【文献共享1】齐泽克：《康德与萨德：绝配》/Kant and...

• 

  2009-05-24 17:41:20 H.弗拉齐 (君子所性 雖大行不加 雖窮居不損)

  翻译若有不当之处 望各位能够及时予以指正 谢谢！

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• 2009-05-24 22:36:46 [已注销]

  辛苦你了，兄弟，不过这东西的中译本已经有了啊。齐泽克的自选集《实在界的面庞》里就有啊。中央编译出版社出的，蓝皮，上面还有他的头像。不过在那里面的名字叫康德同或反萨德。

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• 

  2009-05-25 13:02:27 苍莽

  恩恩，我很早看过了。。。老弗，你真不容易啊。。。我叫你多找下齐泽克的书嘛，赫赫。。。

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  2009-05-25 16:12:11 H.弗拉齐 (君子所性 雖大行不加 雖窮居不損)

  呵呵 没事 就当练英语翻译了……不过还是要多谢两位兄台的提点了 有机会我会拿中译本比对一下的……为小组做点贡献嘛 应该的 应该的 呵呵~

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• 

  2009-05-26 21:53:50 苍莽

  不过话说那个翻译真是烂啊。。。我还是看你的好了。。。赫赫~~~~

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• 

  2009-05-28 12:03:56 H.弗拉齐 (君子所性 雖大行不加 雖窮居不損)

  这话听得我 感动得没话说了……再翻译多少篇都值 呵呵……哎 最近网线出了问题 不能上网的日子真是难熬啊……又见不到你们这些兄弟 那个孤独 那个郁闷……等到下次能上网一定要跟你们疯聊几天 这段时间就暂时就只有郁闷着了 呵呵……老铁 小组你就先帮我打理着吧 呵呵……有兄弟的感觉就是不一样 哈哈……

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• 

  2011-10-09 09:59:15 springhero

  
  A. 只有——与康德相反——一个人坚持欲望的能力并不在其自身的“病态”中。简言之，拉康坚持一个“纯粹欲望批判”的必要性：与康德相反，在他看来我们欲望的能力是彻底地“病态的”（
  B. 只有一个条件，那就是与康德抗衡—我们主张；欲望的能力本身并非病态。简言之，拉康主张「纯粹欲望之批判」的必要性，来跟康德相抗衡。对于康德而言，我们的欲望的能力是徹底「病态」的。
  
  In itself 本身 for whom 的whom是指康德 ，原译的「在他看来」，很容易被误认为是「拉看认为」
  雄伯
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  

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  2011-10-09 10:00:21 springhero

  Only if-in contrast with Kant-one asserts that the faculty of desiring is not in itself "pathological." In short, Lacan asserts the necessity of a "critique of pure desire": in contrast to Kant, for whom our capacity to desire is thoroughly "pathological"

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  2011-10-09 10:51:14 springhero

  It is no accident that the same seminar in which Lacan first deployed the inherent link between Kant and Sade also contains the detailed reading of Antigone in which Lacan delineates the contours of an ethical act that DOES successfully avoid the trap of the Sadean perversion as its hidden truth-in insisting on her unconditional demand for her brother's proper burial, Antigone does NOT obey a command that humiliates her, a command effectively uttered by a sadistic executioner…
  
  A. 在拉康首先展开的康德与萨德之间的内在联系的同一个讨论班中也包含了对安提戈涅的详细解读并非是一个偶然。而在对安提戈涅的解读中，拉康描绘了一个成功避开——通过对妥善安葬其兄的无条件要求的坚持，安提戈涅没有遵从一个使她屈辱的命令，一个实际上是由一个虐待狂的行刑者发出的命令……——将萨德式的变态视为其隐秘真相/真理之陷阱的伦理行为的轮廓。
  B. 拉康在讨论班种首次阐述：在康德与萨德之间，有本质上的关联。这个同样的讨论班，也包括对于安提戈涅狄详细解读，并非是巧合。在这个解读当中，拉康描绘出一个伦理行为的轮廓。这个伦理行为，确实成功地避开这个陷阱：它实际上隐藏著萨德式的虐待变态。安提戈涅坚持她无可妥协的要求：要给予她的兄长合宜地安葬。她并没有顺从让她觉得是屈辱的命令，发出那个命令的摄政王，形同是位具有虐待狂的劊子手。
  

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  2011-10-09 11:06:04 捷瑟敏 (giselemine)

  康德說:
  The human power of choice is “pathologically affected”,
  but not “pathologically necessitated.”
  
  康德認為:
  意志的選擇能力"可以"不受經驗、習慣、所處環境所沾染,
  可以＂出淤泥而不染＂,
  這種自我定立的狀態,正是善之意志的狀態
  
  不染的狀態叫作善意志,而慾望呢,正是受沾染的狀態
  慾望總是在經驗中被形成與影響
  
  pathological sentiments / moral law 正是依此區分
  
  pathological一詞,在此是表達一種＂受經驗影響的被動態＂
  而非morbid的意思
  
  pathological所連結的意涵,
  是受環境激擾所引發的反應,是個人因為經驗的感受,沉積的習慣,
  以及其所帶來的偏見等等所帶來的限制。
  
  康德認為:
  經驗物件以及其在主體上所產生的愉悅感之間，沒有先天的聯結
  (no a priori link between an empirical object and the pleasure this object
  generates in the subject)）
  ---
  
  所以,拉岡或Zizek要講的,是順著脈絡,回應康德說:
  他們覺得有所謂 non-pathological desire
  慾望可以是自由而不受經驗沾染的,據此他們才言"純粹慾望"

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  2011-10-09 13:18:41 springhero

  A. 只有——与康德相反——一个人坚持欲望的能力并不在其自身的“病态”中。简言之，拉康坚持一个“纯粹欲望批判”的必要性：与康德相反，在他看来我们欲望的能力是彻底地“病态的”（
  B. 只有一个条件，那就是与康德抗衡—我们主张；欲望的能力本身并非病态。简言之，拉康主张「纯粹欲望之批判」的必要性，来跟康德相抗衡。对于康德而言，我们的欲望的能力是徹底「病态」的。
  C. 只有一个条件，那就是与康德抗衡—我们主张；欲望的能力本身「并不受经验沾染」。简言之，拉康主张「纯粹欲望之批判」的必要性，来跟康德相抗衡。对于康德而言，我们的欲望的能力是徹底「受到经验沾染」的。
  

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  2011-10-09 13:49:13 springhero

  (since, as he repeatedly stresses, there is no a priori link between an empirical object and the pleasure this object generates in the subject), Lacan claims that there is a "pure faculty of desire," since desire does have a non-pathological, a priori object-cause-this object, of course, is what Lacan calls objet petit a.
  
  A. 正如他所反复强调的那样，由于在实证对象与其在主体之中产生的快感之间没有一个先验的联系），拉康主张存在一个“纯粹的欲望能力”，因为欲望拥有一个非病态的、先验的对象/客体—原因——当然，这一对象/客体就是拉康称之为对象小a/客体小a（objet petit a）的东西。
  B. （如同康德重复地强调：經驗客体，以及其在主體上所產生的愉悅感之間，沒有先天的聯結。）拉康宣称，是有一种「纯粹的欲望能力」。因为欲望确实拥有一个不受经验沾染，一种超验的客体的原因---当然，这个客体就是拉康所谓的小客体。
  （雄伯注： 原因，齐泽克没有明说出来，我推测应该是无意识界或真实界。纯粹的欲望能力，在真实界，不在小客体，因为小客体必然是受到经验沾染。而无意识界或真实界的欲望能力，是不受经验沾染。）
  谢谢捷瑟敏的解说，终于让我看懂！
  

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  2011-10-09 15:37:19 springhero

  译者A：H•弗拉齐/H•Frlazi
  译者B: 雄伯 Springhero
  
  Of all the couples in the history of modern thought (Freud and Lacan, Marx and Lenin...), Kant and Sade is perhaps the most problematic: the statement "Kant is Sade" is the "infinite judgement" of modern ethics, positing the sign of equation between the two radical opposites, i.e. asserting that the sublime disinterested ethical attitude is somehow identical to, or overlaps with, the unrestrained indulgence in pleasurable violence.
  
  A. 在现代思想史的所有的配对中（弗洛伊德与拉康，马克思与列宁……），康德与萨德或许是最成问题的 一对了：“康德（就）是萨德”这一陈述是现代伦理学的“无限判断（infinite judgement）”，它在两个极端的对立者之间划上等号，也就是断言崇高无私的伦理态度与在享乐暴力中的无限沉溺是同一的，或是部分重叠的。
  
  B. 在现代思想史的所有的配对中（弗洛伊德与拉康，马克思与列宁……），康德与萨德或许是最成问题的一对了：“康德（就）是萨德”这一陈述, 是现代伦理学的“无限判断（infinite judgement）”，它在两个极端的对立者之间划上等号。 也就是断言，崇高无私的伦理态度，与没有受到约束地耽溺于欢乐的暴力，为了某种理由，他们是相同的，或是部分重叠的。
  
  A lot-everything, perhaps-is at stake here: is there a line from Kantian formalist ethics to the cold-blooded Auschwitz killing machine? Are concentration camps and killing and genocides as a neutral business the inherent outcome of the enlightened insistence on the autonomy of Reason?
  
  A. 在此，有很多东西——或许是所有东西——都危如累卵：在康德的形式主义伦理学与奥斯维辛冷血的的杀人机器之间是否存在一道分界线呢？集中营与杀戮以及种族灭绝会不会因作为坚持为理性自治启蒙的内在结果而成为一个中立的事件？
  B. 在此，有很多东西——或许是所有东西——都危如累卵：在康德的形式主义伦理学，与奥斯维辛集中营冷血的的杀人机器之间，是否存在一道分界线呢？集中营与杀戮，以及种族灭绝，会不会因作为坚持理性作为啟蒙的自主权，本质上的结果，而成为一个中立的事件？
  
  雄伯注：一个中立的事件 as a neutral business 一词颇费解。我想指的是不具善恶的价值判断。过分开明的理性啟蒙， 会模糊掉善恶之间的价值判断。就像烂好人，常常是非不明，善恶不分。
  
  Is there at least a legitimate lineage from Sade to Fascist torturing, as is implied by Pasolini's film version of Saló, which transposes it into the dark days of Mussolini's Saló republic?
  
  A. 在萨德与法西斯分子的严刑拷打之间是否有一个合理的传承关系，就像帕索里尼的电影版《萨罗（Saló）》——它被变换到由墨索里尼掌权的萨罗共和国的黑暗时光中——中所暗示的那样？
  B. 从萨德到法西斯分子的严刑拷打，是否有一个合理的传承关系？就像帕索里尼的电影版《所多玛120天（Saló）》——它被变换到由墨索里尼掌权的萨罗共和国的黑暗时代中——中所暗示的那样？
  
  This link between Sade and Kant was first developed by Adorno and Horkheimer ( A/H) in the ( deservedly ) famous Excursion II ( ‘ Juliette or Enlightenment and Morals’) of the Dialectic of enlightenment : A?H”s fundamental thesis is that ‘ the work of Marquis de Sade displays the “ Reason which is not led by another agency”, that is is to say, the bourgeois subject, liberated from a state of not yet being mature.
  
  A. 漏译
  B: 萨德与康德之间的关联，首先被发展，在阿德诺与荷克海默名至实归的著名论著「啟蒙辩证法」的第二章：（朱莉亚，或啟蒙与道德）。他们两人的基本论点是： 萨德爵士展示「另类引导的理性」。换句话说，作为中产阶级的生命主体，从尚未成熟的状态里，被解放出来。
  
  Some fifteen years later, Lacan ( without knowing about A/H’s version ) also developed this link first in his Seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1958-59), [1] and then in the Écrits "Kant with Sade" of 1963. [2]
  
  A. 拉康首先在他关于《精神分析伦理学》(1958-59) [1]的研讨班上发展了这一联系，接着是在1963年所写的被收录在选集中的《康德与萨德》里。[2]
  B. 大约十五年后，拉康（他并不知道阿德诺与荷克海默的这种论点），首先在他关于《精神分析伦理学》(1958-59) [1]的研讨班上，发展了这一联系，接着是在1963年所写的被收录在选集中的《康德与萨德》里。[2]
  

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• 

  2011-10-09 17:03:18 springhero

  
  II
  How, then, does Lacan stand in regard to the A/ H version of ‘Kant with Sade’ ( i.e. of Sade as the truth of Kantian ethics)? For Lacan also, Sade consequently deployed the inherent potential of the Kantian philosophical revolution, although Lacan gives to this a somewhat different twist—his point is that Sade honestly externalized the Voice of Conscience. ( which, in Kant, attests the subject’s full ethical autonomy, i.e. is self-posited/ imposed by the subject ) in the Executioner who terrorizes/tortures the victim…The first association here is, of course: what's all the fuss about?
  
  A. 对拉康而言，在其坦诚地将“良心之声（Voice of Conscience）”外在化这一准确意义上，萨德因而发挥了康德哲学革命中的内在潜势。在这里首先联想到的肯定是：这有什么大不了的？
  
  B. 因此，关于阿德诺与荷克海默对于「康德即萨德」的论点，拉康的立场是什么？（譬如，萨德作为康德的伦理学的真理）？对拉康也是一样，萨德因而发挥了康德哲学革命中的内在潜力。虽然拉康对于这一点，有相当不同的扭曲。他的观点是：萨德坦诚地将在恐吓及折磨受害者的行刑者身上的”良心之声（Voice of Conscience）”外在化。（康德认为，良心之声证实生命主体具有充分的伦理自主权。譬如，这个良心之声，是生命主体自己提出或赋加的。）在这里首先联想到的肯定是：这有什么好大惊小怪的？
  
  雄伯注：康德认为良心之声是发自内在本质，拉康则认为，良心之声由外在赋加。
  
  
  Today, in our postidealist Freudian era, doesn't everybody know what the point of the "with" is : the truth of Kant's ethical rigorism is the sadism of the Law, i.e. the Kantian Law is a superego agency that sadistically enjoys the subject's deadlock, his inability to meet its inexorable demands, like the proverbial teacher who tortures pupils with impossible tasks and secretly savors their failings?
  
  A. 今天，在我们的后唯心主义的弗洛伊德时代，难道不是人人都知道“与”指的就是康德伦理学的严格主义就是虐待狂的法则，也就是说，康德主义的法则是虐待狂式地享受主体的僵局——主体无法满足其不可变更的要求——的超我机构，就像那位众所周知的老师靠不可能完成的任务来折磨学生并暗自品尝他们的失败那样？
  C. 今天，在我们的后唯心主义的弗洛伊德时代，难道不是人人都知道，「康德即萨德」的这个「即」字是什么意义。那就是，康德伦理学的严格主义的真理，就是法则的虐待狂。也就是说，康德主义的法则，是一种超我的代理者，他虐待狂式地享受生命主体的僵局——主体无法满足他毫不宽容的要求——，就像那位众所周知的老师，他用不可能完成的任务，来折磨学生，然后暗自品尝他们的挫折感？
  雄伯注：
  the sadism of the Law 是法则的虐待狂，不是「虐待狂的法则」
  what the point of the "with" is 的这个"with"，是衔接前面的 ‘Kant with Sade’ 而来。我的翻译是「康德即萨德」的「即」，而不是「与」。
  Rigorism 「严格主义」是什么意思，也是令人费解。我从网络下载一个解释作为参考：
  The moral teaching which holds that when there is a conflict of two opinions, one in favor of the law, the other in favor of liberty, the law must always be observed, even if the opinion in favor of liberty is the more probable or very probable one as compared with its opposite.
  这种道德的教导主张：当两个意见发生冲突时， 一边赞同法则，另一边赞同自由。法则必须总是被遵守，即使赞同自由的意见，跟法则比较起来，更有可能。
  就像情理法冲突时，我们只有先遵守法。恶法亦法，大概就是这种「严格主义」的主张。
  

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  2011-10-09 17:35:26 springhero

  
  D.
  Lacan's point, however, is the exact opposite of this first association: it is not Kant who was a closet sadist, it is Sade who is a closet Kantian. That is to say, what one should bear in mind is that the focus of Lacan is always Kant, not Sade: what he is interested in are the ultimate consequences and disavowed premises of the Kantian ethical revolution.
  
  A. 然而拉康的观点却与此恰恰相反：不是说康德是一个潜藏的虐待狂，而是说萨德是一个潜藏的康德主义者。这就是说，一个人始终需要铭记的是拉康（所关注）的焦点永远是康德，而不是萨德：他所感兴趣的是康德伦理学革命的最终结果与其被否认了的前提。
  E. 然而，对于这第一个联想：不是说，康德以前是一个不欲人知的虐待狂，而是说，萨德现在是一个不欲人知的康德主义者。拉康的观点恰恰相反。也就是说，我们应该记住的是，拉康所关注，总是是康德，而不是萨德：他所感兴趣的是，康德伦理学革命的最终结果与其被否认了的前提。
  
  雄伯注;
  This first association 后面的标点是冒号。也就是说it is not Kant who was a closet sadist, it is Sade who is a closet Kantian. 这个句子是this first association 的同位语。不是拉康的观点。
  Closet 的字典定义是：to describe people who want to keep some fact about themselves secret 描述有秘密不欲人知的人们
  

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• 

  2011-10-09 18:01:04 Herr.Nos (敦兮其若朴，旷兮其若谷！)

  mark~辛苦了，我来标记一下

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• 

  2011-10-09 21:01:04 捷瑟敏 (giselemine)

  谢谢捷瑟敏的解说，终于让我看懂！
  ---
  No worries man, just put my 2 cents in.
  

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• 

  2011-10-10 10:11:27 springhero

  齐泽克：康德即萨德 02
  
  译者A：H•弗拉齐/H•Frlazi
  译者B: 雄伯 Springhero
  
  In other words, Lacan does not try to make the usual "reductionist" point that every ethical act, as pure and disinterested as it may appear, is always grounded in some "pathological" motivation (the agent's own long-term interest, the admiration of his peers, up to the "negative" satisfaction provided by the suffering and extortion often demanded by ethical acts);
  
  A. 换言之，拉康并不想做出像一般的“还原论者”那样的声明，即每个伦理行为，无论它看上去是多么地纯粹和无私，总会基于某些病态的动机（行为者自身的长远利益，（别人）对他充满崇敬的凝视，直到由伦理行为所要求的痛苦与胁迫提供的“消极”满足）；
  
  B. 换言之，拉康并不想做出像一般的“还原论者”那样的观点：即每个伦理行为，无论它看上去是多么地纯粹和无私，总会基于某些受到经验沾染的动机（行为者自身的长远利益，同侪对他的崇敬，一直到由伦理行为所要求的痛苦与胁迫，提供的“消极”满足。）；
  
  the focus of Lacan's interest rather resides in the paradoxical reversal by means of which desire itself (i.e. acting upon one's desire, not compromising it) can no longer be grounded in any "pathological" interests or motivations and thus meets the criteria of the Kantian ethical act, so that "following one's desire" overlaps with "doing one's duty." Suffice it to recall Kant's own famous example from his Critique of Practical Reason:
  
  A. 拉康的兴趣中心更在于通过以下途径而实现的悖论性反思：欲望本身（按照某人的欲望去行动，而不是向它妥协）无法再基于任何病态的利益或动机，并因此达到了康德伦理学的标准，以致于“顺从某人的欲望”与“履行一个人的义务”在此便有了交集。只要回顾一下康德自己在他的《实践理性批判》中的著名例子便足够了：
  B. 代替的，拉康的兴趣中心更在于悖论性逆转。凭借着这种悖论性逆转，欲望本身（譬如，按照某人的欲望去行动，而不是向它妥协），无法再基于任何受到经验沾染的利益或动机，并因此符合了康德伦理学的标准。所以，顺从某人的欲望”与“履行一个人的义务”，在此便有了交集。只要回顾一下康德自己在他的《实践理性批判》中的著名例子，便足够了：
  
  雄伯注：
  the focus of Lacan's interest rather resides in the paradoxical reversal 是主要子句，by means of which desire itself (i.e. acting upon one's desire 是形容词子句，by means of which 的which 指的是前面的he paradoxical reversal凭借着这种悖论性逆转，而A译的「通过以下途径而实现的悖论性反思」，扭曲前后因果关系。
  康德的伦理行为标准，跟一般的还原论者reductionist最大的不同就是，它「无法再基于任何受到经验沾染的利益或动机」。也就是会有纯粹的顺从欲望，与纯粹的尽自己责任。
  
  Suppose that someone says his lust is irresistible when the desired object and opportunity are present. Ask him whether he would not control his passions if, in front of the house where he has this opportunity, a gallows were erected on which he would be hanged immediately after gratifying his lust. We do not have to guess very long what his answer may be."3
  
  A. 假设某人说当欲望对象与机会出现时，他的欲望就会变得无法抗拒。如果当他获得这个机会的时候，一个绞刑架会立在他面前并且他将在满足欲望之后立即被绞死于其上，问他是否不会去控制他的激情。我们不用想很长时间就能知道他的答案可能是什么。
  B. 假设有某人说，当欲望对象与机会出现时，他的欲望就会变得无法抗拒。那请问他，如果当他获得这个机会的时候，一个绞刑架会立在他面前，并且他将在满足欲望之后，立即被绞死于其上，他会不会去控制他的激情？我们不用想很长时间，就能知道他的答案可能是什么。
  
  雄伯注：
  康德举的这个例子倒是很普遍，就像死刑犯执行前的最后一餐，通常比较丰盛，问题是谁有心情去享受？
  
  Lacan's counterargument here is that we certainly do have to guess what his answer may be : what if we encounter a subject (as we do regularly in psychoanalysis), who can only fully enjoy a night of passion if some form of "gallows" is threatening him, i.e. if, by doing it, he is violating some prohibition? [3]
  
  A. 拉康对此的反驳是：要是我们遇到了这样的一个主体（就像我们在精神分析中经常遇到的那样），他只有在遭受某种形式的“绞刑架”的威胁时——也就是说，通过这样做他便能违反某些禁忌时——才能尽情享 受一夜的激情的话，那又怎样呢？[3]
  
  C. 拉康对此的反驳是：他的回答是什么，我们确实必须猜测一下才知道。要是我们遇到了这样的一个主体（就像我们在精神分析中，经常遇到的那样），他只有在遭受某种形式的“绞刑架”的威胁时——譬如说，通过这样做，他便能违反某些禁忌时——才能尽情享受一夜的激情的话，他会怎么选择呢？[3]
  
  雄伯注：俗语说马不吃险草不肥，越是危险的享乐，越是有人在追求。冒着身败名裂，甚至死亡的危险的激情，还是有人趋之若鹜。
  
  There was an Italian film from the 60's, Casanova 70, starring Virna Lisi and Marcello Mastroianni that hinged on this very point: the hero can only retain his sexual potency if doing "it" involves some kind of danger.
  
  A. 60年代由Virna Lisi与Marcello Mastroianni主演的的意大利影片《卡萨诺瓦70》（Casanova 70）正是取决于这一点：英雄只有在做“那种事”的同时陷入某种危险，才能保持他的性能力。
  
  B.60年代由Virna Lisi与Marcello Mastroianni主演的的意大利影片《卡萨诺瓦70》（Casanova 70）,正是取决于这一点：里面的主角，只有在做“那种事”的同时，,陷入某种危险，才能保持他的性能力。
  
  雄伯注：
  听起来有点变态，可是人性确实是如此。危险是最佳的春药。
  
  At the film's end, when he is on the verge of marrying his beloved, he wants at least to violate the prohibition of premarital sex by sleeping with her the night before the wedding-however, his bride unknowingly spoils even this minimal pleasure by arranging with the priest for special permission for the two of them to sleep together the night before, so that the act is deprived of its transgressive sting. What can he do now?
  
  A. 在电影的结尾，就在马上可以娶到自己心爱之人的时候，他想要通过在婚礼前夜就与她共眠来实现对婚前性行为这一禁忌的最低限度的违抗——然而，他的新娘从神父那里得到的让她俩在婚前同床的特许在不知不觉中破坏了这最微弱的快感，以致于这一行为被剥夺了它由犯罪而带来的刺痛？他现在该怎么办？
  B. 在电影的结尾，就在马上可以娶到自己心爱之人的时候，他想要通过在婚礼前夜,就与她共眠，来实现对婚前性行为,这一禁忌,至少要违抗一下——然而，他的新娘从神父那里，得到的让她俩在婚前同床的特许，在不知不觉中破坏了这最微弱的快感，以致于这一行为，丧失掉由逾越而带来的刺痛之爽？他现在该怎么办？
  
  In the last shot of the film, we see him crawling on the narrow porch on the outside of the high-rise building, giving himself the difficult task of entering the girl's bedroom in the most dangerous way, in a desperate attempt to link sexual gratification to mortal danger…
  
  A. 在电影的最后一个镜头里，我们看到了他在高层建筑物外部的的狭窄窗沿上匍匐前进，（并）在一种将性满足与致命危险联系起来的绝望尝试中，给了他自己一个以最危险的方式进入女孩房间的高难度任务……
  B. 在电影的最后一个镜头里，我们看到了他在高耸建筑物外部的的狭窄窗沿上匍匐前进，（并）在一种将性满足，与致命危险联系起来的绝望尝试中，给了他自己一个以最危险的方式，进入女孩房间的高难度任务……
  
  So, Lacan's point is that if gratifying sexual passion involves the suspension of even the most elementary "egotistic" interests, if this gratification is clearly located "beyond the pleasure principle," then, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, we are dealing with an ethical act, then his "passion" is stricto sensu ethical... [4]
  
  A. 因此，拉康的观点是如果对性激情的满足涉及到了对最根本的“利己主义”利益的悬置，如果这一满足明显地被置于“快乐原则之外”，那么，无论有多少相反的外在表现，我们所面对的都是一个伦理行为，因此他的激情在严格意义上是伦理的……[4]
  B. 因此，拉康的观点是，如果对性激情的满足，涉及到了对最根本的“利己主义”利益的悬置，如果这一满足明显地被置于“快乐原则之外”，那么，无论外表上是多么的相反，我们所面对的，就是一个伦理行为，因此他的激情在严格意义上是伦理的……[4]
  
  雄伯注：
  拉康的这个「伦理」的定义，将性的激情跟伦理扯上关系。也就是，当性的关系不纯粹是性本身，而是夹杂现实的利用及目标，它就是伦理的选择问题。
  
  Lacan's further point is that this covert Sadean dimension of an "ethical (sexual) passion" is not read into Kant by our eccentric interpretation, but is inherent to the Kantian theoretical edifice. [5]
  
  A. 拉康更进一步的观点是：这一“伦理（性）激情”中所潜藏的萨德式（Sadean）维度并没有被我们的离奇解释加入到（对）康德(的理解)中，但它却内在于康德的理论大厦。
  B. 拉康更进一步的观点是：这一“伦理（性）激情”中所潜藏的萨德式（Sadean）维度，并没有被我们的离奇解释，加入到（对）康德(的理解)中，但它是康德的理论建构本质上具有的。
  
  雄伯注：
  this covert Sadean dimension of an "ethical (sexual) passion" 这个句子里， ethical passion 伦理的激情里面括弧著性的激情，这个括弧的意思仅是潜藏covert，但是很容易让人误解为等于。也就是萨德的伦理激情建构，潜藏着萨德的性的激情建构。或者是「康德的理论建构本质上具有的」inherent to the Kantian theoretical edifice。这让我茅塞顿开，萨德的性虐狂行为，不仅是性，而是具有伦理的目标或理想。
  
  If we put aside the body of "circumstantial evidence" for it (isn't Kant's infamous definition of marriage-"the contract between two adults of the opposite sex about the mutual use of each other's sexual organs"-thoroughly Sadean, since it reduces the Other, the subject's sexual partner, to a partial object, to his/her bodily organ which provides pleasure, ignoring him/her as the Whole of a human Person?), the crucial clue that allows us to discern the contours of "Sade in Kant" is the way Kant conceptualizes the relationship between sentiments (feelings) and the moral Law.
  
