转载心理空间上面齐泽克的文章《康德即萨德》

Bizaare

来自: Bizaare 2011-10-14 10:53:51

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  • Bizaare

    Bizaare 2011-10-14 10:54:41

    齐泽克:康德即萨德 02 译者A:H•弗拉齐/H•Frlazi 译者B: 雄伯 Springhero In other words, Lacan does not try to make the usual "reductionist" point that every ethical act, as pure and disinterested as it may appear, is always grounded in some "pathological" motivation (the agent's own long-term interest, the admiration of his peers, up to the "negative" satisfaction provided by the suffering and extortion often demanded by ethical acts); A. 换言之,拉康并不想做出像一般的“还原论者”那样的声明,即每个伦理行为,无论它看上去是多么地纯粹和无私,总会基于某些病态的动机(行为者自身的长远利益,(别人)对他充满崇敬的凝视,直到由伦理行为所要求的痛苦与胁迫提供的“消极”满足); B. 换言之,拉康并不想做出像一般的“还原论者”那样的观点:即每个伦理行为,无论它看上去是多么地纯粹和无私,总会基于某些受到经验沾染的动机(行为者自身的长远利益,同侪对他的崇敬,一直到由伦理行为所要求的痛苦与胁迫,提供的“消极”满足。); the focus of Lacan's interest rather resides in the paradoxical reversal by means of which desire itself (i.e. acting upon one's desire, not compromising it) can no longer be grounded in any "pathological" interests or motivations and thus meets the criteria of the Kantian ethical act, so that "following one's desire" overlaps with "doing one's duty." Suffice it to recall Kant's own famous example from his Critique of Practical Reason: A. 拉康的兴趣中心更在于通过以下途径而实现的悖论性反思:欲望本身(按照某人的欲望去行动,而不是向它妥协)无法再基于任何病态的利益或动机,并因此达到了康德伦理学的标准,以致于“顺从某人的欲望”与“履行一个人的义务”在此便有了交集。只要回顾一下康德自己在他的《实践理性批判》中的著名例子便足够了: B. 代替的,拉康的兴趣中心更在于悖论性逆转。凭借着这种悖论性逆转,欲望本身(譬如,按照某人的欲望去行动,而不是向它妥协),无法再基于任何受到经验沾染的利益或动机,并因此符合了康德伦理学的标准。所以,顺从某人的欲望”与“履行一个人的义务”,在此便有了交集。只要回顾一下康德自己在他的《实践理性批判》中的著名例子,便足够了: 雄伯注: the focus of Lacan's interest rather resides in the paradoxical reversal 是主要子句,by means of which desire itself (i.e. acting upon one's desire 是形容词子句,by means of which 的which 指的是前面的he paradoxical reversal凭借着这种悖论性逆转,而A译的「通过以下途径而实现的悖论性反思」,扭曲前后因果关系。 康德的伦理行为标准,跟一般的还原论者reductionist最大的不同就是,它「无法再基于任何受到经验沾染的利益或动机」。也就是会有纯粹的顺从欲望,与纯粹的尽自己责任。 Suppose that someone says his lust is irresistible when the desired object and opportunity are present. Ask him whether he would not control his passions if, in front of the house where he has this opportunity, a gallows were erected on which he would be hanged immediately after gratifying his lust. We do not have to guess very long what his answer may be."3 A. 假设某人说当欲望对象与机会出现时,他的欲望就会变得无法抗拒。如果当他获得这个机会的时候,一个绞刑架会立在他面前并且他将在满足欲望之后立即被绞死于其上,问他是否不会去控制他的激情。我们不用想很长时间就能知道他的答案可能是什么。 B. 假设有某人说,当欲望对象与机会出现时,他的欲望就会变得无法抗拒。那请问他,如果当他获得这个机会的时候,一个绞刑架会立在他面前,并且他将在满足欲望之后,立即被绞死于其上,他会不会去控制他的激情?我们不用想很长时间,就能知道他的答案可能是什么。 雄伯注: 康德举的这个例子倒是很普遍,就像死刑犯执行前的最后一餐,通常比较丰盛,问题是谁有心情去享受? Lacan's counterargument here is that we certainly do have to guess what his answer may be : what if we encounter a subject (as we do regularly in psychoanalysis), who can only fully enjoy a night of passion if some form of "gallows" is threatening him, i.e. if, by doing it, he is violating some prohibition? [3] A. 拉康对此的反驳是:要是我们遇到了这样的一个主体(就像我们在精神分析中经常遇到的那样),他只有在遭受某种形式的“绞刑架”的威胁时——也就是说,通过这样做他便能违反某些禁忌时——才能尽情享 受一夜的激情的话,那又怎样呢?[3] C. 拉康对此的反驳是:他的回答是什么,我们确实必须猜测一下才知道。要是我们遇到了这样的一个主体(就像我们在精神分析中,经常遇到的那样),他只有在遭受某种形式的“绞刑架”的威胁时——譬如说,通过这样做,他便能违反某些禁忌时——才能尽情享受一夜的激情的话,他会怎么选择呢?[3] 雄伯注:俗语说马不吃险草不肥,越是危险的享乐,越是有人在追求。冒着身败名裂,甚至死亡的危险的激情,还是有人趋之若鹜。 There was an Italian film from the 60's, Casanova 70, starring Virna Lisi and Marcello Mastroianni that hinged on this very point: the hero can only retain his sexual potency if doing "it" involves some kind of danger. A. 60年代由Virna Lisi与Marcello Mastroianni主演的的意大利影片《卡萨诺瓦70》(Casanova 70)正是取决于这一点:英雄只有在做“那种事”的同时陷入某种危险,才能保持他的性能力。 B.60年代由Virna Lisi与Marcello Mastroianni主演的的意大利影片《卡萨诺瓦70》(Casanova 70),正是取决于这一点:里面的主角,只有在做“那种事”的同时,,陷入某种危险,才能保持他的性能力。 雄伯注: 听起来有点变态,可是人性确实是如此。危险是最佳的春药。 