Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? 由于对世事之运行毫无经验，对所有世间突发事件都不能做好准备，所以，我只能问自己：我能够愿意把我的准则变成普遍的规律吗？ If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from me immediate respect for such legislation. 如不能，则它必须被抛弃，抛弃它并不是因为对我自己或是对他人会增加任何不利，而是因为它作为一个原则却不能参与可能的普遍立法，对这样一个立法，理性硬要我给出一个直接的尊重。
I do not indeed as yet discern on what this respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at least I understand this, that it is an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give place, because it is the condition of a will being good in itself, and the worth of such a will is above everything. Thus, then, without quitting the moral knowledge of common human reason, we have arrived at its principle. 这样，我们就在普通人的理性所具有的道德知识中，获得了这种道德知识的原则。And although, no doubt, common men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal form, yet they always have it really before their eyes and use it as the standard of their decision. Here it would be easy to show how, with this compass in hand, men are well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good, what bad, conformably to duty or inconsistent with it, if, without in the least teaching them anything new, we only, like Socrates, direct their attention to the principle they themselves employ; and that, therefore, we do not need science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and good, yea, even wise and virtuous. Indeed we might well have conjectured beforehand that the knowledge of what every man is bound to do, and therefore also to know, would be within the reach of every man, even the commonest. 这里就很容易表明，有了这一指针（原则），普通人的理性会如何清楚地辨明，什么是善，什么是恶，哪些符合责任，哪些不符合责任。我们丝毫也不需要教给他们任何新的东西，唯一要做的就是，以苏格拉底那样的方式，使他们自己注意自己的原则，因此，既不需要科学，也不需要哲学，他们就懂得如何做才能为诚实的和善的，甚至是有智慧的和有德行的。我们事先就可能推想到：关于每个人不得不做的，因而也是必须要知道的知识，是每一个人，甚至连最普通的人，都力所能及的。
Here we cannot forbear admiration when we see how great an advantage the practical judgement has over the theoretical in the common understanding of men. In the latter, if common reason ventures to depart from the laws of experience and from the perceptions of the senses, it falls into mere inconceivabilities完全不可理解 and self-contradictions, 自相矛盾at least into a chaos of uncertainty, obscurity, and instability. But in the practical sphere it is just when the common understanding excludes all sensible springs from practical laws that its power of judgement begins to show itself to advantage.在实践判断中，当普通知性把所有感性动机都排除出在实践规律之外时，判断力就开始展现出它自己的优越性。 It then becomes even subtle, whether it be that it chicanes with its own conscience or with other claims respecting what is to be called right, 那么，实践的判断力就变得甚为精妙，它会对自己的良心或对什么应称为正当的那些其他要求支吾其词or whether it desires for its own instruction to determine honestly the worth of actions; 或者愿望为它自己的指示，去正确地判断某些行为的价值。and, in the latter case, it may even have as good a hope of hitting the mark as any philosopher whatever can promise himself. Nay, it is almost more sure of doing so, because the philosopher cannot have any other principle, while he may easily perplex his judgement by a multitude of considerations foreign to the matter, and so turn aside from the right way.
Would it not therefore be wiser in moral concerns to acquiesce in the judgement of common reason, or at most only to call in philosophy for the purpose of rendering the system of morals more complete and intelligible, and its rules more convenient for use (especially for disputation), but not so as to draw off the common understanding from its happy simplicity, or to bring it by means of philosophy into a new path of inquiry and instruction? 在道德事件中，默许普通理性的判断，或者，引进哲学，至多是为了使道德的体系更加完善和更加易懂，并在使用上（尤其是在论证上）使它的规则更加便利，而不是操纵普通的知性使之偏离其可喜的质朴并通过哲学引导它走向一条新的追问与指示之路，这难道不更明智些吗？Innocence is indeed a glorious thing; only, on the other hand, it is very sad that it cannot well maintain itself and is easily seduced. On this account even wisdom- which otherwise consists more in conduct than in knowledge- yet has need of science, not in order to learn from it, but to secure for its precepts admission and permanence.