  A. 如果我们为它而将旁证撇开不管（难道不是康德对婚姻的臭名昭著的、十分萨德式的定义——“两个异性的成年人之间订立的关于相互使用对方性器官的契约吗？因为它将作为主体性伴侣的大他者/大彼者（the Other）降格成了一个部分对象/部分客体（partial object），一个他的/她的能够提供快感的身体器官，而忽视了作为一个完整的人的他/她），让我们得以看清“康德中的萨德”之轮廓的关键线索在于康德将感情与道德律之间的关系概念化的方式。
  
  B. 如果我们为它而将「跟情境有关的证据」撇开不管（康德对婚姻的定义：“两个异性的成年人之间，订立的关于相互使用对方性器官的契约。这个定义难道不是臭名昭著、十足萨德式吗？因为它将作为主体性伴侣的大他者/大彼者（the Other），降格成了一个部分对象/部分客体（partial object），一个他的/她的能够提供快感的身体器官，而忽视了作为一个完整的人的他/她）。让我们得以看清， “康德中的萨德”之轮廓的这个重要的线索，在于康德用什么方式，将感情与道德律之间的关系概念化。
  
  
  雄伯注：
  If we put aside the body of "circumstantial evidence" for it 的it，指着前面的ethical （sexual） passion 伦理（性） 激情，若是将身体撇开一边，来谈论伦理（性） 激情，而且所谓的身体，加上"circumstantial evidence" 「跟情境有关的证据」。这样的身体是怎样的身体？ 这样的性是怎样的性？撇开身体来谈性，等于是跟柏拉图式的恋爱不谋而合。这颠覆了我以前对萨德的印象.
  
  Although Kant insists on the absolute gap between pathological sentiments and the pure form of moral Law, there is one a priori sentiment that the subject necessarily experiences when confronted with the injunction of the moral Law, the pain of humiliation (because of man's hurt pride, due to the "radical Evil" of human nature);
  
  A. 尽管康德坚持病态情感与道德律的纯粹形式之间的绝对间距，但仍有一种主体在面对道德律的强制命令与受辱的痛苦时（由于人类本性的“极端邪恶”所导致的人的尊严的受损）必然会体验到的先验情感；
  
  B. 尽管康德坚持，不受经验沾染的情感，与道德法则的纯粹形式之间，会有绝对间距。但仍有一种主体在面对道德律的强制命令时，必然会体验到的先验情感，那就是受辱的痛苦，（由于人类本性的“极端邪恶”所导致的人的尊严的受损）；
  
  雄伯注：
  there is one a priori sentiment that the subject necessarily experiences when confronted with the injunction of the moral Law, the pain of humiliation
  
  在这个句子里，that the subject necessarily experiences是形容词子句，修饰前面的a priori sentiment
  先验的情感，when （the subject is）confronted with the injunction of the moral Law 是表时间的分词片语，曖昧的是the pain of humiliation羞辱的痛苦，是a priori sentiment 或是 the injunction of the moral Law,的同位语？A译加上一个「与」字，显然是与「道德律的强制命令」对等，B译则认为是「必然会体验到的先验情感」的同位语。
  
  （because of man's hurt pride, due to the "radical Evil" of human nature); （由于人类本性的“极端邪恶”所导致的人的尊严的受损）
  括弧里的，有两个因为（because of，due to） ，可是中间并没有and，也就是彼此并不是对等，而是后者「人类本性的“极端邪恶」”作为man’s hurt pride人的尊严的受损的原因，而man’s hurt pride 人的尊严的受损则是, the pain of humiliation受辱的痛苦的原因。
  
  那总源头就是「人类本性的“极端邪恶」 the "radical Evil" of human nature); 也就是说，齐泽克认为康德的人性观点是：人类本性具有「激端邪恶」radical Evil。那康德对于这个「激端邪恶」，持怎样的见解？
  
  我在网络下载到一段诠释，颇有参考价值。
  
  In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant discusses the concept of radical evil. The German word “radikal” derives from the Latin word “rādīx,” which means “root” (“Wurzel”), “origin” (“Ursprung”), and “source” (“Quelle”) (Kluge 664). Therefore, when Kant explains the nature of radical evil, he also tries to enquire into “the origin of moral evil” (Religion 35). Kant observes that “the source of evil . . . can lie only in a rule made by the will for the use of its freedom, that is, in a maxim” (17). In Critique of Practical Reason, Kant makes a similar statement which echoes this observation. He writes that “the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law . . . but only . . . after it and by means of it” (54). Therefore, in order to grasp the concept of evil, one has to understand the struggle in “a pathologically affected” human will, namely, the “conflict of maxims with the practical laws cognized by himself”
  
  在「仅是理性的限制内的宗教」，康德讨论极端邪恶的观念。德文字「极端」来自拉丁字，意思是「根源」「起源」「来源」。因此，当康德解释极端邪恶的特性，他也设法探究「道德邪恶的起源」。康德观察到，「邪恶的来源仅会是在意志为了使用它的自由，而造成的习性，也就是说，个人行为的习性。」在「实践理性批判」，康德做同样的陈述，跟这个观察共鸣。他写到：「善恶的观念一定不要在道德法则前面决定，而是要在它之后，及凭借它。」因此，为了理解邪恶的观念， 我们必须了解这个奋斗，在一个「受到经验沾染」的人类的意志，也就是说，「由他自己所认知的实践法则的个人习性的冲突。」
  
  
  for Lacan, this Kantian privileging of pain as the only a priori sentiment is strictly correlative to Sade's notion of pain (torturing and humiliating the other, being tortured and humiliated by him) as the privileged way of access to sexual jouissance (Sade's argument, of course, is that pain is to be given priority over pleasure on account of its greater longevity-pleasures are passing, while pain can last almost indefinitely).
  
  A. 对拉康而言，这在康德哲学中仅仅作为一种先验情感而保持流行的痛苦是与萨德作为通向性享乐/性快感（sexual jouissance）的主要途径的痛苦概念（折磨并屈辱另一个人，被他折磨并屈辱）严格相关的（萨德的观点当然是：由于快感更为强烈的长期愉悦正在消褪，而痛苦几乎可以无限地延续，因此痛苦便被给予了相对于快感的优先性）。
  B. 对拉康而言，康德将痛苦视为具有特权，作为仅有的一种先验情感，与萨德作的痛苦观念（折磨并屈辱另一个人，被他折磨并屈辱），为通向性享乐/性快感（sexual jouissance）的特权方式息息相关，（当然，萨德的论点是：痛苦应该被给予胜过欢乐的优先地位，因为痛苦的时间较长—欢乐一下子就过去，而痛苦能够无止尽地延续下去。
  C.
  雄伯注：
  the only a priori sentiment is
  only 在这里是形容词，而不是副词，故应翻译为「仅有的一种先验情感」，而非「仅仅作为一种先验情感」
  痛苦的快感胜过于欢乐，用来解释性的虐待狂及自虐狂，倒是蛮能自圆其说。
  
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  2011-10-10 16:46:40 springhero

  齐泽克：康德即萨德 02
  
  译者A：H•弗拉齐/H•Frlazi
  译者B: 雄伯 Springhero
  
  This link can be further substantiated by what Lacan calls the Sadean fundamental fantasy: the fantasy of another, ethereal body of the victim, which can be tortured indefinitely and nonetheless magically retains its beauty (see the standard Sadean figure of a young girl sustaining endless humiliations and mutilations from her deprived torturer and somehow mysteriously surviving it all intact, in the same way Tom and Jerry and other cartoon heroes survive all their ridiculous ordeals intact).
  
  A. 这个联系可以通过拉康称作萨德式的基本幻像来得到进一步的证明：一个可以被无止境地折磨下去
  但仍会神奇地保持其美丽的幽灵般的受害者幻像（见一个标准的萨德式的少女形象，她忍受着来自她贫苦的（deprived）施虐者的无尽屈辱与残害但却神奇般地安然无恙地存活了下来，汤姆与杰瑞以及其他的卡通英雄以同样的方式在他们荒谬的困境中安然无恙地存活了下来。
  
  B. 这个联系可以得到进一步的证明, 通过拉康称作萨德式的基本幻像,：受害者保有另一个幽灵般的身体的幻象。这个幽灵般的身体能够被无止境地折磨下去，但仍会神奇地保持它的美丽，,（请参照一个标准的萨德式的少女形象，她忍受着来自她堕落的施虐者的无尽屈辱与残害,，但却神奇般地安然无恙地渡过这样的折磨保持美丽。 就像汤姆与杰瑞以及其他的卡通人物，经历他们荒谬的考验,，安然无恙地存活了下来。
  C.
  雄伯注：
  the fantasy of another, ethereal body of the victim, which can be tortured indefinitely and nonetheless magically retains its beauty
  这个句子的which，指的是another，ethereal body，（另一个幽灵般的身体），而不是「受害者」
  
  Depraved torturer ，A 译为「贫苦的施虐者」，颇为怪异，因为上下文跟「贫苦」无关，而比较近乎「堕落的」
  
  Doesn't this fantasy provide the libidinal foundation of the Kantian postulate of the immortality of the soul endlessly striving to achieve ethical perfection： that is，jis not the phantasmic "truth" of the immortality of the soul its exact opposite, the immortality of the body, its ability to sustain endless pain and humiliation?
  
  A. 这难道没有为康德对灵魂无止境地追求伦理完善之实现的不朽，即不是恰好与灵魂相对的身体的不朽 ——它忍受无尽的痛苦与屈辱的能力——的虚幻“真相/真理（truth）”的假设提供一个力比多基础吗？
  
  B.这个幻见，难道不是提供力比多的基础，给康德的假设：灵魂的不朽永无止尽地设法获得伦理的完美，换句话说，灵魂的不朽的幻见的「真理」，不就是它的恰恰相反之物，身体的不朽， 身体有能力承受无止尽带痛苦与羞辱？
  
  Judith Butler pointed out that the Foucaultian "body" as the site of resistance is none other than the Freudian "psyche": paradoxically, "body" is Foucault's name for the psychic apparatus insofar as it resists the soul's domination.
  
  A. 朱迪斯•巴特勒（Judith Butler）指出福柯理论中作为抵抗场所的“身体”指的正是弗洛伊德的“精神（psyche）”：悖反性地，福柯将精神结构命名为“身体”只是就它抵制灵魂的统治而言的。
  
  B. 朱迪斯•巴特勒（Judith Butler）指出，福柯理论中，作为抵抗场域的“身体”，道道地地正是弗洛伊德的“精神（psyche）”：矛盾的是，「身体」是福柯对精神结构的命名，因为身体抗拒灵魂的统治。
  
  That is to say, when, in his well-known definition of the soul as the "prison of the body," Foucault turns around the standard Platonic-Christian definition of the body as the "prison of the soul," what he calls "body" is not simply the biological body, but is effectively already caught into some kind of pre-subjective psychic apparatus. [6]
  
  A. 这就是说，在他广为人知的灵魂是“身体的监狱”的定义中，福柯颠倒了柏拉图—基督教的身体是“灵魂的监狱”的标准定义，他所说的“身体”不仅仅是生物学意义上的身体，而实际上已经被吸收进了某种前主体性的精神结构当中。
  
  B. 这就是说，在他广为人知的定义：灵魂是“身体的监狱”，福柯颠倒了柏拉图—基督教的标准定义：身体是“灵魂的监狱”。 他所谓的“身体”，不仅仅是生物学意义上的身体，而实际上已经被吸收进了某种前主体性的精神结构当中。
  
  Consequently, don't we encounter in Kant a secret homologous inversion, only in the opposite direction, of the relationship between body and soul: what Kant calls "immortality of the soul" is effectively the immortality of the other, ethereal, "undead" body?
  
  A. 因此，我们难道没有在康德那里遭遇到一个仅仅是朝向相反方向的，隐秘的同源倒置——它是关于身体与灵魂的关系的：康德所说的“灵魂的不朽”实际上是另一个幽灵般的、“不死的”身体的不朽？
  
  C. 因此，我们难道没有在康德那里，遭遇到身体与灵魂的关系的一个秘密的倒转，只是方向相反：康德所说的“灵魂的不朽,”实际上是另一个幽灵般的、“不死的”身体的不朽？
  
  雄伯注：
  齐泽克将灵魂的永恒，转接到身体的永恒，说得蛮费解。 我从一位现代学者Lorenzo Chiesa 的一本论著Subjectivity and Otherness，看到比较浅白的诠释。在此作为参照。
  
  The fundamental fantasy of Sade’s novels can easily be identified with the infliction of eternal suffering on the other body : conversely, in order to endure eternal suffering, the body of the victim must be made eternal. Most importantly, according to Sade, the immortality of the suffering body is the immortality of Nature.
  
  萨德小说的基本幻见，我们很容易用来认同：被赋加在另外一个人身上的永恒的痛苦；相反地， 为了要忍受永恒的痛苦， 我们必须要让受害者的身体成为永恒。
  
  另外在Sade 的一本小说：「床上哲学」 “ Philosophy in the Bedroom”，里面有这么一段话，说的更白：
  
  Eugénie, fuck, my angel; your body is your own, yours alone; in all the world ... the madness to hope for immortality? Why, then, 'tis by fucking, my dear, ...... absurd then to maintain cruelty is a consequence of depravity. I ...
  尤吉尼，做爱吧， 我的天使， 你的身体是你自己的，仅是属于你自己，在全世界上，你急切想要获得永恒吗？那就用做爱来获的永恒，亲爱的， 要以残酷来作为堕落的结果是荒谬的…
  
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  2011-10-10 20:34:09 springhero

  齐泽克：康德即萨德 02
  
  译者A：H•弗拉齐/H•Frlazi
  译者B: 雄伯 Springhero
  
  It's via this central role of pain in the subject's ethical experience that Lacan introduces the difference between the "subject of the enunciation" (the subject who utters a statement) and the "subject of the enunciated (statement)" (the symbolic identity the subject assumes within and via his statement):
  
  A. 正是通过痛苦在伦理体验中所扮演的核心角色，拉康引入了“阐明/说出主体（subject of the enunciation）”（表达出一个陈述的主体）与“陈述主体（subject of the enunciated (statement)）”（主体在他的陈述之内并通过他的陈述而假定的象征性身份）之间的区别：
  
  B. 正是通过痛苦在生命主体的伦理经验里，所扮演的这个核心角色，拉康介绍了这个区别：“陈述主体（subject of the enunciation）是表达出一个陈述的主体，而“被陈述主体（subject of the enunciated (statement)）是主体在他的陈述之内，并通过他的陈述，而假设的象征性身份。
  
  Kant does not address the question of who is the "subject of the enunciation" of the moral Law, the agent enunciating the unconditional ethical injunction--from within his horizon, this question itself is meaningless, since the moral Law is an impersonal command "coming from nowhere," i.e. it is ultimately self-posited, autonomously assumed by the subject himself).
  
  A. 康德并未提及谁是道德律的“说出主体”的问题，行为者在他视野之内说出了这个无条件的伦理命令，而由于道德律是一个“不从任何地方而来的”非个人化的命令——也就是说，它最终是自我设定的，是被主体本身自动设定的——这个问题本身是毫无意义的。
  
  B. 康德并没有处理，谁是道德律的“表述的主体”的问题，这位行为者，表述了这个无条件的伦理命令---从他的视野之内，这个问题本身是无意义的，因为道德律是一个“从虚无之境而来的”非个人化的命令—也就是说，它最终是自我设定的，是被主体本身自动设定的。
  
  Via the reference to Sade, Lacan reads absence in Kant as an act of rendering invisible, of "repressing," the moral Law's enunciator, and it is Sade who renders it visible in the figure of the "sadist" executioner-torturer-this executioner is the enunciator of the moral Law, the agent who finds pleasure in our (the moral subject's) pain and humiliation.
  
  A. 通过对萨德的参照，拉康将缺场作为一种不可见的呈现行动——对道德律的发出者（enunciator）的压抑——记入到康德之中，而正是萨德在“虐待狂的”行刑者—虐待者——这个行刑者是道德律的发出者以及在我们的（道德主体的）痛苦与屈辱之中的快感发现者——的形象中将其呈现为可见的。
  B. 通过对萨德的参照，拉康将康德的缺场，作为一种把道德律的表述者（enunciator），隐藏不见的行为，也就是一种「潜抑」德律的表述者的行为。而让道德律的表述者显现出来的，正是萨德，以虐待狂的”行刑者兼虐待者得形象——这个行刑者就是道德律的表述者，这位行为者，他在我们的（道德主体的）痛苦与屈辱之中，找到欢乐。
  
  Via the reference to Sade, Lacan reads absence in Kant as an act of rendering invisible, of "repressing," the moral Law's enunciator,
  在这个句子里，rendering 的受词是 the moral Law's enunciator,
  Of rendering the moral law’s enunciator invisible，与 repressing the moral law’s enunciator 是对称的介系片语
  
  it is Sade who renders it visible in the figure of the "sadist" executioner-torturer-
  在这个句子里， 第一个it 是it is…who 的强调语气，第二个it 指前面的the moral law’s enunciator
  
  A counterargument offers itself here with apparent self-evidence: isn't all this utter nonsense, since, in Sade, the element that occupies the place of the unconditional injunction, the maxim the subject has to follow categorically, is no longer the Kantian universal ethical command Do your duty! but its most radical opposite, the injunction to follow to their utmost limit the thoroughly pathological, contingent caprices that bring you pleasure, ruthlessly reducing all your fellow humans to the instruments of your pleasure?
  
  A. 一个反驳以其显著的自明性将其自身呈现了出来：难道所有这类说出的不都是废话吗——由于在萨德那里，占据无条件命令的位置的元素，主体必须无条件听从的格言已不再是康德式的普遍伦理命令“履行你的义务！”而是它激进的对立面，即去追随能够给你带来快感的完全病态的、偶然的狂想的极限，并冷酷无情地把你所有的人类同胞都降为为你提供快感的工具？
  
  B. 一个反驳以其显著的不证自明，将其自身呈现了出来：难道所有这些，不都全部是废话吗？—由于在萨德那里，占据无条件命令的位置的元素，范畴上主体必须听从的习性，已不再是康德式的普遍伦理命令，“履行你的义务！”而是它激进的对立面，也就是，将这个完全不受经验染污的随興念头，贯彻到底。这些随興的念头带给你欢乐，毫无容情地将你所有的同胞，都当作是你欢乐的工具。
  
  雄伯注：
  Maxim 在这里的意思不是「格言」而是「个人的行为习性」Rule of personal conduct
  Categorically 范畴上
  这个句子很长，很容易看错。整个句子的问号，放在最后，是哪个句子是疑问句？
  isn't all this utter nonsense？
  since, in Sade, the element that occupies the place of the unconditional injunction, the maxim the subject has to follow categorically, is no longer the Kantian universal ethical command Do your duty! but its most radical opposite, the injunction to follow to their utmost limit the thoroughly pathological, contingent caprices that bring you pleasure, ruthlessly reducing all your fellow humans to the instruments of your pleasure?
  
  since引导的是副词子句，表原因，that occupies the place of the unconditional injunction, 是形容词子句，修饰the element ，the subject has to follow categorically也是形容词子句，修饰the maxim，
  the maxim 是the element 的同位语， is 的主词是the element。 the injunction 是its most radical opposite 的同位语，follow 的的受词是the thoroughly pathological, contingent caprices t，另外，that bring you pleasure, ruthlessly reducing all your fellow humans to the instruments of your pleasure是形容词子句，修饰前面的caprices
  
  
  However, it is crucial to perceive the solidarity between this feature and the emergence of the figure of the "sadist" torturer-executioner as the effective "subject of the enunciation" of the universal ethical statement-command.
  
  A. 然而，理解这种特征与以“虐待狂的”折磨者—行刑者的形象出现的，作为普遍的伦理陈述—命令的真正“阐明/陈述主体”之间的联结是至关重要的。
  
  B. 然而，要感受到，这个特征与这个「虐待狂的」折磨者兼行刑者的形象的出现之间，具有一致性，是至关重要的。因为后者充当普遍的伦理陈述及命令的实际执行的“陈述主体”。
  
  雄伯注：
  Effective 的定义「实际执行」Able to accomplish a purpose; functioning effectively
  Solidarity 一致性
  
  The Sadean move from Kantian Respect-to-Blasphemy, i.e. from respecting the Other (fellow being), his freedom and autonomy, and always treating him also as an end-in-itself, to reducing all Others precisely to mere dispensable instruments to be ruthlessly exploited, is strictly correlative to the fact that the "subject of the enunciation" of the Moral Injunction, invisible in Kant, assumes the concrete features of the Sadean executioner.
  
  A. 从康德主义到萨德主义——从尊重到亵渎，也就是说，从对大他者/大彼者的自由与自主的尊重，并总是把他当做目的本身对待，到把所有的大他者/大彼者全都降为仅仅是可被无情剥削的、无关轻重的工具，是与在康德那里隐而未现的道德命令的“阐明/说出主体”扮演了萨德式行刑者的具体形象这一事实严格相关的。
  
  B. 萨德的这个动作，从康德的「尊敬」，转移成为「亵渎」，也就是从尊敬大它者(同胞)，他的自由与自主权，总是尊敬他作为目的本身，到将所有的大它者，确实沦落到仅是能够被利用及用完即丟的工具，这个动作跟这个事实息息相关：道德命令的「表述的主体」，在康德那里隐而不见，现在则是扮演起萨德的行刑者的具体特征。
  
  雄伯注：
  齐泽克在这里建大它者加个括弧为「同胞」the Other ( fellow being )。也就是是大它者未必是神或佛，而是跟我们来往的同胞，都可能成为我们的大它者。当然，基本的条件是我们尊敬他，作为目的本身，尊敬他的自由与自主权。一旦沦落到将他视为「是能够被利用及用完即丟的工具」，那就成为拉康所说的「小客体」，而不是大它者了。
  
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  2011-10-11 05:06:30 springhero

  齐泽克：康德即萨德 04
  
  译者A：H•弗拉齐/H•Frlazi
  译者B: 雄伯 Springhero
  
  
  
  
  The exemplary case of the "pathological," contingent element elevated to the status of an unconditional demand is, of course, an artist absolutely identified with his artistic mission, pursuing it freely without any guilt, as an inner constraint, unable to survive without it.
  
  A. 病态的、偶然的元素被提升到一个无条件的要求之高度的专案当然就是一位艺术家完全地认同于自身的艺术使命，将其视为一种内在强制而毫无罪恶感地对它展开自由的追求，（并且）没有它便活不下去。
  
  B. 「不受经验沾染的」、偶然的元素，被提升到一个无条件的要求之地位，最典型的例子，当然就是，一位艺术家完全地认同于自身的艺术使命，将其视为一种内在强制，而毫无罪恶感地，对它展开自由的追求，（并且）没有它便活不下去。
  
  The sad fate of Jacqueline du Pré confronts us with the feminine version of the split between the unconditional injunction and its obverse, the serial universality of indifferent empirical objects that must be sacrificed in the pursuit of one's Mission.
  
  A. 杰奎琳•杜朴蕾（Jacqueline du Pré）的悲惨命运让我们面对了在无条件命令及其对立面——必须在一个人的使命中被牺牲掉的一系列无关紧要的实证对象——的分裂的女性版本。
  
  B. 杰奎琳•杜朴蕾（Jacqueline du Pré）的悲惨命运，让我们面对在无条件命令，及其对立面的分裂的女性版本—在追求一个人的使命中，一系列无关紧要的实证对象必须被牺牲。
  
  [8] (It is extremely interesting and productive to read du Pré's life story not as a "real story," but as a mythical narrative: what is so surprising about it is how closely it follows the preordained contours of a family myth, the same as with the story of Kaspar Hauser, in which individual accidents uncannily reproduce familiar features from ancient myths.)
  
  A. [8]（将杜朴蕾的人生故事不当做一个“真的故事”而当做一个虚构的故事来读是非常有意思和有益处的：它让人惊讶的地方是它是如此紧密地续接了一个家庭神话的先定轮廓，就像卡斯帕尔•豪泽（Kaspar Hauser）的故事一样——其中个别的事故从古代神话中神秘地复现了类似的场面。）
  
  B. [8]（将杜朴蕾的人生故事，不当做一个“真实故事”，而当做一个神秘的描述来读，是非常有意思和有益处的：它让人惊讶的地方，是它是如此紧密地续接了一个家庭神话的先定轮廓。就像卡斯帕尔•豪泽（Kaspar Hauser）的故事，在这个故事里，个别的事故从古代神话中，神秘地复现了类似的特征。）
  
  Du Pré's unconditional injunction, her drive, her absolute passion was her art (when she was 4 years old, upon seeing someone playing a cello, she already immediately claimed that this is what she wanted to be...).
  
  A. 杜朴蕾的无条件命令，她的内驱力/冲动（drive），她的绝对热情是她的艺术（在她四岁看见某人演奏大提琴时，她就已经直接宣称这就是她想要成为的了……）。
  
  B. 杜朴蕾的无条件命令，她的内驱力/冲动（drive），她的绝对热情，是她的艺术（在她四岁看见某人演奏大提琴时，她就已经直接宣称，这就是她想要成为的了……）。
  
  This elevation of her art to the unconditional relegated her love life to a series of encounters with men who were ultimately all substitutable, one as good as the other-she was reported to be a serial "man eater."
  
  A. 将她的艺术提升为无条件的（举动）使得她的爱情生活降为与一系列最终都是可替代的男人——几乎每个都一样——的遭遇——她也被传为一个连续的“男人吞食者”。
  
  B. 将她的艺术提升为无条件的（举动），使得她的爱情生活，降为与一系列的邂逅：男人最终都是可替代的—男人都是大同小异——传说她是一个连续的“吃男人者”。
  
  She thus occupied the place usually reserved for the MALE artist-no wonder her long tragic illness (multiple sclerosis, from which she was painfully dying from 1973 to 1987) was perceived by her mother as an "answer of the real," as divine punishment not only for her promiscuous sexual life, but also for her "excessive" commitment to her art...
  
  A. 因此她占据了通常是留给男性艺术家的位置——难怪她长期的悲惨疾病（她从1973到1987年间一直痛苦地忍受着并因之而死去的多发性硬化症）会被他的母亲理解为一个“现实的/实在的（real）的回应”，一个上天不仅仅是对她的性滥交，也是对她对艺术的过度献身的惩罚……
  
  B. 因此她占据了通常是留给男性艺术家的位置—难怪她长期的悲惨疾病，（多发性硬化症，从1973到1987年间，她因为这个病痛，她逐渐痛苦而死，）她被他的母亲理解为一个“真实界的（real）的报应”，一个上天道惩罚，不仅仅是对她的性滥交，也是对她对艺术的「过度」献身……
  
  雄伯注：
  性滥交，我们可能不敢苟同。对艺术的「过度」献身，我们文明不仅较能理解，甚至是赞赏。梵谷，高更等画家，不都也是如此？
  
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  2011-10-11 21:25:31 springhero

  齐泽克：康德即萨德 04
  
  译者A：H•弗拉齐/H•Frlazi
  译者B: 雄伯 Springhero
  
  This, however, is not the whole story. The decisive question is: is the Kantian moral Law translatable into the Freudian notion of superego or not? If the answer is yes, then "Kant with Sade" effectively means that Sade is the truth of the Kantian ethics.
  
  A. 然而，这不是故事的全部。具有决定性意义的问题是：康德的道德律是否可以被翻译为弗洛伊德的超我概念？如果答案是肯定的，那么“康德与萨德”实际上意味着萨德就是康德伦理学的真相/真理。
  
  B. 然而，这不是故事的全部。具有决定性意义的问题是：康德的道德律是否可以被翻译为弗洛伊德的超我概念？如果答案是肯定的，那么“康德与萨德”实际上意味着,萨德就是康德伦理学的真相/真理。
  
  If, however, the Kantian moral Law cannot be identified with superego (since, as Lacan himself puts it in the last pages of The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, moral Law is equivalent to desire itself, while superego precisely feeds on the subject's compromising his/her desire, i.e. the guilt sustained by the superego bears witness to the fact that the subject has somewhere betrayed or compromised his/her desire), [9] then Sade is not the entire truth of Kantian ethics, but a form of its perverted realization. In short, far from being "more radical than Kant," Sade articulates what happens when the subject betrays the true stringency of the Kantian ethics.
  
