【翻译】Pritchard, Duncan (2002),“Recent Work...

问月生

来自: 问月生 2016-11-21 10:25:15

标题:【翻译】Pritchard, Duncan (2002),“Recent Work On Radical Skepticism”
1人 喜欢
  • 问月生

    问月生 2017-02-09 14:12:51

    2017/2/9修订:(下载链接已经更新成修订译文):

    说明:这次修译主要受益于“思与修”哲学研究所的“自我、他人与世界”高阶研修课(2016~2017)在研读这篇论文的过程中全体参与人员的讨论。

    修订细节(相对于2016/11/21校修版):
    1、“……offer a fully fledged account of what this notion of epistemological relevance involves.”
    ——》译文改为【……,对认识论上的“相关性”这个概念给出一个完全到位的说明。】
    2、“This weaker thesis is the principle that knowledge is “closed” under known entailment, or the “closure” principle for short. ”
    ——》译文改为【这个更弱的主张就是知识的“闭合”原则,即“知道……”在蕴含下——且这个蕴含也是知道的——是“闭合的”。】
    ——》后面还有几个类似的地方(“closed” under known entailment),做类似修改。
    3、“This is certainly a very compelling argument,……”
    ——》译文改为【这确实是一个非常有力的论证,……】
    4、“It is to this end that Dretske (1971) went on to ……”
    ——》译文改为【正是为了这,Dretske(1971)继续发展了……】
    5、“One’s belief thus “tracks” the truth adequately to be a candidate for knowledge. ”
    ——》译文改为【所以,这个人的这个相信足以“追踪”真,可以候选为一个知识。】
    6、“We will focus here on those avenues of critique that are directed at the view presented as an antiskeptical proposal, rather than as an analysis (albeit perhaps only a partial one) of knowledge. For example, Edward Craig (1989; 1990b) has argued that the Dretske-Nozick proposal is either impotent at meeting skeptical arguments or unnecessary. That is, the strategy only works on the assumption that skeptical possible worlds are indeed far off worlds, and Craig argues that if we are entitled to that supposition then we have no need of an anti-skeptical strategy. Conversely, if we are not entitled to that supposition, then the modal analysis of knowledge offered by Dretske and Nozick leaves us in an impasse with the skeptic that is no better than we were in before. ”
    ——》译文改为【我们在这里将集中注意力于那些把这个观点作为反怀疑论策略来针对的批评线路上,而不是那些把这个观点作为对知识(knowledge,“知道……”)的分析(虽然或许仅仅是其部分分析)来针对的批评线路上。例如,Edward Craig(爱德华·克雷格)(1989;1990b)论证指出Dretske-Nozick的策略,对处理怀疑论论证来说要么是无力的要么是不必要的。这个批评是这样的:这个策略要起作用仅当假设怀疑论者所提出的可能世界确实是远离这个现实世界的,而Craig论证指出,如果我们有资格做出这个假设那么我们也就无需一个反怀疑论策略了;反过来说,如果我们没有资格做出这个假设,那么Dretske和Nozick对知识(knowledge,“知道……”)所给出的这个模态分析留给我们的是一个并不比以前好多少的怀疑论死路。】
    7、“What is true, however, is that there is nothing in the Dretske-Nozick line which demands that we should be able to become reflectively aware that we have met these conditions if we are to have knowledge, and this element of the view may well be problematic. For if this is the case then the existential force of skepticism—that we could indeed, for all we can tell, be a victim of a skeptical hypothesis—is just as powerful as ever. The worry here is that there is always going to be something intellectually unsatisfactory about an antiskeptical proposal that is run along epistemologically externalist lines.18 We will consider the role of epistemological externalism and internalism in the skeptical debate in more detail below, since it raises issues which affect all anti-skeptical proposals, regardless of whether they retain closure.”
    ——》译文改为【但是下面这一点是成立的:在Dretske-Nozick线路上没有要求我们应该能够在反思中就明白我们已经满足了那些如果我们要持有知识那么我们就要满足的条件, 而这个线路在这个环节上很可能是有问题的。因为,如果情况确实如此,那么怀疑论所具有的力度——即我们可能确实是(我们也只能这样说)这个怀疑论假说情况[中]的受害人——就和以前一样。这里的担心是:沿着认识论意义上的外在论线路所给出的反怀疑论策略,一直都令人有些理智上的不满意。[18]下面我们会更详细地考察一下在怀疑论争论中认识论意义上的外在论/内在论争论所起的作用,因为它引出的一些问题,影响了所有的反怀疑论策略,无论是否支持闭合原则。】
    8、“That someone who endorses a radically different conception of the epistemological landscape should not find the Dretskean proposal plausible is not nearly so intriguing as dissent from those who sign up to many of the key Dretskean claims. ”
    ——》译文改为【对于那些在认识论“图景”上持有完全不同概念的人,他/她们应该不会发现Dretske式方案的合理性,但这和那些[只是]反对Dretske式方案[部分]关键主张的人相比,没那么有吸引力。】
