见过不要脸的,可还没见过这么不要脸的。

快樂

来自: 快樂(流畅感。) 2016-11-22 09:03:45

  • joe

    joe (2012年9月10日桂花香) 2016-11-22 09:43:58

    看问题的出发点很有意思。一个国家一直处于强势,靠帝国主义政策在世界上多有攫取,靠高科技在各方面领先,首要考虑的,往往是自由民主等等。在这个国家的学者看问题的方式方法,各种结论,都受到国家的文化历史经济等等方面的影响,很多其他问题似乎无需考虑的。而非洲一些国家,以前首先要考虑的是独立,摆脱殖民统治,在经济政治上独立自主等等。每个国家国情不一样。治国方略等等不能一概而论。

    看了这个评论,就是感觉到这些国家也知道他们对世界的认识,对治国方略,对只问概念只关心政治正确而不怎么关心百姓饭碗的政党政策,也有看法。一个国家有红利时可以谈很多事情,可以做很多事情,当红利不存在时,政治正确怎么谈,就成为一个大问题。

  • joe

    joe (2012年9月10日桂花香) 2016-11-22 09:51:26

    首先可以炫耀的,也是自由民主概念。枪炮武力这些事情,炫耀可以,但当作理论来说,多少有些气短。为了自己利益,在别的国家扶植各种势力,包括所谓独裁者,说起来,与民主自由相去甚远。在埃及,默认和支持现在的军政权,也是出于自己利益的考虑。

  • joe

    joe (2012年9月10日桂花香) 2016-11-22 10:16:32

    我的看法是,现在的局面实际是宣告概念先行的治国方略和全球政策失败。只谈民主自由,不足以解决问题。这么多年下来,主义谈得很多,政治正确性的事情,已经变得很重要且很微妙,讲话写字必须十分小心,否则就很可能政治不正确。而关心百姓疾苦上的事情用力不够。用汉语说,大致就是,玩虚的,不行。要有干货。若没有,谈什么都谈不好,缺乏说服力。

    目前这个阶段,中国在世界上的影响力逐步扩大,很重要的一点是有钱。到处修路建厂,搞贸易。这是所谓的干货。

  • 快樂

    快樂 (流畅感。) 2016-11-22 11:09:14

    特朗普当总统靠谱吗?
    http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001038441

    福山:美国选民似乎喜欢唐纳德•特朗普当美国总统
    更新于2011年5月6日 06:24 美国斯坦福大学弗里曼•斯伯格里研究所高级研究员 弗朗西斯•福山 为英国《金融时报》撰稿

    唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)出来竞选美国总统,似乎比其他多数人出来参选更加令人难以置信。不过,特朗普只是在追随一系列精力充沛、梦想身居高位的商界领袖所走的道路。美国选民似乎喜欢这样的人物。然而,尽管这种对商业性高效率的渴望是可以理解的,但它却透露出人们未能理解总统职位的性质,也未能理解身居董事会和身居美国总统办公室所需的技能存在明显区别。

    eBay的梅格•惠特曼(Meg Whitman)和惠普(HP)的卡莉•菲奥莉娜(Carly Fiorina)最近分别参与了加州州长和加州参议员的竞选,这在一定程度上是受到她们手中财富的推动。这些人物因其创业劲头、对收益的关注以及公共部门罕见的果断高效而受到赞赏。很多美国人希望看到“唐纳德”冲着闹罢工的教师大声喝道“你被解雇了!”,或是以类似的方式直面外国的恐吓。

    但对政治家来说,像美国首席执行官们那样行使独裁权力也许只能是个梦想。首席执行官要对业绩负责,但他们只向上对将大量处置权下放给他们的董事会负责。他们无需与别人分享权力,他们可以随意做出聘用或解聘决定、发起并购或剥离业务部门。