  A. 然而，如果康德的道德律不能被认同为超我的话（正由于像拉康自己将其放到《精神分析学的四个基本概念》的最后几页那样，道德律是与欲望本身等同的，而超我仅仅是利用了主体对他/她欲望的妥协，也就是说，由超我所维持的罪恶感将为主体对/他她的欲望的背叛或妥协的事实作证），[9]这样萨德便不是康德伦理学的全部真相/真理，而是它的一种病态的实现形式。简言之，远非“比康德更为激进”，萨德道出了主体在背叛康德伦理学的真实严厉性时究竟会发生什么。
  
  B. 然而，如果康德的道德律不能被认同为超我的话（正由于像拉康自己将其放到《精神分析学的四个基本概念》的最后几页那样，道德律是与欲望本身等同的，而超我仅仅是利用了主体对他/她欲望的妥协，也就是说，由超我所维持的罪恶感,见证了这个事实: 主体对背叛他她的欲望，或妥协他/她的欲望），[9]这样，萨德便不是康德伦理学的全部真相/真理，而是它的病态的实现的7一种形式。简言之，根本没有“比康德更为激进”，萨德道出了，主体在背叛康德伦理学的真实严厉性时，究竟会发生什么。
  
  Sade is thus the truth of Kant in so far as we interpret the Kantian ethical imperative as an objectivized apparatus establishing what our duty is ( so that we can use it as an excuse: “ What can I do, the categorical imperative tells me this is my duty!) ; however, in soar as duty itself cannot serve as an excuse to do one’s duty, Sade ( the sadist perversion ) is no longer the truth of Kantian ethics.
  
  A. 漏译
  B. 萨德因此是康德的真理，因为我们解释康德的伦理学的命令，作为一个客体化的工具，证实我们的责任是什么 （所以，我们能够使用它作为一种藉口： 「我能怎么办？范畴的命令告诉我，这是我的责任！ 」）可是， 因为责任本身无法充当尽到责任的藉口，萨德 （这个虐待狂顶变态）不再是康德伦理学的真理。
  
  This difference is crucial in its political consequences: insofar as the libidinal structure of "totalitarian" regimes is perverse (the totalitarian subject assumes the position of the object-instrument of the Other's jouissance), "Sade as the truth of Kant" would mean that Kantian ethics effectively harbors totalitarian potentials; however, insofar as we conceive of Kantian ethics as precisely prohibiting the subject to assume the position of the object-instrument of Other's jouissance, i.e. to calling on him to assume full responsibility for what he proclaims his Duty, then Kant is the antitotalitarian par excellence...
  
  A. 这个区别在其政治上的后果中是很关键的：只要极权主义政体的力比多结构是变态的（极权主义的主体 占据了大他者/大彼者快感/享乐(jouissance)的对象—工具的位置），“作为康德之真相/真理的萨德”就意味着康德伦理学实际上蕴藏了极权主义的潜势；然而，只要我们将康德伦理学设想为是禁止主体占据大他者/大彼者快感/享乐的对象—工具的位置的，也就是说要求他承担起对他所宣布的义务的全部责任，那么康德就是最卓越的反极权主义者。
  
  B. 这个区别在其政治上的后果中，是很关键的：只要极权主义政体的力比多结构是变态的，（极权主义的主体 担任了作为大他者/大彼者快感/享乐(jouissance)的客体工具的位置），“作为康德之真理的萨德，”就意味着，康德伦理学实际上蕴藏了极权主义的潜势；然而，只要我们将康德伦理学设想为是禁止主体，担任大他者/大彼者快感/享乐的客体工具的位置的，也就是说要求他承担起，他所宣布的责任的全部责任，那么康德就是最卓越的反极权主义者。
  
  And the same goes also for Freud himself: the dream about Irma's injection that Freud used as the exemplary case to illustrate his procedure of analyzing dreams is a dream about responsibility-(Freud's own responsibility for the failure of his treatment of Irma)-this fact alone indicates that responsibility is a crucial Freudian notion.
  
  A. 弗洛伊德用来说明其释梦程序的专案——伊玛注射之梦——是一个与责任有关的梦——（弗洛伊德自己对治疗伊玛失败的责任）——单单这一事实就足以说明责任是一个关键的弗洛伊德主义的概念。
  
  C. 同样的道理也适用于弗洛伊德本人：弗洛伊德用来说明其释梦程序的典范个案——伊玛注射之梦——是一个与责任有关的梦—（弗洛伊德自己对治疗伊玛失败的责任）—单单这一事实，就足以说明，责任是一个关键的弗洛伊德主义的概念
  
  But how are we to conceive it? How are we to avoid the usual trap of the mauvaise foi of the Sartrean subject responsible for his existential project, i.e. of the existentialist motif of ontological guilt that pertains to the finite human existence as such, as well as the opposite trap of "putting the blame on the Other" ("since the Unconscious is the discourse of the Other, I am not responsible for its formations, it is the big Other who speaks through me, I am merely its instrument...")?
  A. 但我们该如何设想？我们该如何避免对其存在计划负责的萨特式主体——也就是说，存在主义关于与有限人类的存在本身有关的本体论罪行的核心思想——的常见的自欺陷阱，以及“将责任归咎于大他者/大彼者”的相反陷阱（“由于无意识是大他者/大彼者的辞说/话语（discourse），因此我对它的形成并不负有责任，是大他者/大彼者通过我在讲，我仅仅是它的工具而已……”）？
  
  B. 但我们该如何设想它？我们该如何避免，萨特式主体「坏信仰」的通常陷阱：生命主体要为他的生命实存的计划负责，也就是说，存在主义的主题是：人作为有限生命的存在，本质上具有本体的罪恶感。另外还有一个陷阱是：“将责任归咎于大他者/大彼者”（“由于无意识是大他者/大彼者的辞说/话语（discourse），因此我对它的形成，并不负有责任，是大他者/大彼者通过我在讲话，我仅仅是它的工具而已……”）
  
  
  Lacan himself pointed the way out of this deadlock by referring to Kant's philosophy as the crucial antecedent of the psychoanalytic ethics of the duty "beyond the Good".
  
  A. 拉康本人通过参照作为精神分析伦理学“超越善”的义务之重要先例的康德哲学而指明了走出这一僵局的道路。
  B. 拉康本人指明了走出这一僵局的道路。我们要藉由康德的哲学，将超越善”的责任，作为精神分析伦理学的之重要先例。
  
  According to the standard pseudo-Hegelian critique, the Kantian universalist ethic of the categorical imperative fails to take into account the concrete historical situation in which the subject is embedded, and which provides the determinate content of the Good: what eludes Kantian formalism is the historically specified particular Substance of ethical life.
  
  A. 根据标准的伪黑格尔式的批判，康德关于绝对律令的普遍主义者伦理未能考虑主体置身于其中的具体历史环境，并且善的确定内容也是由其提供的：规避康德的形式主义的是由历史性所指定的伦理生活的特殊实体/本体（Substance）。
  
  B. 根据标准的伪黑格尔式的批判，康德关于范畴命令的普遍主义者的伦理，并没有考虑到，主体置身于其中的具体历史环境。这个环境供应善的决定内容。令康德的形式主义感到困惑的是，伦理生命由历史性所指定的特殊物质（Substance）。
  
  However, this reproach can be countered by claiming that the unique strength of Kant's ethics resides in this very formal indeterminacy: moral Law does not tell me what my duty is, it merely tells me that I should accomplish my duty, i.e. it is not possible to derive the concrete norms I have to follow in my specific situation from the moral Law itself-which means that the subject himself has to assume the responsibility of "translating" the abstract injunction of the moral Law into a series of concrete obligations.
  
  A. 这一指责可以被康德伦理学的独特力量（正是）寓居于这种形式的不确定性之中的主张所反驳：道德律并没有告诉我我的义务是什么，它只是告诉我应该尽自己的义务，也就是说，不可能从道德律本身得到我在特殊条件下必须遵从的具体标准——它意味着主体本身必须承担起将道德律的抽象命令“翻译”为一系列具体义务的责任。
  
  B. 可是，我们能够反驳这个指责，以宣称说：康德伦理学的独特力量，就在于这种形式的不确定性：道德律并没有告诉我，我的责任是什么，它只是告诉，我应该尽自己的责任。也就是说，不可能从道德律本身，得到我在特殊条件下，必须遵从的具体标准——它意味着，主体本身必须承担起这个责任：将道德律的抽象命令，“翻译”为一系列具体的责任。
  
  In this precise sense, one is tempted to risk a parallel with Kant's Critique of Judgement: the concrete formulation of a determinate ethical obligation has the structure of aesthetic judgement, ---that is ，of a judgement by which, instead of simply applying a universal category to a particular object or of subsuming this object under an already given universal determination, I. as it were， invent its universal-necessary-obligatory dimension and thereby elevate this particular-contingent object (act) to the dignity of the ethical Thing.
  
  A. 在这一精确的意义上，一个人会被诱惑着去冒与康德的《判断力批判》做比较的险：对一个确定的伦理义务的明确表达具有审美判断力的结构——也就是说，这个判断力不是仅仅将一个普遍的种类应用到一个特殊对象身上或将这个对象纳入到一个已经被给定的普遍确定之中，而是通过它，可是说是我创造了其普遍的—必要的—义务的维度，并因此将这个特殊—偶然的对象（行动）提升到伦理之物（ethical Thing）的尊严（的高度）。
  
  B. 在这一明确的意义上，我们会被诱惑，去冒险与康德的《判断力批判》相提并论：一个确定的伦理义务的明确表达，具有审美判断力的结构。也就是说，根据这个判断力，我们并没有将一个普遍的范畴，应用到一个特殊的客体身上，或将这个客体，纳入到一个已经被给定的普遍性确定之中。 而是所谓的「我」，创造了它的普遍的—必要的—义务的维度，并因此将这个特殊—偶然的客体，提升到伦理真实界（ethical Thing）的尊严。
  
  雄伯注：
  instead of 是意思是「并没有」，而不是「不是仅仅」。
  Ethical Thing 的 Thing 从弗洛伊德 到拉康，都是指「真实界」或「无意识界」
  
  So there is always something sublime about pronouncing a judgement that defines our duty: in it, I "elevate an object to the dignity of the Thing" (Lacan's definition of sublimation).
  
  A. 因此，总有某种崇高的东西与宣布一个界定我们义务的判断有关：在它之中，我“将一个对象提升到了物（Thing）的尊严（的高度）”（拉康对升华的定义）。
  B. 因此，宣布定义我们的责任的判断时，总是会有有某个昇华的东西：在这个昇华的东西里，我“将一个客体提升到了真实界（Thing）的尊严”（这是拉康对昇华的定义）。
  
  雄伯注：
  in it, 的it， 指的是something sublime 某个昇华的东西。
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  

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  2011-10-11 21:44:39 Herr.Nos (敦兮其若朴，旷兮其若谷！)

  it is not Kant who was a closet sadist, it is Sade who is a closet Kantian.
  
  这句话我的翻译：不是说康德在私下里是一个萨德主义者（施虐狂），而是说萨德在暗地里是一个康德主义者。

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  2011-10-12 00:35:19 Herr.Nos (敦兮其若朴，旷兮其若谷！)

  拉康的意思是说，康德式的超然道德的世界与萨德式的极端邪恶的世界其实是同一回事。这样我们就有了拉康式的《纯粹欲望批判》，因为在拉康看来，道德律或者道德法则只不过是处在纯粹状态的欲望。但是这里面仍然有一个问题，就是拉康怎么定位分析家的欲望这个位置，他先是说分析家的欲望是纯粹的欲望，后来又说分析家的欲望不纯粹，是获得绝对差异的欲望。这是不是说，当我们把萨德跟康德摆在一起的时候，我们其实也把分析家跟倒错者摆在了一起呢？毕竟两者相对于幻想的位置是极其相似的，所以拉康才说要获得绝对的差异，要拒绝担保他者的享乐，从而才说分析家的欲望不纯粹么？我自己觉得这一点很难理解，想听听大家的看法...

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  2011-10-12 16:26:11 springhero

  李新雨absolute difference
  
  it is not Kant who was a closet sadist, it is Sade who is a closet Kantian.
  
  这句话我的翻译：不是说康德在私下里是一个萨德主义者（施虐狂），而是说萨德在暗地里是一个康德主义者。
  
  拉康的意思是说，康德式的超然道德的世界与萨德式的极端邪恶的世界其实是同一回事。这样我们就有了拉康式的《纯粹欲望批判》，因为在拉康看来，道德律或者道德法则只不过是处在纯粹状态的欲望。但是这里面仍然有一个问题，就是拉康怎么定位分析家的欲望这个位置，他先是说分析家的欲望是纯粹的欲望，后来又说分析家的欲望不纯粹，是获得绝对差异的欲望。这是不是说，当我们把萨德跟康德摆在一起的时候，我们其实也把分析家跟倒错者摆在了一起呢？毕竟两者相对于幻想的位置是极其相似的，所以拉康才说要获得绝对的差异，要拒绝担保他者的享乐，从而才说分析家的欲望不纯粹么？我自己觉得这一点很难理解，想听听大家的看法...
  
  雄伯
  我从网络下载一个资讯，翻译出来，作为对你的问题的一个回答。
  
  Lacanian psychoanalytic : revolution of subjectivity p.45-46
  By Lan Parker
  
  Second, the patient subvert the relationship between agency , knowledge, and the unconscious. Lacan comments that the psychotic knows about something of language and the relation of the subject to language, knows something more than the neurotic ,something that an ordinary ‘neurotic’ subject precisely must not know in order to obtain access to and function of the symbolic.
  
  其次， 病人颠覆代理者， 知识，与无意识的关系。 拉康评论，精神病患知道语言与生命主体与语言的关系的某件东西。他比神经症患者更加知道，某件东西， 那个东西， 普通或神经症的生命主体，确实一定不要知道，为了接近及运作象征符号。
  
  Even the neurotic model subject also has to employ a mechanism as drastic as a ‘foreclosure’ in order not to know how language constitutes the perceiving subject, a mechanism which will enable what Lacan terms ‘ subjective ‘synthesis’ （ and recognition of this aspect of foreclosure opens the way to later Lacanian debates over the role of ‘generalized foreclosure’ as the condition for becoming any kind of the subject whatever）.
  
  即使是标准的神经症患者，也必须运用一种诸如「阻挡赎回」那样强烈的机制，为了不要知道，语言如何构成感觉的生命主体。这样的机制使拉康有可能称它为「生命主体的统合」（体认这个阻挡赎回的这一面， 展开了晚期拉康的争论，对于「一般性的阻挡赎回」，作为成为任何一种生命主体的条件。
  
  The analyst is thus faced with a subject who knows something about the unconscious that they, the analyst, must not know.
  
  精神分析师因此面对一个生命主体，这个生命主体知道无意识的某件东西，那是精神分析师他们一定不要知道的东西。
  
  A subject deemed retroactively to properly neurotic will come face-to-face with the nature of language and their relationship to signifiers that bear them at the end of analysis when they meet the analyst’s desire as one “ that tends in a direction that is the exact opposite of identification,” as Lacan puts it, as ‘a desire to obtain absolute difference’.
  
  被认为跟标准的神经症患者相反的生命主体， 他会面对到语言的特质，他们跟在精神分析结束时，负载他们能指的关系，当他们遇见精神分析师的欲望，作为一种欲望，朝向认同的完全的相反方向。如拉康所说的， 作为一种想要获得「绝对差异」的欲望
  
  This means acknowledging the differential work of language, the ‘absolute difference’ between signifiers and cuts into the field of signification which produces meaning, which produces a place for the subject itself to speak.
  
  这意味着，承认语言具有差异性的功作，能指与产生意义的意义领域的切入之间，会有「绝对的差异」。这个绝对的差异产生一个位置，让生命主体本身说话。
  
  The absolute difference also entails lack, for it is at the point in analysis that we could say that the analysand becomes a pure Saussurean, recognizing that in language there are only differences without positive terms and with positive fullness of intention underneath which produces the meaning—they suffer the void of being and cuts in language—and that is precisely why the rendezvous with the analyst is seen as so very different from that of a neurotic.
  
  这个绝对差异也涵盖「欠缺」，因为在精神分析的这个时刻， 我们能够说，受分析者成为一个纯净的索绪尔语言学家， 体认出： 在语言里，只有一些没有积极意义的差异， 可是底下却带有产生意义的充分的意图。他们遭受在语言里的生命实存与切入的空无的痛苦。那确实就是为什么， 他们跟精神分析师的相会，被看著跟神经症患者与精神分析师的相会，截然不同。
  
  The direction of treatment for this kind of the subject is therefore designed to recreate symbolic systems, a stable order out of nothing, rather than to dissolve them into nothing
  
  对于这种生命主体的治疗的方向，因此被设计要重新创造象征符号的系统，从空无中创造一个稳定的秩序，而不是将他们瓦解进入空无。
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  
  

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  2011-10-12 21:22:17 springhero

  Kant with Sade
  康德即萨德
  
  Jacques Lacan
  雅克、拉康
  
  This essay was to have served as a preface to Philosophy in the Bedroom. It
  was published in the journal Critique (CXCI, April 1963) as a review of the
  edition of Sade's works for which it was intended: the 15-volume set brought
  out in 1963 by Editions du Cercle du livre precieux.1
  
  这篇论文本来应该充当「床上哲学」的序言。它在「批判」杂志被刊出（ 1963年4月） 作为一篇评论萨德的一本著作。它就是为这本著作而写。 萨德全集的第15册，在1963年被出版。
  
  The notion that Sade's work anticipated Freud's—if nothing else, as a catalogue
  of the perversions—is a stupidity repeated in works of literary criticism,
  the blame for which goes, as usual, to the specialists.
  
  萨德的著作预期会有佛洛伊德的著---即使没有别的，光是作为变态狂的范畴--这个观念，在文学批评的著作里，是一再被重述的愚行，通常这种愚行都被怪罪到专家。
  
  I, on the contrary, maintain that the Sadean bedroom is of the same stature
  as those places from which the schools of ancient philosophy borrowed their
  names: Academy, Lyceum, and Stoa. Here as there, one paves the way for science
  by rectifying one's ethical position.
  
  相反的，我主张，萨德的床上哲学，跟古代哲学的学派借用的名称，诸如，学院，学园，学廊，具有相同的地位。 在此跟那里一样，我们以矫正我们的伦理立场，替智慧奠下基础。
  
  In this respect, Sade did indeed begin the groundwork that was to progress for a hundred years in the depths of taste in order for Freud's path to be passable. Add to that another sixty years before one could say why.
  
  在这一方面， 萨德确实开始这个基础工作。一百年来， 这个基础工作以深刻的品味进展，为了让佛洛伊德的途径能够被通行。 再多加六十年，我们才能说出什么.
  
  If Freud was able to enunciate his pleasure principle without even having
  to worry about indicating what distinguishes it from the function of pleasure
  in traditional ethics—without risking that it be understood, by echoing a bias
  uncontested for two thousand years, as reminiscent of the attractive notion
  that a creature is preordained for its good and of the psychology inscribed in
  different myths of benevolence—we can only credit this to the insinuating
  rise in the nineteenth century of the theme of "delight in evil" \bonheur dans
  le mal\
  
  假如佛洛伊德能够表达他的快乐原则，甚至不需要担心，它指示著跟传统伦理学的快乐的功用有所区别。而不会冒著这个危险： 它应该被理解，藉著跟一个偏见共鸣。 这个偏见，两千年来没有受到競争， 作为提醒这个迷人观念：一种生物被注定要为它自己的善而活。以及提醒被铭记在慈善的不同神话的心理学。我们仅能推崇它，作为十九世纪「欢喜与邪恶」的主题興起的反讽。
  
  Sade represents here the first step of a subversion of which Kant, as piquant as this may seem in light of the coldness of the man himself, represents the turning point—something that has never been pointed out as such, to the best of my knowledge.
  
  萨德在此代表颠覆的第一步--虽然从萨德本来的冷酷的观点来看，这似乎是够刺激--而康德则是代表这个颠覆的转捩点。据我所知， 这件事情本身从来没有被人提过。
  
  Philosophy in the Bedroom came eight years after the Critique of Practical
  Reason. If, after showing that the former is consistent with the latter, I can
  demonstrate that the former completes the latter, I shall be able to claim that
  it yields the truth of the Critique.
  
  「床上哲学」的出版，比「实践理性的批判」晚八年。假如在显示前者与后者有一致性的同时， 我能够证明， 前者完成后者， 我将能够宣称： 它产生实践理性批判的真理。
  
  As a result, the postulates with which the Critique concludes—the alibi of
  immortality in the name of which it suppresses progress, holiness, and even
  love (everything satisfying that could come from the law), and its need for a
  will to which the object that the law concerns is intelligible—losing even the
  lifeless support of the function of utility to which Kant confined them, reduce
  the work to its subversive core.
  
  结果， 实践理性批判用来作为结论的这些假设，也就是永恒的藉口--以这个永恒的名义， 它压制进步，神圣， 甚至是爱情 （ 每一样令人满意的东西，都可能从法则而来），以及它对一种意志的需要。这样跟法则有关的客体，才能让这个意志了解---它甚至丧失实用的功用的无生命的支持，康德将它们限制在实用的功用里。 这些假设将这个工作还原到它的颠覆的核心。
  
  This explains the incredible exaltation that anyone not prepared by academic piety feels upon reading it—a reaction that will not be spoiled by my having explained it.
  
  这个解释了这个不可思议的欣喜： 对于学术并没有奉献热诚的人，也想要阅读题—这一种反应不会因为我曾经解释它而破坏。
  
  One might say that the shift involved in the notion that it feels good to do evil
  [qu on soit bien dans le mal]—or, if you will, that the eternal feminine does
  not elevate us—was made on the basis of a philological remark: namely, that
  the idea that had been accepted up until then, which is that it feels good to do
  good [quon est bien dans le bien], is based on a homonymy not found in German:
  Manfilhlt sich wohl im Guten. This is how Kant introduces us to his Critique
  of Practical Reason.
  
  我们可能会说： 牵涉到「做恶是好事」的这个观念的改变---或者，假如你们愿意， 那个永恒的女性，并没有提昇我们—那个观念被形成，是根据一个语言学的论述： 也就是， 直到那时被接受的观念， 做好事让人觉得很好。 这个同名异以，在德文里并没有被找到。这就是康德的跟我们介绍「实践理性批判」的方式。
  
  The pleasure principle is the law of feeling good [bien], which is wohl in
  German and might be rendered as "well-being" [bien-etre]. In practice, this
  principle would submit the subject to the same phenomenal sequence that
  determines his objects.
  
  快乐原则是感觉好的法则。在德文称为wohl， 可以被翻译为「幸福」。实际上， 这个原则将会让生命主体承受相同的现象的连续，这些连续决定他的客体。
  
  The objection that Kant raises against this is, in accordance with his rigorous style, intrinsic. No phenomenon can lay claim to a constant relationship to pleasure. No law of feeling good can thus be enunciated that would define the subject who puts it into practice as "will."
  
  对于这一点，康德提出的反对是本质上的，为了跟他严格的风格相一致。没有一种现象会宣称跟快乐有固定的关系。 没有感觉好的法则，因此能够被表达，定义这个实践它的生命主体。
  
  The quest to feel good would thus be a dead end were it not reborn in the
  form of das Gute, the good that is the object of the moral law. Experience tells
  us that we make ourselves hear commandments inside of ourselves, the
  imperative nature of which is presented as categorical, in other words,
  unconditional.
  
  对于感觉好多追寻，因此是一种死亡的结局，假如它没有以「善」的方式重生的话。 善就是道德法则的客体。 精神分析经验告诉我们，我们让自己听到我们内心的十戒。这个十戒的命令性质， 被呈现作为范畴。 换句话说，是没有条件的无上范畴。
  
  Note that this good [bien] is assumed to be the Good [Bien] only if it presents
  itself, as I just said, in spite of all objects that would place conditions
  upon it—that is, only if it opposes any and every uncertain good that these
  objects might bring one according to some theoretical equivalence, such that
  it impresses us as superior owing to its universal value.
  
  请注意，这个善，被认为是「至上的善」，只要它呈现它自己， 如我刚刚所说的， 尽管所有的客体会赋加条件在它上面---也就是说， 只要它反对任何及每一个不确定度善， 这些客体可能会带来的善， 依照某种的理论的相等。它给我们的印象，是作为优秀，由于它的普遍性的价值。
  
  Thus the weight of the Good appears only by excluding everything the subject may suffer from due to his interest in an object, whether drive or feeling—what Kant designates, for that reason, as "pathological“
  
  
  因此， 「至上的善」的重量会出现，仅是排除生命主体可能遭受痛苦的一切， 由于他对于一个客体的興趣，无论是开车或感觉---因为那个理由，康德指明的，是一种「不受经验沾染」。
  
  We would thus find anew here the Sovereign Good of the Greeks by induction from this effect, if Kant, as is his wont, did not specify once more that this Good does not act as a counterweight but rather, so to speak, as an anti-weight—that is, as subtracting weight from the pride [amour-propre] (Selbstsucht) the subject experiences as contentment (arrogantia) in his pleasures, insofar as a look at this Good renders these pleasures less respectable.2 This is both precisely what the text says and quite suggestive.
  
  我们因此将会在此从这个影响中，找到希腊人的这个「统治的善」，假如康德，依照他的习惯，他没有再一次指明，这个「善」并没有充当一种对抗的重量。相反的， 而是作为反对的重量---也就是说， 从生命主体经验到的骄傲扣除重量， 作为他的快乐的满足，对于这个「善的注视」使得这些快乐比较不那么受到尊敬。这确实是这个文本所说的，相当具有建议性。
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  
  
  

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• 

  2011-10-12 21:59:29 Herr.Nos (敦兮其若朴，旷兮其若谷！)

  later Lacanian debates over the role of ‘generalized foreclosure’ as the condition for becoming any kind of the subject whatever
  
  这个第一次了解，原来以为forclusion主要是说精神病主体，看来这个机制在每个主体而言都是起作用的，真是要回到弗洛伊德的verwerfung...
  