Against all the commands of duty which reason represents to man as so deserving of respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in his wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness. 人们感到自身之内有一种强有力的东西来与责任的所有戒律相抗衡，是理性向他提出这种戒律值得高度尊重；这个抗衡的力量就是他的需要和偏好，他把这些需要和偏好的全部满足总括到幸福的名下。Now reason issues its commands unyieldingly, without promising anything to the inclinations, and, as it were, with disregard and contempt for these claims, which are so impetuous, and at the same time so plausible, and which will not allow themselves to be suppressed by any command. Hence there arises a natural dialectic, i. e., a disposition, to argue against these strict laws of duty and to question their validity, or at least their purity and strictness; and, if possible, to make them more accordant with our wishes and inclinations, that is to say, to corrupt them at their very source, and entirely to destroy their worth- a thing which even common practical reason cannot ultimately call good.现在理性颁布铁面无私的戒律而不许诺偏好任何东西。理性对偏好的声明毫无顾忌并予以轻蔑，虽然偏好的声明是那么冲动，还那么有理，而且还将不允许自己被任何戒律所废止。从这里，就产生了一种自然的辩证法，即是说，产生了这样一种癖好，对责任规律的严厉性和有效性发起争论，或者至少是，对责任规律的纯粹性和严格性产生质疑，而且如果可能的话，使它们更适应于我们的愿望和偏好。这就等于是从它们的根基上去腐化它们，破坏它们的尊严——这种事情，就是连普通的实践理性也最终不会被称为善的。 Thus is the common reason of man compelled to go out of its sphere, and to take a step into the field of a practical philosophy, not to satisfy any speculative want (which never occurs to it as long as it is content to be mere sound reason), but even on practical grounds, in order to attain in it information and clear instruction respecting the source of its principle, and the correct determination of it in opposition to the maxims which are based on wants and inclinations, so that it may escape from the perplexity of opposite claims and not run the risk of losing all genuine moral principles through the equivocation into which it easily falls. 这样一来，普通人的理性就被迫走出它的范围，从而进入实践哲学的领域。但是普通理性被迫进入实践领域，并不是出于任何思辨的需要。反而是基于实践的根据，普通理性才被迫进入了实践领域，这乃是为了获得关于普通理性的原则的来源方面的信息和清楚的指令，并正确地规定那与根据需要和偏好的准则相对的普通理性之原则。它寻求这方面的信息是为了摆脱相反方面的要求的困扰，同时避免因为易于陷入的含糊其辞而丧失所有真正的道德原则的危险。Thus, when practical reason cultivates itself, there insensibly arises in it a dialetic which forces it to seek aid in philosophy, just as happens to it in its theoretic use; and in this case, therefore, as well as in the other, it will find rest nowhere but in a thorough critical examination of our reason.因此，当实践的普通理性培育其自身时，一个辩证法就在不知不觉中跟着产生了，这个辩证法迫使普通理性去寻求哲学的帮助，就像在理性的理论应用中所发生的情况一样。在这种情况下，正像在理论方面，要不对我们的理性作一番彻底的批判考察，它就会永不停息。
【理解】本章的任务并不是概括全书，而只是展示其中的第一个层次，即“通俗的道德哲学”层次，也就是从普通人最日常的道德意识入手。所以康德说：“因此为了使我的意愿成为善的我必须做什么，对此我根本用不着任何超人的机敏。……我只是问自己：你也能够愿意使你的准则成为一条普遍的法则吗？”虽然这时我们还看不出对这一普遍立法原则的敬重的根据是什么，但“我们已经在普通人类理性的道德知识中获得了它的原则，虽然这理性并未想到把这一原则以如此普遍的形式分离出来，但实际上总是念兹在兹，将其用作自己评判的准绳。”所以一个普通人，“即使不教给他们任何新东西，只须像苏格拉底所做的那样，使他们注意自己固有的原则，因而不须要任何科学和哲学，人们就知道如何做才是诚实的和善良的，乃至于智慧的和有德的。”但可惜的是，这种通俗的道德哲学若真地停留于朴素状态而失去了更高的哲学的指导，就容易在实践理性自然产生的“辩证论”面前迷失方向而走上歧路，从而使自己的本性遭到败坏，“这甚至使普通的实践理性本身最终毕竟不能称之为善的。”这就促使我们不能不从通俗的道德哲学上升到道德的形而上学。
注：本文系本人依据《道德形而上学原理》苗力田译本和邓晓芒的“康德道德哲学的三个层次——《道德形而上学基础》述评”对“Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 英人阿保特(Thomas Kingsmill Abbott)之译”的第一章作的笔记。如有错误疏漏，欢迎指正。
by Emmanuel Kant
Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
FIRST SECTION
第一章
TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL
从普通的道德理性知识过渡到哲学的道德理性知识
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness. There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will itself and may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good.