At the film's end, when he is on the verge of marrying his beloved, he wants at least to violate the prohibition of premarital sex by sleeping with her the night before the wedding-however, his bride unknowingly spoils even this minimal pleasure by arranging with the priest for special permission for the two of them to sleep together the night before, so that the act is deprived of its transgressive sting. What can he do now? A. 在电影的结尾,就在马上可以娶到自己心爱之人的时候,他想要通过在婚礼前夜就与她共眠来实现对婚前性行为这一禁忌的最低限度的违抗——然而,他的新娘从神父那里得到的让她俩在婚前同床的特许在不知不觉中破坏了这最微弱的快感,以致于这一行为被剥夺了它由犯罪而带来的刺痛?他现在该怎么办? B. 在电影的结尾,就在马上可以娶到自己心爱之人的时候,他想要通过在婚礼前夜,就与她共眠,来实现对婚前性行为,这一禁忌,至少要违抗一下——然而,他的新娘从神父那里,得到的让她俩在婚前同床的特许,在不知不觉中破坏了这最微弱的快感,以致于这一行为,丧失掉由逾越而带来的刺痛之爽?他现在该怎么办? In the last shot of the film, we see him crawling on the narrow porch on the outside of the high-rise building, giving himself the difficult task of entering the girl's bedroom in the most dangerous way, in a desperate attempt to link sexual gratification to mortal danger… A. 在电影的最后一个镜头里,我们看到了他在高层建筑物外部的的狭窄窗沿上匍匐前进,(并)在一种将性满足与致命危险联系起来的绝望尝试中,给了他自己一个以最危险的方式进入女孩房间的高难度任务…… B. 在电影的最后一个镜头里,我们看到了他在高耸建筑物外部的的狭窄窗沿上匍匐前进,(并)在一种将性满足,与致命危险联系起来的绝望尝试中,给了他自己一个以最危险的方式,进入女孩房间的高难度任务…… So, Lacan's point is that if gratifying sexual passion involves the suspension of even the most elementary "egotistic" interests, if this gratification is clearly located "beyond the pleasure principle," then, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, we are dealing with an ethical act, then his "passion" is stricto sensu ethical... [4] A. 因此,拉康的观点是如果对性激情的满足涉及到了对最根本的“利己主义”利益的悬置,如果这一满足明显地被置于“快乐原则之外”,那么,无论有多少相反的外在表现,我们所面对的都是一个伦理行为,因此他的激情在严格意义上是伦理的……[4] B. 因此,拉康的观点是,如果对性激情的满足,涉及到了对最根本的“利己主义”利益的悬置,如果这一满足明显地被置于“快乐原则之外”,那么,无论外表上是多么的相反,我们所面对的,就是一个伦理行为,因此他的激情在严格意义上是伦理的……[4] 雄伯注: 拉康的这个「伦理」的定义,将性的激情跟伦理扯上关系。也就是,当性的关系不纯粹是性本身,而是夹杂现实的利用及目标,它就是伦理的选择问题。 Lacan's further point is that this covert Sadean dimension of an "ethical (sexual) passion" is not read into Kant by our eccentric interpretation, but is inherent to the Kantian theoretical edifice. [5] A. 拉康更进一步的观点是:这一“伦理(性)激情”中所潜藏的萨德式(Sadean)维度并没有被我们的离奇解释加入到(对)康德(的理解)中,但它却内在于康德的理论大厦。 B. 拉康更进一步的观点是:这一“伦理(性)激情”中所潜藏的萨德式(Sadean)维度,并没有被我们的离奇解释,加入到(对)康德(的理解)中,但它是康德的理论建构本质上具有的。 雄伯注: this covert Sadean dimension of an "ethical (sexual) passion" 这个句子里, ethical passion 伦理的激情里面括弧著性的激情,这个括弧的意思仅是潜藏covert,但是很容易让人误解为等于。也就是萨德的伦理激情建构,潜藏着萨德的性的激情建构。或者是「康德的理论建构本质上具有的」inherent to the Kantian theoretical edifice。这让我茅塞顿开,萨德的性虐狂行为,不仅是性,而是具有伦理的目标或理想。 If we put aside the body of "circumstantial evidence" for it (isn't Kant's infamous definition of marriage-"the contract between two adults of the opposite sex about the mutual use of each other's sexual organs"-thoroughly Sadean, since it reduces the Other, the subject's sexual partner, to a partial object, to his/her bodily organ which provides pleasure, ignoring him/her as the Whole of a human Person?), the crucial clue that allows us to discern the contours of "Sade in Kant" is the way Kant conceptualizes the relationship between sentiments (feelings) and the moral Law. A. 如果我们为它而将旁证撇开不管(难道不是康德对婚姻的臭名昭著的、十分萨德式的定义——“两个异性的成年人之间订立的关于相互使用对方性器官的契约吗?因为它将作为主体性伴侣的大他者/大彼者(the Other)降格成了一个部分对象/部分客体(partial object),一个他的/她的能够提供快感的身体器官,而忽视了作为一个完整的人的他/她),让我们得以看清“康德中的萨德”之轮廓的关键线索在于康德将感情与道德律之间的关系概念化的方式。 B. 如果我们为它而将「跟情境有关的证据」撇开不管(康德对婚姻的定义:“两个异性的成年人之间,订立的关于相互使用对方性器官的契约。这个定义难道不是臭名昭著、十足萨德式吗?因为它将作为主体性伴侣的大他者/大彼者(the Other),降格成了一个部分对象/部分客体(partial object),一个他的/她的能够提供快感的身体器官,而忽视了作为一个完整的人的他/她)。让我们得以看清, “康德中的萨德”之轮廓的这个重要的线索,在于康德用什么方式,将感情与道德律之间的关系概念化。 雄伯注: If we put aside the body of "circumstantial evidence" for it 的it,指着前面的ethical (sexual) passion 伦理(性) 激情,若是将身体撇开一边,来谈论伦理(性) 激情,而且所谓的身体,加上"circumstantial evidence" 「跟情境有关的证据」。