  谢谢雄伯老师

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• 

  2011-10-12 22:09:25 Herr.Nos (敦兮其若朴，旷兮其若谷！)

  另外拉康也说分析家在其卷入临床的绝对命令中是一个绝对欲望的存在，这个绝对的欲望想必也就是要制作绝对差异的欲望了，这个很清楚是要避免认同的效果~

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• 

  2011-10-13 06:43:18 springhero

  Absolute injunction and desire
  
  • 2011-10-12 22:09:25 Herr.Nos (齐物方可达道，无言最是逍遥...)
  另外拉康也说分析家在其卷入临床的绝对命令中是一个绝对欲望的存在，这个绝对的欲望想必也就是要制作绝对差异的欲望了，这个很清楚是要避免认同的效果~
  
  Some reflections on the last three sessions of Lacan’s Seminar VII
  By Leonardo S. Rodríguez
  
  Over the years Lacan added precision to his conception of the analyst’s
  desire. A significant milestone of this development was his definition, at the end of Seminar XI (on the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis) of the
  analyst’s desire as the desire ‘to obtain absolute difference’, or the logical
  opposite of an identification with or idealisation of the analyst—which is the aim of psychoanalysis according to ego psychology. (Lacan 1977, 276)
  
  过去几年来， 拉康对于精神分析师的欲望的观念，补充得更明确。 这个发展的一个重要的里程碑式，在11研讨班的结尾 （ 论精神分析的四个观念），把分析师的欲望作为是「获得绝对差异」的欲望，或是跟分析师的认同与理想化，在逻辑上是相反---依照自我心理学，这个精神分析的目标。
  
  We can also inscribe in the same conception the comparison that Lacan made between the analyst and the saint, in so far as both act as a cause of desire:
  [The saint] acts as trash […] so as to embody what the structure entails,
  namely allowing the subject, the subject of the unconscious, to take him as
  the cause of the subject’s own desire. (Lacan 1990, 15)
  
  我们也能够在相同的观念里，铭记拉康所做的必较，关于分析师与圣人。 他们两者的行为，充当是「欲望的原因」。 圣人行为充当垃圾，为了具体表现这个结构所涵盖的内容。 换句话说， 容许主体， 无意识的主体， 把他当成主体欲望的原因。
  
  It is necessary that the desire of someone follow a defined orientation in order to operate as a cause of desire. If the analyst proposed to his patient any particular model or ideal as the aim to achieve in the analysis, the result would be an experience in education of variable value, but not an experience in the
  recognition of the patient’s desire, its limits and its possibilities
  
  某个人的欲望遵照一个被定义的定向是需要的， 为了要运作作为欲望的原因。 假如分析师对他的病人建议任何的模式或理想， 当著是精神分析要获得的目标， 结果在教育上，将是有各种价值的的经验，但并不是对于病人的欲望，它的极限，及它的可能性的承认的经验。
  
  ‘Limits’ and ‘possibilities’: it is pertinent to stress this point in relation to the
  analyst’s desire. The analyst’s desire cannot be conceived as impossible,
  unlimited, or infinite.
  
  「极限」及「可能性」：强调这一点跟分析师的关系是很中肯的。分析师的欲望不可能本额构想为不可能，无限，或永恒。
  
  The metonymic structure of human desire could open the way to a
  conception of desire as infinite: if it is always the desire for something else, then it would be potentially infinite. However, such a notion disregards the fact that human beings—the only desiring beings in the strict sense of the term—are also living beings, that is to say, mortal beings. Death imposes an absolute limit to desire, as it is also its cause and absolute condition.
  
  人类欲望的换喻结构，可能展开途径，构想欲望为永恒。 假如那总是对于某件其它东西的欲望， 那么它潜在是无限。 可是， 这样一个观念忽视了这个事实： 人类---严格意义来说，就是这个术语的欲望生物---也是有生命的生物，也就是会死的生物。 死亡对欲望赋加一个绝对的限制， 因为死亡也是欲望的原因与绝对的条件。
  
  雄伯注：
  如果分析师的个案是神经症neurotic，这种限制比较容易处理，如果个案是精神病患psychotic，他的无意识的欲望，投射到分析师这里，那就麻烦了。一旦分析师自己的无意识欲望也被撩拨起来，新雨，作为分析师，你要如何自处？
  
  请回顾The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis 的最后一段：
  
  The analyst’s desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire to obtain absolute difference, a desire which intervenes when, confronted with the primary signifier, the subject is, for the first time, in a position to subject himself to it. There only may the signification of a limitless love emerge, because it is outside the limits of the law, where alone it may live.
  
  精神分析的欲望并不是一个纯粹的欲望。 它是想要获得绝对差异性的欲望。当这一种欲望面临原初的能指时，它会介入。 生命主体第一次处于一个立场，要将自己屈服于这个欲望。只有在那里， 永恒的爱的意义才会出现， 因为那是在法则的限制外面，只有在那里， 这个欲望才能存活。
  
  

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  2011-10-13 14:44:05 springhero

  Kant with Sade 02
  康德即萨德
  
  Jacques Lacan
  雅克、拉康
  
  Let us consider the paradox that it is at the very moment at which the subject no longer has any object before him that he encounters a law that has no other phenomenon than something that is already signifying; the latter is obtained from a voice in conscience, which, articulating in the form of a maxim in conscience, proposes the order of a purely practical reason or will there.
  
  让我们考虑一下这个矛盾：就在这个时刻，生命主体的面前不再拥有任何的客体，他遭遇到一个法则，这个法则没有其它现象，除了就是某件能指化的东西。 后者被获得，从良心的一个声音。这个声音以某种的个性习性的方式在良心里表达， 建议在那里的纯粹实践理性与意志的秩序。
  
  For this maxim to constitute a law, it is necessary and sufficient that, being
  put to the test of such reason, the maxim may be considered universal as far as
  logic is concerned.
  
  为了要这个个人习性建构法则，就逻辑而言，它有需要，也充分足够被认为是普遍性， 当它接受如此理性的考验时。
  
  This does not mean—let us recall what "logic" entails—that it forces itself on everyone, but rather that it is valid in every case or, better stated, that it is not valid in any case if it is not valid in every case.
  
  这并不意味着—让我们回忆一下「逻辑」涵盖什麽—这个个人习性强迫它自己在每个人身上。而是， 它在每个个案，都是有效的。或者，说得更加恰当些， 假如它无法在每个个案有效，它就在任何个案，都无效。
  
  But this test, which must be based on pure, though practical, reason, can
  only be passed by maxims of the type that allows for analytic deduction.
  
  但是这个考验，建立的基础必须是纯粹，虽然是实践的理性， 只有藉由考虑到分析推理的这种习性， 它才能被传递。
  
  This type is illustrated by the faithfulness required in returning a deposit:3
  we can get some shut-eye after making a deposit knowing that the depositary
  must remain blind to any condition that would oppose this faithfulness. In
  other words, there is no deposit without a depositary worthy of his task.
  
  这种习性的说明例子是；当它回报一个储存时， 要求忠实。我们能够保持盲目，对于任何跟这种忠诚相反的情况。换句话说， 每个储存必然包括值得这个工作的储存物。
  
  One can sense the need for a more synthetic foundation, even in such an
  obvious case. At the risk of some irreverence, let me, in turn, illustrate the
  flaw in it with a maxim by Father Ubu that I have modified slightly: "Long
  live Poland, for if there were no Poland, there would be no Poles."
  
  我们能够感觉这种需要，为了充当综合的基础，甚至在一个明显的个案。 冒着某种不尊敬的结果，轮到让我使用武布父亲的个人习性，说明里面的这个瑕疵，我曾经稍作修改： “ 波兰万岁！因为假如每有波澜， 就没有波澜人。”
  
  Let no one, out of some slowness of wit or emotivity, doubt my attachment
  to a freedom without which the people mourn. But while the analytic
  explanation of it here is irrefutable, its indefectibility is tempered by the
  observation that the Poles have always been known for their remarkable
  resistance to the eclipses of Poland, and even to the lamentation that ensued.
  
  请不要有人因为机智或感情的迟钝，怀疑我争取自由的情感，假如没有自由， 人们会哀伤不己。但是虽然在此有精神分析对它的解释，是无可反驳的，它的没有缺点稍有损伤， 由于这个观察： 波兰人总是以他们的抗拒波兰被贬低著名，甚至导致随后被併吞的哀伤。
  
  We encounter anew here what led Kant to express his regret that no intuition
  offers up a phenomenal object in the experience of the moral law.
  
  我们在此重新遭遇康德被引导表达他的遗憾：在道德法则的经验， 没有直觉提供一个巨大的客体。
  
  I agree that this object slips away throughout the Critique. But it can be surmised in the trace left by the implacable suite Kant provides to demonstrate its slipping away, from which the work derives an eroticism that is no doubt innocent, but perceptible, the well-foundedness of which I shall show through the nature of the said object
  
  我同意， 这个客体从「实践理性批判」里溜走掉。但是我们能够推测，从康德供应的那套严谨的体系，留下的痕迹，为了证明它的溜走掉。 从那里， 这个工作获得一些无可置疑的纯真，但是可感觉到的情爱。透过以上所说的客体， 我将会显示，这个情爱的稳固基础。
  
  This is why I will ask those of my readers who are still virgins with respect to the Critique, never having read it, to stop reading my text here and to return to it after perusing Kant's. Let them see if it does, indeed, have the effect I say it does. In any case, I promise them the pleasure that is brought by the feat itself.
  
  这就是为什么我将会问我的那些读者，对于「实践理性批判」，他们仅是初次接触，因为以前没有阅读过。我要去他们不要阅读我在此的文本，而要先翻阅康德的文本后，再回到这里。 让他们明白， 假如它是否真的有我说的它具有的这个效果。无论如何， 我承诺他们往还阅读会带个他们无穷乐趣。
  
  The other readers will follow me now into Philosophy in the Bedroom, at least into the reading thereof.
  
  其它的读者现在将跟随我们探索「床上哲学」，至少进入对它的阅读。
  
  It proves to be a pamphlet, but a dramatic one, in which the stage lighting allows the dialogue and the action to be taken to the very limits of what is imaginable. The lights go dark for a moment to make room for a diatribe—a sort of pamphlet within the pamphlet—entitled "Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen, If You Would Become Republicans."
  
  那证明是一本小册子，但是非常精彩。在里面， 舞台灯光容许对话及活动，被带到难于想象的极限。 灯光暗淡一下子，是为了让人有责骂的空间---这一种书册里的小册子---题名是：「再努力一次，法国人，假如你想要成为共和党人！」
  
  What is enunciated in it is ordinarily understood, if not appreciated, as a
  mystification. One need not be alerted to the fact that a dream within a dream
  points to a closer relationship to the real to see an indication of the same kind
  in the text's deriding of the historical situation. It is blatant and one would do
  well to look twice at the text.
  
  里面所表述的内容一般人即可了解， 即使没有受到赞赞，作为一种令人迷惑的口号。 我们不需要对有所警觉于这个事实：梦中之梦指向跟真是界有更密切的关系，我们才能明白相同种类的啟示，对于这个文本在历情境里的嘲讽。 这是显而易见的，我们最好对文本再看第二遍。
  
  The crux of the diatribe is, let us say, found in the maxim that proposes a
  rule for jouissance, which is odd in that it defers to Kant's mode in being laid
  down as a universal rule. Let us enunciate the maxim:
  
  谴责的要点是， 让我们说，在这个箴言里被找到. 这个箴言建议一种欢爽的原则， 这个欢爽的原则是古怪的，因为它听从康德的模式，被制定作为一个普遍性的原则。让我们表述这个箴言：
  
  "I have the right to enjoy your body," anyone can say to me, "and I will
  exercise this right without any limit to the capriciousness of the exactions
  I may wish to satiate with your body."
  
  「我有权利享用你的身体，」任何人能够对我说，「我将会运用这个权利，用你的身体，我可以希望满足强取豪夺，没有任何限制。」
  
  Such is the rule to which everyone 's will would be submitted, assuming a
  society were to forcibly implement the rule.
  
  这个原则是如此，以致假如一个社会想要强迫实行这条原则， 每个人都意志将会屈从它。
  
  To any reasonable being, both the maxim and the consent assumed to be
  given it are at best an instance of black humor.
  
  对于任何有理性的人， 箴言与被认为给予它的认同，充其量是冷嘲热讽的例子。
  
  But aside from the fact that if the deductions in the Critique prepared us for
  anything, it is for distinguishing the rational from the sort of reasonable that
  is no more than resorting in a confused fashion to the pathological, we now
  know that humor betrays the very function of the "superego" in comedy.
  
  但是除了这个事实： 假如「实践理性批判」里的推论，让我们心里有所准备， 因为它可用来区别一般理性，与这个仅是以混淆方式诉诸于不受经验沾染到理性。我们现在知道， 冷嘲热讽显示出「超我」在喜剧中的功用。
  
  A fact that—to bring this psychoanalytic agency to life by instantiating it and
  to wrest it from the renewed obscurantism of our contemporaries' use of it—
  can also spice up [relever] the Kantian test of the universal rule with the grain
  of salt it is missing.
  
  这个事实---它具体地活生生地表现精神分析的代理，从现代人对它的使用，重新呈现的蒙眛主义，把它夺取出来—这个事实让康德的普遍性原则的考验，漏失滋味后，有让人興味盎然。
  
  Are we not thus incited to take more seriously what is presented to us as
  not entirely serious? As you may well suspect, I will not ask if it is necessary or sufficient that a society sanction a right to jouissance, by permitting everyone
  to lay claim to it, for its maxim to thus be legitimated by the imperative
  of moral law.
  
  我们难道不是被激起要更加认真看待，所被呈现给我们的东西， 作为并不完全认真？ 你们很有理由怀疑， 我将不问是否这是需要或充分， 一个社会认同一种欢爽的权利， 让每个人宣称它， 为了让它的个人习性被合理化，由于拥有道德法则的命令。
  
  
  No de facto legality can decide if this maxim can assume the rank of a universal
  rule, since this rank may also possibly oppose it to all de facto legalities.
  This is not a question that can be settled simply by imagining it, and the
  extension of the right that the maxim invokes to everyone is not what is at
  issue here.
  
  事实上，没有一种立法能够决定， 是否这个个人习性具有普遍性的原则的地位。因为这个地位也可能将它与所有的实际上的立法相对立。 我们仅是想像它，并无法解决这个问题，这个个人习性对于每个召唤的权利的延伸，并不是在此要讨论的问题。
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  

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  2011-10-14 03:59:21 springhero

  Kant with Sade 03
  康德即萨德
  
  Jacques Lacan
  雅克、拉康
  
  At best one could demonstrate here the mere possibility of generalizability,
  which is not universality; the latter considers things as they are grounded and not as they happen to work out.
  
  充其量，我们在此能够证明，一般化的可能性，并非是普遍化。后者考虑事情，是根据他们的基础，而不是根据他们偶然的奇遇。
  
  I cannot pass up the opportunity to point out the exorbitant nature of the
  role people grant to the moment of reciprocity in structures, especially subjective
  ones, that are intrinsically incompatible with reciprocity.
  
  我们错过这个机会来指出，在结构互惠的时刻，人们给予过高的角色属性，特别是主观性的属性。那在本质上是跟互惠不相容的。
  
  Reciprocity—a relation that is reversible since it is established along a
  simple line that unites two subjects who, due to their "reciprocal" position,
  consider this relation to be equivalent—is difficult to situate as the logical
  time of any sort of breakthrough [franchissement] on the subject's part in his
  relation to the signifier, and far less still as a step in any sort of development,
  whether or not it can be considered psychical (in which it is always so con
  venient to blame the child when providing veneers with a pedagogical intent).
  
  互惠—这一层可倒转的关系，因为它被建立，沿着一条简单的线，统合两个生命主体， 由于他们「互惠」的立场。考虑一下这个关系的平等性---互惠很难定位，作为任何种类突破的逻辑的时间，在生命主体这一方面，由于他跟能指的关系。 更不适合充当任何发展的步骤，无论它是否被认为是心理的发展 （在这种发展里， 要责怪小孩非常方便， 以教导的意图作为掩饰。）
  
  Be that as it may, we can already credit our maxim with serving as a paradigm
  for a statement that as such excludes reciprocity (reciprocity and not
  "my turn next time").
  
  不管是怎样的情况，我们已经是在推崇我们的个人习性，以充当一个陈述的典范。这个陈述的本身排除互惠 （ 是互惠，而不是「下次轮到我」）
  
  Any judgment regarding the odious social order that would enthrone our
  maxim is, thus, of no import here, for the question is whether to grant or
  refuse to grant this maxim the characteristic of a rule acceptable as universal
  in moral philosophy—moral philosophy being recognized, since Kant's
  time, as involving the unconditional practice of reason.
  
  关于这个令人厌恶的社会秩序，它推崇我们的个人习性， 因此任何判断，在此是没有意义的。因为这个问题是要不要给予或拒绝给予这个个习性，在道德哲学上，可接受作为普遍性的规则的特性---因为在康德的时代，道德哲学被体认，作为牵涉到理性的无条件实践。
  
  We must obviously acknowledge this characteristic in the maxim for the
  simple reason that its sole proclamation (its kerygma) has the virtue of instating
  both the radical rejection of the pathological (that is, of every preoccupation
  with goods, passion, or even compassion—in other words, the rejection by
  which Kant cleared the field of moral law) and the form of this law, which is
  also its only substance, insofar as the will becomes bound to the law only by
  eliminating from its practice every reason that is not based on the maxim itself.
  
  我们必须显而易见地承认个人习性的这个特性。理由很简单， 它的唯一的宣布，拥有这个优点： 安置对于未被经验沾染到积极拒绝（ 也就是， 每一件专注于善， 激情，或甚至同情---换句话说， 憑著这个拒绝， 康德清理道德法则的领域），这个法则的形式， 也是它唯一的本质， 只有当从法则的实践里，减少每个不是根据习性本身的理由，意志才变得跟法则连繫在一起。
  
  Of course, these two imperatives—between which moral life can be stretched, even if it snaps our very life—are imposed on us, according to the Sadean paradox, as if upon the Other, and not upon ourselves.
  
  当然， 这两个命令---在它们之间， 道德的生命能够被延伸，即使它折断我们的生命---这两个命令赋加在我们身上，依照萨德的矛盾律， 好像赋加在大它者身上，而不是赋加在我们身上。
  
  But this only differs from Kant's view at first blush, for the moral imperative latently does no less, since its commandment requisitions us as Other.
  但是这仅是表面上跟康德的观点不同，因为道德命令潜在做同等的事， 因为它的命令要求我们作为大它者。
  
  We perceive quite nakedly here what the aforementioned parody of the obvious universality of the depositary's duty was designed to introduce us to—namely, that the bipolarity upon which the moral law is founded is nothing but the split [refente] in the subject brought about by any and every intervention of the signifier: the split between the enunciating subject [sujet de I'enonciation] and the subject of the statement [sujet de I'enonce], The moral law has no other principle.
  
  我们在此相对坦诚地感觉到，前面提到的这个储存物的责任显而易见的普遍化，是一种讽刺模仿，它被设计用来跟我们介绍—也就是说， 道德赖以建立的两极，仅仅就是生命主体的分裂，由于能指的任何介入及每次介入所导致： 表述主体与被被陈述主体的分裂。 道德法则没有其它原则。
  
  Yet it must be blatant, for otherwise it lends itself to the mystification we sense in the gag* "Long live Poland!"
  
  可是， 它一定是很公然的。因为否则在诸如「波兰万岁！」这样的玩笑口号，这种分裂会有助于我们感觉到的神秘化。
  
  In coming out of the Other's mouth, Sade's maxim is more honest than Kant's appeal to the voice within, since it unmasks the split in the subject that is usually covered up.
  
  当萨德的个人习性，从大它者的嘴巴里讲出时，比康德的诉诸于内在的声音更加坦诚，因为它揭发通常被掩盖的主体的分裂。
  
  The enunciating subject stands out here as clearly as in "Long live Poland," where the only thing that sticks out is what its manifestation amusingly evokes.
  
  表述的主体在此清楚地突显出来，如同在「波兰万岁！」。在那里， 仅有突显出来的事情，是它的证明有趣地地在召唤的东西。
  
  To confirm this view, one need but consider the doctrine with which Sade
  himself establishes the reign of his principle: the doctrine of human rights.
  
  为了证实这个观点，我们仅仅需要考虑这个信条，萨德自己用来建立他的原则的统治的信条： 人权的信条。
  
  He cannot use the notion that no man can be the property, or in any way the
  prerogative, of another man as a pretext for suspending everyone's right to
  enjoy him, each in his own way.4
  
  他无法使用这个观念： 不能把人当财产，或是没有人能够对另外一个人拥有特权，作为悬置每个人享受他的权利，每个人都以他自己的方式。
  
  The constraint he endures here is not so much one of violence as of principle, the problem for the person who makes it into a sentence not being so much to make another man consent to it as to pronounce it in his place.
  
  他在此忍受的约束，与其说是暴力的约束，不然说是原则的约束。成功地进入判决的这个人的问题，与其说是要使另外一个人同意它，不如说是要代替他宣判它。
  
  Thus the discourse of the right to jouissance clearly posits the Other qua free—the Other's freedom—as its enunciating subject, in a way that does not differ from the Tu es which is evoked out of the lethal depths [fonds tuant] of every imperative.
  
  因此，欢爽权利的论述，清楚地提出大它者作为自由—大它者的自由---作为它表述的主体， 用的方式跟在每个命令的致命深处召唤出来的「Tues」没有什么不同。
  
  But this discourse is no less determinant for the subject of the statement, giving rise to him with each addressing of its equivocal content: since jouissance, shamelessly avowed in its very purpose, becomes one pole in a couple, the other pole being in the hole that jouissance already drills in the Other's locus in order to erect the cross of Sadean experience in it.
  
  但是论述同样是决定性，对于这个被表述的主体，用它的模棱两可的内容的每次称谓，产生他： 因为欢爽，毫无羞愧地被承认它的目的， 变成配对中的其中一个极端，另外一端则是处于欢爽在大它者的轨迹鑽出的空洞里，为了竖立萨的在里面的十字架。
  
  Leaving off my discussion of its mainspring here, let me recall instead that pain, which projects its promise of ignominy here, merely intersects the express mention of it made by Kant among the connotations of moral experience.
  
  当我停止我在此对它的动力的讨论， 代替的，让我们回顾一下:痛苦投射它的羞辱的承诺， 在此仅是与康德在道德经验的内涵的生动的表达交会。
  
  What pain is worth in Sadean experience will be seen better by approaching it via what might be disconcerting in the artifice the Stoics used with regard to it: scorn
  
  在萨德的经验里，痛苦的价值，将会被看得更加清楚，当他经由禁欲学派使用对于痛苦的巧计里， 令人狼狈的东西，来接近它。那就是： 藐视。
  
  Imagine a revival of Epictetus in Sadean experience: "You see, you broke it," he says, pointing to his leg. To reduce jouissance to the misery of an effect in which one's quest stumbles—doesn't this transform it into disgust?
  
  想像伊壁鸠鲁哲学在萨德经验里的复興： 「你瞧，你打断它，」他说， 指著他的脚。 为了要将欢爽减化成为情感的悲惨，在里面，我们的追寻绊倒---这难道不是将它转变成厌恶？
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  

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  2011-10-14 03:59:59 Herr.Nos (敦兮其若朴，旷兮其若谷！)

  L'expérience nous montre que Kant est plus vrai, et j'ai prouvé que sa théorie de la conscience, comme il écrit de la raison pratique, ne se soutient que de donner une spécification de la loi morale qui, à l'examiner de près, n'est rien d'autre que le désir à l'état pur, celui-là même qui aboutit au sacrifice, à proprement parler, de tout ce qui est l'objet de l'amour dans sa tendresse humaine —je dis bien, non seulement au rejet de l'objet pathologique, mais bien à son sacrifice et à son meurtre. C'est pourquoi j'ai écrit Kant avec Sade
  
  经验向我们表明康德是更真的，而我证明了他的良心理论，就像他就实践理性所写到的那样，仅仅在给出一种道德法则的规范上才站得住脚，这个道德法则，要是仔细地检查一下它的话，只不过是处在纯粹状态的欲望，而这本身导致了牺牲，严格地说，是牺牲在其人类温情中作为爱的对象的一切——我说的好些，不仅在于对病态对象的拒绝，而且在于其牺牲及其谋杀。这就是为什么我写下了《康德与萨德》。
  
  ——拉康《精神分析的四个基本概念》第247页。
  
  
  PS：我终于搞清楚了自己是没搞清楚分析家位置的悖论，于是在切开欲望与享乐的刀刃上，我他妈的焦虑了...

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  2011-10-14 10:55:02 springhero

  Kant with Sade 02
  康德即萨德
  
  Jacques Lacan
  雅克、拉康
  
  This shows that jouissance is that by which Sadean experience is modified.
  For it only proposes to monopolize a will after having already traversed it in
  order to instate itself at the inmost core of the subject whom it provokes
  beyond that by offending his sense of modesty [pudeur].
  
  这显示，欢爽是萨德的经验藉以被修改的东西。 因为它仅是提议要笼断一个意志， 在它已经全面研究它之后，为了要安置它自己在主题的最内层核心。 它挑激主体超越那个核心， 以冒犯他的稳重感。
  
  For modesty is an amboceptor with respect to the circumstances of being:
  between the two, the one's immodesty by itself violating the other's modesty.
  A connection that could justify, were such justification necessary, what I said
  before regarding the subject's assertion in the Other's place.
  
  因为稳重感是一种溶血素，关于生命实存的情境。在两者之间， 一个人的不稳重本身，扰乱另一人的稳重。 若有需要证明，有一个关联能够证明我所说能够成立，关于主体代替大它者所作的主张。
  
  Let us question this jouissance, which is precarious because it depends on
  an echo that it sets off in the Other, only to abolish it little by little by attaching
  the intolerable to it. In the end, doesn't it seem to us to be thrilled only by
  itself, like another horrible freedom?
  
  让我们质疑这个欢爽， 这是不稳定的欢爽， 因为它依靠它在大它者身上触发的一种回响，结果逐渐给予它无法被忍受的东西，而废除它。最后， 仅是它的本身， 就像另外一个可怕的自由， 难道不是似乎会使我们感到興奋？
  
  Thus we will see appear the third term that, according to Kant, is lacking
  in moral experience—namely, the object that Kant, in order to guarantee it to
  the will in the implementation of the Law, is constrained to relegate to the
  unthinkability of the thing in itself. But is this not the very object we find in
  Sadean experience, which is no longer inaccessible and is instead revealed as
  the being-in-the-world, the Dasein^ of the tormenting agent?
  
  因此，我们将会看到第三个术语出现，依照康德， 那就是道德经验的欠缺—也就是说， 康德不得不分配给真实界本身的不可思议性的客体， 为了保证它给予使用法则的意志。 但是这并不是我们在萨德的经验里找到的这个客体。这个客体不再能被接近， 代替的，它被显示作为世界里的生命实存， 折磨代理人的生命实存。
  
  Yet it retains the opacity of that which is transcendent. For this object is strangely separated from the subject. Let us observe that the herald of the maxim need be no more here than a point of broadcast. It could be a voice on the radio recalling the right promoted by the supplemental effort the French would have consented to make in response to Sade's appeal, the maxim having become an organic Law of their regenerated Republic.
  
  可是， 它保留超验的内容的模糊性。 因为这个客体很奇怪地跟生命主体分开。 让我们观察，个人习性的宣布，在此道道地地是一个广播点。 它会像是收音机的一个声音，提醒法国人本来会同意去做辅助的努力以提升的权利，在回应萨德的诉求， 这个个人习性已经成为他们重生动共和国的有机法则。
  
  Such voice-related phenomena, especially those found in psychosis, truly have this object-like appearance. And in its early days, psychoanalysis was not very far from relating the voice of conscience to psychosis.
  
  诸如跟声音有关的现象， 特别是那些在精神病患身上被找到的那些现象， 确实拥有这个像客体一般的表象。 在它早期的日子， 精神分析差不多就是将良心的声音跟精神病联想在一起。
  
  Here we see why Kant views this object as evading every determination of
  transcendental aesthetics, even though it does not fail to appear in a certain
  bulge in the phenomenal veil, being not without hearth or home, time in intuition,
  modality situated in the unreal [irreel], or effect in reality. It is not simply
  that Kant's phenomenology is lacking here, but that the voice—even if
  insane—forces [upon us] the idea of the subject, and that the object of the law
  must not suggest malignancy on the part of the real God.
  
  在此，我们看到， 为什么康德看待这个客体，当著是逃避超验美学的每个决定，即使它一定会以某种的突起出现在现象界的面纱， 因为它并不是每有火炉或家园。在直觉中的时间， 它的形式被定位在非真实界， 或在现实界的情感。 不仅是因为康德的现象学在此是欠缺， 而且那个声音---即使是疯狂， 会将主体的观念强迫在我们身上。法律的客体一定不要建议说， 它是真实上帝的恶意。
  
  Christianity has assuredly taught men to pay little attention to God's jouissance, and this is how Kant makes palatable his voluntarism of Law-for- Law's-sake, which is something that exaggerates, one might say, the ataraxia of the Stoics.
  
