罗斯福与法西斯主义
One of the great questions of modern American politics is why FDR’s administration and the New Deal were never properly connected with the political theory of fascism in general and Mussolini in particular. While doing some research, I found this article from Chronicles Magazine which does a fairly good job of laying out the historical facts:
现代美国政治最重大的一点质疑是，在罗斯福政府及其新政与广义的法西斯政治理论和狭义的墨索里尼政治理论之间，何以没有某种关联性呢？在研究中我发现这篇刊于Chronicles Magazine 的文章，将为解读这一史实提供不小的帮助。
Until Abyssinia, Mussolini was hailed as a genius and a superman on both sides of the Atlantic, primarily because of his economic and social policies. When FDR was inaugurated in March 1933, the world was praising Mussolini’s success in avoiding the Great Depression. Roosevelt and his “Brain Trust,” the architects of the New Deal, were fascinated by Italy’s fascism—a term which was not perjorative at the time. In America, it was seen as a form of economic nationalism built around consensus planning by the established elites in government, business, and labor.
在阿比西尼亚之前，墨索里尼在大西洋两岸都被呼唤为天才、超人，这主要得益于他的经济和社会政策。1933 年三月，罗斯福总统上任，当时全球正赞颂墨索里尼为阻截“经济大萧条”立下的赫赫战功。罗斯福和谋划新政的“智囊团”都曾倾心于意大利的法西斯主义——当时这个词还不是贬义。美国人把它看作经济国家主义的一种形式，是一种建立在政界、商界、工人界精英共同商讨、制定经济计划基础之上的经济国家主义。
American leaders were not very concerned with the undemocratic character of Mussolini’s regime. Fascism had “effectively stifled hostile elements in restricting the right of free assembly, in abolishing freedom of the press and in having at its command a large military organization,” the U.S. Embassy in Rome reported in 1925. But Mussolini remained a “moderate,” confronting the Bolsheviks while fending off extremists on the right. Ambassador Henry Fletcher saw only a choice between Mussolini and socialism, and the Italian people preferred fascist “peace and prosperity” to the “free speech and loose administration” that risked bringing Bolshevism to power. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg joined Fletcher in labeling all opposition groups as “communists, socialists, and anarchists.” The chief of the State Department’s Western European Division, William Castle, declared in 1926 that “the methods of the Duce are not by any means American methods,” but “methods which would certainly not appeal to this country might easily appeal to a people so differently constituted as are the Italians.”
美国政界高层感兴趣的并非墨索里尼政权的非民主做派。法西斯主义“通过限制自由集会权力、废止新闻自由、掌控大规模军事力量，有效抑制了敌对势力，”美国驻罗马大使馆在 1925 年 的报告中这样写道。但墨索里尼保持着“克制”，一面与布尔什维克们对峙，一面避开极右势力。大使Henry Fletcher 在墨索里尼和社会主义之间必须选择一个，意大利人民倾向于法西斯主义者宣传的“和平、繁荣”，他们不愿让布尔什维克上台、让国家面临“言论自由、管理松散”的风险。国务卿Frank Kellogg 支持Fletcher 将所有反对势力归为“共产主义者、社会主义者、无政府主义者。” 1926 年，美国国务院西欧部部长William Castle 宣称“意大利领导人用的法子对美国来说并非良策，”但，“对国家来说不好的方法或将有益于人民和意大利一样人口构成迥异的国民。”
As the political and social effects of the Great Depression hit Europe, Italy received mounting praise as a bastion of order and stability. “The wops are unwopping themselves,” Fortune magazine noted with awe in 1934. State Department roving Ambassador Norman Davis praised the successes of Italy in remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations in 1933, speaking after the Italian ambassador had drawn applause from his distinguished audience for his description of how Italy had put its “own house in order . . . A class war was put down.” Roosevelt’s ambassador to Italy, Breckenridge Long, was also full of enthusiasm for the “new experiment in government” which “works most successfully.” Henry Stimson (secretary of state under Hoover, secretary of war under Roosevelt) recalled that he and Hoover had found Mussolini to be “a sound and useful leader.” Roosevelt shared many of these positive views of “that admirable Italian gentleman,” as he termed Mussolini in 1933.