这样的身体是怎样的身体? 这样的性是怎样的性?撇开身体来谈性,等于是跟柏拉图式的恋爱不谋而合。这颠覆了我以前对萨德的印象. Although Kant insists on the absolute gap between pathological sentiments and the pure form of moral Law, there is one a priori sentiment that the subject necessarily experiences when confronted with the injunction of the moral Law, the pain of humiliation (because of man's hurt pride, due to the "radical Evil" of human nature); A. 尽管康德坚持病态情感与道德律的纯粹形式之间的绝对间距,但仍有一种主体在面对道德律的强制命令与受辱的痛苦时(由于人类本性的“极端邪恶”所导致的人的尊严的受损)必然会体验到的先验情感; B. 尽管康德坚持,不受经验沾染的情感,与道德法则的纯粹形式之间,会有绝对间距。但仍有一种主体在面对道德律的强制命令时,必然会体验到的先验情感,那就是受辱的痛苦,(由于人类本性的“极端邪恶”所导致的人的尊严的受损); 雄伯注: there is one a priori sentiment that the subject necessarily experiences when confronted with the injunction of the moral Law, the pain of humiliation 在这个句子里,that the subject necessarily experiences是形容词子句,修饰前面的a priori sentiment 先验的情感,when (the subject is)confronted with the injunction of the moral Law 是表时间的分词片语,曖昧的是the pain of humiliation羞辱的痛苦,是a priori sentiment 或是 the injunction of the moral Law,的同位语?A译加上一个「与」字,显然是与「道德律的强制命令」对等,B译则认为是「必然会体验到的先验情感」的同位语。 (because of man's hurt pride, due to the "radical Evil" of human nature); (由于人类本性的“极端邪恶”所导致的人的尊严的受损) 括弧里的,有两个因为(because of,due to) ,可是中间并没有and,也就是彼此并不是对等,而是后者「人类本性的“极端邪恶」”作为man’s hurt pride人的尊严的受损的原因,而man’s hurt pride 人的尊严的受损则是, the pain of humiliation受辱的痛苦的原因。 那总源头就是「人类本性的“极端邪恶」 the "radical Evil" of human nature); 也就是说,齐泽克认为康德的人性观点是:人类本性具有「激端邪恶」radical Evil。那康德对于这个「激端邪恶」,持怎样的见解? 我在网络下载到一段诠释,颇有参考价值。 In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant discusses the concept of radical evil. The German word “radikal” derives from the Latin word “rādīx,” which means “root” (“Wurzel”), “origin” (“Ursprung”), and “source” (“Quelle”) (Kluge 664). Therefore, when Kant explains the nature of radical evil, he also tries to enquire into “the origin of moral evil” (Religion 35). Kant observes that “the source of evil . . . can lie only in a rule made by the will for the use of its freedom, that is, in a maxim” (17). In Critique of Practical Reason, Kant makes a similar statement which echoes this observation. He writes that “the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law . . . but only . . . after it and by means of it” (54). Therefore, in order to grasp the concept of evil, one has to understand the struggle in “a pathologically affected” human will, namely, the “conflict of maxims with the practical laws cognized by himself” 在「仅是理性的限制内的宗教」,康德讨论极端邪恶的观念。德文字「极端」来自拉丁字,意思是「根源」「起源」「来源」。因此,当康德解释极端邪恶的特性,他也设法探究「道德邪恶的起源」。康德观察到,「邪恶的来源仅会是在意志为了使用它的自由,而造成的习性,也就是说,个人行为的习性。」在「实践理性批判」,康德做同样的陈述,跟这个观察共鸣。他写到:「善恶的观念一定不要在道德法则前面决定,而是要在它之后,及凭借它。」因此,为了理解邪恶的观念, 我们必须了解这个奋斗,在一个「受到经验沾染」的人类的意志,也就是说,「由他自己所认知的实践法则的个人习性的冲突。」 for Lacan, this Kantian privileging of pain as the only a priori sentiment is strictly correlative to Sade's notion of pain (torturing and humiliating the other, being tortured and humiliated by him) as the privileged way of access to sexual jouissance (Sade's argument, of course, is that pain is to be given priority over pleasure on account of its greater longevity-pleasures are passing, while pain can last almost indefinitely). A. 对拉康而言,这在康德哲学中仅仅作为一种先验情感而保持流行的痛苦是与萨德作为通向性享乐/性快感(sexual jouissance)的主要途径的痛苦概念(折磨并屈辱另一个人,被他折磨并屈辱)严格相关的(萨德的观点当然是:由于快感更为强烈的长期愉悦正在消褪,而痛苦几乎可以无限地延续,因此痛苦便被给予了相对于快感的优先性)。 B. 对拉康而言,康德将痛苦视为具有特权,作为仅有的一种先验情感,与萨德作的痛苦观念(折磨并屈辱另一个人,被他折磨并屈辱),为通向性享乐/性快感(sexual jouissance)的特权方式息息相关,(当然,萨德的论点是:痛苦应该被给予胜过欢乐的优先地位,因为痛苦的时间较长—欢乐一下子就过去,而痛苦能够无止尽地延续下去。 C. 雄伯注: the only a priori sentiment is only 在这里是形容词,而不是副词,故应翻译为「仅有的一种先验情感」,而非「仅仅作为一种先验情感」 痛苦的快感胜过于欢乐,用来解释性的虐待狂及自虐狂,倒是蛮能自圆其说。 32hsiung@pchome.com.tw http://springhero.wordpress.com

