齐泽克：拉康实在之电视

2008-09-09 01:48:04 来自: Herr.Nos(making love for making laugh..)

The Lacanian Real Television
　　
　　拉康实在之电视
　　
　　Slavoj Zizek
　　
　　斯拉沃热·齐泽克
　　
　　Author’s Bio
　　
　　作者简介：
　　
　　Lacan: Television - let’s proceed like idiots; let’s take this title literally and ask ourselves a question, not the question, “what can we learn about TV from Lacan’s teaching?” which would get us on the wrong path of so-called applied psychoanalysis, but the inverse question, “what can we learn about Lacan’s teaching from the TV phenomenon?” At first sight, this seems as absurd as the well-known Hegelian proposition defining phrenology, “the spirit is the bone”: the equalization of the most sublime, elusive theory with the vulgar mass-cultural phenomenon. But perhaps, as in the Hegelian proposition, there is a “speculative truth” beneath the obvious banality - perhaps certain peculiarities of the American TV program allow us to grasp the fundamental Lacanian proposition that psychoanalysis is not a psychology: the most intimate beliefs - even the most intimate emotions such as compassion, crying, sorrow, laughter - can be transferred, delegated to others without losing their sincerity.
　　
　　拉康：电视——让我们像白痴那样进行；让我们从字面上感受这个标题并问我们自己一个问题，不是“关于电视，我们能从拉康的教学中学到什么？”的问题，而是“关于拉康的教学，我们能从电视现象中学到什么？”的相反问题。乍看上去，这似乎与黑格尔定义颅相学的著名命题“精神是骨头”一样是荒谬的：最崇高、难懂的理论与通俗的大众文化现象的同等化。但是或许，如在黑格尔式命题中，在明显的平庸下面有着一个“思辨的真理”——或许美国电视节目的某些怪癖允许我们来理解拉康的基本命题，即，精神分析不是一种心理学：内心最深处的信仰——甚至诸如怜悯、哭泣、悲哀、笑声这样的内心最深处的情绪——可以被转移、被委派给没有丧失其真诚的他者们。

2008-09-09 01:48:32 Herr.Nos (making love for making laugh..)

The first TV-lesson: psychoanalysis is not psychology
　　
　　电视—第一讲：精神分析不是心理学
　　
　　In his seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan is speaking of the role of the Chorus in antique tragedy: we, the spectators, came to the theatre worried, full of everyday problems, unable to accustom ourselves without reserve to the problems of the play, i.e. to feel the required fears and compassions. But no problem; there is the Chorus, which is feeling the sorrow and the compassion instead of us, or, more precisely, we are feeling the required emotions through the medium of the Chorus: “You are then relieved of all worries, even if you don’t feel anything; it is the Chorus who will do it in your place.” [1] Even if we, the spectators, are just drowsily watching the show, objectively - to use this good old Stalinist expression - we are doing our duty of feeling compassion for the heroes. In so-called primitive societies, we find the same phenomenon in the form of “weepers,” women hired to cry instead of us. So, through the medium of the other, we accomplish our duty of mourning, while we can spend our time on more profitable exploits, disputing how to divide the inheritance of the deceased, for example.
　　
　　在关于《精神分析的伦理学》的研讨班中，拉康讲到了唱诗班（Chorus）在古希腊悲剧中的角色：我们这些观众，闷闷不乐地来到剧院，满载着日常的问题，不能使我们自己没有保留地习惯于戏剧的问题，即，感受到必需的恐惧与怜悯。但是没关系；唱诗班正在替我们感受着悲哀与怜悯，或者更准确地说，我们正在通过唱诗班这个媒介感受着必需的情绪：“于是你所有的烦恼被减轻了，即使你没有感受到任何东西；正是唱诗班将在你的位置上感受着它。”[1]即使我们这些观众只是昏昏欲睡地看着表演，客观地说——用这个老掉牙的斯大林式的表达——我们正在尽我们的义务感到对于英雄的怜悯。在所谓的原始社会中，我们在“哭丧者”的形式中发现了同样的现象，女人们受雇替我们哭，经由这个他者的媒介，我们完成了我们服丧的义务，同时我们可以把我们的时间花在更加有利可图的剥削上，例如争论如何来划分死者的遗产。
　　
　　But to avoid the impression that this exteriorization, this transference of our most intimate feelings, is just a characteristic of the so called primitive stages of development, let’s remind ourselves of a phenomenon quite usual in popular TV shows or serials - canned-laughter. After some supposedly funny or witty remark, you can hear the laughter and the applause included in the soundtrack of the show itself. Here we have die exact counterpart of the Chorus in antique tragedy; it’s here that we have to look for “living Antiquity.” That is to say, why this laughter? The first possible answer - that it serves to remind us when to laugh - is interesting enough because it implies the paradox that laughter is a matter of duty and not of some spontaneous feeling. But this answer isn’t sufficient, because usually we don’t laugh. The only correct answer would then be that the other - embodied in the TV-set - is relieving us even of our duty to laugh, i.e., is laughing instead of us. So, even if, tired from the hard day’s stupid work, we did nothing all evening but gaze drowsily into the TV-screen, we can say afterwards that objectively, through me medium of the other, we had a really good time.