当经济大萧条产生的政治、社会影响波及欧洲，意大利这座秩序和稳定的堡垒迎来好评如潮。1934 年，《财富》杂志惊恐的写道：“在美国的意大利人都在往回赶！” 1933年，美国国务院巡回大使Norman Davis 在外交关系委员会盛赞意大利的成功，此前，意大利大使亦将本国描述为“社会秩序井然，阶级斗争已得到平息”，尊贵的委员会成员为此响起热烈掌声。罗斯福派去意大利的大使Breckenridge Long 对这项“大获成功”的“政府管理实验”也具有饱满的热情。Henry Stimson（胡佛政府国务卿、罗斯福政府的战争部长）回想起自己和胡佛都将墨索里尼视为“明知、务实的领袖”。墨索里尼收获的这些积极评价，罗斯福基本赞同，并于在1933 年尊称其为“人民爱戴的意大利绅士”。
The most radical aspect of the New Deal was the National Industrial Recovery Act, passed in June 1933, which set up the National Recovery Administration. Most industries were forced into cartels. Codes that regulated prices and terms of sale transformed much of the American economy. The industrial and agricultural life of the country was to be organized by government into vast farm and industrial cartels. This was corporatism, the essence of fascism.
罗斯福新政中最激进的部分是“全国产业复兴法”（National Industrial Recovery Act）。该法案于 1933 年六月议会通过，并据此成立国家工业复兴总署。多数产业被迫成为卡特尔。价格管理规范和买卖条件很大程度上改变了美国经济。工业和农业命脉将由政府重组成为大型农场和工业卡特尔。这正是法西斯主义的实质——法团主义。
It may be argued that Roosevelt simply did what seemed politically expedient. But contemporaries knew what was in the making. Some liked it: Charles Beard freely admitted that “FDR accepts the inexorable collectivism of the American economy . . . national planning in industry, business, agriculture and government.” But detractors existed even within his own party. Democratic Sen. Carter Glass of Virginia denounced the NRA as “the utterly dangerous effort of the federal government at Washington to transplant Hitlerism to every corner of this nation.”
或许有人要说，罗斯福只是采取了一种政治上的权宜之计。但当时的人们很清楚将会发生什么。有人支持：Charles Beard 坦陈“罗斯福总统认同美国经济势不可挡的集体主义……工业、贸易、农业和政府各方面都存在国有计划。”但也出现了反对者，就连民主党内部都有。弗吉尼亚州的Sen. Carter Glass 将国家工业复兴总署斥为“华盛顿联邦政府极其危险的举动，将在整个国家移植希特勒主义”。
FDR’s New Deal united communists and fascists. Union leader Sidney Hillman praised Lenin as “one of the few great men that the human race has produced, one of the greatest statesmen of our age and perhaps of all ages.” Big-business partisan Gen. Hugh Johnson wanted America to imitate the “dynamic pragmatism” of Mussolini. Together, Hillman and Johnson developed the National Labor Relations Board. They shared a collectivist and authoritarian aversion for historical American principles of liberty.
罗斯福新政联合了共产主义者和法西斯主义者。联盟领袖Sidney Hillman 赞颂列宁为“人中英杰，本时代、甚至古往今来最伟大的政治家之一。”大财团党羽Gen. Hugh Johnson 希望美国效仿墨索里尼的“有活力的实用主义”（dynamic pragmatism）。Hillman 与Johnson 携手创办了美国全国劳资关系委员会（National Labor Relations Board）。此二人不喜美国的自由主义传统，信奉集体主义和极权主义。
Like fascist and communist dictators, Roosevelt relied on his own charisma, carefully and deceitfully developed, and the executive power of his office to stroke the electorate into compliance and to bludgeon his critics. His welfare projects went far beyond aid to the poor and wound up bribing whole sectors of American society—farmers, businessmen, banks, intellectuals—into dependence on him and the state he created. Through subsidies, wrote Richard Hofstadter, “a generation of artists and intellectuals became wedded to the New Deal and devoted to Rooseveltian liberalism.” Their corrupted descendants still thrive through federal endowments for the arts and humanities and in politically correct, federally funded academia. The only practical difference between FDR and fascist dictators was that he was far less successful in resolving the economic crisis. He made the Depression worse and even prolonged it. When he was elected, there were 11.6 million unemployed; seven years later, there were still 11.3 million out of work. In 1932, there were 16.6 million on relief; in 1939, there were 19.6 million. Only the war eventually ended the depression.