    相比之下,美国总统的职权从设计上就是软弱无力的,它受到宪法制定者的限制,受到与难以对付的国会分享权力的限制。美国总统要向下对不同阶层的选民负责,而选民们不信任政客,憎恨把权力委托给行政部门。最近的一个例子是,有人反对美国总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)为控制联邦医疗保险(Medicare)成本设立新评审委员会的计划——很多人认为,此举是在篡夺国会的监督职权。这件事就好比是公司董事会要求逐项评审首席执行官的成本削减决定。在私营部门,这种做法将是令人无法容忍的微观管理。

    最为重要的是,在总统业绩中没有收益这一项。政府是受选民委托,去实现一系列互相矛盾的目标,而选民们既想要广泛的服务,又想享受低税收。职权方面的这种种区别意味着,总统与强势首席执行官所需要的技能完全不同。前者就像是牧猫人,他必须通过哄骗、鼓舞、乞求、交涉和恐吓来建立共识。面对怀有敌意的国会、持怀疑态度的媒体、或受公务员规定保护的公职人员大喝“你被解雇了!”,这种总统当不了多久。

    实际上,当代美国企业演进后的公司治理模型更接近于东亚的威权统治,一点也没有美国民主传统的影子。美国企业界和亚洲政府都属于冷酷的精英管理;它们只对上负责,不对下负责;它们的衡量标准是经济表现,而非让追求各种不同目标的广泛利益群体感到满意的能力。

    此外,我们有必要仔细思考一下21世纪初私营部门和公共部门治理之间开始显现的巨大分化。前者的趋势是让企业结构变得更为扁平化,将更多权力托付给受过良好教育的管理者。在此过程中存在问责,但也存在高度的信任。

    相比之下,美国公共部门正受到越来越多层规定的妨碍,这不是因为政府官员需要它们,而是因为公众不相信政府会代表自己行事。抱怨大政府之低效的民粹主义者,很快就会去责难企业界和亚洲政府普遍存在的放权行为。

    当某位坐上总统宝座的前公司高管针对总统权力受到的限制进行抗争时,那些希望看到他(但愿他不是一位像特朗普那样信口开河的人,而是一位建立起一家持久性企业的商界领袖)当选美国总统的人应该会感到失望。但如果这个国家的规则真的发生改变,让它可以像一家公司那样运营,那么选民们将会惊奇地发现,自己突然之间生活在了中国或新加坡,而非他们所向往的那个美国。

    本文作者是美国斯坦福大学(Stanford)弗里曼•斯伯格里研究所(Freeman Spogli Institute)高级研究员,著有《政治秩序的起源:从史前时代到法国大革命》(The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution)一书

    译者/梁艳裳

  • joe

    joe (2012年9月10日桂花香) 2016-11-22 11:48:42

    一方面说存在众多问题,一方面似乎说问题无法解决,或者说不能用那样的方式解决。那么,应该用什么方法解决呢?

  • joe

    joe (2012年9月10日桂花香) 2016-11-22 11:55:01

    坐而论道是幸福的。但,有时候也是可耻的。幸福,是因为不用操心其他事情,不愁吃不愁穿。可耻,是有时候自己政治想法是第一位的,主义是第一位的,其他国家的任何事情都不重要,其他人的生死等等往往都不重要。

  • 快樂

    快樂 (流畅感。) 2016-11-22 14:04:10

    http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001056973?page=1
    谁在威胁美国核心利益?

    美国斯坦福大学研究员福山:伊拉克正在发生一场宗派战争,一场人道主义危机不断发酵,但对美国核心利益来说,恐怖主义无足轻重,中俄挑战才更具威胁性。
    更新于2014年6月30日 06:31 美国斯坦福大学研究员 弗朗西斯•福山 为英国《金融时报》撰稿

    对某些人来说,世界永远停留在1939年。我们不停地告诉自己,上世纪30年代时,美英是怎样低估了德国和日本的威胁,西方领导人中唯独温斯顿•邱吉尔(Winston Churchill)一人看出危险,并号召他的国人捍卫民主,抗击纳粹(Nazis)。美国在二战后持续70年的领头,不乏这样的“丘吉尔时刻”——从柏林空运(1948年第一次柏林危机期间美国借助大规模空运挫败苏联对西柏林的封锁——译者注)到柏林墙的倒塌。