  基督教确实教人不要太注意上帝的欢爽。这就是为什么康德让他的志愿者的为了法则而法则的志愿者，那么讨人喜爱的地方。我们不妨说， 它是某件誇张力禁欲学派的「安详」。
  
  One might be tempted to think that Kant feels pressured here by what he hears too close by, not from Sade but from some nearby mystic, in the sigh that muffles what he glimpses beyond, having seen that his God is faceless: Grimmigkeit? Sade says: supremely-evil-being.
  
  我们可能会被引诱去认为，康德在此感觉有压力，由于太靠近听到的东西， 不是从萨德听到，而是从某个附近的神秘主体听到，在错过他所瞥见的东西的讯息里，因为他曾经看见，他的上帝是没有面貌的：Grimmigkeit ？ 萨德说： 崇高的邪恶之神。
  
  But humph! Schwarmereien, black swarms—I chase you away in order to
  return to the function of presence in the Sadean fantasy.
  
  但是，哼！ 这些黑色的虫群---我总是追逐你们，为了回到萨德的幻见到存在的功能。
  
  This fantasy has a structure that we will see again further on; in it the object is but one of the terms in which the quest it figures can die out [s'eteindre].
  
  这个幻见拥有一个结构，我们随后将会再次看到， 在它里面， 这个客体仅是其中一个术语，它所扮演的追寻会逐渐消失。
  
  When jouissance petrifies in the object, it becomes the black fetish, in which can be recognized the form that was verily and truly offered up at a certain time and place, and still is in our own time, so that one can adore the god therein.
  
  在这个客体身上，欢爽惊呆时，它变成黑色的物神。在里面， 我们能够体认到这个形式：它道道地地是在某个时间及某个地方，在我们的时代，依旧被提供的形式。这样，我们能够崇拜这个内在的神。
  
  This is what becomes of the executioner in sadism when, in the most extreme case, his presence is reduced to being no more than the instrument.
  
  这就是在虐待狂里， 行刑者的遭遇。在最极端的情况里，他的存在被还原成为仅是一种工具。
  
  But the fact that the executioner's jouissance becomes fixated there does not spare his jouissance the humility of an act in which he cannot help but become a being of flesh and, to the very marrow, a slave to pleasure.
  
  但是，行刑者的欢爽变成固定，这个事实并没有替他的欢爽，减免行动的卑下。 在行动里，他身不由己地成为一个肉体的生命实存。 追根究底来说，就是欢乐的奴隶。
  
  This duplication neither reflects nor reciprocates (why wouldn't it "mutualize"?) the duplication that took place in the Other owing to the subject's two alterities.
  
  这种复制既没有反射，也没有互惠。 （ 何不说是「彼此利用」？）这个复制发生在大它者，由于生命主体具有两个大它者。
  
  Desire—which is the henchman of the subject's split—would no doubt be willing to call itself "will to jouissance." But this appellation would not make desire any more worthy of the will it invokes in the Other, in tempting that will [to go right] to the extreme of its division from its pathos; for when it does so, desire departs [part] beaten down, doomed to impotence.
  
  欲望---是生命主体的分裂的忠实追随者---无可置疑地愿意称它自己是「欢爽的意志」。但是这个名称将不会使欲望配得上意志的价值， 它在大它者身上召唤的意志。它引诱那个意志从它的痛苦里，直接探究它的分裂的极端。因为当它这样做时， 欲望脱离， 被击败，注定无能为力。
  
  For desire disappears [part] under pleasure's sway, pleasure's law being such as to make it always fall short of its aim: the homeostasis of the living being, always too quickly reestablished at the lowest threshold of tension at which he scrapes by, the ever early fall of the wing, with which desire is able to sign the reproduction of its form—a wing which here must nevertheless rise to the function of representing the link between sex and death. Let us lay that wing to rest behind its Eleusinian veil.
  
  因为在欢乐的影响下，欲望消失。欢乐的法则是如此， 以致于使欲望总是没有到达它的目标。 人作为生物的体内平衡，总是太快就被重新建立在最低的紧张门槛。存活在那里，这个翅膀的早期掉落。使用这个翅膀， 欲望能够预示它的形式的复制---这一种翅膀在此必须被提升到代表性与死亡之间的联结的功能。 让我们将那个翅膀停靠在阿留辛尼安的面纱背后休息。
  
  Pleasure, a rival of the will in Kant's system that provides a stimulus, is thus in Sade's work no more than a flagging [defaillant] accomplice. At the moment of climax [jouissance], it would simply be out of the picture if fantasy did not intervene to sustain it with the very discord to which it succumbs.
  
  欢乐，在康德的系统里，是提供刺激的意志的敌对。在萨德的著作里，欢乐因此仅是一种下垂的共犯。在欢爽高潮的时刻，它仅是脱离画面， 假如幻见没有介入维持它，用它所屈服的不和谐。
  
  Stated differently, fantasy provides the pleasure that is characteristic of desire. Let us recall that desire is not the subject, for it cannot be indicated anywhere in a signifier of any demand whatsoever, for it cannot be articulated in the signifier even though it is articulated there.
  
  用不同角度来陈述， 幻见供应表现欲望特征的欢乐。 让我们回忆一下： 欲望并不是生命主体， 因为欲望无法在要求的能指的任何地方被指示。 因为它无法在能指里被表达，即使它存在那里。
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  

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  2011-10-14 16:58:58 springhero

  •
  2011-10-14 03:59:59 Herr.Nos (齐物方可达道，无言最是逍遥...)
  L'expérience nous montre que Kant est plus vrai, et j'ai prouvé que sa théorie de la conscience, comme il écrit de la raison pratique, ne se soutient que de donner une spécification de la loi morale qui, à l'examiner de près, n'est rien d'autre que le désir à l'état pur, celui-là même qui aboutit au sacrifice, à proprement parler, de tout ce qui est l'objet de l'amour dans sa tendresse humaine —je dis bien, non seulement au rejet de l'objet pathologique, mais bien à son sacrifice et à son meurtre. C'est pourquoi j'ai écrit Kant avec Sade
  
  经验向我们表明康德是更真的，而我证明了他的良心理论，就像他就实践理性所写到的那样，仅仅在给出一种道德法则的规范上才站得住脚，这个道德法则，要是仔细地检查一下它的话，只不过是处在纯粹状态的欲望，而这本身导致了牺牲，严格地说，是牺牲在其人类温情中作为爱的对象的一切——我说的好些，不仅在于对病态对象的拒绝，而且在于其牺牲及其谋杀。这就是为什么我写下了《康德与萨德》。
  
  ——拉康《精神分析的四个基本概念》第247页。
  PS：我终于搞清楚了自己是没搞清楚分析家位置的悖论，于是在切开欲望与享乐的刀刃上，我他妈的焦虑了...
  雄伯：
  Experience shows us that Kant is more true, and I have proved that his theory of conscience, when he writes of practical reason, is sustained only by giving a specification of the moral law, which, looked at more closely, simply desire in its pure state, that very desire that culminates in the sacrifice, strictly speaking, of everything that is the object of love in one’s human tenderness—I would say, not only in the rejection of the pathological object, but also in its sacrifice and murder. That is why I wrote Kant and Sade.
  
  精神分析经验向我们表明，康德是更加真实。我曾经证明，他的良心理论，就像他就实践理性所写到的那样，仅仅在给出一种道德法则的一个规范上，才能自圆其说。这个道德法则的规范，要是仔细地检查一下它的话，只不过是处在纯粹状态的欲望。而这个纯粹状态的欲望，达到最高潮时，严格来说，会牺牲掉人类眼里是柔情的一切爱的客体---我不妨说，不但要拒绝掉未受经验沾染的客体，而且要牺牲它及杀死它。
  这就是为什么我写下了《康德与萨德》。
  
  pathological object 在康德的用法是指「未受经验沾染的客体」
  第三行的which 指的是 a specification of moral law, 而不仅是 moral law、
  英文版that very desire that culminates in the sacrifice 的culminates
  是「达到高潮」，法文版是「导致」？还是误译
  
  
  
  This is the prime example of the eye-opening effect (disillement) that analysis makes possible in relation to the many efforts, even the most noble ones, of traditional ethics.
  
  這是精神分析學對於傳統倫理，勇往直前，兢兢業業地探索，讓人大開眼界的最佳例子。
  
  This is an extreme position, but one that enables us to grasp that man can adumbrate his situation in a field made up of rediscovered knowledge only if he has previously experienced the limit within which, like desire, he is bound.
  
  但是这个例子让我们能够理解，只有在人先前曾经验过这个限制：像欲望一样，人被约束在那个限制里，他才能够描绘他在这个领域的处境。这个领域由一再被发现的领域组成。
  
  Love, which, it seems to some, I have down-graded, can be posited only in that beyond, where, at first, it renounces its object.
  
  只有在超越那个领域的地方，爱才能够被提出。 在超越那个领域的地方， 起初，爱抛弃它的客体。有人会觉得，我这样说是贬低了爱。
  
  This also enables us to understand that any shelter in which may be established
  a viable, temperate relation of one sex to the other necessitates the intervention—this is what psycho-analysis teaches us—of that medium known as the paternal metaphor.
  
  这也让我们能够了解， 任何的庇护所，都让那个媒介的介入成为必要。众所周知，那个媒介就是父权的象征。在这个庇护所，一个人的性跟另外一个人的性，可能建立可实行，及有节制的关系。这就是精神分析所教导我们的。
  
  
  The analyst's desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire to obtain absolute difference, a desire which intervenes when, confronted with the primary signifier, the subject is, for the first time, in a position to subject himself to it.
  
  精神分析師的欲望，並不是一個純淨的欲望。這個欲望想要獲得绝对的不同，這個欲望的介入，是當主體面臨最初的能指時，第一次處於將自己臣服於這個欲望的立場。
  雄伯注：
  所谓「纯净的欲望」是指前面所说的「这个道德法则的规范，要是仔细地检查一下它的话，只不过是处在纯粹状态的欲望。而这个纯粹状态的欲望，达到最高潮时，严格来说，会牺牲掉人类眼里是柔情的一切爱的客体---我不妨说，不但要拒绝掉未受经验沾染的客体，而且要牺牲它及杀死它。」
  所谓的「绝对的不同」，就是截然不同于这个「纯净的欲望」。
  精神分析师的欲望的介入，跟父权象征的介入不同。父权象征的介入是在「任何的庇护所」
  而精神分析师的欲望的介入，是在超越那个限制的领域以外的地方。
  
  There only may the signification of a limitless love emerge, because it is outside the limits of the law, where alone it may live.
  
  只有在那裡，無盡的愛的意義才會出現，因為爱是在這個法則的限制之外，只有在那里，爱可能存活。
  
  雄伯譯
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  新雨，作为精神分析师，你对「這個法則的限制之外」的这样的「无尽的爱」limitless love
  你有追求的欲望与勇气吗？能不能写一下你对于「获得绝对的差异」obtain absolute difference 的体验？
  
  
  
  

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  2011-10-14 18:53:19 springhero

  订正： pathological object 受到经验沾染的客体，不是未受沾染

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  2011-10-14 23:31:57 springhero

  新雨
  你能否将Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 的最后一段，用法文翻译一篇。看看英译是否有出入。因为解释起来蛮费解。譬如pure desire, absolute difference, limitless love, a desire which intervenes.你能否解释一下你的心得与领悟？

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  2011-10-15 01:57:25 捷瑟敏 (giselemine)

  提供幾個翻譯的建議:
  
  sovereign good - 至善
  maxim - 格律
  
  
  另外,subject不應翻成"生命主體",因為這樣已經暗示了太多"實質"
  (ex. he's a substantial / historical /lived subject...etc)
  
  拉岡用符號$代表主體,
  既是要講言說活動與其內容的分裂,也是要表示主體的虛空,
  表示它與能指互動,但本身沒有實質特定歸屬的狀態
  
  $是跟一切能指產生關係,
  但本身無法被一勞永逸定位的"有能動力的虛無"
  
  主體的意涵,在拉岡那裏也有內在發展
  若有興趣可以看看<Cogito and the Unconscious>
  這本書前段,Mladen Dolar寫的部分
  他寫道:
  拉岡的前中後思想發展,亦恰好可用3 orders來表達之:
  
  I (imaginary self)--> S(subject of signifier)---> R(subject of Real)
  
  again,我認為使用"生命主體"一詞是不好的,
  理由是:若把"生命"這個詞導入這三個區分中,我認為反而導致混淆
  
  
  另外,關於分析師的位置
  在Four Discourses當中,分析師占據的位置是a
  
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_discourses
  
  
  

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  2011-10-15 02:26:54 Herr.Nos (敦兮其若朴，旷兮其若谷！)

  Cette position n'est pas tenable pour nous. L'expérience nous montre que Kant est plus vrai, et j'ai prouvé que sa théorie de la conscience, comme il écrit de la raison pratique, ne se soudait que de donner une spécification de la loi morale qui, à l'examiner de près, n'est rien d'autre que le désir à l'état pur, celui-là même qui aboutit au sacrifice, à proprement parler, de tout ce qui est l'objet de l'amour dans sa tendresse humaine —je dis bien, non seulement au rejet de l'objet pathologique, mais bien à son sacrifice et à son meurtre. C'est pourquoi j'ai écrit Kant avec Sade.
  
  这个位置不是我们站得稳的。经验向我们表明康德是更加正确的，而我证明了他的良心理论，正如他就实践理性所写道的那样，只是经由给出一个道德法则的规范而得以维持的，这个道德法则的规范，要是仔细检查一下它，无非是处在纯粹状态的欲望，这个欲望本身导致了牺牲，严格地说，是牺牲了其人类温情中的一切爱的对象——我想说，它不仅导致了对病理性对象的拒绝，而且还导致了其牺牲及其谋杀。这就是为什么我写下了《康德同萨德》。
  
  C'est là l'exemple de l'effet de désillement que l'analyse permet de tant d'efforts, même les plus nobles, de l'éthique traditionnelle. Position-limite, qui nous permet de saisir que l'homme ne peut esquisser sa situation dans un champ qui serait de connaissance retrouvée qu'à avoir auparavant rempli la limite où, comme désir, il se trouve enchaîné. L'amour, dont il est apparu aux yeux de certains que nous avions procédé au ravalement, ne peut se poser que dans cet au-delà où, d'abord, il renonce à son objet C'est là aussi ce qui nous permet de comprendre que tout abri oü puisse s'instituer une relation vivable, tempérée, d'un sexe à l'autre nécessite l'intervention — c'est l'enseignement de la psychanalyse — de ce médium qui est la métaphore paternelle;
  
  这就是分析使传统伦理学的那么多努力，甚至是那些最高尚的努力都成为可能的让人大开眼界的典范。这个限位使我们能够懂得，只有人在以前占据过这一界限，像欲望一样，他觉得被束缚在那里，人才能勾勒出他在一个可能属于重新发现的认识的领域中的位置。爱只存在于那个彼岸【超越界限的地方】，在那里爱首先放弃了它的对象，而在某些人的眼中看来我们对爱进行了贬低。这也让我们能够理解，一切庇护所——在那里可以建立起一种过得去且有节制的两性关系——都必然引起父性隐喻这个媒介【中项】的介入，这便是精神分析的教诲。
  
  Le désir de l'analyse n'est pas un désir pur. C'est un désir d'obtenir la différence absolue, celle qui intervient quand, confronté au signifiant primordial, le sujet vient pour la première fois en position de s'y assujettir, Là seulement peut surgir la signification d'un amour sans limite, parce qu'il est hors des limites de la loi, où seulement il peut vivre.
  
  分析家的欲望并非一种纯粹的欲望。它是一种获得绝对差异的欲望，这一绝对差异介入在对质于原始能指，主体第一次来到服从于它的位置上的时候。只有在那里一种无限的爱的意指才会出现，因为这种爱在法则的种种界限之外，只有在那里它才能存活。
  
  拉康《精神分析的四个基本概念》第247-248页。

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  2011-10-15 07:00:51 springhero

  谢谢新雨的翻译。能不能用你自己的话，说明什么是绝对的差异，并非一种纯粹的欲望，指的是什么 分析师的欲望是无限的爱，那是什么意思？Maxim若翻为格律，上下文如何解释，能否举例说明？无限的爱是一个重要的主题，在拉康的哪些其它研讨班，还有讨论到？

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  2011-10-15 10:57:01 springhero

  雄伯
  谢谢新雨的翻译。能不能用你自己的话，说明什么是绝对的差异，并非一种纯粹的欲望，指的是什么 分析师的欲望是无限的爱，那是什么意思？Maxim若翻为格律，上下文如何解释，能否举例说明？无限的爱是一个重要的主题，在拉康的哪些其它研讨班，还有讨论到？
  雄伯
  等不及你的回应，我自己在网络找到一篇文章解说什么是绝对的差异及并非一种纯粹的欲望。
  Larvel subject 初期的主体
  My own ethical position, if such it can be called, is thoroughly pervaded by my experience of the Lacanian clinic. At the end of The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan remarks that,
  我自己的伦理立场，如果可以这样称呼的话， 是徹的受到我在拉康临床学的经验的影响。在精神分析的死鬼基本观念的结语时，拉康说：
  
  The analyst’s desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire to obtain absolute difference, a desire which intervenes when, confronted with the primary signifier, the subject is, for the first time, in a position to subject himself to it. There only may the signification of a limitless love emerge, because it is outside the limits of the law, where alone it may live. (276)
  分析家的欲望并非一种纯粹的欲望。它是一种获得绝对差异的欲望，这一绝对差异介入在对质于原始能指，主体第一次来到服从于它的位置上的时候。只有在那里一种无限的爱的意指才会出现，因为这种爱在法则的种种界限之外，只有在那里它才能存活。
  The Lacanian clinic is unique in its reverence for the singularity of the subject. Unlike other forms of psychotherapy, the Lacanian clinic does not begin by diagnosing patients under a set of diagnostic categories such that symptoms are treated as signs. For example, a patient may enter analysis due to the symptom of repeatedly washing his hands.
  拉康的临床学的独特之处，是它尊重主体的「独特性」。不像其它形态的精神治疗学， 拉康的临床学并不是开始于用一套诊断的范畴来诊断病人，而是将病征当著是讯息。例如， 一位病人进来接受分析， 因为有重复洗手的病征。
  The Lacanian analyst does not summarily conclude that the symptom of hand washing means or “stands for” the disorder of obsessional neurosis, but instead leaves the significance of the symptom entirely open.
  
  拉康派的分析师并没有总结地下结论说：这个重复洗手的病征，意味着或「代表」妄想症患者的疾病。代替的， 它留下病征的意义完全开放。
  Only the analysand will be able to determine the significance of this symptom and the desire it embodies. As a consequence, second, the analyst does not present himself as a master that knows better than the analysand.
  只有受分析者将能够决定病症与其表现的欲望的意义。其次，结果，分析师并没有表现自己，作为比受分析者更加知道的大师。
  Over the course of analysis the analyst might gain knowledge of the analysand’s symptoms in a way that renders her capable of intervening well, but the only subject that knows is the analysand’s unconscious. Unlike a psychotherapist that claims to have knowledge and a solution, an analyst begins from the standpoint of ignorance.
  
  在分析过程， 分析师可能获得受分析者的病症的知识，这让她能够适当地介入。但是唯一「知道」的主体， 受分析者的无意识。 不像宣称拥有知识及解决办法的精神治疗师，分析师从「无知」的观点开始。
  
  Finally, and most importantly, third, the analyst is not a guru claiming to have an answer as to what is best for the analysand. The analyst, as Lacan says, is an advocate for the analysands (unconscious) desire. She does not have a model of what the analysand should be, or what the outcome of analysis should be.
  最后，也是最重要的， 第三点， 分析师并不是拥有解答的大师，关于对于受分析者，怎样是最好的解决。 如拉康所说的， 分析师是受分析者（无意识）欲望的主张者。 她并没有一个榜样，对于受分析者应该是什么样子， 或是分析的结果应该怎么样。
  She does not desire that the analysand should be successful at his job, that he should become a great artist, that he should be politically active in this or that way, or that the analysand should stay with his wife and family.
  她并不欲望，受分析者应该事业成功， 他应该成为一位伟大的艺术家， 他应该政治方面积极参与，或是受分析者应该跟他的妻子及家人在一块。
  The analyst sides with the analysand’s desire and is a midwife that assists in bringing that desire to articulation. If the analyst knows one thing, it’s that the failure to live and acknowledge one’s desire will be worse for that analysand.
  分析师偏袒受分析者的欲望，像个产婆，帮忙将那个欲望出来表达。假如分析师知道一件事情，那就是，没有实现或承认自己欲望，对于那位受分析者而言， 将是更遭糕的情况。
  As in the case of the closeted homosexual, that failure will mean the intensification of the symptom, involving self-destructive activity in the form of masochistic substance abuse, abuse of others, etc., etc., etc. As midwife, the analyst thus assists the analysand in avowing his desire. The outcomes of analysis, judged from the standpoint of bourgeois society, might be less than happy, yet at least the analysand will be true to the desire that animates him.
  如同在不欲人知的同性恋者， 那种失败将会意味着，对病症强化， 会牵涉到自我毁灭的行动，以受虐狂的凌虐的形式，等等。 作为产婆， 分析师因此帮忙受分析者承认他的欲望。 精神分析的结果，从布尔乔亚的社会的观点来判断， 可能还是不快乐，可是至少受分析者将会忠实于激发他生命的欲望。
  Psychoanalytic ethics is thus a queer ethics. It is an ethics of difference, an ethics that valorizes the singular, rather than an ethics that pursues normalizing sameness. The difference between these ethics is profoundly evident in the difference between the discourse of the university and the discourse of the analyst:
  精神分析的伦理学，因此是一种「劣势」的伦理学。 它是一种「差异」的伦理学，这种伦理学推崇「独特性」，而不是一种追求正常化的相同的伦理学。在这些伦理学之间的差异，本质上是非常明显，由于大学的论述与精神分析师的论述的差异。
  
  
  The upper discourse is the discourse of the university, while the lower is the discourse of the analyst. In each of Lacan’s four discourses, the upper right position is the position of the agent, the upper left is the position of the addressee or other, the lower right is the position of the product, and the lower left is the unconscious truth of the discourse.
  上方的论述是大学的论述，而下方的论述是精神分析师的论述。 在拉康的四个论述的每一个， 右上方的位置上代理者的位置， 左上方是被对讲者的位置。右下方是产物的位置，左下方是论述的无意识位置。
  In the discourse of the university we see S2 (the agent) addressing objet a (the remainder or difference). In the position of the product is $, the barred, alienated, or divided subject.
  在大学的论述，我们看到第二主体（ 代理者），对著小客体（剩余物或差异）讲话，在产物的位置是被禁制，被疏离，被分裂的主体，。
  
  This is the essence of the university discourse: the domestication of difference (objet a) within a system of categories (S2), so as to produce a divided or alienated subject. I am no longer this singularity “Levi”, but am instead now reduced to “depressive”, with all the institutional consequences that follow from this categorization.
  这就是大学论述的本质： 在范畴的系统里，差异（小客体）的被驯服，为了产生一个分裂的主体。我不再这个名为Levi的「独特性」。代替的，我现在被沦落成为「压抑者」由于从这个范畴演变出来的各种体制的结果。
  Within the discourse of the university, the singularity of my desire, person, and drive means nothing. Rather all that is relevant is how I can be sorted and categorized in a system of knowledge (S2) for the sake of the bureaucratic system.
  在大学论述里， 我的欲望，我的个人，我的驱力的独特性，全无意义。 代替的， 一切相关的东西就是，在知识（作为第二主体） 的系统里，我如何被分类，被范畴化，为了配合官僚的体制。
  In the discourse of the analyst, by contrast, the analyst approaches the analysand ($) from the standpoint of difference (objet a). The analyst strives to occupy the position of the analysand’s singular differences, to allow these differences to speak, rather than alienating the analysand in a system of pre-existent categories or knowledge (S2). The product of this discourse is S1 or the analysand naming his or her own desire. What the analyst attends to is the singularity of this analysand here, refusing all identificatory knowledge.
  比较起来，在精神分析的论述， 分析师接近这个受分析者 （作为被禁制的主体），从差异（小客体）的观点。精神分析说尝试佔有受分析者独特差异的位置，容许这些差异讲话。而不是让受分析者在先前存在的范畴或知识系统里被疏离。 这个论述的产物是第一主体或受分析者命名他或她自己的欲望。 分析师所注意到是，在此这位受分析者的独特性，拒绝各种认同的知识。
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  

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  2011-10-15 17:04:30 Herr.Nos (敦兮其若朴，旷兮其若谷！)

  嗯，记得拉康在S11的最后画了一个莫比乌斯带的内8，说是分析家的欲望要制作一个差异，防止分析者的要求经由转移而变成认同。这里分析家的欲望明显是相对于认同来说的，也就是说，分析家在强调主体独特性的同时，也要使主体承担起一个差异性的元素，这个元素在根本上就是能指的差异，为S1所代表，一方面S1在主人话语中捕获了主体，另一方面S1在分析家的话语中作为剩余物处在生产的位置上，这里是从不可能到无能的一个转变，而这个不可能的动因显然就是分析家的欲望。
  
  关于这个欲望，开始的时候，拉康只是用否定的形式来描述，说它不是理解分析者的欲望，因为理解仅仅意味着分析家一方的幻想，而分析家之所以保有无知的激情，处在愚蠢的位置上，就是要从假设知道的主体这个虚假的主人性位置上下来。由此，一个必然的结果在于，分析家的欲望也要拒绝分析者的要求，从而将要求维持在挫折的水平上，如此痛苦之于主体才是生产性的，因此分析家并不处在传统伦理学所要求的至善的位置上，他必须把主体的欲望辩证出来，即作为分析者欲望的原因，使分析者从要求的主体变成欲望的主体。最后，拉康说这个欲望是绝对的差异，意味着分析家是一个绝对的他者，或者我们说是S（A/），所有其他能指都对其代表着主体。
  
  举一些临床的例子来说明这个绝对差异，比如说分析者抱怨从分析家那里总是得不到自己期待的东西，继而断言自己想要的是一些完全不同于分析家的东西，这里就是一个差异的效果。再比如说，一个人对精神分析很感兴趣，于是找到一个分析家，要求一个分析，而分析家的回应可能是：”精神分析未必是你想要的“。或者，当分析者对分析家产生了强烈的认同，甚至将精神分析本身作为自己的症状来享乐而不自知时，分析家的回应可能是：”精神分析对你没用“。
  
  至于无限的爱，我自己的理解有些模糊，似乎这里的爱和冲动有某种联系，既然处在法则的界限之外，也就超出了欲望的界限，这里是最困惑我的地方，因为我之前遇到的问题是，分析家在大A的位置上享乐小a，这让我将某个分析家与倒错联系在一起。或许，我们要讨论爱和欲望和享乐的关系，想起拉康在《焦虑》中的一句话：只有爱情允许享乐屈就于欲望，也多亏爱情，欲望来到享乐的位置。但问题在于，分析家的欲望是否是一个享乐的欲望？显然这是一个悖论性的位置，分析家的欲望或许是一个不做分析家的欲望，中文有点绕，用英语说，the desire of analyst is not a desire that enjoy being an analyst，至少不是在分析家的位置上享乐分析者的痛苦的欲望！

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  2011-10-15 18:02:19 捷瑟敏 (giselemine)

  maxim翻譯成格律,是討論康德哲學時的慣用翻譯
  
  maxim在康德那邊是"主觀原則", subjective principle of volition的意思
  
  可參考
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative
  http://baike.baidu.com/view/1342008.html?fromTaglist#4_1

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  2011-10-16 06:14:04 springhero

  Kant with Sade 007
  康德即萨德
  
  Jacques Lacan
  雅克、拉康
  
  Taking pleasure in fantasy is easy to grasp here.
  
  欢喜于幻见，在此是很容易理解。
  
  Physiology shows that pain has a longer cycle than pleasure in every respect, since a stimulation provokes pain at the point at which pleasure stops.
  