和法西斯主义、共产主义独裁者一样，罗斯福一方面依赖自己的个人魅力，小心谨慎、不惜采用欺骗手段培养个人魅力；另一方面，他依赖内阁的执行力，降服选民、恫吓批评者。罗斯福的社会福利项目并非止步于济贫，而是惠及美国社会各阶层——农民、商人、银行业、知识分子——通通依赖于罗斯福和他的政府。Richard Hofstadter 写道：“补助金让一代艺术家和知识分子与新政联姻，倾心于罗斯福自由主义。”他们的后代生活腐化，靠着联邦为艺术和人文学科提供的基金，在政治正确、联邦政府扶持的学界活的很滋润。罗斯福和法西斯独裁者的唯一真正区别在于，在化解经济危机方面，罗斯福做的远不如后者。大萧条因他破坏性更强、持续时间更久。罗斯福当选之时，失业人数是一千一百六十万；七年后，失业人数仍高达一千一百三十万。1932 年，接受救济的人数是一千六百六十万；1939 年，该数据升至一千九百六十万。最终，终结大萧条的是战争。
FDR was of course held as a sort of hero by many who lived though that generation. I know my grandparents were quite fond of him. It is no surprise that they refused to accept that the New Deal was based on the fascism developed by Mussolini. However now that their generation is passing from the scene, I think there is a lot that can be gained by drawing the connection which has been long delayed.
亲历那个时代的许多人自然将罗斯福奉为“英雄”。比如我的祖父母就对他颇为敬重。至于他们拒绝接受新政的根基是墨索里尼法西斯主义，也一点也不奇怪。现如今，那个时代已然过去，重拾这个被长久搁置的关联性，应该是会为我们带来不少裨益的。
First of course, it would be a well deserved blow to the self-serving official American political narrative. Not only would it destroy the left’s bogyman of “fascism” always lurking just around the corner (“sorry, been there, done that already”), it would put on display their own fascination and support for it. It would also be a blow for the establishment right though: having long purported that American is a nation based on an Idea, it takes the cover off of the darker truth that America is more a country in search of an Idea. For the multiculturalists, it is worth remembering FDR was well known for taking the initiative to bring Blacks, Jews and others into his political alliance; there is nothing about multi-ethnicity which precludes fascism and statism. It also helps explain the weakness of the establishment to lobbying (and blackmail) that led to the 1965 immigration bill and other “inclusive” agenda.
首当其冲的，是美国官方政治自说自话者，这群自私自利的家伙理应领受一回重击。罗斯福和法西斯主义之间的关联性不仅摧毁长久以来潜伏在角落里的左翼“法西斯”妖怪（“抱歉，一直在那儿，该干的早就干过了”），还会展现他们自己对法西斯的青睐和支持。右翼也会遭到打击：长久鼓吹美国是一个建立在理念之上的国家，罗斯福和法西斯主义之间的关联性掀开位于暗处的真相的盖子——美国其实是一个寻找理念的国家。多元文化主义者应该记住，罗斯福率先在政治联盟中引入黑人、犹太人和其他亚文化族裔的脸孔，但无关多元种族对法西斯主义和国家主义的阻止作用。罗斯福和法西斯主义之间的关联性还能解释游说（和勒索）机构为什么虚弱无力，使得1965 年移民法和其他“包容”议案顺利通过。
In the end, the State is not our friend. MR’ers know that of course, but hopefully the sad tale of FDR’s effect on America can remind more average Americans of this as well. Statism and hard nationalism are no substitutes for our ethnic genetic interest. How to pursue it without the parasites of bureaucratism, corporatism, and other “discrete” groups piling on to feed is perhaps a harder question to answer.