  • Bizaare

    Bizaare 2011-10-14 10:55:09

    齐泽克:康德即萨德 03 译者A:H•弗拉齐/H•Frlazi 译者B: 雄伯 Springhero This link can be further substantiated by what Lacan calls the Sadean fundamental fantasy: the fantasy of another, ethereal body of the victim, which can be tortured indefinitely and nonetheless magically retains its beauty (see the standard Sadean figure of a young girl sustaining endless humiliations and mutilations from her deprived torturer and somehow mysteriously surviving it all intact, in the same way Tom and Jerry and other cartoon heroes survive all their ridiculous ordeals intact). A. 这个联系可以通过拉康称作萨德式的基本幻像来得到进一步的证明:一个可以被无止境地折磨下去 但仍会神奇地保持其美丽的幽灵般的受害者幻像(见一个标准的萨德式的少女形象,她忍受着来自她贫苦的(deprived)施虐者的无尽屈辱与残害但却神奇般地安然无恙地存活了下来,汤姆与杰瑞以及其他的卡通英雄以同样的方式在他们荒谬的困境中安然无恙地存活了下来。 B. 这个联系可以得到进一步的证明, 通过拉康称作萨德式的基本幻像,:受害者保有另一个幽灵般的身体的幻象。这个幽灵般的身体能够被无止境地折磨下去,但仍会神奇地保持它的美丽,,(请参照一个标准的萨德式的少女形象,她忍受着来自她堕落的施虐者的无尽屈辱与残害,,但却神奇般地安然无恙地渡过这样的折磨保持美丽。 就像汤姆与杰瑞以及其他的卡通人物,经历他们荒谬的考验,,安然无恙地存活了下来。 C. 雄伯注: the fantasy of another, ethereal body of the victim, which can be tortured indefinitely and nonetheless magically retains its beauty 这个句子的which,指的是another,ethereal body,(另一个幽灵般的身体),而不是「受害者」 Depraved torturer ,A 译为「贫苦的施虐者」,颇为怪异,因为上下文跟「贫苦」无关,而比较近乎「堕落的」 Doesn't this fantasy provide the libidinal foundation of the Kantian postulate of the immortality of the soul endlessly striving to achieve ethical perfection: that is,jis not the phantasmic "truth" of the immortality of the soul its exact opposite, the immortality of the body, its ability to sustain endless pain and humiliation? A. 这难道没有为康德对灵魂无止境地追求伦理完善之实现的不朽,即不是恰好与灵魂相对的身体的不朽 ——它忍受无尽的痛苦与屈辱的能力——的虚幻“真相/真理(truth)”的假设提供一个力比多基础吗? B.这个幻见,难道不是提供力比多的基础,给康德的假设:灵魂的不朽永无止尽地设法获得伦理的完美,换句话说,灵魂的不朽的幻见的「真理」,不就是它的恰恰相反之物,身体的不朽, 身体有能力承受无止尽带痛苦与羞辱? Judith Butler pointed out that the Foucaultian "body" as the site of resistance is none other than the Freudian "psyche": paradoxically, "body" is Foucault's name for the psychic apparatus insofar as it resists the soul's domination. A. 朱迪斯•巴特勒(Judith Butler)指出福柯理论中作为抵抗场所的“身体”指的正是弗洛伊德的“精神(psyche)”:悖反性地,福柯将精神结构命名为“身体”只是就它抵制灵魂的统治而言的。 B. 朱迪斯•巴特勒(Judith Butler)指出,福柯理论中,作为抵抗场域的“身体”,道道地地正是弗洛伊德的“精神(psyche)”:矛盾的是,「身体」是福柯对精神结构的命名,因为身体抗拒灵魂的统治。 That is to say, when, in his well-known definition of the soul as the "prison of the body," Foucault turns around the standard Platonic-Christian definition of the body as the "prison of the soul," what he calls "body" is not simply the biological body, but is effectively already caught into some kind of pre-subjective psychic apparatus. [6] A. 这就是说,在他广为人知的灵魂是“身体的监狱”的定义中,福柯颠倒了柏拉图—基督教的身体是“灵魂的监狱”的标准定义,他所说的“身体”不仅仅是生物学意义上的身体,而实际上已经被吸收进了某种前主体性的精神结构当中。 B. 这就是说,在他广为人知的定义:灵魂是“身体的监狱”,福柯颠倒了柏拉图—基督教的标准定义:身体是“灵魂的监狱”。 他所谓的“身体”,不仅仅是生物学意义上的身体,而实际上已经被吸收进了某种前主体性的精神结构当中。 Consequently, don't we encounter in Kant a secret homologous inversion, only in the opposite direction, of the relationship between body and soul: what Kant calls "immortality of the soul" is effectively the immortality of the other, ethereal, "undead" body? A. 因此,我们难道没有在康德那里遭遇到一个仅仅是朝向相反方向的,隐秘的同源倒置——它是关于身体与灵魂的关系的:康德所说的“灵魂的不朽”实际上是另一个幽灵般的、“不死的”身体的不朽? C. 因此,我们难道没有在康德那里,遭遇到身体与灵魂的关系的一个秘密的倒转,只是方向相反:康德所说的“灵魂的不朽,”实际上是另一个幽灵般的、“不死的”身体的不朽? 雄伯注: 齐泽克将灵魂的永恒,转接到身体的永恒,说得蛮费解。 我从一位现代学者Lorenzo Chiesa 的一本论著Subjectivity and Otherness,看到比较浅白的诠释。在此作为参照。 The fundamental fantasy of Sade’s novels can easily be identified with the infliction of eternal suffering on the other body : conversely, in order to endure eternal suffering, the body of the victim must be made eternal. Most importantly, according to Sade, the immortality of the suffering body is the immortality of Nature. 萨德小说的基本幻见,我们很容易用来认同:被赋加在另外一个人身上的永恒的痛苦;相反地, 为了要忍受永恒的痛苦, 我们必须要让受害者的身体成为永恒。 另外在Sade 的一本小说:「床上哲学」 “ Philosophy in the Bedroom”,里面有这么一段话,说的更白: Eugénie, fuck, my angel; your body is your own, yours alone; in all the world ... the madness to hope for immortality? Why, then, 'tis by fucking, my dear, ...... absurd then to maintain cruelty is a consequence of depravity. I ... 尤吉尼,做爱吧, 我的天使, 你的身体是你自己的,仅是属于你自己,在全世界上,你急切想要获得永恒吗?那就用做爱来获的永恒,亲爱的, 要以残酷来作为堕落的结果是荒谬的… 32hsiung@pchome.com.tw http://springhero.wordpress.com