Moderation in the affections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be called good without qualification, although they have been so unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles of a good will, they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it. A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations.
Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value. There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will. Therefore we will examine this idea from this point of view. In the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being adapted suitably to the purposes of life, we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now in a being which has reason and a will, if the proper object of nature were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, and the whole rule of its conduct, would be far more surely prescribed to it by instinct, and that end would have been attained thereby much more certainly than it ever can be by reason.
Should reason have been communicated to this favoured creature over and above, it must only have served it to contemplate the happy constitution of its nature, to admire it, to congratulate itself thereon, and to feel thankful for it to the beneficent cause, but not that it should subject its desires to that weak and delusive guidance and meddle bunglingly with the purpose of nature. In a word, nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into practical exercise, nor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself the plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature would not only have taken on herself the choice of the ends, but also of the means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both to instinct. And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction.
And from this circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of the understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their shoulders. rather than gained in happiness; and they end by envying, rather than despising, the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we must admit, that the judgement of those who would very much lower the lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard to the happiness and satisfaction of life, or who would even reduce them below zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with which the world is governed, but that there lies at the root of these judgements the idea that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must, for the most part, be postponed.
For as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and since, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i. e., as one which is to have influence on the will, 理性这种实践能力意指理性对意志有影响力，therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary. 理性的正当功能必定是产生在其本身即是善的意志，而不仅仅作为手段的善，就其产生自身即是善的意志来说，理性是绝对必要的。This will then, though not indeed the sole and complete good, must be the supreme good and the condition of every other, even of the desire of happiness.
Under these circumstances, there is nothing inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the cultivation of the reason, which is requisite for the first and unconditional purpose, does in many ways interfere, at least in this life, with the attainment of the second, which is always conditional, namely, happiness. Nay, it may even reduce it to nothing, without nature thereby failing of her purpose. For reason recognizes the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination, and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its own proper kind, namely that from the attainment of an end, which end again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination. We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to do this, we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and hindrances.
【理解】康德指出，普通人类理性都会承认，一件事情的道德价值在于行为者的“善良意志”，而不在于它的实用性。因而善良意志是我们在撇开一切感性的东西时单凭理性来设想的一种意志，而理性（作为实践理性）则是一种“应当给意志以影响的能力”，“所以它的真正的使命决不是作为另外意图的手段，而是产生出自在地本身就是善良的意志来”。大自然给人配备了理性不是为了满足人的感性欲求，因为在这种满足上人的本能比理性要更有用，人的理性是为了更高的理想，也就是实现“义务”这一包含着善良意志的概念。对于这一点，每个普通人单凭自己自然的健全知性即可领会，所以“不须教导，只要解释就行”。但之所以需要解释，是因为义务和“爱好”经常混杂在一起，因而一个行为是道德的还是仅仅是明智的，仅凭普通的道德理性知识还不足以区分，而必须提升到哲学的道德理性知识，即从日常混杂的行为中把“出于义务”（而不仅仅是“合乎义务”）的成分区别出来。
These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the brighter. I omit here all actions which are already recognized as inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful for this or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all, since they even conflict with it. I also set aside those actions which really conform to duty, but to which men have no direct inclination, performing them because they are impelled thereto by some other inclination. For in this case we can readily distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from duty, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this distinction when the action accords with duty and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it. 但是当行为与责任一致，行为的主体对其又有一种直接的偏好时，要分辨出他们就相当困难了。
康德接下来就举了四个例子来对什么是真正的道德行为加以解释。这四个例子并不是随便举的，而是按照严格的逻辑关系排列的。这四个例子就是：1）做买卖童叟无欺（对他人的消极义务）；2）不放弃自己的生命（对自己的消极义务）；3）帮助他人（对他人的积极义务）；4）增进自己的幸福（对自己的积极义务）。康德指出，在这四个例子中，人们很容易看出这些行为要能够具有道德涵义必须是“出于义务”，而不仅仅是“合乎义务”。合乎义务的事从普通的道德理性来看是值得嘉奖和鼓励的，因而属于“普通的道德理性的知识”；但从哲学的道德理性来看却还不一定值得高度推崇，还要看它是否真是“出于义务”而做的。
第一个例子：做买卖童叟无欺（对他人的消极义务）
For example, it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not over charge an inexperienced purchaser; and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone, so that a child buys of him as well as any other. Men are thus honestly served; but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it; it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might besides have a direct inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one over another.Accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view.