　　
　　但是要避免我们内心最深处的感觉的这种外化（exteriorization）、这种转移（transference）不过是所谓的原初发展阶段的一个特征的这种印象，让我们回想一下在通俗电视表演或连续剧中的一个相当常见的现象——录音的笑声（canned-laughter）。在一些假想的滑稽或诙谐的评论之后，你会听到表演本身的音轨中所含有的笑声与掌声。我们在这里已经得到了古希腊悲剧中唱诗班的严格相似物（counterpart）；正是在这里，我们必须去寻找“活着的古代”。也就是说，这个笑声是为什么？第一个可能的回答——这足以让我们想起什么时候去笑——是足够有趣的，因为它暗含了笑声是一个义务的问题而不是某些自发的感觉的问题的悖论。然而这个回答是不充分的，因为通常我们不会笑。唯一正确的回答因而将是在电视机中被具体化的他者正好减轻了我们去笑的义务，即，他者正在替我们笑。所以，即使因为苦日子的愚蠢工作中而感到疲倦的我们整晚上除了昏昏欲睡地盯着电视屏幕什么也不做，然后我们也可以说，客观地说，经由这个他者的媒介，我们有了一个真正的美好时光。
　　
　　All this is, of course, just to illustrate the alienation of the subject in the signifier as soon as he is caught in the radically exterior signifying network, he is mortified, dismembered, divided. To get an idea of what is meant by the Lacanian division of the subject, one has only to remember the well-known paradox of Lewis Carroll: “I’m so glad I don’t like asparagus,” said the small girl to a sympathetic friend. “Because, if I did, I should have to eat it - and I can’t bear it!” Here you have the whole Lacanian problem of the reflexivity of desire: desire is always a desire of a desire, i.e., the question is not immediately, “what should I desire?” but, “there are a lot of things that I desire; I have a lot of desires - which of them is worth being the object of my desire? Which desire should I desire?” This paradox is literally reproduced in the basic situation of the classic Stalinist political processes where the accused victim is at the same time supposed to confess his love for the asparagus (the bourgeoisie, the counter-revolution) and express an attitude of disgust towards his own activity which goes to the point of demanding the death penalty for himself. That’s why the Stalinist victim is the perfect example of the difference between the sujet d’énoncé (subject of the statement) and the sujet d’énonciation (subject of the enunciating). The demand that the Party addresses to him is: “At this moment, the Party needs the process to consolidate the revolutionary gains, so be a good communist, do a last service to the Party and confess.” Here we have the division of the subject in its purest form: the only way for the accused to confirm himself as a good communist at the level of the sujet d’énonciation, is to confess, i.e., to determine himself, at the level of the sujet d’énoncé, as a traitor. Ernesto Laclau was perhaps right when he once remarked that it isn’t only Stalinism which is a language-phenomenon; it is already language itself which is a Stalinist phenomenon.