    这种说法在很大程度上是符合事实的:美国及其盟友战后在欧洲和亚洲创建了一个和平、自由的国际秩序,他们的表现是可敬的。但这一叙述的选择性太强。历史上西方领导人在许多时刻自认为是丘吉尔:1956年苏伊士运河危机中的英国首相安东尼•伊登(Anthony Eden),越战期间的美国总统林登•约翰逊(Lyndon Johnson),以及伊战期间的乔治·W·布什(George W Bush)。他们高估了自己面对的威胁,把事情搞得更糟,挑起不必要且适得其反的战争,削弱了国际主义外交政策所得到的政治支持。

    当今的辩论焦点应该是:我们该如何区分各种威胁的轻重缓急?最严重的威胁有多糟糕?今年我们看到了一连串进展迅速的事件,从俄罗斯吞并克里米亚,到中国在南中国海和东中国海声索主权,再到伊拉克政府管治崩溃。威权势力正在活动。

    从这一点来说,美国总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)5月在西点军校(West Point)发表的外交政策演讲是错误的。他列出了动用武力的种种抽象标准(军事行动必须“适度、有效和正义”;在美国利益不受直接威胁的情况下,“必须提高动武的门槛”)。这些标准让人很难提出异议。但接下来他声称,我们面对的唯一直接威胁是恐怖主义。对于世界秩序面临的另外两大挑战——俄罗斯和中国,他几乎只字不提长期应对策略。奥巴马在首个任期宣布最重要的政策举措之一,美国重返亚洲时,曾大肆渲染了一番,但这一次他在演讲中根本没提到“重返”这个词。

    尽管伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(Isis)最近连连取胜,但我主张,对美国的核心利益来说,恐怖主义其实是这些挑战中最无足轻重的一个。我们在伊拉克和叙利亚目睹的是一场缓慢扩散的逊尼派与什叶派之战,当地武装力量分别扮演着沙特阿拉伯和伊朗代理人的角色。一场人道主义危机不断发酵。然而,即便在15万美军占领伊拉克时,我们也捂不住宗派仇恨;很难看出我们现在能够采取什么果断行动。

    而另一方面,俄罗斯对克里米亚的吞并是跨越了一道非常重要的门槛。冷战后欧洲的全部秩序都有赖于俄罗斯对现状的接受,即滞留在邻国的俄罗斯少数民族呆在原地安居乐业。俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)让这一切都产生悬念,摩尔多瓦、哈萨克斯坦和爱沙尼亚都将感受到影响。

    不过,俄罗斯的实力建立在有缺陷的经济模式之上,终将受到削弱。中国的情况就不同了,它已是世界第二大经济体,而且未来几年很可能会超过美国。中国一直在一点点地推进领土主张,以其它地方更具戏剧性的事件为掩护。它想成为东亚的主宰力量,将美国从中国自己划出的势力范围赶出去。

    Isis极端主义势力最终将被证明是在自掘坟墓。与此形成对比的是,美国曾缔约保卫的一些盟友,如今受到某些已完成工业化的国家的高技术军力的威胁。
    可是,即便俄罗斯和中国构成严重挑战,世界形势仍与1939年时相去甚远。美国该作出何种回应才算恰当?我们应优先考虑政治手段:将北约(Nato)重振为一个真正的军事同盟,而不是民主推广俱乐部;同时建立一个同中国打交道的多边框架,让其邻国有一个不必单独面对北京的替代选择。奥巴马嘴上重视多边机制,但实际上没有怎么下功夫使其成为现实。