第二个例子：不放弃自己的生命（对自己的消极义务）
On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in addition, everyone has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this account the of anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral import. They preserve their life as duty requires, no doubt, but not because duty requires. On the other band, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it- not from inclination or fear, but from duty- then his maxim has a moral worth.
第三个例子：帮助他人（对他人的积极义务）
To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find a pleasure in spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however proper, however amiable it may be, bas nevertheless no true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations, e. g., the inclination to honour, which, if it is happily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and accordant with duty and consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem.
For the maxim lacks the moral import, namely, that such actions be done from duty, not from inclination. Put the case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that, while he still has the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead insensibility, and performs the action without any inclination to it, but simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine moral worth. Further still; if nature bas put little sympathy in the heart of this or that man; if he, supposed to be an upright man, is by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, perhaps because in respect of his own he is provided with the special gift of patience and fortitude and supposes, or even requires, that others should have the same- and such a man would certainly not be the meanest product of nature- but if nature had not specially framed him for a philanthropist, would he not still find in himself a source from whence to give himself a far higher worth than that of a good-natured temperament could be? Unquestionably. It is just in this that the moral worth of the character is brought out which is incomparably the highest of all, namely, that he is beneficent, not from inclination, but from duty.
第四个例子：增进自己的幸福（对自己的积极义务）。
To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly; for discontent with one's condition, under a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation to transgression of duty. But here again, without looking to duty, all men have already the strongest and most intimate inclination to happiness, because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are combined in one total. But the precept of happiness is often of such a sort that it greatly interferes with some inclinations, and yet a man cannot form any definite and certain conception of the sum of satisfaction of all of them which is called happiness. It is not then to be wondered at that a single inclination, definite both as to what it promises and as to the time within which it can be gratified, is often able to overcome such a fluctuating idea, and that a gouty痛风 patient, for instance, can choose to enjoy what he likes, and to suffer what he may, since, according to his calculation, on this occasion at least, be has not sacrificed the enjoyment of the present moment to a possibly mistaken expectation of a happiness which is supposed to be found in health.
有人做好事是出于长远利益的考虑，或是出于自己乐善好施的性格，有人维持生命只是出于本能或爱好，追求幸福只是为了享受，在康德看来这些都不能算作道德的。只有为义务而做好事，只有即使在生不如死的艰难处境中仍然不自杀，这才上升到了哲学的道德理性的层次，其“知识”可归结为三条命题：1）只有意志的出于义务的行为才具有道德价值；2）这种行为的道德价值不在于其结果（目的），而只在于其意志的准则（动机），因而这准则只能是意志的先天形式原则；3）“义务就是一个出自对法则的敬重的行动的必然性”，这敬重所针对的法则是一种普遍的立法原则。在这里所提出的三条命题中，已经显示出了该书总体结构的三个层次了，即：哲学的道德理性能够从普通的道德理性中把意志的“出于义务的行为”作为真正道德的行为分辨出来；道德的形而上学则能够在哲学的道德理性或通俗的道德哲学中把出于义务的动机归结为意志的先天形式法则，即绝对命令；这种绝对命令作为意志的先天的普遍立法原则（“自律”）如何可能、即它的必然性根据则是实践理性批判的课题，后者将这种可能性归结为人的自由，这就在更高的层次上回到了全部论证的起点即自由意志。
But even in this case, if the general desire for happiness did not influence his will, and supposing that in his particular case health was not a necessary element in this calculation, there yet remains in this, as in all other cases, this law, namely, that he should promote his happiness not from inclination but from duty, and by this would his conduct first acquire true moral worth. It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those passages of Scripture also in which we are commanded to love our neighbour, even our enemy. For love, as an affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake may; even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination- nay, are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practical love and not pathological- a love which is seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense- in principles of action and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded.
