Contempt as a moral sentiment（原创）
2009-08-01 16:58:00 来自: camus
这是我一门课程的论文，我很希望谁能给我一点意见，不要针对形式，用思想实验讨论是老师的要求，而且这也是西方哲学传统的一种讨论方式。
我这篇论文的基本观点就是：一个道德的人不仅要有反思性的道德观念（reflective moral conception），还要有道德情感（moral sentiment），这些道德情感包括同情、关怀、愤怒，还有就是蔑视（contempt）。我构想了两个思想实验，第一个实验里的人是一个准康德主义者，他有反思性的道德观念但是缺乏道德情感，第二个实验里的人没有反思性的道德观念却有除蔑视以外的所有道德情感，我要论证的是这两种人都不可以称得上一个道德的人，而且我要批驳一种可能性：即存在这么一种人，他有反思性道德观念和所有正常的道德情感，除了蔑视。这篇论文的思想实验和论辩往来都是为了论证蔑视何以可以作为一种道德情感。
Abstract: In this paper I deal with the problem of contempt with a ‘view from nowhere’ assisted by a methodology of thought experiment. I propose two thought experiment from two aspects to test the question raised and the conclusion reached. Three challenges are put forward in the later part in order to deepen and broaden the understanding of this problem.
Contempt, as a sentiment, is generally viewed as ‘nonmoral’, if not immoral, by moral philosophers who are committed to Kantian system. We can remember the famous second formulation of the categorical imperative, ‘Act so as to treat humanity, in your own person as well as everyone else’s, always as an end and never as a mere means.’[1] The implication of this formulation imposes a duty of treating all men with a certain respect. Of course ‘respect’ will contradict contempt though it is not necessarily so as we could show certain respect while have silent contempt inside. But here raises the question: ‘What is the right response to those immoral people?’
Kant does give an answer. Surely we could propose reproach and condemnation to the vice, but it must ‘never leads to complete contempt for the depraved man’, ‘nor to the denial of all moral worth in him; for he would then be supposed unable ever to improve himself, which can not be reconcile with the idea of man, as such, as a moral being, can never lose every inclination toward what is good.’[2] That is to say, every rational being is a potentially moral being, who is worth our respect even if he is now far away from this ideal. Yet we are not here to analyze Kant’s text and see whether he leaves any room for contempt in his moral system. We are also not to take Kant’s principles as the final criterion of our problem since Kantian assessments generally point to actions rather than people. Let’s just ask: ‘Is contempt an right response to immoral people even if it conflicts with Kant’s doctrines?’
The answer I am going to give is ‘yes’. But we must ask further: ‘To what extent? Is contempt a sentiment necessary involved in the response of moral people to immoral people? Or is it just a contingent sentiment which happen to some moral people but not to all?’ To answer these questions, we’d better first propose a thought experiment.
Suppose I have a friend, named Joe. We are so close that we can talk about anything and I am perfectly sure he won’t lie to me or conceal any opinion or attitude when we talk. Joe is easy-going. Actually he is polite and gentle to every person he knows or even he meets. For most people, he is admirable especially in that he never criticize others to the teeth. It is believed that this ‘merit’ attracts a lot of people. Among the people he knows, there are people who gamble, who rape, who prostitute, who take drug, who torture their parents. He gets along well with them, but is by no means affected, whether habits or moods. He is still who he is. Suppose we have such a conversation, I say to him, ‘of course you know the things they do are obviously wrong. Did you ever give them any advice?’ He may answer like this, ‘No, I know they wouldn’t listen.’ ‘Is that because you don’t want to make any one unhappy?’ ‘To tell you the truth, I don’t care whether they are unhappy or not.’ ‘Then what’s your feelings when with them? Don’t you have any slight contempt to them?’ ‘Of course not.’ ‘Why not?’ ‘I just don’t have it.’
Is Joe really a moral person? Does he really have any idea what morality is? Obviously he shares with me some basic opinion that gamble, rape, prostitution, taking drug and torturing ones’ own parents are wrong.; and he himself will never commit these things or even any other slighter vice, such as lying or breaking his promise. He can be a perfect Kantian, though we don’t have to presuppose that in the thought experiment (Later we will argue under this presupposition thanks to the elicitation of Stocker’s hospitalized patient). He can reflect and act out of the principles of universality as well as respect for humanity as an end in itself. Some many object that A Kantian must propose reproach of immoral behaviors to the agents in hopes of their changing. Otherwise he doesn’t truly treat those agents as end in itself but means. But we may says this is just one kind of the interpretations. Joe does treat those people as end in itself because he respect every one’s freedom by not proposing any reproach which they will surely not accept. He just lacks some sentiments, contempt especially. A Kantian doesn’t have to possess any sentiment in moral action and moral assessment.
Yet we could still ask again: Is he really a moral person? Does he really have any idea what morality is? Even if he is able to elucidate the Kantian conception of morality to everyone and perfectly reflect and act out of it, we may still think by intuition that he doesn’t know what morality is since he lacks some moral sentiments which help us fully comprehend the effects of our actions. Without those sentiments as moral experience, a Kantian like Joe can only respect persons in the abstract—persons considered as rational being—not individual persons. From a normal person’s perspective, he seems like a combination of a born indifferent person and an equipped Kantian, who does moral action without efforts and sentiments while follows every step Kantian ethics prescribes. This hardly is enough to make him realize what morality is. Nor is it enough to make him a moral person. Because a person who doesn’t have that kind of moral experience cannot be called a moral person.