  心理学显示，痛苦在各方面的循环都比欢乐长久，因为在欢乐停止的这个点， 一种刺激挑起痛苦。
  
  However prolonged one assumes it to be, pain, like pleasure, nevertheless
  comes to an end—when the subject passes out.
  
  可是，无论我们认为它多么长久， 痛苦，就像欢乐一样，还是会结束—当主体死亡时。
  
  Such is the vital datum that fantasy takes advantage of in order to fixate— in the sensory aspect of Sadean experience—the desire that appears in its agent.
  
  幻见利用的这个资讯是如此重要，为了固定出现在它的代理的欲望---在萨德的经验的感官的一面。
  
  Fantasy is defined by the most general form it receives in an algebra I have
  constructed for this purpose—namely, the formula ($＜＞a)? m which the
  lozenge ＜＞is to be read as "desire for," being read right to left in the same way,
  introducing an identity that is based on an absolute non-reciprocity. (This
  relation is coextensive with the subject's formations.)
  
  幻见被下定义，根据它所接受的最一般性的形式，在我为了这个目的建构的代数图形---也就是，($＜＞a)这个公式。在这个公式里， 这个方块＜＞，应该被读著「对…的欲望」，以同样方式从右到左阅读，介绍一种绝对非互惠为基础的认同。（ 这种关系跟主体的形成有共同空间。
  
  Be that as it may, this form turns out to be particularly easy to animate in the present case. Indeed, it relates the pleasure that has been replaced by an instrument (object a in the formula) here to the kind of sustained division of the subject that experience orders.
  
  无论如何， 这个形式结果成为特别容易激发，在目前的个案。的确，它把公式里的小客体的工具所取代的欢乐，在此跟经验所规范的主体的持久分裂，扯上关系。
  
  This only occurs when its apparent agent freezes with the rigidity of an object, in view of having his division as a subject entirely reflected in the Other.
  
  这会发生，只有当它的明显的代理，跟一个客体的僵化冻结，因为它作为主体的分裂，完全被反应在大它者身上。
  
  From the vantage point of the unconscious, a quadripartite structure can always be required in the construction of a subjective ordering. My didactic schemas take this into account.
  
  从无意识的视野来看，由四个部分组成的结构，总是被要求，在一个主体化的规范的结构。 我作为教学的基模考虑到这一点。
  
  Let us modulate the Sadean fantasy with a new schema of this kind: SCHEMA I
  让我们调适这个萨德的幻见，用这种的一个新的基模； 基模一
  
  
  The lower line accounts for the order of fantasy insofar as it props up the Utopia of desire.
  
  底下的这条线说明幻见的秩序，当它突出欲望的乌托邦。
  
  The curvy line depicts the chain that allows for a calculus of the subject. It is oriented, and its orientation constitutes here an order in which the appearance of object a in the place of the cause is explained by the universality of its relationship to the category of causality; forcing its way into Kant's transcendental deduction, this universality would base a new Critique of Reason on the linchpin [ckeville] of impurity.
  
  曲线描述容许主体的计算法的锁链。 它被定方向，而它的方向在此组成一种秩序。依照这个秩序，小客体的出现，代替这个原因，被解释，经由它跟因果律的范畴的关系的普遍化。它强迫前进到康德的超验推理，这个普遍性，将一种新的理性批判，建立在免受处罚的关键。
  
  Next there is the V which, occupying the place of honor here, seems to impose the will [volonte] that dominates the whole business, but its shape also evokes the union [reunion] of what it divides by holding it together with a vel—namely, by offering up to choice what will create the $ of practical reason from S, the brute subject of pleasure (the "pathological" subject).
  
  其次， 这个V，佔据在此光荣的这个位置，它似乎赋加支配整个事情的这个「意志」，但是它的形状也召唤它所分裂的东西再结合，藉着将它跟一种「两个圆圈连接的空间」连接在一起，藉着提供从主体所创造的实践理性的这个被禁制的主体，这个欢乐的残酷主体，作为选择。
  
  Thus it is clearly Kant's will that is encountered in the place of this will that can only be said to be a will to jouissance if we explain that it is the subject reconstituted through alienation at the cost of being nothing but the instrument of jouissance.
  
  因此，这显见是康德的意志被遭遇到，代替这个仅能被说是欢爽的意志，假如我们解释， 这是通过疏离被重新建构的主体， 花费的代价是仅是充当欢爽的工具。
  
  Thus Kant, being interrogated "with Sade"—that is, Sade serving here, in our thinking as in his sadism, as an instrument— avows what is obvious in the question "What does he want?" which henceforth arises for everyone.
  
  因此，康德，由于受到质疑跟「跟萨德一伙」---换句话说， 在我们的想法跟在他的虐待狂，萨德在此充当一种工具—康德坦承这个问题显而易见的东西： 「他到底想要什么？」从此以后，对于每个人，这个问题会浮现。
  
  Let us now make use of this graph in its succinct form to find our way around in the forest of the fantasy that Sade develops according to a systematic plan in his work.
  
  让我们现在利用这个图形，以它简明的形式，为了在萨德依照他的著作的系统计划，发展的幻见森林里，找到我们的出路。
  
  We will see that there is a statics of the fantasy, whereby the point of aphanisis, assumed to lie in $, must in one's imagination be indefinitely pushed back. This explains the hardly believable survival that Sade grants to the victims of the abuse and tribulations he inflicts in his fable.
  
  我们将会看出有一种幻见的静力学，在那里，欲望消失点， 被认为位置在被禁制的主体。在我们的想像里，这个消失点一定是无限制地被推后。 这解释了，萨德在他的寓言，给予受害者凌虐及磨难，她们竟然会匪夷所思地存活。
  
  The moment of their death seems to be motivated there merely by the need to replace them in a combinatory, which alone requires their multiplicity. Whether unique
  (Justine) or multiple, the victim is characterized by the monotony of the subject's
  relation to the signifier, in which, if we rely on our graph, she consists.
  
  她们死亡的时刻，在那里似乎仅是由于在组合中，必须取代她们而引起。仅是这种组合就要求她的多重性。 无论是独特（ 贾斯丁），或多重性， 受害者的特性是主体与能指的关系千篇一律。假如我们依靠我们的图形， 她就在那个能指里被找到。
  
  The troupe of tormentors (see Juliette), being object a in the fantasy and situating
  themselves in the real, can have more variety.
  
  这群折磨者（参照朱莉亚蒂），在幻见里是小客体， 却定位自己在真实界，变化性就较多。
  
  The requirement that the victims' faces always be of incomparable (and, moreover, unalterable, as I just said) beauty is another matter, which we cannot account for with a few banal and quickly fabricated postulates about sex appeal.
  
  受害者的脸孔总是要美得无以伦比，（而且，还是美得永不变化，如我刚刚所说），这个要求，是另外一件我们无法用几句陈腔滥调解释的事，它跟关于性的吸引力有关很快被建构的假设。
  
  Rather, we should see here the grimace of what I have shown regarding the function of beauty in tragedy: the ultimate barrier that forbids access to a fundamental horror. Consider Sophocles' Antigone and the moment when the words Epcog avixaxe ^laKav ring out.5
  
  相反地， 我们应该在此看出我曾经表现的厌恶，关于这个美丽在悲剧的功用： 这个最后的阻碍，禁止接近一个基本的恐怖。考虑一下索福克利斯的「安提戈尼」，当「Epcog avixaxe ^laKav」这些字迴响出来。
  
  This excursus would be of no value here did it not introduce what one might call the discordance between the two deaths, introduced by the existence of the condemnation.
  The between-two-deaths of the shy of [I'en-defd] is essential to show us that it is no other than the one by which the beyond [I'au-deld] is sustained.
  
  补充说明在此将是没有价值，假如它没有介绍我们所谓的两次死亡之间的不协调。这个两次死亡是由判刑的存在所介绍。「I'en-defd」 的让人惊退的两次死亡之间是很重要，用来跟我们显示：它道道地地就是被用来维持超越「I'en-defd」的死亡。
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  

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  2011-10-16 06:52:43 springhero

  至于无限的爱，我自己的理解有些模糊，似乎这里的爱和冲动有某种联系，既然处在法则的界限之外，也就超出了欲望的界限，这里是最困惑我的地方，因为我之前遇到的问题是，分析家在大A的位置上享乐小a，这让我将某个分析家与倒错联系在一起。或许，我们要讨论爱和欲望和享乐的关系，想起拉康在《焦虑》中的一句话：只有爱情允许享乐屈就于欲望，也多亏爱情，欲望来到享乐的位置。但问题在于，分析家的欲望是否是一个享乐的欲望？显然这是一个悖论性的位置，分析家的欲望或许是一个不做分析家的欲望，中文有点绕，用英语说，the desire of analyst is not a desire that enjoy being an analyst，至少不是在分析家的位置上享乐分析者的痛苦的欲望！
  新雨
  至于无限的爱，我自己的理解有些模糊，似乎这里的爱和冲动有某种联系，
  
  雄伯
  这个冲动是不是指「死亡冲动」，death drive？也就是Antigone 的爱算不算是处于两次死亡之间的无限的爱limitless love？你能诠释一下你对death drive 的看法吗？
  
  新雨
  因为我之前遇到的问题是，分析家在大A的位置上享乐小a，这让我将某个分析家与倒错联系在一起。
  
  雄伯
  分析家是享乐小客体，还是牺牲小客体？或是作为小客体被享乐或牺性？你那时是充当分析家？还是分析者？ 「享受你的病征」enjoy your symptoms 跟倒错perversion 联系在一起时，拉康的态度是什么？你的态度是什么，是enjoy 还是sacrifice？
  
  新雨
  分析家的欲望或许是一个不做分析家的欲望，中文有点绕，用英语说，the desire of analyst is not a desire that enjoy being an analyst，至少不是在分析家的位置上享乐分析者的痛苦的欲望。
  雄伯
  分析家一方面以大它者身份，处于小客体的位置，理解分析者的绝对差异absolute，另一方面，分析家的欲望是追求无限的爱limitless love。两者之间的矛盾，你要如何解开？分析家体悟到自己的肉身及欲望，作为小客体的限制bound吗？无限的爱是超越肉身作为小客体的救赎吗？作为分析家，当你面临作为表述的主体enunciating subject与被表述内容的主体subject of enunciation的矛盾时，你如何自处？
  
  

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  2011-10-16 08:55:16 springhero

  Kant with Sade 008
  康德即萨德
  
  Jacques Lacan
  雅克、拉康
  
  This can be clearly seen in the paradox constituted in Sade's work by his position regarding hell. The idea of hell, refuted a hundred times by him and cursed as religious tyranny's way of constraining people, curiously returns to explain the gestures of one of his heroes who is, nevertheless, among the most taken with libertine subversion in its reasonable form: the hideous Saint-Fond.6
  
  在萨德的著作里，从他对于地狱的立场，这一点很清楚被看出。地狱的观念，被他排斥上百次，被诅咒作为宗教约束人们的暴虐。然后，他又耐人寻味地回头解释他的其中一个小说角色的姿态。可是，他是以理性方式从事放荡倒错最骇人听闻的一位：可恶的圣凡得。
  
  The practices, whose final agony he imposes on his victims, are based on his belief that he can render their torment eternal in the hereafter [I'au-deld]. He highlights the authenticity of this behavior by concealing it from his accomplices and the authenticity of this credence by the difficulty he has explaining himself. Thus we hear him, a few pages later, try to make his behavior and credence sound plausible in his discourse with the myth of an attraction tending to gather together the "particles of evil."
  
  他将这些倒错的最后痛苦，赋加在他的受害者身上。这些倒错是根据这个信仰： 他能够让他们的磨难成为永恒，在往生之后。他强调这个行为的真诚，隐藏这个真诚不让他的共犯知道，也强调这个献祭的真诚，虽然遭遇解释自己的困难。因此，我们听到他，在后面几页， 他论述这个用来召集「恶灵」的引力的神话，尝试使他的行为及献祭听起来合理。
  
  This incoherence in Sade's work, overlooked by sadists (they, too, are a
  bit hagiographic), could be explained by noting in his writings the formally
  expressed term "the second death."
  
  萨德著作里的这个矛盾， 被虐待狂忽略（ 他们也是有点圣徒气质）。我们若是注意在他的著作里， 这个正式被表达的「第二次死亡」，这个矛盾就能够被解释。
  The assurance he expects from it against the awful routine of nature (which crime, as he tells us elsewhere, serves to disrupt) would require that it go to an extreme in which the vanishing [evanouissement] of the subject is redoubled. He symbolizes this in his wish that the very decomposed elements of our body be destroyed so that they can never again be assembled.
  
  他期望从这个第二次死亡获得确定，对抗自然的这个可怕的例行之事 （ 如同他在别处告诉我们的，此例行之事的罪恶充当一种瓦解）。这个确定要求， 它应该被运用到极端，在那里， 主体的这个消失会被加强。 他以他的愿望作为这个象征： 我们身体被瓦解的元素应该被毁灭，这样它们才永远不会再被聚集。
  
  The fact that Freud nevertheless recognizes the dynamism of this wish in certain of his clinical cases, and that he very clearly, perhaps too clearly, reduces its function to something analogous to the pleasure principle by relating it to a "death drive" (demand [demande] for death)—this will not be accepted by those who have been unable to learn from the technique they owe Freud, or from his teachings, that language has effects that are not simply utilitarian or, at the very most, for purposes of display. Freud is [only] of use to them at conventions.
  
  可是，佛洛伊德在他的临床的个案，体认出这个愿望的动力。他非常清楚地，或许过于清楚地， 将它的功用还原成为某件类似快乐原则，将它跟「死亡冲动」（对于死亡的要求）联系在一起。如果人们无法从他们归功于佛洛伊德的技术，或从他的教学，学习到：语言拥有不仅是实用的影响， 或是充其量，作为展示之目的，他们将无法接受这个事实。只有在传统习惯里，佛洛伊德才对他们有用途。
  
  In the eyes of such puppets, the millions of men for whom the pain of existence is the original reason for the practices of salvation that they base on their faith in Buddha, are undoubtedly underdeveloped; or, rather, they think like Buloz, the straight out when he turned down his article on Buddhism (this according to Burnouf) at some point during the eighteen-fifties, that it is "impossible that there are people that dumb."
  
  在这些傀儡的眼里， 这数百万的人们， 无可置疑是民智未开，因为对于他们， 存在的痛苦就是救赎的实践的原初理由。他们将救赎的基础，建立在对于佛陀的信仰上。或者说， 他们的思想像是「布洛兹」人。在1850年代的某个时刻，当他毫不犹豫地拒绝他探讨佛教的文章，因为不可能会有如此愚蠢的人们。
  
  If they believe that they have better ears than other psychiatrists, have they somehow escaped hearing such pain in a pure state model the song of certain patients referred to as melancholic?
  
  假如他们相信，他们拥有比精神病医生更好的倾听能力，他们会用某种方法逃避听见，某些病人提到的忧郁症，纯粹表达从来的如此的痛苦吗？
  
  Have they not heard one of those dreams by which the dreamer remains overwhelmed, having, in the felt condition of an inexhaustible rebirth, plumbed the depths of the pain of existence?
  
  他们难道不曾听过那些梦？作梦者始终被那些梦摄服，陷入生命存在的痛苦深渊，在无穷尽的重生的感觉情况里？
  
  Or, in order to put hell's torments back in their place, torments which could never be imagined beyond what men traditionally inflict in this world, shall we implore them to think of our everyday life as having to be eternal?
  
  或是，为了将地狱的折磨放回它们的为置，折磨永远无法被想像，超越人们传统上赋加在这个世界。我们将恳请他们思考一下我们的日常生活， 当著必须是永恒吗？
  
  We must hope for nothing, not even hopelessness, to combat such stupidity, which is, in the end, sociological; I am mentioning it here only so that people on the outside will not expect too much, concerning Sade, from the circles of those who have a surer experience of forms of sadism.
  
  我们必须什么都不希望，甚至不要想到无望，为了对抗这种愚蠢。这种愚蠢，追根究底是社会的愚蠢。我在此提到它， 仅是为了不要让外面的人们，不要期望太多，关于萨德，对于那些对于虐待狂的形式，有更确定经验的人。
  
  Especially regarding a certain equivocal notion that has been gaining ground about the relation of reversion that supposedly unites sadism with a certain idea of masochism—it is difficult for those outside such circles to imagine the muddle this notion creates.
  
  特别是关于倒错的关系的某个模棱两可的观念：它被认为是将虐待狂跟某种受虐狂联系在一起。这个观念一直在发展，但是很难让这些圈外的人想像， 这个观念所引起的混乱。
  
  We would do better to learn from it the lesson contained in a fine little tale told about the exploitation of one man by another, which is the definition of capitalism, as we know. And socialism, then? It is the opposite.
  
  我们最好从那里学到这个教训，这个教训被包含在一个小故事，有关一个人被另外一个利用。那就是资本主义的定义，如同我们所知道的。社会主义，呵呵？那是它的相对。
  
  Unintended humor—this is the tone with which a certain circulation of psychoanalysis occurs. It fascinates people because it goes, moreover, unnoticed.
  
  我不是故作幽默---这是精神分析的某些流行经常发生的语调。 它让人们感到興趣，而且因为它让人视而不见。
  
  But there are doctrinaires who strive for tidier appearances. One acts the part of a do-good existentialist, another, more soberly, that of a ready-made* personalist. This results in the claim that the sadist "denies the Other's existence."
  
  但是有某些教条主义者，设法要将表象弄得更清楚。有一位扮演做好事的存在主义者，还有另外一位，脑筋更加清醒，扮演一位现成的人格主义的角色。 这造成这个宣称： 虐待狂「否认大它者的存在」。
  
  Which is precisely, one must admit, what has just come out in my analysis. To pursue my analysis, is it not the case, rather, that the sadist discharges the pain of existence into [rejette dans] the Other, but without seeing that he himself thereby turns into an "eternal object," if Whitehead is willing to let us have this term back.
  
  我们必须承认，这确实是在我的精神分析，刚刚显露出来的东西。探索我的精神分析，这难道不就是这个情况：虐待狂将存在的痛苦，发泄在大它者身上？但是他们却没有看到，他自己因此成为一个「永恒的客体」，假如怀德海愿意让我们将这个术语要回来。
  
  But why wouldn't it belong to both of us? Isn't this—redemption and immortal soul—the status of the Christian? Let us not proceed too quickly, so as not to go too far either.
  
  但是为什么它属于我们两位？这难道不1是基督教徒的地位：救赎及永生的灵魂？ 让我们不要进行得太快，为了不要前进得太远。
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  

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  2011-10-16 11:06:28 springhero

  Kant with Sade 009
  康德即萨德
  
  Jacques Lacan
  雅克、拉康
  
  Let us note, instead, that Sade is not duped by his fantasy, insofar as the rigor of his thinking is integrated into the logic of his life.
  
  代替的，让我们注意， 萨德并没有被他的幻见所欺骗。因为他思想的严谨被合并到他生命的逻辑。
  
  Let me give my readers an assignment here. The fact that Sade delegates a right to jouissance to everyone in his Republic is not translated in my graph by any symmetrical reversal [reversionalong an axis or around some central point, but only by a 90-degree rotation of the graph, as follows:
  
  让我在此给予读者一个作业。萨德指派他个共和国的每个人，获得欢爽的权利。这个事实在我的图形里，并没有被任何均称的倒转翻译。这个某个中央点的轴心或四周，但是以九十度的图形旋转，如下：
  
  SCHEMA 2 第二基模
  t
  d
  （图形，我用word画不出来）
  
  V, the will to jouissance, leaves no further doubt as to its nature, because it appears in the moral force implacably exercised by the President of Montreuil [Sade's mother-in-law] on the subject; it can be seen that the subject's division does not have to be pinned together [reunie] in a single body.
  
  V，代表欢爽的意志， 关于它的特质，没有留下可质疑之处。因为它让蒙特鲁的总裁（萨德的岳母），以道德的力量，毫不留情地运用在主体身上。 我们能够看出， 主体的分裂并不需要被合并钉在一个身体里。
  
  (Let us note that it is only the First Consul who seals this division with its effect of administratively confirmed alienation.)
  
  （让我们注意到，仅是首席领事封闭这个分裂，使用它获得行政认可的疏离。）
  
  This division here pins together [re'unit] as S the brute subject incarnating the heroism characteristic of the pathological in the form of faithfulness to Sade manifested by those who at first tolerated his excesses—his wife, his sister-in-law, and why not his manservant too?9—and others who have been effaced from his history.
  
  在此的这个分裂，把具体表现病态特性的英雄主义的残酷的主体，合并钉住为S的主体， 以他忠实于萨的的形式。这种忠实可由起初容忍他的过分的那些人症实。他的妻子，他的姨子，他的男仆 （ 有何不可呢？）---还有其它在他的历史被抹除的人。
  
  For Sade, $ (barred S), we finally see that, as a subject, it is through his disappearance that he makes his mark, things having come to their term.
  
  对于萨德，被禁制的主体， 我们最后看出：作为一位主体， 通过他的消失，他才功成名就，当事情要跟他们的术语验证时
  
  Incredibly, Sade disappears without anything—even less than for Shakespeare—
  of his image remaining to us, after he gave orders in his will to have a thicket efface the very last trace on stone of a name that sealed his fate.
  
  难于置信地， 萨德是平百消失—甚至比莎士比亚还不如---没有留下他的任何意象给予我们。在他的遗嘱，他下命令用一座叢林，抹除封闭他命运的名字的石碑上的最后痕迹。
  
  Mr| (jptivai,10 "not to be born"—Sade's curse is less holy than Oedipus', and does not carry him toward the Gods, but is immortalized in his work, whose unsinkable buoyancy Jules Janin backhandedly shows us, saluting it behind the books that hide it, if we are to believe him, in every worthy library, like the writings of St. John Chrysostom or Pascal's Pensees.
  
  「但愿不要出生」---萨德的诅咒不像伊底普斯那么神圣。这个诅咒并没有带领他朝向众神，但是却在他的著作里获得不朽。他的著作永垂不朽，由杰宁朱力斯间接地跟我们显示，在隐藏它的书的字里行间，对它表示致敬。 假如我们想要相信他，在每所有价值的图书馆， 就像是圣克萊索斯盾的著作，或是巴斯卡的「沉思录」。
  
  But Sade's work is annoying, according to you—yes, like thieves at a fair—your honor and member of the Academie Franchise; but his work always suffices to bother you, one of you by the other, both one and the other, and one in the other.11
  
  但是萨德的著作是令人懊恼的，依照你的说法—没错， 就像市场的小偷—依照你作为法兰西学院的荣誉与成员。但是他的著作总是足够让你懊恼，你的某一部分被另外一部分，两个部分，及另外一个部分懊恼。
  
  A fantasy is, in effect, quite bothersome, since we do not know where to situate it due to the fact that it just sits there, complete in its nature as a fantasy, whose only reality is as [de] discourse and which expects nothing of your powers, asking you, rather, to square accounts with your own desires.
  
  实际上， 幻见是相当令人懊恼。因为我们不知道将它定位在哪里，由于这个事实： 它就位在那里。作为幻见， 它的特性非常完整。幻见的唯一现实性是作为论述，它并没有期望你的力量，相反地，它要求你跟你自己的欲望达成平衡。
  
  The reader should now reverentially approach those exemplary figures who,
  in the Sadean boudoir, assemble and disassemble in a carnival-act-like rite:
  "Change of positions."
  
  读者应该恭敬地走近那些作为典范的人物。他们在萨德的闺房，以一种嘉华年般的仪式，结合然后分开：「立场的交换」。
  
  It is a ceremonial pause, a sacred scansion.
  
  这是一种典礼的停顿，一种神圣的韵律节奏。
  
  Let us salute here the objects of the law, of which you will know nothing unless you know how to find your way around in the desires those objects cause.
  
  让我们在此对法则的那些客体致敬。对于法则的客体，你们将会一无所知， 除非你们知道如何找到你们的途径，在那些客体引起的欲望里。
  
  It is good to be charitable
  But to whom? That is the question.
  
  表现慈善是良好的
  但是对谁？那是个问题。
  
  A certain Monsieur Verdoux answered this question every day by putting women in an oven until he himself got the electric chair. He thought that his family wanted to live in greater comfort.
  
  有某一位勃斗先生每天回答这个问题。他将女人放在火炉上烤，直到他自己被送上电椅。 他认为他的家人想要过更舒适的生活。
  
  More enlightened, the Buddha offered himself up to be devoured by those who did not know the way.
  
  更加啟明地，佛陀提供他自己，给那些并不知道真理之道的人吞食掉。
  
  Despite this eminent patronage, which might well be based solely on a misunderstanding
  
  尽管这位名声卓著的佛陀，那可能仅是是基于一种误解。
  
  (it is not clear that a tigress enjoys eating Buddha), Verdoux's abnegation stemmed from an error that deserves to be dealt with severely, since a little lesson from the Critique, which does not cost much, would have helped him avoid it. No one doubts but that the practice of Reason would have been both more economical and more legal, even if his family would have had to go hungry now and then.
  
  （老虎是否享受吃掉佛陀，并不清楚），勃斗先生的自我捨弃起源于一种应该被严厉处理的错误。因为从「实践理性批判」有一个小小的教训。这个教训代价没有很大，但是本来可以帮助他避免它。没有人怀疑，理性的实践本来会更加精简，及更加合法，即使他的家人本来需要不时挨饿。
  
  "But what's with all these metaphors," you will say, "and why . . . ?"
  
  「但是你讲所有这些比喻，作什么用？」你会问，「为什么….?」
  
  The molecules that are monstrous insofar as they assemble here for an obscene jouissance, awaken us to the existence of other more ordinary jouissances
  encountered in life, whose ambiguities I have just mentioned. They are suddenly more respectable than these latter, appearing purer in their valences.
  
  在这里聚合的小分子，为了一个卑下的欢爽，是骇人听闻。它们让我们觉醒到其它更加普通的欢爽的存在。这些欢爽在生活中被遭遇到， 它们的曖昧性， 我刚刚提到。 它们比起这些后者，突然变得更加受人尊敬，在它们的次级品种里，显得更见纯洁。
  
  Desires . . . here are the only things that bind them, and they are exalted in making it clear that desire is the Other's desire.
  
  欲望…在此是唯一维繫它们的东西。他们乐意地清楚表达： 欲望就是大它者的欲望。
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  
  

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  2011-10-16 16:42:46 springhero

  Kant with Sade 010
  康德即萨德
  
  Jacques Lacan
  雅克、拉康
  
  If you have read my work up to this point, you know that, more accurately
  stated, desire is propped up by a fantasy, at least one foot [pied] of which is in
  the Other, and precisely the one that counts, even and above all if it happens
  to limp.
  
  假如你已经阅读我迄今的著作，你会知道，更加正确地陈述，幻见使欲望突然冒出来，至少有一隻脚上是大它者那里。重要的确实是这隻脚，甚至尤其是，它凑巧是跛脚。
  
  The object, as I have shown in Freudian experience—the object of desire,
  where we see it in its nakedness—is but the slag of a fantasy in which the subject
  does not come to after blacking out [syncope]. It is a case of necrophilia subject's vacillation].
  
  这个客体，如无在佛洛伊德的经验所显示的—欲望的客体，在那里，我们看见它赤裸的模样—这仅是幻见到溶渣。在那里，主体死亡之后，并没有来到那里。这是一个恋尸癖的恋栈。
  
  This is what makes it as ungraspable as is the object of the Law according
  to Kant. But here we suspect that a rapprochement is necessary: Doesn't the
  moral law represent desire in the case in which it is no longer the subject, but
  rather the object that is missing [fait defaut]?
  
  依照康德，这就是让它无法让人理解的原因，如同法则的客体。但是在此，我们怀疑， 友善关系的建立是需要的。道德法则难道不是代表欲望处于它不再是主体的情况，而是漏失的客体。
  
  Doesn't the subject—alone remaining present, in the form of the voice within, speaking nonsensically most of the time—seem to be adequately signified by the bar with which the signifier $ bastardizes him, that signifier being released from the fantasy ($＜＞a) from which it derive, in the two senses of the term [derive meaning both derives and drifts]?
  