The second proposition is: That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, 1）只有意志的出于义务的行为才具有道德价值。but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire. 2）这种行为的道德价值不在于其结果（目的），而只在于其意志的准则（动机），因而这准则只能是意志的先天形式原则。It is clear from what precedes that the purposes which we may have in view in our actions, or their effects regarded as ends and springs of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditional or moral worth. In what, then, can their worth lie, if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to its expected effect? It cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of the will without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action. For the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori spring, which is material, as between two roads, and as it must be determined by something, it that it must be determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, in which case every material principle has been withdrawn from it.既然意志必须被某种东西所规定，如果一个行动是出于责任而做，那么他就必须被意欲本身的形式原则所规定，因为一切质料的原则在这里都已经被抛弃。
The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding, I would express thus Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law. 3）“义务就是一个出自对法则的敬重的行动的必然性”，这敬重所针对的法则是一种普遍的立法原则。I may have inclination for an object as the effect of my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it, just for this reason, that it is an effect and not an energy of will. 我可以对我所设定的行为后果的对象有所偏好，但是我不会尊重它，这恰恰是因为它仅仅是意志的一个后果，而不是意志的一个活动。
Similarly I cannot have respect for inclination, whether my own or another's; I can at most, if my own, approve it; if another's, sometimes even love it; i. e., look on it as favourable to my own interest. It is only what is connected with my will as a principle, by no means as an effect- what does not subserve my inclination, but overpowers it, or at least in case of choice excludes it from its calculation- in other words, simply the law of itself, which can be an object of respect, and hence a command. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim* that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations.
*A maxim is the subjective principle of volition. The objective principle (i. e., that which would also serve subjectively as a practical principle to all rational beings if reason had full power over the faculty of desire) is the practical law.
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it,行为的道德价值并不在于这个行为所期望的结果 nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from this expected effect. 也不在于从这种预期的效果中借得动机的那种行为的任何原则。For all these effects- agreeableness of one's condition and even the promotion of the happiness of others- could have been also brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no need of the will of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the supreme and unconditional good can be found. 卓越的善仅仅存在于规律自身的概念中The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will. This is a good which is already present in the person who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to appear first in the result.*这个卓越的善出现在根据这一概念而行动的人中，而不必首先在结果中找到它。
*It might be here objected to me that I take refuge behind the word respect in an obscure feeling, instead of giving a distinct solution of the question by a concept of the reason. But although respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through influence, but is self-wrought by a rational concept, and, therefore, is specifically distinct from all feelings of the former kind, which may be referred either to inclination or fear, What I recognise immediately as a law for me, I recognise with respect. This merely signifies the consciousness that my will is subordinate to a law, without the intervention of other influences on my sense. The immediate determination of the will by the law, and the consciousness of this, is called respect, so that this is regarded as an effect of the law on the subject, and not as the cause of it. Respect is properly the conception of a worth which thwarts my self-love. 尊重是一种抑制自我眷恋的价值概念。Accordingly it is something which is considered neither as an object of inclination nor of fear,因此它既不被看做偏好的对象，也不被看做恐惧的对象 although it has something analogous to both. 