Then we should turn to the question: what qualifies contempt as moral sentiment? Even though we admit that possessing moral sentiments is a necessary condition to be a moral person, it doesn’t follow that contempt will be in the list with respect to the response of moral people to immoral people. In the thought experiment, Joe not simply lacks the sentiment of contempt, he also lacks care, sympathy, anger, etc. Maybe we could safely conclude that contempt is not a sentiment necessary involved in the response of moral people to immoral people, but just a contingent sentiment which happen to some moral people but not to all. Let’s propose another thought experiment to examine this conclusion..
Suppose I have another close friend, Kelvin. Kelvin is also easy going. In fact, he is even more reputed than Joe since he not only restraint from criticizing people, but also treats everyone carefully and considerately. His friend circle is not bigger than Joe’s for he is not capable to provide care and concern to too many friends. However, he still has some friends who commit vice just like the evil friends of Joe’s. But these are not the words he will use on them. He thinks that every one has his own conception of morality, he himself was not qualified to judge others even if he knows what their conceptions are. Actually, he doesn’t interfere my using those words as well. He is just so considerate. A tag of his is ‘if you’re happy with that’, surely those guys are sometimes quite unhappy, he has all the feelings that a considerate friend will have for them, say, sympathy, anger. But contempt is never included.
Now we encounter another type of case. Both Joe and Kelvin are good moral performers from an external perspective. But Joe has a reflective moral conception yet lacks moral sentiments. Kelvin is a different type. He has all the moral sentiments except contempt. Does he have any moral conception? It should be subjective relativism if any. Subjective relativism cannot count a serious moral conception since there can be no moral disagreement if it is true. In the thought experiment above, one of Kelvin’s friends may think there is nothing wrong with gamble. But in my opinion, it is quite wrong. Which of us is right? Kelvin will say we are both right. A happy ending! But what difference does it make from canceling morality? If we say Joe cannot count a moral person, then Kelvin is far more away from being moral. What qualifies a person without moral conception a moral person?
It can be argued that contempt will arise from a person who has a reflective moral conception and normal moral sentiments, namely, from a truly moral person. For such a person, He acts according to the moral principles which have been reflected and justified by himself, going with sentiments like admiration, sympathy, care, anger and contempt. Contempt arises when he knows someone commits the vices that he abhors or regards as disgusting. If this person has the sentiments of abhorrence or antipathy to those vices, it is reasonable to assume that he also has contempt to the people who commit them.
Some may argue that the assertions above are too absolute. It is definitely imaginable that someone has a reflective moral conception and normal moral sentiments except contempt. Some religious saints, such as Jesus Christ, may be of this kind. Of course we remember the famous story about Jesus and the prostitute with the logion: ‘whoever never committed sins, please throw his stone first.’ We also keep in mind that Jesus is always sympathetic for the suffering of all humanity. It is very likely that he is the exception that would wobbles our assertion. But actually I can’t figure out in what way can this perfect man be a model of morality for ordinary people as he himself never made any moral mistake. For if he will, there can be chance the contempt points also to himself. (we will discuss the problem of self-contempt in the challenge part). As to a normal person, it is quite amazing how his mechanism of morality can work perfectly without contempt and why contempt is the only sentiment which is left out. Suppose when he sees someone committing the vice he abhors, can he totally separate the action and the agent who is responsible for it? Will he think: ‘this action is horrible! How I wish to extinguish this kind of vice in the world! But the person who commit it is excusable. He is a potential moral agent.’ ?
Yet we don’t have to claim so strongly to the effect that contempt is a sentiment necessary involved in each response of a moral person to immoral people. Maybe there are some actions which a moral person regards as wrong but doesn’t detest (we cannot be so strict as to ask each moral person to have intense antipathy to every immoral action), accordingly he may not have contempt to the agents who perform them. But for every moral person, there should be some actions that he reasonably abhors and some agents who deserve his contempt by performing those actions.
Now we are going to face several anticipatory challenges, the first of which will be: contempt is a prejudiced sentiment because it is not fair for us to have a immoral person in contempt unless we know the whole history of him.
The intact argument is like this: we know that one’s character effects how one acts, and character itself is effected by both genes and environment. So suppose a person is brought up in a depraved environment by his evil parents, whose immoral genes can have been inherited by him. This guy will probably commit vices as he inclines and is educated. But what else sentiments could we have to him except pity? Leaving alone this extreme case, there are situations in which a generally good person is seen to be committing some vice by a stranger who happens to abhors this kind of vice. But that maybe the first time he commits it, or there are reasons that he has to do that though he is quite reluctant, say, someone threatens to kill his father if he doesn’t do it. In these cases, to have those agents in contempt seems imprudent.