  • Herr.Nos

    Herr.Nos (放弃你的签名吧!) 2011-10-14 10:58:09

    春雄老师是俺们的楷模~

  • Bizaare

    Bizaare 2011-10-14 10:58:16

    齐泽克:康德即萨德 02 译者A:H•弗拉齐/H•Frlazi 译者B: 雄伯 Springhero It's via this central role of pain in the subject's ethical experience that Lacan introduces the difference between the "subject of the enunciation" (the subject who utters a statement) and the "subject of the enunciated (statement)" (the symbolic identity the subject assumes within and via his statement): A. 正是通过痛苦在伦理体验中所扮演的核心角色,拉康引入了“阐明/说出主体(subject of the enunciation)”(表达出一个陈述的主体)与“陈述主体(subject of the enunciated (statement))”(主体在他的陈述之内并通过他的陈述而假定的象征性身份)之间的区别: B. 正是通过痛苦在生命主体的伦理经验里,所扮演的这个核心角色,拉康介绍了这个区别:“陈述主体(subject of the enunciation)是表达出一个陈述的主体,而“被陈述主体(subject of the enunciated (statement))是主体在他的陈述之内,并通过他的陈述,而假设的象征性身份。 Kant does not address the question of who is the "subject of the enunciation" of the moral Law, the agent enunciating the unconditional ethical injunction--from within his horizon, this question itself is meaningless, since the moral Law is an impersonal command "coming from nowhere," i.e. it is ultimately self-posited, autonomously assumed by the subject himself). A. 康德并未提及谁是道德律的“说出主体”的问题,行为者在他视野之内说出了这个无条件的伦理命令,而由于道德律是一个“不从任何地方而来的”非个人化的命令——也就是说,它最终是自我设定的,是被主体本身自动设定的——这个问题本身是毫无意义的。 B. 康德并没有处理,谁是道德律的“表述的主体”的问题,这位行为者,表述了这个无条件的伦理命令---从他的视野之内,这个问题本身是无意义的,因为道德律是一个“从虚无之境而来的”非个人化的命令—也就是说,它最终是自我设定的,是被主体本身自动设定的。 Via the reference to Sade, Lacan reads absence in Kant as an act of rendering invisible, of "repressing," the moral Law's enunciator, and it is Sade who renders it visible in the figure of the "sadist" executioner-torturer-this executioner is the enunciator of the moral Law, the agent who finds pleasure in our (the moral subject's) pain and humiliation. A. 通过对萨德的参照,拉康将缺场作为一种不可见的呈现行动——对道德律的发出者(enunciator)的压抑——记入到康德之中,而正是萨德在“虐待狂的”行刑者—虐待者——这个行刑者是道德律的发出者以及在我们的(道德主体的)痛苦与屈辱之中的快感发现者——的形象中将其呈现为可见的。 B. 通过对萨德的参照,拉康将康德的缺场,作为一种把道德律的表述者(enunciator),隐藏不见的行为,也就是一种「潜抑」德律的表述者的行为。而让道德律的表述者显现出来的,正是萨德,以虐待狂的”行刑者兼虐待者得形象——这个行刑者就是道德律的表述者,这位行为者,他在我们的(道德主体的)痛苦与屈辱之中,找到欢乐。 Via the reference to Sade, Lacan reads absence in Kant as an act of rendering invisible, of "repressing," the moral Law's enunciator, 在这个句子里,rendering 的受词是 the moral Law's enunciator, Of rendering the moral law’s enunciator invisible,与 repressing the moral law’s enunciator 是对称的介系片语 it is Sade who renders it visible in the figure of the "sadist" executioner-torturer- 在这个句子里, 第一个it 是it is…who 的强调语气,第二个it 指前面的the moral law’s enunciator A counterargument offers itself here with apparent self-evidence: isn't all this utter nonsense, since, in Sade, the element that occupies the place of the unconditional injunction, the maxim the subject has to follow categorically, is no longer the Kantian universal ethical command Do your duty! but its most radical opposite, the injunction to follow to their utmost limit the thoroughly pathological, contingent caprices that bring you pleasure, ruthlessly reducing all your fellow humans to the instruments of your pleasure? A. 一个反驳以其显著的自明性将其自身呈现了出来:难道所有这类说出的不都是废话吗——由于在萨德那里,占据无条件命令的位置的元素,主体必须无条件听从的格言已不再是康德式的普遍伦理命令“履行你的义务!”而是它激进的对立面,即去追随能够给你带来快感的完全病态的、偶然的狂想的极限,并冷酷无情地把你所有的人类同胞都降为为你提供快感的工具? B. 一个反驳以其显著的不证自明,将其自身呈现了出来:难道所有这些,不都全部是废话吗?—由于在萨德那里,占据无条件命令的位置的元素,范畴上主体必须听从的习性,已不再是康德式的普遍伦理命令,“履行你的义务!”而是它激进的对立面,也就是,将这个完全不受经验染污的随興念头,贯彻到底。这些随興的念头带给你欢乐,毫无容情地将你所有的同胞,都当作是你欢乐的工具。 雄伯注: Maxim 在这里的意思不是「格言」而是「个人的行为习性」Rule of personal conduct Categorically 范畴上 这个句子很长,很容易看错。整个句子的问号,放在最后,是哪个句子是疑问句? isn't all this utter nonsense? since, in Sade, the element that occupies the place of the unconditional injunction, the maxim the subject has to follow categorically, is no longer the Kantian universal ethical command Do your duty! but its most radical opposite, the injunction to follow to their utmost limit the thoroughly pathological, contingent caprices that bring you pleasure, ruthlessly reducing all your fellow humans to the instruments of your pleasure? since引导的是副词子句,表原因,that occupies the place of the unconditional injunction, 是形容词子句,修饰the element ,the subject has to follow categorically也是形容词子句,修饰the maxim, the maxim 是the element 的同位语, is 的主词是the element。 the injunction 是its most radical opposite 的同位语,follow 的的受词是the thoroughly pathological, contingent caprices t,另外,that bring you pleasure, ruthlessly reducing all your fellow humans to the instruments of your pleasure是形容词子句,修饰前面的caprices However, it is crucial to perceive the solidarity between this feature and the emergence of the figure of the "sadist" torturer-executioner as the effective "subject of the enunciation" of the universal ethical statement-command. A. 然而,理解这种特征与以“虐待狂的”折磨者—行刑者的形象出现的,作为普遍的伦理陈述—命令的真正“阐明/陈述主体”之间的联结是至关重要的。 B. 然而,要感受到,这个特征与这个「虐待狂的」折磨者兼行刑者的形象的出现之间,具有一致性,是至关重要的。因为后者充当普遍的伦理陈述及命令的实际执行的“陈述主体”。 雄伯注: Effective 的定义「实际执行」Able to accomplish a purpose; functioning effectively Solidarity 一致性 The Sadean move from Kantian Respect-to-Blasphemy, i.e. from respecting the Other (fellow being), his freedom and autonomy, and always treating him also as an end-in-itself, to reducing all Others precisely to mere dispensable instruments to be ruthlessly exploited, is strictly correlative to the fact that the "subject of the enunciation" of the Moral Injunction, invisible in Kant, assumes the concrete features of the Sadean executioner. A. 从康德主义到萨德主义——从尊重到亵渎,也就是说,从对大他者/大彼者的自由与自主的尊重,并总是把他当做目的本身对待,到把所有的大他者/大彼者全都降为仅仅是可被无情剥削的、无关轻重的工具,是与在康德那里隐而未现的道德命令的“阐明/说出主体”扮演了萨德式行刑者的具体形象这一事实严格相关的。 B. 萨德的这个动作,从康德的「尊敬」,转移成为「亵渎」,也就是从尊敬大它者(同胞),他的自由与自主权,总是尊敬他作为目的本身,到将所有的大它者,确实沦落到仅是能够被利用及用完即丟的工具,这个动作跟这个事实息息相关:道德命令的「表述的主体」,在康德那里隐而不见,现在则是扮演起萨德的行刑者的具体特征。 雄伯注: 齐泽克在这里建大它者加个括弧为「同胞」the Other ( fellow being )。也就是是大它者未必是神或佛,而是跟我们来往的同胞,都可能成为我们的大它者。当然,基本的条件是我们尊敬他,作为目的本身,尊敬他的自由与自主权。一旦沦落到将他视为「是能够被利用及用完即丟的工具」,那就成为拉康所说的「小客体」,而不是大它者了。 32hsiung@pchome.com.tw http://springhero.wordpress.com