虽然它与偏好和恐惧有某些类似。The object of respect is the law only, 尊重的唯一对象是规律and that the law which we impose on ourselves and yet recognise as necessary in itself. 这个规律实际上是我们自己施加在我们身上的，却仍把它看作是本身必然的东西。As a law, we are subjected too it without consulting self-love; 由于它是规律，所以我们服从它而不需咨询自我眷恋之心。as imposed by us on ourselves, it is a result of our will. 由于它是由我们自己施加于我们身上的，所以它是我们的意志的结果。In the former aspect it has an analogy to fear, in the latter to inclination. 在前一方面，尊重与恐惧类似，在后一方面，尊重与偏好类似。Respect for a person is properly only respect for the law (of honesty, etc.) of which he gives us an example. Since we also look on the improvement of our talents as a duty, we consider that we see in a person of talents, as it were, the example of a law (viz., to become like him in this by exercise), and this constitutes our respect. All so-called moral interest consists simply in respect for the law.所谓的道德关切仅仅存在于对规律的尊重中。
But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification? 但是，究竟会是哪种规律，它的概念必定决定意志，而不必考虑预期的结果？单是在这种条件下，意志才能被称作绝对而无条件的善。As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, 既然我已经从意志所服从的任何规律中剔除了那可能发生在意志身上的所有冲动，那么，除了行为对此类规律本身的普遍符合外，就没有任何能够充当意志的原则的东西留存下来。i. e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion. 这即是说，我从来也不应该以我自己也不意愿的方式去行动，这样方能使我自己的准则成为一个普遍有效的规律。如果责任不想成为一个徒然虚构和空幻的概念，那么，单纯对规律自身的符合（不须假定任何应用于某些行为的特殊规律为前提），就作为意志的原则，而且它必须作为这样一个意志的原则。 The common reason of men in its practical judgements perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the principle here suggested. 人们的通常理性，在其实践判断中，完全与此一致，而且通常都把这一原则放在心中。
Let the question be, for example: May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it?当我身处困境，我是否可以许下诺言而有意不去遵守？ I readily distinguish here between the two significations which the question may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to make a false promise? 两个意思，许下一个虚假的诺言是否明智，或者许下一个虚假的诺言是否符合我的责任。The former may undoubtedly of be the case. I see clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from a present difficulty by means of this subterfuge欺骗, but it must be well considered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much greater inconvenience than that from which I now free myself, and as, with all my supposed cunning, the consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me than any mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be considered whether it would not be more prudent to act herein according to a universal maxim and to make it a habit to promise nothing except with the intention of keeping it. But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still only be based on the fear of consequences. 毫无疑问，前一个意思可能常常是这样一种情况，虽然我很清楚仅仅以这种权宜之计来逃脱眼前的困境不足够成分，但是我还是必须考虑，是否会有比眼前更大的困难会因为这个谎言在随后的生活中涌现出来。即使用尽了我所能设想的一切狡计，这后果仍然不能被轻易预见。一旦失去信任而可能给我带来的不利，会比我现在所企求摆脱的不幸更为大些，而且依照普遍规则行动并养成习惯不去许诺任何无意实现的承诺，这是否更为明智还很难讲清楚。但是我很快就看清楚了，这样一个规则只是基于对后果的一个忧虑。
Now it is a wholly different thing to be truthful from duty and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. 出于责任的真诚与出自对不利后果的恐惧的真诚完全是两回事In the first case, the very notion of the action already implies a law for me; 因为在前一种情形中，行为自身的概念已包含着为我的规律in the second case, I must first look about elsewhere to see what results may be combined with it which would affect myself. 而在后一种情形中，我还必须首先四处寻找什么样为我的结果可能与行动相联系。For to deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; 所以要是偏离了责任原则就肯定是恶but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very advantageous to me, 而对我的明智准则的不忠却可能时常对我有利although to abide by it is certainly safer. 虽然遵守这个准则会更加安全The shortest way, however, and an unerring one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, "Should I be content that my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others? 要对一个欺骗性的诺言是否与责任一致这个问题求个答案，最敏捷最可靠的途径就是问我自己：我会愿意把我的准则当成一个既对我自己普遍有效也对别人普遍有效的规律吗？and should I be able to say to myself, "Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate himself?" Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law.我能对我自己这样说，当身处困境而别无它法逃离时，人人都可以许下假诺言吗？我就会立即明白，我可能愿意撒谎，但却不愿意让撒谎成为一个普遍的规律。 For with such a law there would be no promises at all, 因为按照这个规律，就不会有任何诺言了。since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or if they over hastily did so would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself.我的准则一旦成为规律，它必会自戕 I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. 因此，要弄明白我必须做什么才能使我的意欲成为道德上的善，就不需要任何的精明睿智了。Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? 由于对世事之运行毫无经验，对所有世间突发事件都不能做好准备，所以，我只能问自己：我能够愿意把我的准则变成普遍的规律吗？ If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from me immediate respect for such legislation. 如不能，则它必须被抛弃，抛弃它并不是因为对我自己或是对他人会增加任何不利，而是因为它作为一个原则却不能参与可能的普遍立法，对这样一个立法，理性硬要我给出一个直接的尊重。