    战略的关键就在于区分轻重缓急,确立优先顺序,阐述哪些事比其他事更重要,并解释为什么如此。认为事事都值得美国操心的理念算不上战略。奥巴马在表述中排错了优先事项,延续了其倍受批评的前任最初的错误,即高估恐怖主义的挑战。而与此同时,他又奇怪地消极无为,让利比亚和埃及等地的局势在不知不觉间恶化。而且他投入的时间和精力也远远不足以支持现有机构,以及建立对付长期挑战的更广泛框架。

    一头是新保守主义者,另一头是孤立主义者,这样的两极世界提供了错误选择。真正的战略永远介于二者之间。

    本文作者是美国斯坦福大学(Stanford University)研究员,著有《历史的终结及最后之人》(The End of History and the Last Man)

    译者/何黎

  • 快樂

    快樂 (流畅感。) 2016-11-22 14:14:49

    http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001044537
    中国没有解决“坏皇帝”问题

    这篇的中译看不到,只找到了英文版:
    (这个波伊竟然是个日本人!)

    China’s Bad Emperor Problem
    02/28/2014 03:34 pm ET | Updated Dec 01, 2014
    Francis Fukuyama author, “The End of History and the Last Man”

    Francis Fukuyama is a professor of political science at Stanford University and author of “The End of History and the Last Man” and “The Origins of Political Order.” His comments here are adapted from his remarks at the 21st Century Council meeting in Beijing in November.

    BEIJING — There are many democratic countries in Europe, such as Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia that are well-governed. On the other hand, some democracies, including the U.S., Italy, and India, have had problems recently in their political decision-making process. They have been mired in partisan gridlock and beholden to special interests; the United States constitutes less of a model of democratic governance than it once did.

    When it comes to governance, the effectiveness of the bureaucratic administrative system is the key to performance. China’s system has some clear advantages in this respect. What China lacks are institutions of constraint — either the rule of law or mechanisms of procedural accountability — that prevent its strong state from behaving dictatorially.

    The Chinese bureaucratic system builds on a long history of relatively high quality bureaucracy. China was the first centrally governed country in the world to establish a modern bureaucratic system based on meritocratic capability. In the Qin Dynasty more than 2000 years ago, China was unified with a central administrative system for the first time. European countries only established a similar central administrative system after the end of the 17th century. China, in this sense, was really the first “modern” state.

    In the Qin Dynasty more than 2000 years ago, China was unified with a central administrative system for the first time. European countries only established a similar central administrative system after the end of the 17th century. China, in this sense, was really the first “modern” state.

    China’s key advantage today — its decisive decision-making processes — reflects these roots. In this aspect, the difference between China and India is quite obvious. China is strong in building infrastructure facilities: large airports, high-speed railways, bridges and dams because the centralized government structure makes it faster to implement these projects. India has more precipitation on average, but stores much less water than China. Why? Because India’s system is unbalanced, with too little effective administration and too much law and political mobilization.

    When China was building the Three Gorges Dam, for example, there was a lot of opposition and criticism. But the government disregarded these criticisms and built the dam. In the process, it trampled on the rights of many of its own citizens. By contrast, Tata Auto wanted to build a vehicle company in west Bangalore. There were strikes, protests and even lawsuits by trade unions and peasant organizations. The plant finally had to be built in another state due to strong political opposition.So in certain economic decision-making, the authoritarian Chinese system has strong advantages.

    In the case of the U.S., we have a law-based government and formal democratic accountability. The U.S. is not as bad as India in terms of decision-making, but we have our own problems in the political system, for example, coping with long-term fiscal deficits. Every expert knows that this is not sustainable, but our political system is largely paralyzed in doing anything about it by the perpetual confrontation between the Democrats and the Republicans.

    Our interest groups are very powerful; our system of checks and balances make it easy for them to block decisions. Decisions that serve broad public interests are not taken in the end simply because of the opposition from some interest groups. It is a tough issue to be addressed in the U.S. Whether we can change this state of affairs over the next few years is important in judging whether the democratic system of the U.S. can be successful in the long run.