  • Bizaare

    Bizaare 2011-10-14 10:58:39

    齐泽克:康德即萨德 05 译者A:H•弗拉齐/H•Frlazi 译者B: 雄伯 Springhero The exemplary case of the "pathological," contingent element elevated to the status of an unconditional demand is, of course, an artist absolutely identified with his artistic mission, pursuing it freely without any guilt, as an inner constraint, unable to survive without it. A. 病态的、偶然的元素被提升到一个无条件的要求之高度的专案当然就是一位艺术家完全地认同于自身的艺术使命,将其视为一种内在强制而毫无罪恶感地对它展开自由的追求,(并且)没有它便活不下去。 B. 「不受经验沾染的」、偶然的元素,被提升到一个无条件的要求之地位,最典型的例子,当然就是,一位艺术家完全地认同于自身的艺术使命,将其视为一种内在强制,而毫无罪恶感地,对它展开自由的追求,(并且)没有它便活不下去。 The sad fate of Jacqueline du Pré confronts us with the feminine version of the split between the unconditional injunction and its obverse, the serial universality of indifferent empirical objects that must be sacrificed in the pursuit of one's Mission. A. 杰奎琳•杜朴蕾(Jacqueline du Pré)的悲惨命运让我们面对了在无条件命令及其对立面——必须在一个人的使命中被牺牲掉的一系列无关紧要的实证对象——的分裂的女性版本。 B. 杰奎琳•杜朴蕾(Jacqueline du Pré)的悲惨命运,让我们面对在无条件命令,及其对立面的分裂的女性版本—在追求一个人的使命中,一系列无关紧要的实证对象必须被牺牲。 [8] (It is extremely interesting and productive to read du Pré's life story not as a "real story," but as a mythical narrative: what is so surprising about it is how closely it follows the preordained contours of a family myth, the same as with the story of Kaspar Hauser, in which individual accidents uncannily reproduce familiar features from ancient myths.) A. [8](将杜朴蕾的人生故事不当做一个“真的故事”而当做一个虚构的故事来读是非常有意思和有益处的:它让人惊讶的地方是它是如此紧密地续接了一个家庭神话的先定轮廓,就像卡斯帕尔•豪泽(Kaspar Hauser)的故事一样——其中个别的事故从古代神话中神秘地复现了类似的场面。) B. [8](将杜朴蕾的人生故事,不当做一个“真实故事”,而当做一个神秘的描述来读,是非常有意思和有益处的:它让人惊讶的地方,是它是如此紧密地续接了一个家庭神话的先定轮廓。就像卡斯帕尔•豪泽(Kaspar Hauser)的故事,在这个故事里,个别的事故从古代神话中,神秘地复现了类似的特征。) Du Pré's unconditional injunction, her drive, her absolute passion was her art (when she was 4 years old, upon seeing someone playing a cello, she already immediately claimed that this is what she wanted to be...). A. 杜朴蕾的无条件命令,她的内驱力/冲动(drive),她的绝对热情是她的艺术(在她四岁看见某人演奏大提琴时,她就已经直接宣称这就是她想要成为的了……)。 B. 杜朴蕾的无条件命令,她的内驱力/冲动(drive),她的绝对热情,是她的艺术(在她四岁看见某人演奏大提琴时,她就已经直接宣称,这就是她想要成为的了……)。 This elevation of her art to the unconditional relegated her love life to a series of encounters with men who were ultimately all substitutable, one as good as the other-she was reported to be a serial "man eater." A. 将她的艺术提升为无条件的(举动)使得她的爱情生活降为与一系列最终都是可替代的男人——几乎每个都一样——的遭遇——她也被传为一个连续的“男人吞食者”。 B. 将她的艺术提升为无条件的(举动),使得她的爱情生活,降为与一系列的邂逅:男人最终都是可替代的—男人都是大同小异——传说她是一个连续的“吃男人者”。 She thus occupied the place usually reserved for the MALE artist-no wonder her long tragic illness (multiple sclerosis, from which she was painfully dying from 1973 to 1987) was perceived by her mother as an "answer of the real," as divine punishment not only for her promiscuous sexual life, but also for her "excessive" commitment to her art... A. 因此她占据了通常是留给男性艺术家的位置——难怪她长期的悲惨疾病(她从1973到1987年间一直痛苦地忍受着并因之而死去的多发性硬化症)会被他的母亲理解为一个“现实的/实在的(real)的回应”,一个上天不仅仅是对她的性滥交,也是对她对艺术的过度献身的惩罚…… B. 因此她占据了通常是留给男性艺术家的位置—难怪她长期的悲惨疾病,(多发性硬化症,从1973到1987年间,她因为这个病痛,她逐渐痛苦而死,)她被他的母亲理解为一个“真实界的(real)的报应”,一个上天道惩罚,不仅仅是对她的性滥交,也是对她对艺术的「过度」献身…… 雄伯注: 性滥交,我们可能不敢苟同。对艺术的「过度」献身,我们文明不仅较能理解,甚至是赞赏。梵谷,高更等画家,不都也是如此? 32hsiung@pchome.com.tw http://springhero.wordpress.com