说到底，政府不是我们的朋友。大佬们当然知道这一点，希望这一番罗斯福对美国的影响的悲伤叙述能让更多美国寻常百姓知道这一常识。国家主义和硬性民族主义不是种族基因利益的替代品。如何在没有官僚主义、大财团主义和其他“离散”群体一堆叠一堆寄生虫等着喂养的情况下，追求种族基因利益，或许这才是更艰难的问题。
现代美国政治最重大的一点质疑是，在罗斯福政府及其新政与广义的法西斯政治理论和狭义的墨索里尼政治理论之间，何以没有某种关联性呢？在研究中我发现这篇刊于Chronicles Magazine 的文章，将为解读这一史实提供不小的帮助。
Until Abyssinia, Mussolini was hailed as a genius and a superman on both sides of the Atlantic, primarily because of his economic and social policies. When FDR was inaugurated in March 1933, the world was praising Mussolini’s success in avoiding the Great Depression. Roosevelt and his “Brain Trust,” the architects of the New Deal, were fascinated by Italy’s fascism—a term which was not perjorative at the time. In America, it was seen as a form of economic nationalism built around consensus planning by the established elites in government, business, and labor.
在阿比西尼亚之前，墨索里尼在大西洋两岸都被呼唤为天才、超人，这主要得益于他的经济和社会政策。1933 年三月，罗斯福总统上任，当时全球正赞颂墨索里尼为阻截“经济大萧条”立下的赫赫战功。罗斯福和谋划新政的“智囊团”都曾倾心于意大利的法西斯主义——当时这个词还不是贬义。美国人把它看作经济国家主义的一种形式，是一种建立在政界、商界、工人界精英共同商讨、制定经济计划基础之上的经济国家主义。
American leaders were not very concerned with the undemocratic character of Mussolini’s regime. Fascism had “effectively stifled hostile elements in restricting the right of free assembly, in abolishing freedom of the press and in having at its command a large military organization,” the U.S. Embassy in Rome reported in 1925. But Mussolini remained a “moderate,” confronting the Bolsheviks while fending off extremists on the right. Ambassador Henry Fletcher saw only a choice between Mussolini and socialism, and the Italian people preferred fascist “peace and prosperity” to the “free speech and loose administration” that risked bringing Bolshevism to power. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg joined Fletcher in labeling all opposition groups as “communists, socialists, and anarchists.” The chief of the State Department’s Western European Division, William Castle, declared in 1926 that “the methods of the Duce are not by any means American methods,” but “methods which would certainly not appeal to this country might easily appeal to a people so differently constituted as are the Italians.”
美国政界高层感兴趣的并非墨索里尼政权的非民主做派。法西斯主义“通过限制自由集会权力、废止新闻自由、掌控大规模军事力量，有效抑制了敌对势力，”美国驻罗马大使馆在 1925 年 的报告中这样写道。但墨索里尼保持着“克制”，一面与布尔什维克们对峙，一面避开极右势力。大使Henry Fletcher 在墨索里尼和社会主义之间必须选择一个，意大利人民倾向于法西斯主义者宣传的“和平、繁荣”，他们不愿让布尔什维克上台、让国家面临“言论自由、管理松散”的风险。国务卿Frank Kellogg 支持Fletcher 将所有反对势力归为“共产主义者、社会主义者、无政府主义者。” 1926 年，美国国务院西欧部部长William Castle 宣称“意大利领导人用的法子对美国来说并非良策，”但，“对国家来说不好的方法或将有益于人民和意大利一样人口构成迥异的国民。”
As the political and social effects of the Great Depression hit Europe, Italy received mounting praise as a bastion of order and stability. “The wops are unwopping themselves,” Fortune magazine noted with awe in 1934. State Department roving Ambassador Norman Davis praised the successes of Italy in remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations in 1933, speaking after the Italian ambassador had drawn applause from his distinguished audience for his description of how Italy had put its “own house in order . . . A class war was put down.” Roosevelt’s ambassador to Italy, Breckenridge Long, was also full of enthusiasm for the “new experiment in government” which “works most successfully.” Henry Stimson (secretary of state under Hoover, secretary of war under Roosevelt) recalled that he and Hoover had found Mussolini to be “a sound and useful leader.” Roosevelt shared many of these positive views of “that admirable Italian gentleman,” as he termed Mussolini in 1933.