  这个主体---仅是保持在现场，以内在声音的形式，大部分时间，无意义地言谈---主体似乎由这个禁制充分地表达，使用这个禁制，被禁制的能指私生下他，那个能指从幻见里被释放出来。从幻见那里，它「derive」，这是个双关语（ derive 意思是获得与飘浮）。
  
  Although this symbol returns the commandment from within at which Kant marvels to its rightful place, it opens our eyes to the encounter which, from Law to desire, goes further than the slipping away of their object, for both the Law and desire.
  
  虽然这个象征符号从内在回应这个命令。康德对它惊奇到无以复加。它让我们张开眼睛看到这个邂逅， 从法则到欲望， 这个邂逅前进更远，不仅从它们的客体滑走，对于法则与欲望两者。
  
  It is the encounter in which the ambiguity of the word "freedom" plays a part; the moralist, by grabbing freedom for himself, always strikes me as more impudent still than imprudent.
  
  在这个邂逅，「自由」这个字眼扮演模棱两可的角色。 道德家替自己捉住这个自由，是厚颜无耻，而不是不谨慎。
  
  But let us listen to Kant himself illustrate it once more:
  
  但是让我们倾听康德自己再一次说明它：
  
  Suppose someone alleges that his lustful inclination is quite irresistible to him when he encounters the favored object and the opportunity. [Ask him] whether, if in front of the house where he finds this opportunity a gallows were erected on which he would be strung up immediately after gratifying his lust, he would not then conquer his inclination.
  
  假如有某人宣称，当他邂逅他锺爱的客体与机会，他实在无法抗拒他的欲望倾向。请问他，假如在这栋房屋前面， 他发现这个机会， 但是有个吊刑架被竖立在那里， 当他一旦满足欲望之后，马上会被吊死，他会不会克服他的欲望倾向。
  
  One does not have to guess long what he would reply. But ask him whether, if his
  prince demanded, on the threat of the same prompt penalty of death,12 that he give false testimony against an honest man whom the prince would like to ruin under specious pretenses, he might consider it possible to overcome his love of life, however great it may be.
  
  我们不需要猜测很久，对于他会怎么回答。但是请问他，假如他的亲王要求，同样面临马上会有死刑的威胁，他应该给予虚假的证词，反对一位亲王想要毁灭的诚实的人，在光明堂皇的名称下。他可能会认为克服他的生命之爱是可能，无论他多么爱他的生命。
  
  He will perhaps not venture to assure us whether or not he would overcome that love, but he must concede without hesitation that doing so would be possible for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he is conscious that he ought to do it, and he cognizes freedom within himself— the freedom with which otherwise, without the moral law, he would have remained unacquainted.13
  
  他或许不敢告诉我们，他是否会克服那种爱，但是他必须毫不犹豫地承认，这样做对于他是可能的。 因此，他判断，他能够做某件事情， 因为他意识到，他应该做它。他组织他内部的自由—否则他本来不会知道他拥有这个自由， 假如没有道德的法则。
  
  The first response that is presumed to be given here by a subject, about whom we are first told that a great deal transpires by means of words, gives me the impression that we are not being given the letter [of what he said ] when that is the crux of the matter. For the fact is that, in order to express it, Kant prefers to rely on someone whose sense of shame we would, in any case, risk offending, for in no case would he stoop so low: namely, the ideal bourgeois to whom Kant elsewhere declares that he takes his hat off, no doubt in order to counter Fontenelle, the overly gallant centenarian.14
  
  第一个回答被认为在此是被一位主体发出。关于这个主体，我们首先被告诉，许多会透露出来。这个回答给予我这个印象： 我们并没有给予这个「他所说内容」的文字，当那是事情的关键。因为事实上， 为了表达它， 康德宁可依靠某个人，他的羞愧感，我们无论如何会冒险冒犯。因为他无论如何不会屈服得如此低：换句话说，那就是理想的布尔乔亚阶级。对于这种人，康德宣称说，他脱帽致敬，无可置疑地， 为了反击范滕内勒，这位过分英勇的百岁老人。
  
  We will excuse the hoodlum, then, from having to testify under oath. But it is possible that a partisan of passion, who would be blind enough to combine it with questions of honor, would make trouble for Kant by forcing him to recognize that no occasion precipitates certain people more surely toward their goal than one that involves defiance of or even contempt for the gallows.
  
  我们将会原谅这位无赖，因为他必须在誓言下作证。但是这是可能的，一位激情的党人，将会足够盲目地把它跟荣誉的问题混为一谈。他会强迫他承认，当一个牵涉到要挑衅死刑吊架，或甚至藐视死刑吊架，这个场合最后促成他朝着他们的理想勇往直前。这种情况会让康德无法解释。
  
  For the gallows is not the Law, nor can the gallows be wheeled in by the Law here. Only the police have the necessary trucks, and while the police can be the State, as Hegel says, the Law is something else, as we have known since Antigone.
  
  因为死刑吊架并不是法则，死刑吊架也不能够被法则推到这里。只有警察才有这些必须的車辆。虽然警察能够代表国家， 如同黑格尔所说， 法律是别的东西。如同自从安提戈尼以来。
  
  Kant, besides, does not contradict this with his apologue. The gallows is brought in merely so that he can attach to it, along with the subject, his love of life.
  
  除外，康德并没有以他寓言教训反驳这一点。死刑吊架被带进来，仅是为了让他能够将他的生命之爱跟它联系一起，跟主体在一起。
  
  Now, this is what the desire in the maxim Et non propter vitam Vivendi perdere cansas can become in a moral being, rising, precisely because he is moral, to the rank of a categorical imperative, assuming he has his back to the wall [aupieddu mur]—which is precisely where he is forced here.
  
  现在，这就是在这个格言「Et non propter vitam Vivendi perdere cansas」，欲望在一位道德之人身上会成为的样子，确实是因为他是道德的，提升到范畴命令的地位， 假定他背对着墙壁---这确实是他被迫在那里的地方。
  
  Desire, what is called desire, suffices to make life meaningless if it turns someone into a coward. And when law is truly present, desire does not stand up, but that is because law and repressed desire are one and the same thing—which is precisely what Freud discovered. We are ahead at halftime, professor.
  
  欲望，所谓的欲望，足够让生命成为没有意义，假如它将某个人转变成为懦夫。当法律确实存在， 欲望并没有站起来，但是这是因为法律及被压抑的欲望是完全同样的东西---这确实是佛洛伊德发现的。教授，我们超过中场休息时间。
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  
  

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  2011-10-16 20:38:11 springhero

  Kant with Sade 011
  康德即萨德
  
  Jacques Lacan
  雅克、拉康
  
  Let us chalk up our success to the infantry, the key to the game, as we know.
  
  让我们将我们的成功归属于婴儿时期，我们知道，这是棋戏的关键。
  
  For we have not brought in either our knight—which would have been easy,
  since it would be Sade, whom we believe to be qualified enough here—our
  bishop, our rook (human rights, freedom of thought, your body is your property),
  or our queen, an appropriate figure with which to designate the daring
  deeds of courtly love.
  
  因为我们没有带进「仕」，那本来会很容易。因为那时萨德，我们相信他在此有充分资格---我们的「主教」我们的「车」（ 人权， 思想自由， 你的身体是你的财产），或是我们的「皇后」。她是一个适当的人物。用这个人物，我们用来指明骑士之爱的勇敢行为。
  
  This would have involved moving too many people for a less certain result.
  
  这本来会牵动太多的人们，为了一个比较不确定的结果。
  
  For if I claim that for a few bantering remarks, Sade risked—knowing full
  well what he was doing (consider what he did with his "outings," whether
  licit or illicit)—imprisonment in the Bastille for a third of his lifetime (it was
  rather well-aimed banter, no doubt, but all the more demonstrative with respect to its recompense), I'll have Pinel and his Pinelopies taking aim at me.
  
  因为假如我宣称，对于几句逗笑的谈论，萨德冒险---他充分知道他正在做什么（ 考虑一下他所作所为，用他的「外出」，无论是合法或不合法）---他冒着一生的三分之一岁月，被囚禁在巴斯底狱的危险，（无可置疑，那是目标明确的逗笑，但是受到的惩罚更加明确），我将派尼尔跟他的同伙目标瞄准我。
  
  Moral madness, the latter opine. In any case, a fine affair it is! I am reminded
  to show respect for Pinel, to whom we owe one of the noblest steps of
  humanity. "Thirteen years in Charenton for Sade were, however, part of this
  step," [I retort]. "But he should not have been sent there," [I am told].
  
  道德的疯狂，是后者的信仰。 无论如何， 那是多么好的一件事！ 我被提醒要对派尼尔表示尊敬， 我们将人类最高贵的一个进步归功于他。 「可是，对于萨德而言，十三年被囚禁在查仁顿监狱，是这个进步的部分，」（容我反驳）。「但是他本来不应该被送去那里。」我听说。
  
  "That's the whole point," [I continue]. It was Pinel's step that led him there.
  
  「这是整个重点，」(容我继续说)。那是派尼尔採取的步骤，导致他在那里。
  
  His place, and all thinkers agree on this point, was elsewhere. But there you have it: those who think clearly [quipensent Hen] think that his place was outside, and the right-thinking [les bien-pensants], starting with Royer-Collard, who demanded it at the time, wanted him condemned to hard-labor, if not to the scaffold. This is precisely why Pinel was an important moment in the history of thought.
  
  他的位置，所有的思想家都同意这一点， 是在别的地方。但是在那里，你宣称这是事实： 那些思想清楚的人认为， 他的位置是在外面， 正确的思想从罗伊、科拉得开始，当时他要求正确的思想，要他被判劳苦工作， 即使不是上死刑吊架。 这确实是为什么派尼尔在思想史上是一个重要的运动。
  
  Willy-nilly, he supported the destruction, on the right and the left, by thought of freedoms that the Revolution had just promulgated in the very name of thought.
  
  无论愿意不愿意，他都支持由法国大革命宣扬的自由思想，以思想的名义，给予左右两派的的这个毁灭。
  
  For if we consider human rights from the vantage point of philosophy, we see what, in any case, everyone now knows about their truth. They boil down to the freedom to desire in vain.
  
  因为假如我们考虑人权，从哲学的宏观来看，我们看到，无论如何，每个人现在都知道有关他们的真理。他们徒劳地将人权精简为欲望的自由。
  
  A lot of good that does us [Belle jambe]\ But it gives us an opportunity to recognize in it the impulsive \de prime-saut] freedom we saw earlier, and to confirm that it is clearly the freedom to die.
  
  这可对我们有很大的益处。但是它给们一个机会在里面体认到，我们早先看到这个冲动的自由，并且确认它显见就是死亡的自由。
  
  But it also gives us the opportunity to be frowned upon by those who find
  it low in nutritional value. They are plentiful in our time. We see here the
  renewed conflict between needs and desires in which, as if by chance, it is the
  Law that empties the shell [qui vide Uecaille].
  
  但是这也给予我们这个机会，遭受那些的人反对，他们把这个死亡的自由，当著无甚营养价值。这种人在我们这个时代甚多。我们在此看到，处于需要与欲望之间谍这个重新开始的冲突。在这个冲突里，好像巧合地， 是法律将这个自由的贝壳掏空掉。
  
  To counter Kant's apologue, courtly love offers us a no less tempting path, but it requires us to be erudite. To be erudite by one's position is to bring on the attack of the erudites, and in this field that is tantamount to the entrance of the clowns.
  
  为了反驳康德的教训，骑士之爱提供我们一个同样的迷人的途径，但是它要求我们要知识广博。 对于自己立场知识广博，就是要对博学者从事攻击，而且是在相当等于就是小丑的入口的领域。
  
  Kant could very easily make us lose our serious demeanor here already
  since he hasn't the slightest sense of comedy (this is proved by what he says
  about it when he discusses it).
  
  康德很容易就让我们丧失我们在此已经具有的认真的风度。因为他丝毫没有喜剧的滑稽感。 （可由他讨论问题时，所说的话获得证明。）
  
  But someone who has no sense of comedy whatsoever is Sade, as has been
  pointed out. This topic could perhaps be fatal to him, but a preface is not
  designed to do the author a disservice.15
  
  但是某个根本没有喜剧滑稽感的人是萨德，如同我们所指出的。 这个主题可能对于他是致命的，但是一篇序言并不是被设计来毁谤作者。
  
  Let us thus turn to the second stage of Kant's apologue. It no more proves his
  point than the first stage did. For assuming that Kant's helot here has the slightest
  presence of mind, he will ask Kant if perchance it would be his duty to bear
  true witness were this the means by which the tyrant could satisfy his desire Should he say that the innocent man is a Jew, for example, if he truly is one, before a tribunal (we have seen such situations) that considers this a punishable offense?
  
  让我们因此回到康德的教训的第二阶段。它不像在第一阶段那样证明他的论点。 因为假如康德的农奴有丝毫的冷静心态，他将会问康德，或许这将是他的义务，来作真实的见证，假如这就是暴君能够满足他的欲望的这个工具。万一他说，譬如，这位纯真的人是犹太人，假如他确实是犹太人， 在法庭的面前，（我们曾经看见过这样的情况）， 这个法庭会认为这是一个可处罚的罪吗？
  
  Or that he is an atheist, when it is quite possible that he himself has a better grasp on the import of the accusation than a consistory that simply wants to establish a file?
  
  或者他是一位无神论者， 很有可能，他自己会有比较好的理解，对于这个控诉的意义，比一个仅是想要建立档案的宗教法庭？
  
  And in the case of some deviation from "the party line," will he plead that this deviation is not guilty at a time and a place where the name of the game is autocritique? Why wouldn't he?
  
  在某些偏离「党派路线」的情况，他会答辩说：在这个棋戏的名称是自我批判的时刻与地方时，这个偏离不算是犯罪吗？为什么他不是犯罪呢？
  
  After all, is an innocent man ever completely spotless? Will he say what he knows?
  We could make the maxim that one must counter a tyrant's desire into a duty, if a tyrant is someone who appropriates the power to enslave the Other's desire.
  
  畢竟，一位无辜的人是完全没有过失吗？他将会说他知道的内容吗？ 我们能够发表这个格言:我们必须阻挡暴君的欲望成为义务，假如一位暴君是某位篡夺权力，来奴役大它者的欲望。
  
  Thus with regard to the two examples (and the precarious mediation between them) that Kant uses as a lever to show that the Law weighs in the scales not only pleasure but also pain, happiness and even the burden of abject poverty, not to mention the love of life—in short, everything pathological— it turns out that desire can have not only the same success but can obtain it more legitimately.
  
  因此，关于这两个例子，（ 它们中间不稳定的调和），康德使用来充当槓干，显示： 法律在天枰上不仅衡量欢乐，也衡量痛苦，快乐，甚至是卑下贫穷的负担，更不用说， 对于生命之爱---总之， 每一样受到经验沾染的东西---结果证明是： 欲望能够拥有不但是相同的成功， 而且能够获更加合法地得它。
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  

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  2011-10-17 10:40:59 springhero

  Kant with Sade 012
  康德即萨德
  
  Jacques Lacan
  雅克、拉康
  
  But if the credence we lent the Critique due to the alacrity of its argumentation
  owed something to our desire to know where it was heading, can't the
  ambiguity of this success turn the movement back toward a revising of the
  concessions we unwittingly made?
  
  但是假如我们借给于「实践理性批判」的推崇，由于归属某件东西给我们欲望的论点的灵活，为了要知道它会引导到哪里。这种成功的模棱两可难道不会将这个运动回转来修订我们很不机智所做的让步？
  
  For example, the disgrace that rather quickly befell all objects that were
  proposed as goods [Hens] because they were incapable of achieving a harmony
  of wills: simply because they introduce competition. Such was the case
  of Milan, about which both Charles V and Francois I knew what it cost them
  for each to see the same good in it.
  
  例如，相当快速降临在所有客体的羞辱，被建议充当货物，因为它们不能够完成一种意志的和谐：仅是因为它们介绍競争。米兰的情况就是如此， 关于米兰，查理四世及法兰克斯一世知道，他们要花费什么代价，才能让每个人看到里面的相同的好处。
  
  For that is clearly to misrecognize the status of the object of desire.
  
  因为那显见是误认欲望客体的地位。
  
  I can introduce its status here only by reminding you what I teach about desire, which must be formulated as the Other's desire [desir de VAutre] since it is originally desire for what the Other desires [desir de son desir].
  
  我能够介绍这个地位，仅是从提醒你们我教导的关于欲望。这个欲望必须被说明为大它者的欲望。因为它原先是对于大它者所欲望的欲望。
  
  This is what makes the harmony of desires conceivable, but not devoid of danger. For when desires line up in a chain that resembles the procession of Breughel's blind
  men, each one, no doubt, has his hand in the hand of the one in front of him, but no one knows where they are all going.
  
  这就是为什么欲望的和谐会被构想，但并不是没有危险。因为当欲望排队成一锁链，类似布鲁格尔的盲人的行列。无可置疑的，每个人手牵着前面的人的手，但是没有人知道他们前往哪里。
  
  Now, in retracing their steps, they all clearly experience a universal rule, but this is because they do not know any more about it.
  
  现在，重新追踪他们的步骤，他们都清楚地经验到一种普遍性的规则，但这是因为他们再也不知道它。
  
  Would the solution in keeping with practical reason be that they go around in circles?
  
  跟实践理性一致的结果，会是他们不断地绕圈子转吗？
  
  Even when lacking, the gaze is clearly the object that presents each desire with its universal rule, by materializing its cause, in binding to it the subject's division "between center and absence."
  
  甚至当欠缺时， 眼光显见就是呈现每个欲望的这个客体，带着它的普遍性原则，具体化它的原因，将它连接到「中心与欠缺」之间的分裂。
  
  Let us therefore confine ourselves to saying that a practice like psychoanalysis,
  which takes desire as the subject's truth, cannot misrecognize what follows
  without demonstrating what it represses.
  
  让我们因此限制我们自己说： 像精神分析的实践，将欲望作为主体的真理，不可能误认后面跟随的东西，而不证明它潜抑什么。
  
  In psychoanalysis, displeasure is understood to provide a pretext for repressing
  desire, displeasure arising, as it does, along the pathway of desire 's satisfaction;
  but displeasure is also understood to provide the form this very satisfaction takes in the return of the repressed.
  
  在精神分析，不愉快被了解，为了供养一个藉口，作为潜抑欲望，不愉快产生，如同它沿着欲望的满足的途径产生。但是不愉快也被了解是供应满足採取得这个形式，在受潜抑的欲望回来。
  
  Similarly, pleasure redoubles its aversion when it recognizes the law, by supporting the desire to comply with it that constitutes defense.
  
  同样地，快乐重复产生它的厌恶，当它体认出这个法则，支持欲望忠实于法则，组成防卫。
  
  If happiness means that the subject finds uninterrupted pleasure in his life, as the Critique of Practical Reason defines it quite classically,16 it is clear that happiness is denied to whomever does not renounce the pathway of desire.
  
  假如快乐意味着，主体发现没有被中断的快乐在他的人生里，如同「实践理性的批判」相当古典地定义它。显而易见地， 快乐被拒绝给予没有抛弃欲望途径的人。
  
  This renunciation can be willed, but at the cost of man's truth, which is quite
  clear from the disapproval of those who upheld the common ideal that the
  Epicureans, and even the Stoics, met with. Their ataraxia deposed their wisdom.
  
  这种抛弃能够被意愿获得，但是要花费人的真理作代价。这是相当显而易见，根据支持共同理想的那些人，伊壁鸠鲁学派，甚至史陀亚禁欲学派所遭遇的。他们的「安详心灵」证明他们的智慧。
  
  We fail to realize that they degraded desire; and not only do we not consider the Law to be commensurably exalted by them, but it is precisely because of this degrading of desire that, whether we know it or not, we sense that they cast down the Law.
  
  我们没有体会到，他们贬低欲望。我们不但没有认为法则被欲望均称地提升，而是确实是因为贬低欲望，无论我们知道与否，我们才感觉到，欲望击败法则。
  
  Sade, the former aristocrat, takes up Saint--Just right where one should.
  
  萨德，这位先前的贵族，从事正义圣人的行为，就在我们应该所在地地方。
  
  The proposition that happiness has become a political factor is incorrect. It has always been a political factor and will bring back the scepter and the censer that make do with it very well.
  
  快乐已经成为政治的因素，这个命题是不正确的。快乐一向总是一个政治的因素，将会带回这个统治权杖及香炉，它们将就地使用它。
  
  Rather, it is the freedom to desire that is a new factor, not because it has inspired a revolution—people have always fought and died for a desire—but because this revolution wants its struggle to be for the freedom of desire.
  
  相反地，欲望的自由才是一个新的因素。不是因为它曾经啟发一次的革命---人们总是为了欲望而战斗及死亡---而是因为这次革命想要它的奋斗是为了欲望的自由。
  
  Consequently, the revolution also wants the law to be free, so free that it
  must be a widow, the Widow par excellence, the one that sends your head to
  the basket if it so much as balks regarding the matter at hand. Had Saint-
  Just's head remained full of the fantasies in Organt, Thermidor might have
  been a triumph for him.
  
  结果， 革命也想要法律自由，如此地自由，以致于它必须是个寡妇，最佳的寡妇。这位寡妇会将你的头丢到篮子里，假如它对手边的事情，畏首畏尾。假如正义圣人的头在他的史诗「奥钢特」，始终充满幻见，索米得可能对他老早就是胜利。
  
  Were the right to jouissance recognized, it would consign the domination of the pleasure principle to an obsolete era. In enunciating this right, Sade imperceptibly displaces for each of us the ancient axis of ethics, which is but the egoism of happiness
  
  假如欢爽的权利被体认到，它会将快乐原则的支配委托给过去的时代。 当萨德表达这个权利时，他不知不觉地替我们更换这个伦理学的古代轴心。那仅是快乐的自我主义。
  
  One cannot say that every reference to it is eliminated in Kant's work, given the very familiarity with which it accompanies him, and still more given the offshoots of it seen in the exigencies that make him argue both for some retribution in the hereafter and progress in this world.
  
  我们无法说，每个提到欲望的指称，在康德的著作里都被减少，假如考虑到，欲望伴随康德，也是耳熟能详。尤其考虑到，欲望的衍生物，从让他主张的迫切性看得出来。他主张在死后的报答及这个世界的进步。
  
  Should another happiness be glimpsed whose name I first uttered, the status
  of desire would change, demanding a reexamination of it.
  
  万一有另外一种快乐被瞥见，它的名字我首先表达的，欲望的地位将会改变，要求对于它重新审视。
  
  But it is here that something must be gauged. How far does Sade lead us in the experience of this jouissance, or simply of its truth?
  
  但是在此，某件东西必须被衡量。在这个欢爽的经验，萨德引导我们走多远？ 或仅仅就是欢爽的真理的经验？
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  

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  2011-10-18 02:25:40 springhero

  Kant with Sade 013
  康德即萨德
  
  Jacques Lacan
  雅克 拉康
  
  For the human pyramids he describes, which are fabulous insofar as they
  demonstrate the cascading nature of jouissance, these water buffets of desire
  built so that jouissance makes the Villa d'Este Gardens sparkle with a
  baroque voluptuousness—the higher they try to make jouissance spurt up
  into the heavens, the more insistently the question "What is it that is flowing
  here?" demands to be answered.
  
  对于他所描述的人类金字塔，是难以置信的，因为他证明欢爽具有倾泄的特性。这些欲望的饮食店被建造，这样欢爽才会是别墅花园洋溢着肉欲的花团锦簇---他们尝试使欢爽喷射进入天庭越高，「在此流露出的是什么」的这个问题，越是持续地要求被回答。
  
  Unpredictable quanta by which the love/hate atom glistens in the vicinity of the Thing from which man emerges through a cry, what is experienced, beyond certain limits, has nothing to do with what desire is propped up by in fantasy, which is in fact constituted on the basis of these limits.
  
  不可预测的总量，憑藉它们，爱与恨的原子闪亮在「真实界」的附近。从那里，人透过苦喊出现，所被经验的东西，超越某些限制，跟在幻见里欲望突然被冒出的东西，丝毫没有关系。事实上，幻见是根据这些限制所构成。
  
  We know that Sade went beyond these limits in real life.
  
  我们知道，萨德在现实生活里，超越这些限制。
  
  Otherwise, he probably would not have given us this blueprint of his fantasy
  in his work.
  
  否则，他本来可能不会在他的著作里，给予我们他的幻见到蓝图。
  
  Perhaps I will surprise people when I call into question what his work also
  tries to convey of this real experience.
  
  或许，我将让人们惊讶，当我质疑他的著作也根据他的真实经验，尝试要表达的东西。
  
  Confining our attention to the bedroom, for a rather lively glimpse of a girl's feelings about her mother, the fact remains that wickedness \mechancete\ so suitably situated by Sade in its transcendence, does not teach us much that is new here about her changes of heart.
  
  我们深刻地瞥见一个女孩对于她的母亲的感觉，这个事实始终存在，萨德如此适当地将邪恶定位在它的超验的位置。但是将我们的注意力限制在床上，并没有教导我们新的东西，关于她的心灵的改变。
  
  A work that wishes to be bad [mechant] cannot allow itself to be a bad piece of work, and one has to admit that Philosophy in the Bedroom leaves itself open to this ironic remark by a whole strain of good works found in it. It's a little too preachy.
  
  希望表现坏心肠的作品，不可能容许它本身是一部差劲的著作。我们必须承认， 「床上哲学」让它自己本身承受这个反讽的评论，由于在里面，我们发现整套好作品的气质。 它有点在宣扬真理。
  
  Of course, it is a treatise on the education of girls17 and it is subject, as such, to the laws of a genre. Despite its merit of bringing to light the "anal sadism" that obsessively permeated this subject for the two preceding centuries, it remains a treatise on education. The victim is bored to death by the preaching and the teacher is full of himself.
  
  当然，这是一篇有关十七岁女孩的教育的论文。论文的本身隶属于艺术的法则。尽管它具有啟明「肛门虐待狂」的优点，在先前两个世纪，这种肛门虐待狂的主题，令人著迷地弥漫不己，可是这始终是一篇教育的论文。受害者对于宣导的内容无聊得要死，而老师却興趣盎然。
  
  The historical or, better, erudite information here is dreary and makes us miss someone like La Mothe-le-Vayer. The physiology contained in it is made up of wet nurses' notions, and as for what might pass for sex education one has the impression that one is reading a modern medical treatise on the subject, which says it all.
  
  在此的历史资讯，或更精确地说是广征博引，是沉闷的。它让我们怀念某个像马德列瓦这样的人。 在里面包括的生理学，由软弱无力的護理观念组成。至于可能被认为的性教育，我们的印象是: 我们是在阅读一篇有关这个主题的现代的医学论文，这道尽了一切。
  
  More coherence in his scandal would help him see, in the usual impotence
  of educational intentions, the very impotence against which fantasy here
  fights—whence arises the obstacle to every valid account of the effects of
  education, since what brought about the results cannot be admitted to in discussing
  the intention.
  
  在他的丑闻里，比较一贯的东西会让他看出，他的教育意图，通常是无力的。在此的幻见对抗这种无力感—从那里产生这个阻碍，无法有效地描述教育的影响。因为导致这些结果的东西， 在讨论教育意图时，无法被容许。
  
  This remark [trait] would have been priceless, due to the praiseworthy effects of sadistic impotence. The fact that Sade failed to make it gives us pause for thought.
  
  这个谈论本来会是无价之宝，由于虐待狂的无力感的影响，是令人赞赏的。萨德表达不出这种虐待狂的无力感，这个事实让我们不禁掷卷三思。
  
  His failure here is confirmed by another that is no less remarkable: The work never presents us with a successful seduction in which his fantasy would nevertheless find its crowning glory—that is, a seduction in which the victim, even if she were at her last gasp, would consent to her tormentor's intention, or even join his side in the fervor of her consent.
  