　　
　　当然，这完全不过是要说明主体在能指中的异化（alienation），一旦他被捕获在根本外在的能指网络中，他就是被克制的、被肢解的、被分割的。为了获悉拉康的主体的分割意味着什么，人们只能去回忆刘易斯•卡罗尔（Lewis Carroll）的著名悖论：“我很高兴我不像芦笋”，小女孩对一个富有同情心的朋友说道。“因为，如果我那样，我将必需吃掉它——而我无法忍受于此！”这时你已经有了拉康关于欲望的自反性（reflexivity）的整个问题：欲望总是对于一个欲望的欲望，即，问题并不直接地是“我该欲望什么?”而是“有许多事情是我所欲望的；我有许多欲望——它们中的哪一个才是值得我欲望的客体？哪一个欲望才是我该欲望的？”这则悖论从字面上被重现于经典斯大林主义政治程序的基本情境中，这个被告的受害者在那里同时应该坦白他对芦笋（资产阶级、反革命）的爱并对足以判他死刑的他自己的行为表示出一种厌恶的态度。这就是为什么斯大林主义的受害者是陈述的主体（sujet d’énoncé）与阐述的主体（sujet d’énonciation）之间差异的完美范例。党给他的要求是：“在这个时候，党需要这个程序来巩固革命的果实，所以作为一名优秀的共产党员，为党作最后的贡献并坦白吧。”这里我们得到了在其纯粹形式中的主体的分割：对于这个被告而言，在阐述的主体（sujet d’énonciatio）的水平上确定他自己是一名优秀的共产党员的唯一方式就是坦白，即，在陈述的主体（sujet d’énoncé）的水平上决定他自己是一个叛国者。欧内斯托•拉克劳（Ernesto Laclau）或许是对的，他曾经评论说这不是唯一作为一个语言现象的斯大林主义；它已经是作为一个斯大林主义现象的语言本身。
　　
　　Here, however, we must carefully distinguish between this Lacanian notion of the divided subject and the “post-structuralist” notion of the subject-positions. In “post-structuralism,” the subject is usually reduced to subjection. He is conceived as an effect of a fundamentally non-subjective process: the subject is always caught in, traversed by, the pre-subjective process (of “writing,” of “desire,” etc.), and the accent is put on die different modes of how individuals “experience,” “live,” their positions as “subjects,” “actors,” “agents” of the historical process. For example, it is only at a certain point in European history that the author of works of art, a painter or a writer, began to see himself as a creative individual who, in his work, is giving expression to his interior subjective richness. The great master of such analysis was, of course, Foucault: one might say that the main point of his late work was to articulate the different modes of how individuals assume their subject-positions.
　　
　　然而，在这里我们必须谨慎地区分被分割的主体（the divided subject）这个拉康的观念与主体位置（subject-position）的“后结构主义”观念。在“后结构主义”中，主体通常被缩减为臣服（subjection）。他被设想成一个基本的非主体作用（non-subjective process）的结果：主体总是被捕获于（关于“书写”、“欲望”等等的）前主体作用（pre-subjective process）并由它所穿过，重音放在了个体是如何“体验”、“经历”其作为历史过程的“主体”、“行动者”、“媒介”的位置的不同模式上。例如，只有在欧洲历史的某一时期，艺术作品的作者，画家或作家才开始将他自己看作是在其著作中表达出其内部主观丰富性的一个创造性个体。当然，这种分析的大师就是福柯（Foucault）：人们可以说他晚期著作的重点就是要链接个体如何假定其主体位置的不同模式。
　　
　　But with Lacan, we have quite another notion of the subject. To put it in a simple way: if we abstract, if we subtract all the richness of the different modes of subjectivization, all the fullness of experience present in the way individuals “live” their subject-positions, what remains is an empty place which was filled out with this richness; and this original void, this lack of the symbolic structure is the subject, the subject of the signifier. The subject is therefore to be strictly opposed to the effect of subjectivation: what the subjectivation masks is not a pre- or trans-subjective process of writing but a lack in the structure, a lack which is the subject.
　　
　　但是关于拉康，我们完全有着另一种主体的观念。以一种简单的方式来说：如果我们抽象化存在于个体“经历”其主体位置的方式中的所有经验的丰富，如果我们减去主体化（subjectivization）不同模式的所有丰富性，剩余的东西就是由这个丰富性所填补的一个空的位置，而这个原始的空（void）、这个象征结构的缺失（lack）就是主体、能指的主体（subject of the signifier）。主体因此应是与主体化严格相反的：主体化所掩饰的并非关于书写的一个前主体或超主体作用（pre-subjective or trans-subjective process），而是结构中的一个缺失，这个缺失就是主体。
　　
　　Our predominant idea of the subject is, in Lacanian terms, that of the “subject of the signified,” the active agent, the bearer of some signification who is trying to express himself in the language. The starting point of Lacan is, of course, that the symbolic representation represents the subject always in a distorted way, that it is always a displacement, a failure, i.e., that the subject cannot find a signifier which would be “his own,” that he is always saying less or too much, in short: something other than what he wanted, intended to say. The usual conclusion from this would be that the subject is some kind of interior richness of meaning which always exceeds its symbolic articulation: “language cannot express fully what I’m trying to say…” The Lacanian thesis is its exact opposite: this surplus of signification masks a fundamental lack. The subject of the signifier is precisely this lack, this impossibility to find a signifier which would be “his own”: the failure of his representation is a positive condition. The subject tries to articulate himself in a signifying representation, and the representation fails; instead of a richness we have a lack, and this void opened by the failure is the subject of the signifier. To put it in a paradoxical way: the subject of the signifier is a retroactive effect of the failure of his own representation; that’s why the failure of representation is the only way to represent him adequately.