  • Bizaare

    Bizaare 2011-10-14 10:59:13

    齐泽克:康德即萨德 06 译者A:H•弗拉齐/H•Frlazi 译者B: 雄伯 Springhero This, however, is not the whole story. The decisive question is: is the Kantian moral Law translatable into the Freudian notion of superego or not? If the answer is yes, then "Kant with Sade" effectively means that Sade is the truth of the Kantian ethics. A. 然而,这不是故事的全部。具有决定性意义的问题是:康德的道德律是否可以被翻译为弗洛伊德的超我概念?如果答案是肯定的,那么“康德与萨德”实际上意味着萨德就是康德伦理学的真相/真理。 B. 然而,这不是故事的全部。具有决定性意义的问题是:康德的道德律是否可以被翻译为弗洛伊德的超我概念?如果答案是肯定的,那么“康德与萨德”实际上意味着,萨德就是康德伦理学的真相/真理。 If, however, the Kantian moral Law cannot be identified with superego (since, as Lacan himself puts it in the last pages of The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, moral Law is equivalent to desire itself, while superego precisely feeds on the subject's compromising his/her desire, i.e. the guilt sustained by the superego bears witness to the fact that the subject has somewhere betrayed or compromised his/her desire), [9] then Sade is not the entire truth of Kantian ethics, but a form of its perverted realization. In short, far from being "more radical than Kant," Sade articulates what happens when the subject betrays the true stringency of the Kantian ethics. A. 然而,如果康德的道德律不能被认同为超我的话(正由于像拉康自己将其放到《精神分析学的四个基本概念》的最后几页那样,道德律是与欲望本身等同的,而超我仅仅是利用了主体对他/她欲望的妥协,也就是说,由超我所维持的罪恶感将为主体对/他她的欲望的背叛或妥协的事实作证),[9]这样萨德便不是康德伦理学的全部真相/真理,而是它的一种病态的实现形式。简言之,远非“比康德更为激进”,萨德道出了主体在背叛康德伦理学的真实严厉性时究竟会发生什么。 B. 然而,如果康德的道德律不能被认同为超我的话(正由于像拉康自己将其放到《精神分析学的四个基本概念》的最后几页那样,道德律是与欲望本身等同的,而超我仅仅是利用了主体对他/她欲望的妥协,也就是说,由超我所维持的罪恶感,见证了这个事实: 主体对背叛他她的欲望,或妥协他/她的欲望),[9]这样,萨德便不是康德伦理学的全部真相/真理,而是它的病态的实现的7一种形式。简言之,根本没有“比康德更为激进”,萨德道出了,主体在背叛康德伦理学的真实严厉性时,究竟会发生什么。 Sade is thus the truth of Kant in so far as we interpret the Kantian ethical imperative as an objectivized apparatus establishing what our duty is ( so that we can use it as an excuse: “ What can I do, the categorical imperative tells me this is my duty!) ; however, in soar as duty itself cannot serve as an excuse to do one’s duty, Sade ( the sadist perversion ) is no longer the truth of Kantian ethics. A. 漏译 B. 萨德因此是康德的真理,因为我们解释康德的伦理学的命令,作为一个客体化的工具,证实我们的责任是什么 (所以,我们能够使用它作为一种藉口: 「我能怎么办?范畴的命令告诉我,这是我的责任! 」)可是, 因为责任本身无法充当尽到责任的藉口,萨德 (这个虐待狂顶变态)不再是康德伦理学的真理。 This difference is crucial in its political consequences: insofar as the libidinal structure of "totalitarian" regimes is perverse (the totalitarian subject assumes the position of the object-instrument of the Other's jouissance), "Sade as the truth of Kant" would mean that Kantian ethics effectively harbors totalitarian potentials; however, insofar as we conceive of Kantian ethics as precisely prohibiting the subject to assume the position of the object-instrument of Other's jouissance, i.e. to calling on him to assume full responsibility for what he proclaims his Duty, then Kant is the antitotalitarian par excellence... A. 这个区别在其政治上的后果中是很关键的:只要极权主义政体的力比多结构是变态的(极权主义的主体 占据了大他者/大彼者快感/享乐(jouissance)的对象—工具的位置),“作为康德之真相/真理的萨德”就意味着康德伦理学实际上蕴藏了极权主义的潜势;然而,只要我们将康德伦理学设想为是禁止主体占据大他者/大彼者快感/享乐的对象—工具的位置的,也就是说要求他承担起对他所宣布的义务的全部责任,那么康德就是最卓越的反极权主义者。 B. 这个区别在其政治上的后果中,是很关键的:只要极权主义政体的力比多结构是变态的,(极权主义的主体 担任了作为大他者/大彼者快感/享乐(jouissance)的客体工具的位置),“作为康德之真理的萨德,”就意味着,康德伦理学实际上蕴藏了极权主义的潜势;然而,只要我们将康德伦理学设想为是禁止主体,担任大他者/大彼者快感/享乐的客体工具的位置的,也就是说要求他承担起,他所宣布的责任的全部责任,那么康德就是最卓越的反极权主义者。 And the same goes also for Freud himself: the dream about Irma's injection that Freud used as the exemplary case to illustrate his procedure of analyzing dreams is a dream about responsibility-(Freud's own responsibility for the failure of his treatment of Irma)-this fact alone indicates that responsibility is a crucial Freudian notion. A. 弗洛伊德用来说明其释梦程序的专案——伊玛注射之梦——是一个与责任有关的梦——(弗洛伊德自己对治疗伊玛失败的责任)——单单这一事实就足以说明责任是一个关键的弗洛伊德主义的概念。 C. 同样的道理也适用于弗洛伊德本人:弗洛伊德用来说明其释梦程序的典范个案——伊玛注射之梦——是一个与责任有关的梦—(弗洛伊德自己对治疗伊玛失败的责任)—单单这一事实,就足以说明,责任是一个关键的弗洛伊德主义的概念 But how are we to conceive it? How are we to avoid the usual trap of the mauvaise foi of the Sartrean subject responsible for his existential project, i.e. of the existentialist motif of ontological guilt that pertains to the finite human existence as such, as well as the opposite trap of "putting the blame on the Other" ("since the Unconscious is the discourse of the Other, I am not responsible for its formations, it is the big Other who speaks through me, I am merely its instrument...")