Being and Event

springhero

来自: springhero 2015-03-24 16:23:32

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  • Walt

    Walt (事必躬亲) 2015-03-24 16:35:24

    请教雄伯 meditation应为冥想之意 mediator才是中介 您是看错了还是摘错了?

  • springhero

    springhero 2015-03-24 16:39:47

    Being and Event
    存在与事件
    Alain Badious
    亚伦 巴迪欧

    M ED I TATI ON O N E
    一的沉思
    The O n e a n d t h e M u l ti p l e : a priori c o n d i ti o ns of
    a ny poss i b l e ontol ogy
    一与多重:任何可能本体论的先验情况

    Since i t s Pa rmenidean organization, ontology h a s built t h e portico o f its
    ruined temple out of the following experi e n ce : what presents itself is
    essentially multiple; what presents itself i s essentially one . The reciprocity
    of the one and being is certainly the inaugural axiom of philosophy
    -Leibniz's formulation i s excellent; ' What i s not a being i s not a
    being'-yet it is also its impasse; an impasse in which the revolving doors
    of Plato's Parmenides i n troduce us to the singular j oy of never seeing the
    moment of conclusion arrive. For if being i s one, then one must posit that
    what is not one, the multiple, is not. B ut this i s unacceptabl e for thought,
    because what i s presented is multiple and one cannot see how there could
    be an access to being outside all presentati o n .

    因为这是巴门尼底斯的组织,本体论曾经使用以下的经验,来建造它的废墟的庙堂的天庭:呈现它自己的东西基本上是多重的。呈现它自己的东西,基本上是一。一与存在的互惠确实是哲学的开始的公理—莱布尼兹的阐述是优秀的,「并不存在的东西,并不是一个存在物」--可是,这也是它的僵局。在这个僵局里,柏拉图的巴门尼底斯的旋转的门,引导我们进入这个独异性的欢爽:从来看不见结论的时刻到达的独异性的欢爽。因为假如存在是一,那么我们必须假设:并非一的东西,也就是多重的东西,并非是存在。但是,对于思想,这是不可接受的。因为所被呈现的东西是多重。而且一无法无法看出,如何接近一切的呈现之外的存在。

    If presentation i s not, does it
    still make sense to designate what presents ( itself) a s being? O n the other
    hand, if presentation is, then the multiple necessarily is. It follows that
    being i s no longer reciprocal with the one and thus i t i s no longer necessary
    to consider as one what presents itself, inasmuch as i t i s . This conclusion is
    equally unacceptable to thought because presentation i s only this multiple
    i nasmuch as what it presents can be counted as one; and so on.

    假如呈现并不存在,指明是什么呈现它自己作为一个存在物,依旧会有意义吗?在另一方面,假如呈现是存在,那么多重的比要性就存在。我们推论:存在不再是跟这个一互惠,因此不再必要认为这个一是呈现它自己的一。因为它存在。这个结论同样无法被思想接受,因为呈现仅就是这个多重性。因为它所呈现的东西能够被认为是一,等等。

    We find o u rselves on the brink of a decision, a decision to break with the
    arcana of the one and the multiple i n which philosophy i s born and buried,
    phoenix of its own sophistic consu mption . This decision can take n o other
    form than the following: the one is not. It is not a question, however, of
    abandoning the principle Lacan assigned to the symbolic; that there is
    Oneness . Everything turns on mastering the gap between the presupposi tion
    (that must be rej ected ) of a being of the one and the thesis of its 'there
    i s ' . What could there be, which i s not? Strictly speaking, it i s a l ready too
    much to s a y ' there is Oneness' because t h e 'there', taken as an errant
    localization, concedes a point of being to the one.

    我们发现我们自己处在决定的边缘,决定要跟这个一与多重奥秘中断。哲学在那里诞生而且被埋葬,它自己的论辩的消耗的浴火重生。这个决定无法採有任何其他的形式,除了以下这个形式:这个一并不存在。可是,问题并不是放弃这个原则,拉康指定给象征界的原则。这个“一”是存在。每件事情的旋转,都在于掌控这个罅隙,存在于这个一的存在物的假设(必须被拒绝的假设),与这个一的存在的议题之间的罅隙。并不存在的东西,那可能是什么东西?严格而言,这样说已经是太过分了,「这个一存在,因为它就存在那里」。这句话被认为是谵妄动位置,它承认一个存在的点给这个一。

    What has to be declared is that the one, which is not, solely exists as
    operation . In other words: there is no one, only the cou nt-as-one. The one,
    being an operation, is never a presentation. It should be taken quite
    seriously that the 'one' is a number. And yet. except i f we pythagorize,
    there is no ca use to posit that being qua being is nu mber. Does this mean
    that being is not mUltiple either? S trictly speaking, yes, because being is
    only multiple inasmuch as it occurs in presentation.