　　
　　用拉康的话说，我们关于主体的主要思想就是那个“所指的主体”（subject of the signified）、那个主动的媒介、那个试图在语言中表达自身的某些意指（signification）的携带者（bearer）。当然，拉康的出发点是象征的表象（symbolic representation）总是以一种扭曲的方式代表着主体，它总是一个移置（displacement）、一个失败，即，主体无法找到可能是“他自己”的一个能指，他总是说得太少或太多，简而言之：不同于他所想要、意欲去说的事情的某种东西。由此得出的通常结论将会是，主体是始终超过其象征性链接（symbolic articulation）的某种意义的内部丰富性：“语言无法充分地表达我试图去说的东西……”拉康的论题是其严格的对立面：这个意指的剩余掩盖了一本基本的缺失。能指的主体正是这个缺失，是找到可能是“他自己”的一个能指的这个不可能性：他的表象的失败是一个肯定的条件。主体试图在一个能指的表象中链接他自己，而这个表象失败了；我们有了一个缺失而不是一个丰富性，而这个由失败打开的空就是能指的主体。以一种悖论的方式来说：能指的主体是他自身的表象的失败的一个回溯性效果；这就是为什么表象的失败是充分代表他的唯一方式。
　　
　　To make this crucial point clearer, let’s take again the Hegelian proposition on phrenology: “the spirit (the subject) is a bone, a skull (der Geist ist ein Knochen).” If we read this proposition literally, it is vulgar-materialistic nonsense, reducing the subject to his immediate material reality. But where lies, in Hegel’s words, the speculative truth of this proposition? The effect of the phrase, “the spirit is a bone.” On the listener is the feeling of its utter inadequacy, of its absolute contradiction: it is total nonsense - how can we reduce the spirit, its dialectical movement, to an inert presence of a dead object, of a skull? The Hegelian answer me subject is precisely this absolute contradiction, this absolute negativity that we feel when we experience the uttermost inadequacy of the proposition, “the spirit is the bone.” We have here a kind of dialogic economy: we articulate a proposition defining the subject, and our attempt fails; we experience the absolute contradiction, the extreme negative relationship between the subject and the predicate - and it’s precisely this absolute discordance which is the subject as absolute negativity. It is the same as with a well-known joke from the Soviet Union about Rabinovitch, a Jew who wants to emigrate. The bureaucrat at the emigration office asks him why; Rabinovitch answers: “There are two reasons why. The first is that I’m afraid that in the Soviet Union, the communists will lose power, there will be a counter-revolution, and the new power will put all the blame for the communist crimes on us Jews - and there will be again the anti-Jewish pogroms…” “But,” interrupts the bureaucrat, “this is pure nonsense; nothing can change in the Soviet Union - the Soviet power will last eternally!” “Well,” responds Rabinovitch calmly, “that’s my second reason.” The logic is here the same as with the Hegelian proposition, “the spirit is a bone”: the failure itself of a first reading gives us the true meaning.