当经济大萧条产生的政治、社会影响波及欧洲，意大利这座秩序和稳定的堡垒迎来好评如潮。1934 年，《财富》杂志惊恐的写道：“在美国的意大利人都在往回赶！” 1933年，美国国务院巡回大使Norman Davis 在外交关系委员会盛赞意大利的成功，此前，意大利大使亦将本国描述为“社会秩序井然，阶级斗争已得到平息”，尊贵的委员会成员为此响起热烈掌声。罗斯福派去意大利的大使Breckenridge Long 对这项“大获成功”的“政府管理实验”也具有饱满的热情。Henry Stimson（胡佛政府国务卿、罗斯福政府的战争部长）回想起自己和胡佛都将墨索里尼视为“明知、务实的领袖”。墨索里尼收获的这些积极评价，罗斯福基本赞同，并于在1933 年尊称其为“人民爱戴的意大利绅士”。
The most radical aspect of the New Deal was the National Industrial Recovery Act, passed in June 1933, which set up the National Recovery Administration. Most industries were forced into cartels. Codes that regulated prices and terms of sale transformed much of the American economy. The industrial and agricultural life of the country was to be organized by government into vast farm and industrial cartels. This was corporatism, the essence of fascism.
罗斯福新政中最激进的部分是“全国产业复兴法”（National Industrial Recovery Act）。该法案于 1933 年六月议会通过，并据此成立国家工业复兴总署。多数产业被迫成为卡特尔。价格管理规范和买卖条件很大程度上改变了美国经济。工业和农业命脉将由政府重组成为大型农场和工业卡特尔。这正是法西斯主义的实质——法团主义。
It may be argued that Roosevelt simply did what seemed politically expedient. But contemporaries knew what was in the making. Some liked it: Charles Beard freely admitted that “FDR accepts the inexorable collectivism of the American economy . . . national planning in industry, business, agriculture and government.” But detractors existed even within his own party. Democratic Sen. Carter Glass of Virginia denounced the NRA as “the utterly dangerous effort of the federal government at Washington to transplant Hitlerism to every corner of this nation.”
或许有人要说，罗斯福只是采取了一种政治上的权宜之计。但当时的人们很清楚将会发生什么。有人支持：Charles Beard 坦陈“罗斯福总统认同美国经济势不可挡的集体主义……工业、贸易、农业和政府各方面都存在国有计划。”但也出现了反对者，就连民主党内部都有。弗吉尼亚州的Sen. Carter Glass 将国家工业复兴总署斥为“华盛顿联邦政府极其危险的举动，将在整个国家移植希特勒主义”。
FDR’s New Deal united communists and fascists. Union leader Sidney Hillman praised Lenin as “one of the few great men that the human race has produced, one of the greatest statesmen of our age and perhaps of all ages.” Big-business partisan Gen. Hugh Johnson wanted America to imitate the “dynamic pragmatism” of Mussolini. Together, Hillman and Johnson developed the National Labor Relations Board. They shared a collectivist and authoritarian aversion for historical American principles of liberty.
罗斯福新政联合了共产主义者和法西斯主义者。联盟领袖Sidney Hillman 赞颂列宁为“人中英杰，本时代、甚至古往今来最伟大的政治家之一。”大财团党羽Gen. Hugh Johnson 希望美国效仿墨索里尼的“有活力的实用主义”（dynamic pragmatism）。Hillman 与Johnson 携手创办了美国全国劳资关系委员会（National Labor Relations Board）。此二人不喜美国的自由主义传统，信奉集体主义和极权主义。
Like fascist and communist dictators, Roosevelt relied on his own charisma, carefully and deceitfully developed, and the executive power of his office to stroke the electorate into compliance and to bludgeon his critics. His welfare projects went far beyond aid to the poor and wound up bribing whole sectors of American society—farmers, businessmen, banks, intellectuals—into dependence on him and the state he created. Through subsidies, wrote Richard Hofstadter, “a generation of artists and intellectuals became wedded to the New Deal and devoted to Rooseveltian liberalism.” Their corrupted descendants still thrive through federal endowments for the arts and humanities and in politically correct, federally funded academia. The only practical difference between FDR and fascist dictators was that he was far less successful in resolving the economic crisis. He made the Depression worse and even prolonged it. When he was elected, there were 11.6 million unemployed; seven years later, there were still 11.3 million out of work. In 1932, there were 16.6 million on relief; in 1939, there were 19.6 million. Only the war eventually ended the depression.