    所必需被宣布的东西是,这个一,并不存在的这个一,它仅是作为运作而存在。换句话说,并没有这个一,仅有作为一的这个计算。作为运作的这个一从来不是一个呈现。它应该相当认真地被看待,这个一是一个数字。可是,除了假如我们“整理系列”,就没有理由提出:作为生命实存的存在是数字。这难道意味着,生命实存也并不是多重?严格地说,没错。因为生命实存仅有发生在呈现时,它才是多重。

    In sum: the mUltiple is the regime of presentation; the one, in respect to
    presentation, is an operational result; being is what presents ( itself ) . On
    this basis, being is neither one (because only presentation itself is pertinent
    to the count-as-one ) , nor mUltiple (because the multiple is solely the
    regime of presentation ) .

    总之,多重就是呈现的体制。关于呈现的这个一,是一个运作的结果。生命实存就是呈现它自己的东西。根据这个基础,生命实存既不是一(因为仅有呈现的本身,才是中肯的,对于这个被认为的一)。生命实存也不是多重,(因为多重仅是呈现的体制)。

  • springhero

    springhero 2015-03-24 17:07:39

    数字。可是,除了假如我们“整理系列”,就没有理由提出:作为生命实存的存在是数字。这难道意味着,生命实存也并不是多重?严格地说,没错。因为生命实存仅有发生在呈现时,它才是多重。

    In sum: the mUltiple is the regime of presentation; the one, in respect to
    presentation, is an operational result; being is what presents ( itself ) . On
    this basis, being is neither one (because only presentation itself is pertinent
    to the count-as-one ) , nor mUltiple (because the multiple is solely the
    regime of presentation ) .

    总之,多重就是呈现的体制。关于呈现的这个一,是一个运作的结果。生命实存就是呈现它自己的东西。根据这个基础,生命实存既不是一(因为仅有呈现的本身,才是中肯的,对于这个被认为的一)。生命实存也不是多重,(因为多重仅是呈现的体制)。

    Let's fi x the terminology: I term situation any presented mUltiplicity.
    Granted the effectiveness of the presentation, a situation is the place of
    taking-place, whatever the terms of the multiplicity in question. Every
    situation admits its own particular operator of the count -as-one. This is the
    most general definition of a structure; i t is what prescribes, for a presented
    m u ltiple, the regime of its co unt-as- one.

    让我们修补这个术语。我将“情境”这个术语定义为任何被呈现的多重性。“情境”虽然具有呈现的有效性,它就是发生的位置,无论受到质疑的这些术语是什么。每个情境都承认它自己的特殊的运作,被认为是一的运作。这就是结构的最通俗的定义。它就是所指定的东西,对于一个被呈现的多重性,它被认为一的这个体制。

    When anything is counted as one in a situation, all this means is that it
    belongs to the situation in the mode particular to the effects of the
    situation'S structure .

    当任何东西被认为是情境里的一,所有这一切的意涵是,它属于这个情境,处于这个情境的结构的影响所特有的模式。

    A structure allows n umber to occur within the presented multiple . Does
    this mean that the multiple, as a figure of presentation, is not 'yet' a
    number? One must not forget that every situation is structured. The
    multiple is retroactively legible therein as anterior to the one, insofar as the
    count - a s - one i s always a result. The fact that the one i s an operation a l lows
    us to say that the domain of the operation is not one ( for the one is not) ,
    and that therefore this domain is mUltiple; since, within presentation, what
    is not one is necessarily m u ltiple. In other words, the count -as- one ( the
    structure ) installs the universal pertinence of the one / m u ltiple couple for
    any situation .

    结构让数字发生,在被呈现的多重里。这难道意味着,多重性,作为呈现的人物,还尚未是一个数字?我们一定不要忘记,每个情境都具有结构。多重性在那里面反溯地可理解,作为早先于一。因为这个被认为的一总是结果。事实上,这个一是一个运作,让我们能够说,运作的领域并不是一个一(因为这个一并不存在)。因此,这个领域是多重,因为,在呈现之内,并不是一的东西,必然是多重。换句话说,这个被认为一(这个结构)安置这个一与多重的配对的普世的中肯,给任何情境。

    What will have been counted as one, on the basis of not having been
    one, turns out to be multiple.

    将来会被认为一的东西,根据它从来没有成为一,结构呈现多重性。

    It is therefore always in the after-effect of the count that presentation is
    uniquely thinkable as multiple, and the n umerical inertia of the situation
    is set out. Yet there is no situation without the effect of the count, and
    therefore it is correct to state that presentation as such, in regard t o
    number, i s multipl e .

    它因此总是处于这个计算的后续的效果,呈现独特地被认为是多重性。情境的这个数字的堕性被触发。可是,只要有情境,就必然会有计算的效果。因此,我们可以正确地陈述:关于数字的呈现的本身,就是多重性。

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