　　
　　为了使这个关键点变得更加清晰，让我们再次拿出黑格尔关于颅相学的命题：“精神（主体）是一块骨头、一块头骨（der Geist ist ein Knochen）”。如果我们从字面上阅读这个命题，它就是庸俗唯物主义的胡说，把主体缩减为其直接的物质现实。但是用黑格尔的话说，这个命题的思辨的真理位于什么地方？这个措辞的结果，“精神是一块骨头”。听者感受到的是其全然的不充分，是其绝对的矛盾：这完全是胡说——我们如何能够把精神及其辩证运动缩减为一个死的客体、一块骨头的惰性存在？黑格尔的回答是，主体正是当我们经验到“精神是骨头”这个命题的极度不充分时我们所感受到的这个绝对的矛盾、这个绝对的否定性。我们在这里得到了一种对话经济（dialogic economy）：我们链接一个定义主体的命题，而我们的尝试失败了；我们经验到主语与谓语之间的这个绝对矛盾、这个极度否定的关系——这个绝对的不协调正是作为绝对否定性的主体。这与来自苏联的一则著名笑话是一样的。移民办事处的官员问拉宾诺维奇（Rabinovitch）——一个想要移民的犹太人——为什么要移民；拉宾诺维奇回答说：“有两个理由。第一个是我害怕共产主义者会在苏联丧失权力，那样就会有一个反革命，而新的权力会把对共产主义者的罪行的谴责全部归咎于我们犹太人——那样就又会有反犹太的大屠杀……”官员打断他说，“但是这纯粹是胡说；在苏联什么也不会改变——苏联的权力将永恒地持续！”拉宾诺维奇平静地答道，“好吧，这就是我的第二个理由。”这里的逻辑与黑格尔的命题是一样的，“精神是一块骨头”：第一个阅读的失败本身为我们给出了真正的意义。

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2008-09-09 01:48:53 Herr.Nos (making love for making laugh..)

The second TV-lesson: you only die twice
　　
　　电视—第二讲：你只能死两次
　　
　　Hereby, we have touched the other, usually neglected side of the Lacanian teaching: the side of the object in its inertia, the remnants, the left-over of the signifying process. This object - the Lacanian objet petit a - is filling out the void of the symbolic structure which is the subject: $ ◊ a, “the spirit is a bone.” In Lacanian theory, it is not the word which replaces the absent object; it is on the contrary the object itself which is filling out a lack of the signifier, a central void in the great Other of the symbolic structure. And here again, the cartoons - another characteristic feature of TV - are useful in more than one way to illustrate some fundamental Lacanian categories.
　　
　　因此，我们已经触及了他者，拉康教学通常被忽视的方面：客体在其惰性中的方面，能指作用的剩余、残留物。这个客体——拉康的客体小a（object petit a）——填满了主体这个象征结构的空：S ◊ a ，“精神是一块骨头”。在拉康的理论中，词并没有代替这个缺位的客体；相反这个客体本身填满了一个能指的缺失、象征秩序的大写他者中的某个空。除此之外，卡通片——电视的另一个典型特征——对于阐明某些基本的拉康范畴在很多方面都是非常有用的。
　　
　　Let’s take the notion of “knowledge in the real”: the idea that nature knows its laws and behaves accordingly. We all know the classical, archetypal scene from the cartoons: a cat is approaching the edge of the precipice, but she doesn’t stop: she proceeds calmly, and although she is already hanging in the air, without ground under her feet, she doesn’t fall. When does she fall? The moment she looks down and becomes aware of the fact that she is hanging in the air. The point of this nonsense-accident is that, when the cat is walking slowly in the air, it is as if the real has for a moment forgotten its knowledge: when the cat finally looks down. She remembers that she must follow the laws of nature and falls down. It’s basically the same logic as in the well-known dream reported in Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams of a father who doesn’t know that he is dead: the point is again that because he doesn’t know that he is dead, he continues to live. He must be reminded of his death, or, to give this situation a comical twist, he is still living because he has forgotten to die. That’s how the phrase memento mori should be read: don’t forget to die!