    China does have a lot of other advantages not particularly rooted in the Chinese history and culture. Compared with the last generation, the Chinese today are relatively free from ideology. The government has tried many innovations. If they work, it goes with them. If not, it drops them. Meanwhile, the U.S. government is actually rigid in making economic policies. Although the U.S. has been known historically for being pragmatic and willing to try new things, of late that has not been the case.

    Despite these advantages, the question for China is how sustainable its system is. After the financial crisis, China has done quite well while the U.S., though edging toward recovery, is still a long way from reaching a governing consensus. But which system is more sustainable in the next two to three decades? My preference is still for the American system rather than the Chinese system.

    There are two key issues that deserve our attention in the Chinese political system. First, the lack of downward political accountability. If you look at the dynastic history in China, you often see that a highly centralized bureaucratic system with insufficient information and knowledge of the society results in ineffective governance. What bureaucracy brings is corruption and bad governance.To a great extent, this problem can still be observed in China today.

    Of course there are many opportunities to collect information. For example we have the Internet and many other modern communication technologies, including the vast microblogging Weibo today in China that has hundreds of millions of participants. However, it remains an issue whether the government is able to respond to popular demands and aspirations and respect public opinion on governance. Downward political accountability should be realized through some form of elections so that leaders always have the sense of threat. Only then will they know that if they don’t do the right thing; they won’t be elected.

    The second issue is the “bad emperor” issue in traditional Chinese history. Undoubtedly, if you have competent and well-trained bureaucrats, or well-educated technical professionals who are dedicated to public interest, this kind of government is better than democratic government in the short term. But there are no institutional rules limiting the power of a bad emperor. The last bad emperor commonly acknowledged as such was Mao Zedong. Such an individual can do far more damage to the society than a constitutionally and democratically constrained democratic leader.

    Despite reforms in the last 30 years that specifically limit the tenure of the leadership, having a good emperor doesn’t guarantee no bad emperors will emerge. The enforced retirement of political leaders are, after all, Communist Party rules. They are not inscribed in law and thus can be changed at will.

    In the end, there is no accountability system to remove a bad emperor if there is one. How can you get a good emperor? How can you make sure good emperors will reproduce themselves generation after generation? There is no ready answer today in the Chinese system.

    The only answer in my view is a formal legal system — that is, rule of law, not rule by law. In this, China has a good distance to go.

  • joe

    joe (2012年9月10日桂花香) 2016-11-22 15:17:45

    坏皇帝的论点,有道理的。

  • joe

    joe (2012年9月10日桂花香) 2016-11-22 15:24:34

    我感觉,比较小的国家,科技发达的,外围无强敌环伺的,牢固建立的民主制度运行比较容易一些。国家地域辽阔人口众多,历史遗产更大一些的,运行就比较困难。

  • 快樂

    快樂 (流畅感。) 2016-11-23 08:51:00

      哦,我还没来得及看那篇
      英文不好,看起来太慢太费时间
      只是有时候觉得中译的个别字句翻译得不是那么回事
      想看原文是怎么写的

  • 快樂

    快樂 (流畅感。) 2016-11-23 09:41:50

      借助有道在线翻译的双语对照功能
      我得以较快地浏览一下那篇文章。

      Our interest groups
      broad public interests

    Our interest groups are very powerful; our system of checks and balances make it easy for them to block decisions. Decisions that serve broad public interests are not taken in the end simply because of the opposition from some interest groups. It is a tough issue to be addressed in the U.S. Whether we can change this state of affairs over the next few years is important in judging whether the democratic system of the U.S. can be successful in the long run.

    我们的利益集团非常强大;我们的制衡制度使它容易块决定。决定不采取提供广泛的公共利益最终因为一些利益集团的反对。这是一个棘手的问题需要解决在美国我们是否可以改变这种状况在未来几年是很重要的在判断美国的民主制度能否成功的从长远来看。

      川普不正是一个选项么?
      哈哈哈

      而且,
      在“你们”这么牛叉的系统里
      给“你们”一个“坏皇帝”川普
      看看到底能怎样!

      哈哈哈

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