In Kantian ethics, all that above won’t constitute a challenge. For the character factor is just something that Kant wants to erase in moral philosophy. The external factors such as education, accident and menace also don’t count as reasons that Kantians recognize. But as we mention in the beginning, we are not going to take Kant’s principle as our final criterion since it is still debatable in these problems. Let’s proceed our response case by case. With regard to the bad character guy, doesn’t it leave any room for contempt? We do admit action is affected by character, and character is affected by genes and environment. It doesn’t equal to that action is determined by character and character is determined by genes and environment. For if action is totally determined by factors other than free will, how is moral judgment possible? It is reasonable to say this bad character guy should take some responsibility for what he has done if not all, which leaves room for contempt to the effect that he fails to realize another possibility of his life. As for those good people committing bad things, I think contempt is allowed because it do no harm to any one. A stranger’s contempt will surely not hurt the agent’s feelings, and if there is chance for him to know the fact further, the contempt will out of question disappear. What’s wrong to keep this normal sentiment when he is still not informed?
They second challenge comes from the moral skeptics, who are skeptical about the validity of moral conceptions and the entitlement of the alleged moral people. Let’s put their challenge more specifically as follows: It is said the asserted moral people that we have described have reflective moral conceptions and normal moral sentiments. And contempt arises when they know someone commit vices that they abhor or regard as disgusting. No doubt what counts as vice is defined by their moral conceptions. But are their moral conceptions reliable? In other words, where does the validity of their moral conceptions come from? Are they absolutely right so that the contempt justified by them is thus reasonable? In addition, haven’t those asserted moral people made any moral mistakes? People do often make mistakes. Those who have ever made moral mistakes, are they qualified to have others in contempt just because they themselves make fewer and slighter?
Moral skeptics can easily incline to moral relativism. Kelvin is one of the examples. Because no one of prudence will claim that his moral conception is absolutely and ultimately right, it seems natural of moral skeptics’ suggestion that we suspend our moral judgments. But that is ridiculous if probed deeper. We know there is not a natural science theory that claims to be absolutely right about all the problems it deals with. Does it mean we have to suspend all the factual judgments? Although we haven’t acquired all the truths in the world, we do get parts of them. In the field of morality, there are competing systems which have disagreements on the basic moral principles as well as on some detailed judgments. Nevertheless there are some evident truths which we can know simply by intuition. For instance, murder, rape and lying are all wrong. The moral conception of a moral person absorbs these truths gained by intuition instead of distorting them to fit the frame. Still, a reflective moral conception admits the existence of equivocal areas. So it is not likely that when a person with such a conception knows someone commits this kind of quasi-vice, contempt will still arise from him.
Though the second part of the challenge is proposed more frequently by moral skeptics, it is easier to answer. Contempt as a moral sentiment points not only to others, but only to ourselves. If we could treat ourselves as treating others in this aspect and have ourselves in contempt when we commit the vices we detest (in virtue of weakness of the will or something else), there is nothing wrong we keep this sentiment despite that we ourselves may sometimes fail to meet our own moral conceptions. The imperfectness of a moral person won’t invalidate the moral conception he embodies, nor will it deny the entitlement of moral sentiments he possesses.
The last challenge is a more complicated one, some seeming irrelevant points can be under this heading. Some might say: contempt is a negative sentiment, since first, it involve a sense of superiority; second, it effects our personal relationship when it is showed.; and third, it may make ourselves unhappy
The sense of superiority is generally hated as the remnant of the hierarchy rank. It is true that for normal people, contempt often arises as a nonmoral kind. Appearance, ability, taste and status especially can be the target of this sentiment. We admit that contempt of these kind may be unreasonable. Even in moral world, not every one will appreciate contempt as well as the sense of superiority for they seem to violate the implication of the principle of equality. It is for these reasons that when contempt is showed, the other side feels more humiliated than ashamed. How can personal relationship be not affected if two parties disagree each other sharply on one thing and have expressed respectively by contempt and hatred? It is surprising that people who just go through such conflicts would still keep a good mood. That is why pragmatic people who have ever suffered by all that above adopt relativism in order to avoid these conflicts.
No doubt when we make moral judgments, we stand back from the actions and the agents; and no doubt when contempt arises in us, we have a sense of what things ought to be like. But this doesn’t imply that it goes with a sense of superiority to the effect that ‘I am superior than he is.’ It is more unlikely to imply that the agent who deserves my contempt can’t be myself. Certainly sometimes my moral contempt makes others as well as myself unhappy. Yet to leave alone the claims made by utilitarian, we see no reason why happiness should have the priority especially when it contradicts the evident moral truths. It is exactly how one chooses in the conflicting area between morality and happiness that manifests what kind of person one is.
In this paper I take no reference and no antecedent position to explicate the problem of contempt although the topic may remind somebody of Hume’s moral theory. I do try my best to disentangle the details of this problem and propose the challenges which I am able to anticipate and respond. Despite of all these discussions, I believe there are still room to improve in this thesis. Maybe I will explore deeper as I have received more criticism.
[1] Kant, Immanuel. Fundamental principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, section 2.
[2] Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysics of Morals, part 2, “Doctrine of Virtue”, paras. 38, 39.
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