　　
　　让我们提出“实在界中的认识”这个概念：自然（nature）知道其法则并因此而运转的这种观念。我们都这个这个来自于卡通片的经典原型场景：一只猫正在靠近悬崖的边缘，然而她并没有停下来：她平静地继续着，尽管她已经悬在了空中，她的脚下什么也没有，但她却没有掉下去。她在什么时候掉下去呢？当她向下看并意识到她正悬在空中的时候。这则无意义事故（nonsence-accident）的要点是，当猫缓慢地在空中行走时，就好像实在界片刻间忘掉了其认识：当猫最后向下看得时候。她想起她必须遵循自然的法则并掉了下去。这与弗洛伊德在《释梦》中所报告的一个父亲不知道他死了的著名的梦是基本相同的逻辑：要点又一次是因为他不知道他死了，所以他继续活着。他必须回想起他的死亡，或者给这个情境一个滑稽的歪曲，他仍然活着是因为他已经忘记了去死。也就是说“memento mori”这个拉丁短语应该被读作：谨记死亡！
　　
　　This introduces us to a distinction between the two deaths: because of the lack of knowledge, the father of Freud’s dream is still living although he is already dead. From this perspective, we can also approach the problem of repetition: in a way, everybody must die twice. That’s the Hegelian theory of repetition in history. When Napoleon lost for the first time and was consigned to Elba, he didn’t know that he was already dead, that his historical role was finished, and he had to be reminded of it through his second defeat at Waterloo. At this point, when he died for the second time, he was really dead. [2]
　　
　　这把我们引到了两种死亡之间的区分：因为认识的缺失，弗洛伊德梦中的父亲仍然活着，尽管他已经死了。从这种观点中我们还可以着手重复的问题：在某种程度上，每个人都必须死两次。这就是黑格尔的在历史中重复的理论。当拿破仑第一次失败并被送去厄尔巴岛的时候，他并不知道他已经死了，他的历史角色被终结了，而他必须通过他在滑铁卢的第二次战败才能想起这个。此时，当他第一次死亡的时候，他就真的死了。[2]
　　
　　And, to put it briefly, the place of the Stalinist communist is exactly between the two deaths. The somewhat poetical definitions of the figure of a communist that we find in Stalin’s work are to be taken literally. When, for example, in his speech at the funeral of Lenin, Stalin proclaims, “We, the communists, are people of a special mould. We are made of a special stuff,” it is quite easy to recognize the Lacanian name for this special stuff: objet petit a, the sublime object placed in the interspace between the two deaths. In the Stalinist vision, communists are “men of iron will,” somehow excluded from the everyday cycle of ordinary human passions and weaknesses. It is as if they are in a way “the living dead,” still alive but already excluded from the ordinary cycle of natural forces. It is as if they possessed another body, the sublime body beyond their ordinary physical body. (Is the fact that in Lubitch’s Ninotchka, the role of the high party apparatchik is played by Bela Lugosi, identified with the figure of Dracula, another “living dead,” expressing the presentiment of the described state of things, or is it just a happy coincidence?) The fantasy which serves as a support for the figure of the Stalinist communist is then exactly the same as the fantasy which is at work in the cartoons of Tom and Jerry: behind the figure of the indestructibility and invincibility of the communist who can endure even the most terrible ordeal and survive it intact, reinforced with new strength, there is the same fantasy-logic as that of a cat whose head is blown up by dynamite and who, in the next scene, proceeds intact in its pursuit of its class enemy, the mouse.
　　
　　而且，简要地说，斯大林式的共产主义者的位置正好就在这两种死亡之间。我们在斯大林的著作中找到的对一个共产主义者形象的有些诗意的定义要从字面上来理解。例如，斯大林在列宁葬礼上做演讲时，他宣布说，“我们这些共产主义者是一种特别铸造的人。我们由一种特殊材料制成”，我们很容易认出拉康对这种特殊材料的命名：客体小a（object petit a），放在两种死亡中间的这个崇高客体。在斯大林主义的景象中，共产主义者是“钢铁意志的人”，不知何故被排除在普通人的激情与软弱的日常循环之外。就好像他们在某种程度上是“活死人”，仍然活着却已经被排除在自然力量的普通循环之外。就好像他们占有了另一个人的身体、超越他们平凡的物理性身体的崇高身体。（在卢比西奇的《尼洛契卡》中，高度党性的共产党员角色是由贝拉•卢勾西所扮演的，与另一个“活死人”德古拉一样，表达了对事物的被描述状态的预感，还是说这只是一个愉快的巧合？）用以支持斯大林式共产主义者的形象的这个幻想于是和在卡通片《猫和老鼠》中运转的幻想正好是一样的：在这个可以忍受甚至最可怕的酷刑并完好的幸存下来的共产主义者用新的力量加固的不灭与无敌的形象背后，有着与那只猫同样的幻想逻辑，即，炸药爆炸了她的脑袋，然而在下一个场景中，这只猫在对其阶级敌人——老鼠——的追击中仍然是完好的。
　　
　　The problem is that we find this notion of a sublime body located between the two deaths already with the classical, pre-bourgeois Master: the King, for example - it is as if he possessed, beyond his ordinary body, a sublime, ethereal, mystical body personifying the State. [3] Where then lies the difference between the classical Master and the totalitarian Leader? The trans-substantiated body of the classical Master is an effect of the performative mechanism already described by la Boétie, Pascal, and Marx: we, the subjects, think that we treat the King as a King because he is in himself the King, but in reality a King is a King because we are treating him like one. And this fact that the charismatic power of a King is an effect of the symbolic ritual performed by his subjects, must remain hidden: as subjects, we are necessarily victims of the illusion that the King is already in himself a King. That’s why the classical Master must legitimize his rule with a reference to some non-social, external authority (God, Nature, some mythical past event…). As soon as the performative mechanism which gives him his charismatic authority is unmasked, the Master loses his power.