和法西斯主义、共产主义独裁者一样，罗斯福一方面依赖自己的个人魅力，小心谨慎、不惜采用欺骗手段培养个人魅力；另一方面，他依赖内阁的执行力，降服选民、恫吓批评者。罗斯福的社会福利项目并非止步于济贫，而是惠及美国社会各阶层——农民、商人、银行业、知识分子——通通依赖于罗斯福和他的政府。Richard Hofstadter 写道：“补助金让一代艺术家和知识分子与新政联姻，倾心于罗斯福自由主义。”他们的后代生活腐化，靠着联邦为艺术和人文学科提供的基金，在政治正确、联邦政府扶持的学界活的很滋润。罗斯福和法西斯独裁者的唯一真正区别在于，在化解经济危机方面，罗斯福做的远不如后者。大萧条因他破坏性更强、持续时间更久。罗斯福当选之时，失业人数是一千一百六十万；七年后，失业人数仍高达一千一百三十万。1932 年，接受救济的人数是一千六百六十万；1939 年，该数据升至一千九百六十万。最终，终结大萧条的是战争。
FDR was of course held as a sort of hero by many who lived though that generation. I know my grandparents were quite fond of him. It is no surprise that they refused to accept that the New Deal was based on the fascism developed by Mussolini. However now that their generation is passing from the scene, I think there is a lot that can be gained by drawing the connection which has been long delayed.
亲历那个时代的许多人自然将罗斯福奉为“英雄”。比如我的祖父母就对他颇为敬重。至于他们拒绝接受新政的根基是墨索里尼法西斯主义，也一点也不奇怪。现如今，那个时代已然过去，重拾这个被长久搁置的关联性，应该是会为我们带来不少裨益的。
First of course, it would be a well deserved blow to the self-serving official American political narrative. Not only would it destroy the left’s bogyman of “fascism” always lurking just around the corner (“sorry, been there, done that already”), it would put on display their own fascination and support for it. It would also be a blow for the establishment right though: having long purported that American is a nation based on an Idea, it takes the cover off of the darker truth that America is more a country in search of an Idea. For the multiculturalists, it is worth remembering FDR was well known for taking the initiative to bring Blacks, Jews and others into his political alliance; there is nothing about multi-ethnicity which precludes fascism and statism. It also helps explain the weakness of the establishment to lobbying (and blackmail) that led to the 1965 immigration bill and other “inclusive” agenda.
首当其冲的，是美国官方政治自说自话者，这群自私自利的家伙理应领受一回重击。罗斯福和法西斯主义之间的关联性不仅摧毁长久以来潜伏在角落里的左翼“法西斯”妖怪（“抱歉，一直在那儿，该干的早就干过了”），还会展现他们自己对法西斯的青睐和支持。右翼也会遭到打击：长久鼓吹美国是一个建立在理念之上的国家，罗斯福和法西斯主义之间的关联性掀开位于暗处的真相的盖子——美国其实是一个寻找理念的国家。多元文化主义者应该记住，罗斯福率先在政治联盟中引入黑人、犹太人和其他亚文化族裔的脸孔，但无关多元种族对法西斯主义和国家主义的阻止作用。罗斯福和法西斯主义之间的关联性还能解释游说（和勒索）机构为什么虚弱无力，使得1965 年移民法和其他“包容”议案顺利通过。
In the end, the State is not our friend. MR’ers know that of course, but hopefully the sad tale of FDR’s effect on America can remind more average Americans of this as well. Statism and hard nationalism are no substitutes for our ethnic genetic interest. How to pursue it without the parasites of bureaucratism, corporatism, and other “discrete” groups piling on to feed is perhaps a harder question to answer.
说到底，政府不是我们的朋友。大佬们当然知道这一点，希望这一番罗斯福对美国的影响的悲伤叙述能让更多美国寻常百姓知道这一常识。国家主义和硬性民族主义不是种族基因利益的替代品。如何在没有官僚主义、大财团主义和其他“离散”群体一堆叠一堆寄生虫等着喂养的情况下，追求种族基因利益，或许这才是更艰难的问题。