I do not indeed as yet discern on what this respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at least I understand this, that it is an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give place, because it is the condition of a will being good in itself, and the worth of such a will is above everything. Thus, then, without quitting the moral knowledge of common human reason, we have arrived at its principle. 这样，我们就在普通人的理性所具有的道德知识中，获得了这种道德知识的原则。And although, no doubt, common men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal form, yet they always have it really before their eyes and use it as the standard of their decision. Here it would be easy to show how, with this compass in hand, men are well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good, what bad, conformably to duty or inconsistent with it, if, without in the least teaching them anything new, we only, like Socrates, direct their attention to the principle they themselves employ; and that, therefore, we do not need science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and good, yea, even wise and virtuous. Indeed we might well have conjectured beforehand that the knowledge of what every man is bound to do, and therefore also to know, would be within the reach of every man, even the commonest. 这里就很容易表明，有了这一指针（原则），普通人的理性会如何清楚地辨明，什么是善，什么是恶，哪些符合责任，哪些不符合责任。我们丝毫也不需要教给他们任何新的东西，唯一要做的就是，以苏格拉底那样的方式，使他们自己注意自己的原则，因此，既不需要科学，也不需要哲学，他们就懂得如何做才能为诚实的和善的，甚至是有智慧的和有德行的。我们事先就可能推想到：关于每个人不得不做的，因而也是必须要知道的知识，是每一个人，甚至连最普通的人，都力所能及的。
Here we cannot forbear admiration when we see how great an advantage the practical judgement has over the theoretical in the common understanding of men. In the latter, if common reason ventures to depart from the laws of experience and from the perceptions of the senses, it falls into mere inconceivabilities完全不可理解 and self-contradictions, 自相矛盾at least into a chaos of uncertainty, obscurity, and instability. But in the practical sphere it is just when the common understanding excludes all sensible springs from practical laws that its power of judgement begins to show itself to advantage.在实践判断中，当普通知性把所有感性动机都排除出在实践规律之外时，判断力就开始展现出它自己的优越性。 It then becomes even subtle, whether it be that it chicanes with its own conscience or with other claims respecting what is to be called right, 那么，实践的判断力就变得甚为精妙，它会对自己的良心或对什么应称为正当的那些其他要求支吾其词or whether it desires for its own instruction to determine honestly the worth of actions; 或者愿望为它自己的指示，去正确地判断某些行为的价值。and, in the latter case, it may even have as good a hope of hitting the mark as any philosopher whatever can promise himself. Nay, it is almost more sure of doing so, because the philosopher cannot have any other principle, while he may easily perplex his judgement by a multitude of considerations foreign to the matter, and so turn aside from the right way.
Would it not therefore be wiser in moral concerns to acquiesce in the judgement of common reason, or at most only to call in philosophy for the purpose of rendering the system of morals more complete and intelligible, and its rules more convenient for use (especially for disputation), but not so as to draw off the common understanding from its happy simplicity, or to bring it by means of philosophy into a new path of inquiry and instruction? 在道德事件中，默许普通理性的判断，或者，引进哲学，至多是为了使道德的体系更加完善和更加易懂，并在使用上（尤其是在论证上）使它的规则更加便利，而不是操纵普通的知性使之偏离其可喜的质朴并通过哲学引导它走向一条新的追问与指示之路，这难道不更明智些吗？Innocence is indeed a glorious thing; only, on the other hand, it is very sad that it cannot well maintain itself and is easily seduced. On this account even wisdom- which otherwise consists more in conduct than in knowledge- yet has need of science, not in order to learn from it, but to secure for its precepts admission and permanence.