　　
　　问题是我们发现处于两种死亡之间的这个崇高身体的概念与经典的前资产阶级的主人是一致的：例如国王——就好像他占有着超越其平凡身体并人格化这个国家的一个崇高的、永恒的、神话的身体。[3]那么经典主人与极权主义领袖之间的差异在什么地方？经典主人的这个超实体化的身体是已经由拉伯提（La Boétie）、帕斯卡和马克思描述过的述行机制（performative mechanism）的一个结果：我们这些主体认为我们把这个国王视作一个国王因为他本身就是国王，但是在现实中，一个国王之所以是国王是因为我们把他像一个国王一样去看待。一个国王的至上权力是由他的臣民所履行的象征仪式的结果的这个事实必须仍然被藏起来：作为臣民，我们必然是这样国王本身已经是一个国王的幻象的受害者。这就是为什么经典主人必须参照于一些非社会性的、外部的权威（上帝、自然、某些神话的过去事件……）来合法化他的统治。一旦给他至上权力的这个述行机制被揭穿，这个主人就丧失了他的权力。
　　
　　But the problem with the totalitarian leader is that he doesn’t need this external point of reference anymore to legitimize his rule. He isn’t saying to his subjects, “You must follow me because I’m your Leader.” Quite the opposite: “In myself, I’m nothing. I am what I am only as an expression, an embodiment, an executor of your will; my strength is your strength…” To put it briefly, it is as if the totalitarian Leader is addressing his subjects and legitimizing his power precisely by refer- ring to the above-mentioned Pascalian-Marxian argumentation, i.e., revealing to them the secret of the classical Master. Basically, he is saying to them: “I’m your master because you are treating me as your master; it is you, with your activity, who are making me your master!”
　　
　　但是极权主义领袖的问题却是他不再需要这个外部的参照点来合法化他的统治。他不对着他的臣民说，“你们必须追随我，因为我是你们的领袖。”而是完全相反：“在我自身中，我什么也不是。我只不过是如你的意志的表达、化身、执行人一样的东西；我的力量就是你的力量……”简要地说，就好像这个极权主义领袖正是通过参照于上述的帕斯卡—马克思的论点来处理他的臣民并合法化他的权力的，即，向他们揭示出经典主人的秘密。基本上，他对他们说：“我之所以是你们的主人是因为你们把我看待成你们的主人，正是你们用你们的行为使我成为了你们的主人！”
　　
　　How, then, can we subvert the position of the totalitarian Leader, if the classical Pascalian-Marxian argumentation doesn’t work here any more? Here, the basic deception consists in the fact that the Leader’s point of reference, the instance to which he is referring to legitimize his rule (the People, the Class, the Nation) doesn’t exist, or, more precisely, exists only through and in its fetishistic representative, the Party and its Leader. The misrecognition of the performative dimension runs here in the opposite direction: the classical Master is the Master only insofar as his subjects are treating him as a Master, but here, the People are the “real People” only insofar as they are embodied in its representative, the Party and its Leader. The formula of the totalitarian misrecognition of the performative dimension would then be the following: the Party thinks that it is the Party because it represents the People’s real interests, because it is rooted in the People, expressing their will, but in reality, the People are the People because - or, more precisely, insofar as - they are embodied in the Party. And by saying that the People as a support of the Party don’t exist, we don’t mean the obvious fact that the majority of the people really don’t support the Party rule; the mechanism is a little bit more complicated. The paradoxical functioning of the “People” in the totalitarian universe can be most easily detected through the analysis of phrases like “the whole people supports the Party.” This proposition cannot be falsified because, behind the form of a statement of a fact, we have a circular definition of the People: in the Stalinist universe, “supporting the rule of the Party” is in the last analysis the only feature which - to use Kripkean terms - in all possible worlds defines the People. That’s why the real member of the People is only he who supports the rule of the Party: those who are working against the rule of the Party are automatically excluded from the People; they became the “enemies of the People.” What we have here is a somewhat crueller version of a well-known joke: “my fiancée never misses an appointment with me because the moment she misses one, she isn’t anymore my fiancée.” The People always support the Party because any member of the People who opposes the Party-rule automatically excludes himself from the People.