    9、“According to contextualist theories of knowledge attributions, how strong an epistemic position S must be in with respect to P for A’s assertion to be true can vary according to features of A’s conversational context”
    ——》译文改为【按归知的语境论,S的认识论立场(epistemic position)——使得A的[归知]断定为真的S关于P的认识论立场——的强度能够随着A的会话语境特征的变化而变化。】
    10、“……although one’s “epistemic position” is constant at any one time, the epistemic position that one needs to be in so as to count as possessing knowledge can be variable.”
    ——》译文改为【……,尽管一个人的“认识论立场”(epistemic position)在任何一个时间是不变的,但那种一个人需要处在其中的以至于可算作持有知识的认识论立场是可变的。】
    11、“……,but relative to the extra-evidential circumstances of the knower and those who, like the knower, have the same stake in what is true in the matter in question. ”
    ——》译文改为【……,但是相对于的是这个知道者(the knower)以及其他人——其他那些在所讨论的事情上对什么是真的和这个知道者具有相同[认识论]情况的人——的证据之外的环境情况(the extra-evidential circumstances)。】
    12、“ Indeed, this is to be expected given that, as we have already seen, any plausible anti-skeptical proposal will have to deny some claim that is otherwise thought to be intuitive (Dretske himself denies closure, for example). ”
    ——》译文改为【确实,这是我们能够直接预料到的,因为——就如我们已经看到的——任何合理的反怀疑论方案都将不得不拒绝某主张,即使这主张在其他方面看是直观的(Dretske自己拒绝的是闭合原则)。】
    13、“The thought here is that since our presumably empirical knowledge in this respect cannot be coherently thought of as being the result of an empirical investigation, we cannot make sense of it at all. ”
    ——》译文改为【这里的思想是:我们在这方面的知识,一方面来说大概是经验的,但另一方面来说却又不能融贯地认为是经验研究可以得到的结论, 所以我们根本不可能搞清楚它。】
    14、“……,what is odd about these propositions is that, unlike other seemingly empirical propositions, ……”
    ——》译文改为【……,有些奇怪的是,这些命题不像其他那些看起来是经验命题的命题,……】
    15、“……,and that no belief in an empirical proposition is beyond coherent doubt should the grounds for that belief be found wanting.”
    ——》译文改为【……;“如果一个经验信念缺乏支持它的证据(grounds),那么这个经验信念不能够免于融贯怀疑”这是正确的。】
    ——》还有几处“grounds”,结合上下文,修订为【证据】
    16、“……for discounting the skeptic’s doubt. ”
    ——》译文改为【要抵消怀疑论者的怀疑,……】
    17、“……,the problem with Moore’s argument is precisely not the falsity of the conclusion (which would be to validate either radical skepticism or the denial of closure), but rather concerns the manner in which he proposes it and the ends that it is designed to serve.”
    ——》译文改为【……,摩尔的论证,其问题恰恰不是其结论为假(而这个结论的为假或者会支持彻底怀疑论或者会导致拒绝闭合原则),而是摩尔提出其论证的方式以及其论证所试图达到的论证目的。】
    18、“Williams argues that certain error-possibilities are only epistemically relevant, and thus potentially knowledge defeating, in certain contexts.”
    ——》译文改为【Williams论证指出:在某些语境,只有某些错误可能性才是认识上相关的,于是知识[才]默认对其的排除。】
    19、“Nevertheless, inferential contextualism may well carry with it even more troubling problems of its own, not least the worry that this approach is allied to a general quietistic philosophical approach.”
    ——》译文改为【但是,推理语境论也会带来它自己的——甚至更多更麻烦的——问题,尤其是这样一个问题,即这个进路类似于这样一个一般性哲学进路即沉默主义 哲学进路(quietistic philosophical approach)。】
    20、“if initial appearances are not in themselves reliable guides to reality, [then] why should the products of detached reflection be any different? Why aren’t they . . . equally doubtful . . . ?”
    ——》译文改为【如果最初显现出来的东西本身是对实在性的不可靠引导,[那么]为什么“中立”反思(detached reflection)的产物就应该不同?为什么这些反思产物不是……同等可疑的……?】
    21、“……that even supposedly non-foundationalist epistemologies such as coherence theory or reliabilism involve an implicit commitment to the basic foundationalist structure.”
    ——》译文改为【……:即使是那些所谓的非基础主义认识论理论,例如融贯论或可靠论 ,实际上也暗示性地承认了这样的基础主义基本结构。】
    22、“a virtue-theoretic theory of knowledge”
    ——》译文改为【关于知识的一个“效力论 ”理论】
    ——》类似有几处“virtue”改译为【效力】,并添加了一个译者注来说明。
    23、“moral”
    ——》译文改为【“隐喻”(moral)】
    24、还有若干小调整:人名的处理上有些系统调整,还有一些小细节。

  • 问月生

    问月生 2017-02-09 16:20:08

    更正:

    第22个修改废除,全部改成“德性”,去除那个译者注。

    PDF下载版也更改为“2017/2/9再修订版。

你的回应

回应请先 , 或 注册

550 人聚集在这个小组
↑回顶部