Against all the commands of duty which reason represents to man as so deserving of respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in his wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness. 人们感到自身之内有一种强有力的东西来与责任的所有戒律相抗衡，是理性向他提出这种戒律值得高度尊重；这个抗衡的力量就是他的需要和偏好，他把这些需要和偏好的全部满足总括到幸福的名下。Now reason issues its commands unyieldingly, without promising anything to the inclinations, and, as it were, with disregard and contempt for these claims, which are so impetuous, and at the same time so plausible, and which will not allow themselves to be suppressed by any command. Hence there arises a natural dialectic, i. e., a disposition, to argue against these strict laws of duty and to question their validity, or at least their purity and strictness; and, if possible, to make them more accordant with our wishes and inclinations, that is to say, to corrupt them at their very source, and entirely to destroy their worth- a thing which even common practical reason cannot ultimately call good.现在理性颁布铁面无私的戒律而不许诺偏好任何东西。理性对偏好的声明毫无顾忌并予以轻蔑，虽然偏好的声明是那么冲动，还那么有理，而且还将不允许自己被任何戒律所废止。从这里，就产生了一种自然的辩证法，即是说，产生了这样一种癖好，对责任规律的严厉性和有效性发起争论，或者至少是，对责任规律的纯粹性和严格性产生质疑，而且如果可能的话，使它们更适应于我们的愿望和偏好。这就等于是从它们的根基上去腐化它们，破坏它们的尊严——这种事情，就是连普通的实践理性也最终不会被称为善的。 Thus is the common reason of man compelled to go out of its sphere, and to take a step into the field of a practical philosophy, not to satisfy any speculative want (which never occurs to it as long as it is content to be mere sound reason), but even on practical grounds, in order to attain in it information and clear instruction respecting the source of its principle, and the correct determination of it in opposition to the maxims which are based on wants and inclinations, so that it may escape from the perplexity of opposite claims and not run the risk of losing all genuine moral principles through the equivocation into which it easily falls. 这样一来，普通人的理性就被迫走出它的范围，从而进入实践哲学的领域。但是普通理性被迫进入实践领域，并不是出于任何思辨的需要。反而是基于实践的根据，普通理性才被迫进入了实践领域，这乃是为了获得关于普通理性的原则的来源方面的信息和清楚的指令，并正确地规定那与根据需要和偏好的准则相对的普通理性之原则。它寻求这方面的信息是为了摆脱相反方面的要求的困扰，同时避免因为易于陷入的含糊其辞而丧失所有真正的道德原则的危险。Thus, when practical reason cultivates itself, there insensibly arises in it a dialetic which forces it to seek aid in philosophy, just as happens to it in its theoretic use; and in this case, therefore, as well as in the other, it will find rest nowhere but in a thorough critical examination of our reason.因此，当实践的普通理性培育其自身时，一个辩证法就在不知不觉中跟着产生了，这个辩证法迫使普通理性去寻求哲学的帮助，就像在理性的理论应用中所发生的情况一样。在这种情况下，正像在理论方面，要不对我们的理性作一番彻底的批判考察，它就会永不停息。
【理解】本章的任务并不是概括全书，而只是展示其中的第一个层次，即“通俗的道德哲学”层次，也就是从普通人最日常的道德意识入手。所以康德说：“因此为了使我的意愿成为善的我必须做什么，对此我根本用不着任何超人的机敏。……我只是问自己：你也能够愿意使你的准则成为一条普遍的法则吗？”虽然这时我们还看不出对这一普遍立法原则的敬重的根据是什么，但“我们已经在普通人类理性的道德知识中获得了它的原则，虽然这理性并未想到把这一原则以如此普遍的形式分离出来，但实际上总是念兹在兹，将其用作自己评判的准绳。”所以一个普通人，“即使不教给他们任何新东西，只须像苏格拉底所做的那样，使他们注意自己固有的原则，因而不须要任何科学和哲学，人们就知道如何做才是诚实的和善良的，乃至于智慧的和有德的。”但可惜的是，这种通俗的道德哲学若真地停留于朴素状态而失去了更高的哲学的指导，就容易在实践理性自然产生的“辩证论”面前迷失方向而走上歧路，从而使自己的本性遭到败坏，“这甚至使普通的实践理性本身最终毕竟不能称之为善的。”这就促使我们不能不从通俗的道德哲学上升到道德的形而上学。
注：本文系本人依据《道德形而上学原理》苗力田译本和邓晓芒的“康德道德哲学的三个层次——《道德形而上学基础》述评”对“Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 英人阿保特(Thomas Kingsmill Abbott)之译”的第一章作的笔记。如有错误疏漏，欢迎指正。