　　
　　那么，如果经典的帕斯卡—马克思的论点在这里不再起作用，我们如何能够颠覆这个极权主义领袖的位置？在此，基本的欺骗存在于这样的事实中，即这个领袖的参照点，对于他正向其提到要合法化他的统治的情况（人民、阶级、国家）是不存在的，或者更准确地说，这只有通过其物神崇拜的代表——党及其领袖——并在其物神崇拜的代表中才是存在的。集权主义对于这个述行维度的误认的公式于是如下：党认为它之所以是党是因为它代表着人民的真实利益，因为它根植于人民中，表达着他们的意志，但是在现实中，人民之所是人民是因为——或者更准确地说——他们在党中受到了具体化。而通过说作为对党的一个支持的人民是不存在的，我们想说并不是大多数人民并没有真的支持党的统治的这个明显事实；这个机制有一点被更加复杂化了。“人民”在极权主义世界中的悖论机能通过对像“全体人民支持党”这样的短语的分析可以被最容易地察觉。这个命题无法被伪造是因为，在一个事实的陈述的形成背后，我们有着对于人民的一个迂回的定义：在斯大林主义的世界中，“支持党的统治”在于对唯一特征的最后分析——用克里普克的话来说——这个唯一特征在所有可能的世界中定义了人民。这就是为什么人民的真正成员只是支持党的统治的人：那些反对党的统治的人就被自动排除在人民之外了；他们变成了“人民的敌人”。我们在这里得到的是一个著名笑话的有些残酷的版本：“我的未婚妻从未错过同我的约会，因为当她忘记约会的时候，她就不再是我的未婚妻。”人民总是支持党，因为任何反对党的统治的人民成员自己都被自动排除在人民之外了。
　　
　　The Lacanian definition of democracy would then be: a socio-political order where the People don’t exist - they don’t exist as a unity, embodied in their unique representative. That’s why the basic feature of the democratic order is that the place of Power is, by the necessity of its structure, an empty place. [4] In a democratic order, sovereignty lies in the People - but what are the People if not, precisely, the collection of the subjects of the power? Here, we have the same paradox as that of a natural language which is at the same time the last, the highest metalanguage. Because the People cannot immediately govern themselves, the place of Power must always remain an empty place; each person occupying it can only do it temporarily, as a kind of surrogate, substitute for the real-impossible sovereign, - “nobody can rule innocently,” as Saint-Just puts it. And in totalitarianism, the Party again became precisely the subject who, being the immediate embodiment of the People, can rule innocently. It is not by accident that the real socialist countries call themselves “people’s democracies.” Here, finally, “the People” exist again.
　　
　　拉康对民主政治的定义于是将会是：人民在那里不存在的一个社会政治秩序——他们不作为在其独特代表中被具体化的统一体而存在。这就是为什么民主秩序的基本特征是权力的位置是通过其结构的必然性的一个空的位置。[4]在一个民主秩序中，主权在人民身上——但是，如果人民无法聚集起来臣民的权利？在这里，我们得到了与同时是最高元语言的一种自然语言一样的悖论。因为人民无法直接地统治他们自己，所以权力的位置必须始终保持一个空的位置；每个占据它的人只能暂时性的实行它，好像一种代理人，是实在之不可能的统治的替代，——“没有人可以清白地统治”，如圣徒所做的那样。在极权主义中，党再一次变成了人民的直接化身的主体，可以清白地统治。它并不通过实在的社会主义国家将它们自己称作是“人民的民主政治”的这个事故。在这里，“人民”最终又一次地存在了。

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2008-09-16 21:37:02 ly45

不懂.

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2008-09-17 01:13:43 Quentin (人似秋鸿来有信，事如春梦了无痕)

就是说集权是无法真正做到民主的，因为此时民主中的“民”只是那部分支持唯一政党的所谓的“人民”，所以根本不会存在真正意义上的“人民民主专政”。

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2009-10-23 17:09:39 的的 (圣诞节大餐期待中~~~~~~~~~)

与电视有什么联系？我也没懂

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