  他在此的无能为力，由另外一种同样显著的无能为力证实。 这部作品 从来没有呈现给我们，具有成功的诱拐。可是，在诱拐里，他的幻见会风华正茂地呈现—换句话说，在这种诱拐里，受害者，虽然她奄奄一息，会同意她的折磨者的意图，或甚至加入他那一边，来赞同她的同意。
  
  This demonstrates from another vantage point that desire is the flip side of the law. In the Sadean fantasy, we see how they support each other. For Sade, one is always on the same side, the good or the bad; no wrongdoing can change that. It is thus the triumph of virtue: This paradox merely comes down to the derision characteristic of edifying books, the kind Justine aims at too much not to have adopted it.
  
  从另外一个宏观角度，这证明，欲望是法律的另一面。在萨德的幻见里， 我们看到，它们如何互相支持。 对于萨德，我们总是在相同的一边， 好或坏的一边。没有一种错误的行为能够改变它。 它因此是品德的胜利。这个矛盾仅仅变成具有教化特性的书籍反讽。 这位「善心的贾斯丁」意图太多，反讽对他是当之无愧。
  
  Apart from the nose that twitches, which we find at the end of The Dialogue of a Priest with a Dying Man, a posthumous work (admit that this is a subject hardly suited to other graces than divine grace), a lack of witticisms— and, one might say, more broadly, of the wit*, the need for which Alexander Pope had, over a century before, already indicated—makes itself felt at times in Sade's work.
  
  除了抽蓄的鼻子，我们在「僧侣对垂死的人的对话」里，找到一本死后留下的作品（ 我们承认，最适合于这个主题的恩典，莫过于神的恩典），这个作品欠缺机智话语---我们不妨说， 更广义的机锋话语。在一个世纪以前，亚历山大，波普曾经採用这种机锋话语，已经指示过。在萨德的著作里，这种机锋话语不时光芒显现。
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  

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• 

  2011-10-18 07:47:44 Herr.Nos (敦兮其若朴，旷兮其若谷！)

  雄伯老师，我也准备翻译《康德同萨德》~

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• 

  2011-10-18 10:08:28 springhero

  拉康的seminar 有二十几本之多。我建议我们用分工方式翻译。已翻译部分，你用法文校正即可。否则大部人对拉康，难窥全貌。
  雄伯

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• 

  2011-10-18 14:57:32 springhero

  Kant with Sade 014
  康德即萨德
  
  Jacques Lacan
  雅克 拉康
  
  This is obviously forgotten owing to the invasion of pedantry that has weighed on French letters since W.W. II.*
  
  这一点显而易见被遗忘，由于卖弄博学的侵犯，自从二次大战以来，一直沉重地压在法国文学里。
  
  But if you need a strong stomach to follow Sade when he recommends calumny, the first article of morality that he would institute in his republic, one might prefer that he add the spice of someone like Renan. "Let us be thankful," the latter writes, "that Jesus encountered no law against insulting a whole class of citizens. For the Pharisees would have been inviolable."18 Renan continues:
  
  但是假如你们需要强大胃肠，才能遵照萨德，当他推荐毁谤，这是他在共和国发表的第一篇道德文章。「让我们感谢，」后者写道，「耶稣没有遭遇任何法律禁止辱骂一整个阶级的公民。因为法利赛人本来是不可亵渎的。」雷南继续说：
  
  His exquisite mockery and magic provocations always hit home. The Nessus-tunic of ridicule that the Jew, the son of the Pharisees, has been dragging in tatters behind him for eighteen centuries, was woven by Jesus with divine skill.
  
  他的精致的嘲讽及魔术般的挑衅总是一针见血。 像神话里有毒内褡般的嘲讽，法利赛人的儿子，犹太人死后一直带着，那是耶稣以神的技巧编织。
  
  A masterpiece of high-level mockery, his scathing remarks have become burned into the flesh of the hypocrite and of the falsely devout. Incomparable remarks, worthy of a Son of God! Only a God knows how to kill in this fashion. Socrates and Moliere merely graze the skin. Jesus carries fire and rage into the very depths of one's bones.19
  
  一部高层次嘲讽的杰作，他的尖锐的评论已经燃烧化为伪君子与假冒的信徒的肉身! 只有上帝知道，如何以这种方式杀死。苏格拉底与莫里哀仅是刮伤外皮而已。耶稣则是怒火交加地，直探骨髓之内。
  
  For these remarks derive their value from the sequel that we know, I mean his vocation as an Apostle from the rank of the Pharisees and the universal triumph
  of Pharisaic virtues.
  
  因为这些评论获得他们的价值，从我们知道的接续，我指的是他从法利赛人的立场，及法利赛人品德的普遍获得胜利，作为使徒的使命。
  
  This, you will agree, lends itself to an argument that is more relevant than the rather sorry excuse that Sade is content with in his apology for calumny—namely, that an honest man will always triumph over it.
  
  你们将会同意，这会有助于一个论点。比起萨德在他对于毁谤的答辩，感到心满意足的遗憾藉口，这个论点更加有关联。也就是， 一位诚实的人总会战胜它。
  
  This platitude does not encumber the somber beauty that radiates from this monument of challenges. This beauty evinces the experience that I am seeking behind the make-believe quality [fabulation] of the fantasy: it is a tragic experience, insofar as it projects its condition here in a light [that comes] from beyond all fear and pity.
  
  这种陈腔滥调并没有阻碍，从挑战的的这个钜作，洋溢出慘淡光辉的美丽。这种美丽显示，我正在幻见到伪装特质背后寻求的经验。 这是一个悲剧的经验，因为它从超越所有的恐惧与同情的光辉，投射它在此的情境。
  
  Bewilderment and shadows, such is the conjunction, unlike that found in jokes,20 that fascinates us in these scenes with its ember-like brilliance.
  
  困惑与阴影，是它们结合的情境，不像我们在笑话中所找到的困惑与阴影的结合。在这些场景里，这些笑话以其困惑与阴影的结合，让我们迷惑不已。
  
  This tragedy is of the kind that becomes clearer later on in the century in more than one work, whether erotic novel or religious drama. I would call it senile tragedy; until I said so, no one realized, except schoolboys in their jokes, that it is but a stone's throw from noble tragedy. To see what I mean, read Claudel's trilogy, Le Pere humilie.
  
  这个悲剧属于在本世纪稍后变成明朗的那种，不仅在一部作品里，无论是色情小说，或是宗教剧。我将称它为老迈的悲剧，直到我这样说， 没有人体会到， 除了学童们的笑话。 他距离高贵的悲剧，仅是一石之掷那么近。为了明白我的意思，请阅读克劳帖尔的三部曲，「Le Pere humilie. 」。
  
  (To see what I mean, one should also know that I have shown that this trilogy contains the characteristics of the most authentic tragedy. It is Melpomene who, along with Clio, is decrepit, without our knowing which one will bury the other.)
  
  （为了明白我的意思，我们应该也知道，我曾经显示，这部三部曲包括最真实悲剧的特性。梅坡敏与克立奥，两人都垂垂老矣，我们不知道，他们谁要替谁办考别式.
  
  We are now finally enjoined to examine Sade, My Neighbor, the invocation of which we owe to the perspicacity of Pierre Klossowski. Being extreme, his perspicacity has no need to resort to the same things as the highbrow literati.
  
  现在我们被嘱咐要检视「萨德，我的邻人」。我们将这个祈愿归功于科洛索斯基的洞察力。 因为他的洞察力发挥到极端，它没有需要诉诸于跟高品味的文学同样的东西。
  
  It is undoubtedly Klossowski's discretion that makes him justify his formulation
  with a reference to Saint Labre. I do not, however, feel inclined to give it the same justification.
  
  无可置疑的，科洛索斯基的谨慎，使他对自己的说明振振有词，关于拉布乐圣人。可是，我并不觉得倾向于给予它相同的认可道理。
  
  My structural reference points make it easy to grasp that the Sadean fantasy
  is better situated among the stays of Christian ethics than elsewhere.
  
  我的结构性指称点让人很容易理解： 萨德的幻见的位置最好定位在基督教的伦理学的内部，而不是别的地方。
  
  But what must be kept in mind is that Sade himself refuses to be my neighbor, not so that I can refuse to be his neighbor in turn but so as to recognize the meaning of his refusal here.
  
  但是我们必须记住的是，萨德自己本人拒绝成为我的邻人，不是为了我能够拒绝当他的邻人，而是为了体认出他在此拒绝的意义。
  
  In my view, Sade does not have neighborly enough relations with his own malice [mechancete] to encounter his neighbor in it, a characteristic he shares with many people and with Freud, in particular. For this is indeed the only reason why beings, who are sometimes experienced, back away from the Christian commandment.
  
  依我的观点，萨德跟他自己的恶意，并没有处理好足够的邻人关系，来跟邻人在那里相遇。 这个特性，他跟许多人们一样共有，特别是佛洛伊德。因为这确实是唯一的理由，为什么人类，有时是很有经验的人，会地基督教的戒律望而却步。
  
  We see what is, to my mind, the crucial test of this in Sade's rejection of the death penalty, the history of which would suffice to prove, if not its logic, at least that it is one of the correlates of Charity.
  
  我们明白，在萨德拒绝死刑时，我心目中，这是最重要的东西。 死刑的历史，即使不是死刑的逻辑，至少足以证明：死刑是慈善的共同因素之一。
  
  Sade thus stopped at the point where desire and the law become bound up
  with each other [se noue].
  
  萨德因此停在这里：欲望与法律互相交织的地方。
  
  If something in him let itself remain tied to the law in order to take the
  opportunity, mentioned by Saint Paul, to become inordinately sinful, who
  would cast the first stone? But Sade went no further.
  
  假如在他身上有某件东西，让他保持跟法律紧连， 为了捉住这个机会，圣保罗提到的机会， 成为放纵的原罪，谁会对他抛掷第一块石头？但是萨德对于这一点适可而止。
  
  It is not simply that his flesh is weak, as it is for each of us; it is that the
  spirit is too willing not to be deluded. His apology for crime merely impels
  him to an oblique acceptance of the Law. The Supreme Being is restored in
  Evil Action [le Malefice].
  
  仅仅是因为他的肉体是软弱的，如同我们每一个人的肉体都是软弱。 因为精神的意愿太强，无法被欺骗。他对犯罪的辩解仅仅驱使他模糊地接纳法律。 在「邪恶的行动」里， 「崇高的生命实存」被恢复。
  
  Listen to him praise his technique of immediately implementing whatever comes into his head, thinking too that by replacing repentance with reiteration he can be done with the law within. To encourage us to follow his example, he comes up with nothing better than the promise that nature, woman that she is, will magically give us ever more.
  
  倾听他对于他善于马上利用脑海的灵感的技巧的赞美。他认为，憑藉以重犯取代悔改， 他能够跟内在的法律作一了断。 为了鼓励我们遵照他的榜样， 他构想出没有比这个诺言更好的东西：自然天性，因为是个女人，她会给予我们越来越多的东西。
  
  We would be foolish to have faith in this typical dream of potency. It indicates to us clearly enough, in any case, that it cannot be true that Sade, as Klossowski suggests — all the while noting that he does not believe it—achieved the sort of apathy that involves having "returned to nature's bosom, in the waking state, in our world" inhabited by language.
  
  假如我们信仰能力的这种典型梦想，我们将是个傻瓜。无论如何，它足够清楚地跟我们指示：这不可能是真实的，萨德，如同科洛索斯基所建议---他始终注意到，他并不相信这种能力。萨德完成这种牵涉到「回归自然天性的怀抱」时的冷漠，在清醒的时刻，在我们被语言驻居的世界。
  
  I have forbidden myself to say a word about what Sade is missing here. Let
  it be sensed in the climax of Philosophy in the Bedroom, it being the curved
  needle, dear to Bunuel's heroes, which is finally called upon to resolve in the
  girl dipenisneid [penis envy] that is posited to some degree in it.
  
  我曾经禁止我自己说一个字，关于萨德在这里所漏失的东西。 在「床上哲学」的高潮时，让它被感觉到，让它成为布纽尔导演的角色所喜爱的弯针。这个弯针最后被要求用来解决这个女孩的「阳具妒羡」，在它里面，「阳具妒羡」被提出。
  
  In any case, it appears that nothing has been gained by replacing Diotima
  here with Dolmance, a person whom the usual orifice seems to frighten more
  than is fitting, and who—did Sade see this?—concludes the whole business
  with a sort of Noli tangere matrem. Syphilized and sewn shut—the mother
  remains prohibited. My verdict is confirmed regarding Sade's submission to
  the Law.
  无论如何，似乎，在此，用德曼斯来取代帝奥提玛，没有什么利益曾经被获得。对于德曼斯这个人，通常的阴户穴似乎会惊吓他，而无法适当插入---萨德看到什么？---德曼斯下结论说： 整个事情就是中了梅毒，被缝合—母亲始终是被禁忌。我的判断被证实，关于萨德屈服于法律。
  
  There is thus precious little here—in fact, nothing—by way of a treatise that is truly on desire.
  
  因此，在此几乎没有啟示任何东西---事实上，根本就没有啟示任何东西—憑藉著一篇确实是讨论欲望的论文。
  
  What is announced about desire here, in this mistake based on an encounter, is at most but a tone of reason.
  
  关于欲望，在此被宣佈的东西，在这个根据邂逅的错误，充其量仅是一种理性的语调。
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  

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  2011-10-18 23:29:16 springhero

  拉康：RSI
  真实界，象征界，与想象界
  
  Introduction
  序言
  Preliminary to the Seminar of R.S.I.
  
  真实界，象征界，与想象界研讨班序言
  19 November 1974
  
  There is no mike. So you’re going to have to tell me whether you can hear me.
  
  没有麦克风。所以你们必须告诉我，是否你们能够听得见我。
  
  There you are, there are people, I know because I was told so, who are living the strike like a celebration. I know it, of course, through analysis. One gets to know things by analysis! One gets to know even that there are people twisted enough for that. But anyway, why not? It’s subjective, as they say.
  
  我们开始吧，有些人，我知道因为有人告诉我，他们生活在这次的摆课风潮，就像是开庆祝会。当然，我是经由精神分析知道。 我们变得有精神分析知道事情。 我们甚至变得知道，人们因为那次摆课而受到扭曲。但是无论如何，有何不可？ 那是主观性的，如他们所说。
  
  That means that there are people who can tackle a lot of things from the right angle. Nevertheless, I am not one of them; as analyst, I can only take the strike to be a symptom, in the sense that this year perhaps, I will manage to convince you of it,
  that the symptom, to refer to one of my three categories, belongs to the Real. The annoying thing – and this is why I have some reservations – is that it is an organised symptom; that is what is bad, at least from the point of view of the analyst.
  
  那意味着，有些人们能够克服许多事情，从适当的角度。可是，我并不是其中一位。 作为精神分析师，我仅能将这次的罢课风潮当著是病征。那意味着， 或许这一年，我将成功地让你们信服这一点：这个病征，提到我的三个范畴之一，它是属于真实界。 令人懊恼的事是---这就是为什么我会有这些保留---它是一种有组织的病征。换句话说， 这是它不好的地方，至少从分析师的观点来看。
  
  So then, if all the same I am going to go on strike, it is not because for me it is a celebration, but it happens that this strike comes to me like a ring on my finger; I mean that it happens that today, namely, at the start of this year 74-75, I have not the slightest inclination to do a seminar for you, as is attested by the fact that you have not seen any notice of it, announcing the title like every other year.
  
  所以，假如我仍然要进行罢课，这不是因为对于我而言，这是一种庆祝，而是恰好地，这次罢课风潮就像我手上的这个戒指，来到我这里。我的意思是，它恰好是今天。也就是说， 在1974进到1975年的开始，我并没有丝毫意愿跟你们开这个研讨班。这个事实可作为证明： 你们并没有看到它的公告，宣布像每隔一年都会公告课程的名称。
  
  I must say that nevertheless your number today does not fail to shake me. You know
  that every year I question myself about what it could be that motivates this crowd.
  
  我必须说，可是你们今天出席的人数一定会让我动摇。 你们知道，每一年，我质问我自己，是什么激发那么多人研讨的动机。
  
  It is not any more resolved now, it is not any more resolved for me, but all the same I consider it as an appeal, an appeal (10) linked to the fact that what I wrote, did nothing more than write, I mean what is written on the board with little signs, the o, the S1, the S2, the $ of the subject, the fact is that the analytic discourse is something that stirs you, I mean which stirs you. It is not a you, a stirs you in the neutral sense. It is true that to have written it, is an attempt, a tentative approximation. One could perhaps do better. I hope that one will do better.
  
  现在这个问题并没有被回答，对于我而言，它不再被回答。但是我仍然认为它是一个诉求， 这个诉求跟这个事实有关： 我所写的东西， 我仅是写作， 我的意思是， 用一些小符号书写在黑板上的东西， 这个小客体o，第一主体S1，第二主体S2.被禁制的主体＄。事实上， 精神分析的论述是某件扰乱你们的东西。我的意思是， 扰乱「你」。这并不是一个「你」，以中立的意义「扰乱你」。的确，曾经书写下它，是一种企图，一种试验性地接近方法。 我们或许能够做得更好。我希望我们将会做得更好。
  
  But in short this year, I have to tell you that I have other concerns.
  
  但是总之，这一年，我必须告诉你们，我有其它关怀的事。
  
  That would, I hope, only give me greater merit in your eyes, if I pursue this seminar here. I have other concerns and I question myself as to whether I ought not to let them take precedence. I mean that among you – I see numerous faces of them here – there are people who belong to my School. And perhaps after all my lassitude comes from something that is eating me, namely, that this seminar prevents me from paying more attention to this School.
  
  我希望，在你们的眼睛里，那仅是给予我更大的优点，假如我在此探讨这个研讨班。 我还其它的关怀，而我质疑我自己，关于我是否应该让它们具有优先权。我的意思是，在你们当中---我看到他们的无数的脸孔在这里—有些人属于我的学派。 或许，畢竟，我的厌倦来自某将侵蚀我的东西，换句话说， 这个研讨班使我无法更加注意这个学派。
  
  This year to stimulate this School, I took a tack of which some among you have perhaps heard an echo. I am not going to put the concerns that this gives me into the public forum. Not, of course, that this is something private, quite the contrary, since what is at stake is that there is elsewhere, somewhere other than here, something that gives a place to other teachings than mine.
  
  今年，要刺激这个学派，我改变方针，你们当中有些人或许听到一些风声。 我并不要将这些关怀，让我成为公共的议论。当然，不要。这是某件私人的事情，完全相反地，因为濒临危险的事，在别的地方，在除此之外的某个地方，有某件事情给予其它的教学，除了我的教学之外。
  
  It is strange, strange in the properly Freudian sense, unheimlich, it is strange that it is by some people who do not find themselves properly speaking yet authorized by analysis, but who are on the path, that there comes this resistance to the reason why I am stimulating them. I am stimulating them in short to make effective, to make effective what?
  
  这是奇怪的，意纯粹佛洛伊德的意义来说，是奇怪的。奇怪的是， 有些人并没有发现他们自己，适当来说，得到精神分析的授权。 但是他们在这条途径上，对于我为什么要刺激他们的理由，会有所抗拒。总之，我正在刺激他们，为了要实行，实行什么？
  
  In a testimony that they would contribute about the point where they are at, to make effective this passe which perhaps some of you know is what I am trying to introduce into my School, this passe by which in short what is at stake is that each one contributes his stone to the analytic discourse by bearing witness to how one enters into it.
  
  在一个他们提供的证词，有关他们的位置在哪里的这点， 为了使这个「通过制度」实行。你们有些人或许知道， 「通过制度」是我正在尝试介绍到我的学派。 憑藉这个「通过制度」，总之，岌岌可危的是，每一个人都贡献他的一块石头，给精神分析的论述。他们见证到我们如何进入这个论述。
  
  It is strange that among them there are some who are fully formed analysts and who when literally – this is what I did in this place where I wanted certain teachings to take place – when literally I beg their help – this is what I did – refuse it in the most categorical way, and go as far as to answer me with the insult, the insult which can be found in the newspapers for example – these are not things that have an effect on me but which, all the same about this insult, which is already not (11) bad to find in the newspaper, in the newspaper Le Monde in particular, as it happens, inflate this insult, and add to it. Yeah.
  
  奇怪的是，他们有些人是充分有资格的精神分析师，当实质上—这是我处在这个立场所做的。在这个立场，我要某些的教学能够发生---当我实质上请求他们的帮忙---这是我所做的---他们断然地拒绝帮忙，并且过分到以羞辱回答我。譬如，这种羞辱能够在报纸上找到---这些事对我并没有什么影响，但是仍然是关于这个羞辱，能在报纸上找到，还算不错，在「Le Monde」这家报纸上。它恰巧地将羞辱扩大，然后加油添醋。没错。
  
  If I speak this year, I will take things from the angle of the identity of self to self. The question is whether this applies to the analyst. Can the analyst be considered as an element? Does he make, in other words, a set? Making a set/doing it together (faire ensemble), this is something that I will try to explain to you, is not to form a trade union.
  
  假如我今年谈论，我将从自我跟自我的认同的角度看待事情。 这个问题是，这是否可以应用的分析师身上。分析师能够被认为是一个元素吗？换句话说，他能够形成一个「集合」吗？ 形成一个「集合」，或聚集在一块，这就是我将尝试跟你们解释的事情。这并不是要组成一个商业公会。
  
  They are two different terms. Faire ensemble might mean, that means being able to make a series. And what I am questioning myself about is where this series stops? Among other terms, can an analyst, like the example of what I have just alluded to about the insult, behave like an imbecile (imbécile)?
  
  他们是两个不同的术语。 「聚集在一块」可能意味着，那意味着，能够形成一连串的行动。我正在质疑我自己的是，这一连串行动会停在哪里？ 除了其它术语， 精神分析师能够行为像个白痴吗？譬如，我刚刚提到的这个羞辱。
  
  This is a very important question. How judge what I am describing as imbecility? It surely has a meaning, even in the analytic discourse; elsewhere, of course, in every discourse no one has any doubt, one is an imbecile or not, I am saying with respect to
  this discourse specifically to the discourse of the master, the discourse of the university, the scientific discourse, there is no doubt about it.
  
  这是非常重要的问题。 如何判断我正在描述什么当作白痴？它确实具有一种意义， 甚至在精神分析的论述；当然，在别的地方， 在每个论述，没有人会怀疑，他是否是白痴。我正在说的，关于这个论述，明确地说，是提到主人的论述， 大学的论述， 科学的论述，关于它是无可置疑的。
  
  How define imbecility in the analytic discourse? Here is a question, a question that I introduced, faith, I would say, from the first year of my seminar in stating that analysis is certainly a remedy against ignorance, that it is without effect against being an asshole (connerie).
  
  在精神分析的论述里，如何定义白痴行为？ 这是一个问题，我不妨说，这是我介绍的一个问题， 请相信，从我研讨班的第一年，我陈述：精神分析确实是一种对抗无知的一种补救。对抗一种狗屎的东西，它并非没有效果。
  
  19.11.74 Draft 2 Int 4
  Hang on, pay attention! I already said that connerie is not imbecility. How can you situate imbecility, specify it as being an asshole?
  
  请注意，请仔细注意！我已经说过「connerie」并不是白痴行为。你们如何定位白痴行为，明确指定它为狗屎？
  
  The annoying thing and what is difficult in the question that I evoke, is something is perhaps something that you got wind of from me, I did not heavily insist on it, but all the same it must be said there are subjects for whom analysis, I mean the analytic experience, when they present themselves to it, does not succeed. And I specify that this makes them imbeciles. It must indeed be that there is something flawed at the start.
  
  令人懊恼的事情是，我召唤的这个问题，困难的地方，或许是某件你们从我这里听到的东西。 我并没有强烈地坚持它，但是我仍然必须说，有些主体，对于他们，精神分析，我指的是精神分析经验，当他们呈现他们自己面对它时，它并没有成功。我明确指明，这使他们成为白痴。从一开头，一定是有某件瑕疵的地方。
  
  That means perhaps that they would be more useful, I mean useable elsewhere. I mean that for something else they have obvious gifts.
  
  那或许意味着，他们会更加有用。我的意思是在别的地方有用途。我的意思是，对于某件其它的事情，他们有明显的天才。
  
  This brings us back to the ethics of each discourse and it is not for nothing that I put forward the term ethics of psychoanalysis.
  
  这将为们带回每个论述的伦理学。我提出精神分析的伦理学这个术语，并非毫无意义。
  
  Ethics is not the same in it and it is perhaps with those whose ethics would have made them shine elsewhere that analysis does not succeed.
  
  伦理学在里面并不相同。或许对于伦理学本来会在别的地方焕发光辉的那些人，精神分析并没有成功。
  
  Simple hypothesis, but that perhaps – this cannot be without twists and turns – perhaps if I decide, we will put here, finally we will put, it is a manner of speaking, I will put to the test here, (12) starting from the fact that I am indicating that there is no other ethics than to play the game according to the structure of a discourse and that we rediscover there my title of last year; it is the non-dupes, those who do not play the game of a discourse, who find themselves liable to err. It is not inevitably any worse for that. Only it is at their own risk.
  
  这是简单的假设，但是或许---这不可能没有受到扭曲与转变---或许，假如我决定，我们将会放置在这里，最后，我们将会放置，这是一种言谈的方式， 我将会在从考验它。我从这个事实开始：我正在指示，除了依照论述的结构，玩这个遊戏外，没有其它的伦理学。我们在那里重新发现去年的我地演讲标题：「这并不是欺骗」。那些没有玩论述遊戏的人， 那些发现他们自己容易犯错误的人。这无可避免，不会更加糟糕。只是他们冒着自己的风险。
  
  Those who err, in each discourse, are not inevitably useless in it. Far from it! Only it would be preferable in order to found a new one of these discourses, that people should be a little bit more dupe.
  
  在每个论述里犯错误的那些人，他们未必然是没有用途。根本不是！ 只是我们最好创建一种新的这些论述。人们应该稍微被欺骗一下。
  
  There you are. So then since all the same it would be quite useless to tell you that I am suspending myself, that I am questioning myself about what I will do this year, it would be quite vain to do so, but to do it for two hours which is what you were expecting, well then, I am not going to do it. I am going to stop there while asking you simply to trust, in order to know if you are to come back here on the 10th
  December, the second Tuesday, to trust the little notices on which I will inscribe the title that I will have chosen, if do this seminar this year.
  
  问题就在这里。既然这将是完全没有用途，假如我告诉你们，我正在悬置我自己，我正在质疑我自己，关于今年我将怎么做。 这样做将是完全白费力气，但是做它两个小时，这是你们当时正在期望的。 呵呵，我将不要做它。 我将要停在那里，当我要求你们仅是信任，为了要知道，你们在十二月十日，第二个星期二，你们是否会回到这里。我要求你们信任这些小小的公告。在公告上，我将记下我到时选定的这个标题，如同今年的这个研讨班。
  
  It is quite superfluous, and I would even say contra-indicated for you to bombard Gloria with telephone calls. The poor woman can’t take any more! It will be one thing or another, either this notice will be put up there, let us say to leave the time to do it and then I must also think things out, the notice will be in the corridor two days
  before, or else it will not be. If it is not there, well then!
  
  这是完全是多此一举。我甚至会说相反的指示，让你们用电话，使葛洛瑞亚秘书应接不暇。这位可怜的女人再也忍受不了！这将是某件事情， 要就这个公告公佈，我们姑且保留时间来做它。
  
  You can tell yourselves that I am taking a year’s sabbatical. If it is there, I am
  counting on seeing you as numerous as you are today.
  
  你们能够告诉你们自己，我正在度一年的安息日。假如是在那里，我相信我会见到你们许多人，如同今天一样。
  
  雄伯译
  32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
  http://springhero.wordpress.com
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

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