? A. 但我们该如何设想?我们该如何避免对其存在计划负责的萨特式主体——也就是说,存在主义关于与有限人类的存在本身有关的本体论罪行的核心思想——的常见的自欺陷阱,以及“将责任归咎于大他者/大彼者”的相反陷阱(“由于无意识是大他者/大彼者的辞说/话语(discourse),因此我对它的形成并不负有责任,是大他者/大彼者通过我在讲,我仅仅是它的工具而已……”)? B. 但我们该如何设想它?我们该如何避免,萨特式主体「坏信仰」的通常陷阱:生命主体要为他的生命实存的计划负责,也就是说,存在主义的主题是:人作为有限生命的存在,本质上具有本体的罪恶感。另外还有一个陷阱是:“将责任归咎于大他者/大彼者”(“由于无意识是大他者/大彼者的辞说/话语(discourse),因此我对它的形成,并不负有责任,是大他者/大彼者通过我在讲话,我仅仅是它的工具而已……”) Lacan himself pointed the way out of this deadlock by referring to Kant's philosophy as the crucial antecedent of the psychoanalytic ethics of the duty "beyond the Good". A. 拉康本人通过参照作为精神分析伦理学“超越善”的义务之重要先例的康德哲学而指明了走出这一僵局的道路。 B. 拉康本人指明了走出这一僵局的道路。我们要藉由康德的哲学,将超越善”的责任,作为精神分析伦理学的之重要先例。 According to the standard pseudo-Hegelian critique, the Kantian universalist ethic of the categorical imperative fails to take into account the concrete historical situation in which the subject is embedded, and which provides the determinate content of the Good: what eludes Kantian formalism is the historically specified particular Substance of ethical life. A. 根据标准的伪黑格尔式的批判,康德关于绝对律令的普遍主义者伦理未能考虑主体置身于其中的具体历史环境,并且善的确定内容也是由其提供的:规避康德的形式主义的是由历史性所指定的伦理生活的特殊实体/本体(Substance)。 B. 根据标准的伪黑格尔式的批判,康德关于范畴命令的普遍主义者的伦理,并没有考虑到,主体置身于其中的具体历史环境。这个环境供应善的决定内容。令康德的形式主义感到困惑的是,伦理生命由历史性所指定的特殊物质(Substance)。 However, this reproach can be countered by claiming that the unique strength of Kant's ethics resides in this very formal indeterminacy: moral Law does not tell me what my duty is, it merely tells me that I should accomplish my duty, i.e. it is not possible to derive the concrete norms I have to follow in my specific situation from the moral Law itself-which means that the subject himself has to assume the responsibility of "translating" the abstract injunction of the moral Law into a series of concrete obligations. A. 这一指责可以被康德伦理学的独特力量(正是)寓居于这种形式的不确定性之中的主张所反驳:道德律并没有告诉我我的义务是什么,它只是告诉我应该尽自己的义务,也就是说,不可能从道德律本身得到我在特殊条件下必须遵从的具体标准——它意味着主体本身必须承担起将道德律的抽象命令“翻译”为一系列具体义务的责任。 B. 可是,我们能够反驳这个指责,以宣称说:康德伦理学的独特力量,就在于这种形式的不确定性:道德律并没有告诉我,我的责任是什么,它只是告诉,我应该尽自己的责任。也就是说,不可能从道德律本身,得到我在特殊条件下,必须遵从的具体标准——它意味着,主体本身必须承担起这个责任:将道德律的抽象命令,“翻译”为一系列具体的责任。 In this precise sense, one is tempted to risk a parallel with Kant's Critique of Judgement: the concrete formulation of a determinate ethical obligation has the structure of aesthetic judgement, ---that is ,of a judgement by which, instead of simply applying a universal category to a particular object or of subsuming this object under an already given universal determination, I. as it were, invent its universal-necessary-obligatory dimension and thereby elevate this particular-contingent object (act) to the dignity of the ethical Thing. A. 在这一精确的意义上,一个人会被诱惑着去冒与康德的《判断力批判》做比较的险:对一个确定的伦理义务的明确表达具有审美判断力的结构——也就是说,这个判断力不是仅仅将一个普遍的种类应用到一个特殊对象身上或将这个对象纳入到一个已经被给定的普遍确定之中,而是通过它,可是说是我创造了其普遍的—必要的—义务的维度,并因此将这个特殊—偶然的对象(行动)提升到伦理之物(ethical Thing)的尊严(的高度)。 B. 在这一明确的意义上,我们会被诱惑,去冒险与康德的《判断力批判》相提并论:一个确定的伦理义务的明确表达,具有审美判断力的结构。也就是说,根据这个判断力,我们并没有将一个普遍的范畴,应用到一个特殊的客体身上,或将这个客体,纳入到一个已经被给定的普遍性确定之中。 而是所谓的「我」,创造了它的普遍的—必要的—义务的维度,并因此将这个特殊—偶然的客体,提升到伦理真实界(ethical Thing)的尊严。 雄伯注: instead of 是意思是「并没有」,而不是「不是仅仅」。 Ethical Thing 的 Thing 从弗洛伊德 到拉康,都是指「真实界」或「无意识界」 So there is always something sublime about pronouncing a judgement that defines our duty: in it, I "elevate an object to the dignity of the Thing" (Lacan's definition of sublimation). A. 因此,总有某种崇高的东西与宣布一个界定我们义务的判断有关:在它之中,我“将一个对象提升到了物(Thing)的尊严(的高度)”(拉康对升华的定义)。 B. 因此,宣布定义我们的责任的判断时,总是会有有某个昇华的东西:在这个昇华的东西里,我“将一个客体提升到了真实界(Thing)的尊严”(这是拉康对昇华的定义)。 雄伯注: in it, 的it, 指的是something sublime 某个昇华的东西。 32hsiung@pchome.com.tw http://springhero.wordpress.com

  • 王彻

    王彻 (双重死亡=?) 2011-10-17 03:09:03

    在实在界的面庞那本书里,此文有中文版。

  • [已注销]

    [已注销] 2011-10-20 06:08:59

    B译雄伯翻译的豪迈大气 A译本平庸傻气

  • [已注销]

    [已注销] 2011-10-22 13:45:55

    A译是意识式翻译,B译是无意识式翻译

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